

CIVILIAN SURGE

KEY TO COMPLEX OPERATIONS

Edited by
Hans Binnendijk
and Patrick M. Cronin

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Executive Summary

The United States today manifestly lacks adequate civilian capacity to conduct complex operations—those operations that require close civil-military planning and cooperation in the field.¹ Examples of complex operations abound and include operations for stabilization and reconstruction, humanitarian and disaster relief, and irregular warfare and counterinsurgency. Troubled operations in places like Iraq, Afghanistan, and New Orleans underscore that point. Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Peter Pace and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates both focused attention on this need and transferred defense dollars into civilian programs. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review dedicated a chapter to “building partner capacity.” At least two dozen recent studies document aspects of the civilian capacity problem and recommend remedies. Various directives and statutes have been issued in the past few years that begin to provide partial solutions. And yet there has been no comprehensive review of all elements of this national need. This book is intended to fill that gap. Its main conclusion is that current efforts to build a civilian response capacity for complex operations are unfinished and that the Obama administration needs to dedicate additional attention and resources to complete the task.

Capabilities Lost

Four decades ago in Vietnam, the U.S. military had a strong civilian partner to work with in what was then called pacification. Programs of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) were important components of the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program. CORDS operations were relatively successful against the Viet Cong but were trumped in the end by North Vietnamese regular forces in a massive, conventional invasion. In the wake of the fall of South Vietnam, U.S. military and civilian components let this important capacity to conduct complex operations lapse.

Attempts to avoid repeating the Vietnam experience produced restrictive guidelines governing American military interventions and assistance to foreign governments. Doctrines associated with former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and General Colin Powell that emphasized decisive use of overwhelming force had the unintended consequence of undermining skills required for smaller engagements. Military skills associated with stabilization and reconstruction operations withered, while America's Armed Forces became extremely proficient in high-intensity, net-centric warfare. A culture developed within the military that deferred to civilian partners to conduct what came to be known as phase four or postconflict operations.

Rather than develop the capacity to fulfill this role, civilian departments and agencies saw their skills and resources decline in the face of a strong cost-cutting mood in Congress. USAID was compelled to reduce its Foreign Service and Civil Service staff from about 12,000 personnel during the Vietnam War to about 2,000 today. The United States Information Agency (USIA), which had more than 8,000 personnel worldwide in 1996, was decimated and forced to merge with the State Department—itsself underresourced and understaffed, sometimes having to forego any new intake of Foreign Service Officers. Other civilian departments of government had few incentives to contribute workers to national security missions.

Filling the Gap

Some reconstruction capabilities were inherent in the forces that invaded Iraq, but their mission was to capture Baghdad, not to engage in stabilization and reconstruction. Commander of U.S. Central Command General Tommy Franks made it clear that he had planned only for the invasion, not for postconflict operations. That mission was left to civilians reporting to the Secretary of Defense, but their number was small, their time to plan limited, and their resources negligible. Hence, in May 2003, when civilian and military skills were needed to manage postinvasion operations in Iraq, those skills were in short supply.

In January 2004, National Defense University published *Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations*, which identified a “stabilization and reconstruction gap.” It called on the military to adapt and develop the skills needed to fill this gap. Reluctantly at first, and under the pressure of two insurgencies, America's Armed Forces did eventually adapt. In 2005, Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 declared that stability operations were a core U.S. military mission to be accorded priority comparable to combat operations. Army occupational specialties were shifted

to this new core mission by the tens of thousands. New joint operational concepts and field manuals were written on stability operations, counter-insurgency, and irregular warfare. In October 2007, the leaders of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard issued a new Maritime Strategy that announced another important change in focus: “We believe that preventing wars is as important as winning wars.” Operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere have created a large cadre of officers and enlisted personnel with some of the skills needed for complex operations.

The process of change came much more slowly on the civilian side. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee took the lead, passing several versions of the Lugar-Biden Bill, which created offices and provided funding at the State Department to begin to meet the need. That legislation was finally enacted late in 2008 as part of the National Defense Authorization Act. In 2004, stimulated by the introduction of the Lugar-Biden Bill, the State Department had created a new office, Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), which in turn drafted National Security Presidential Directive 44 that named State as the lead agency for reconstruction and stability operations overseas. S/CRS made heroic efforts to organize and develop civilian capabilities for complex operations, but the new office was underfunded, understaffed, and unappreciated within the State Department. Whereas the Department of Defense (DOD) had dedicated tens of thousands of military personnel to these operations, S/CRS had a staff of fewer than 100, most of them detailees. Important efforts by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to pursue “transformational diplomacy” were also underfunded.

Inevitably and necessarily, DOD was forced to fill the overall gap with military resources and personnel and with private contractors. Traditionally civilian functions were increasingly performed in Iraq and Afghanistan by DOD. Foreign assistance was provided through the Commander’s Emergency Response Program. Provincial Reconstruction Teams, which in Afghanistan are predominantly military, implemented local reconstruction projects. Civil Affairs units previously relegated to the Reserve Component and seldom called to Active duty became front-line coordinators. Public affairs, too, became a province of the military, with new strategic communication efforts and military information support teams doing what USIA had done in an earlier era. Human terrain teams, guided by cultural anthropologists, provided the kinds of important insights traditionally offered by State Department experts.

These DOD efforts became global. All regional commands developed small interagency civilian cohorts, usually called Joint Interagency

Coordination Groups. In two cases, U.S. Africa Command and U.S. Southern Command, major efforts are ongoing to strengthen the capabilities of civilians within the commands who are under State Department deputies yet ultimately serve under military commanders. Legislation was enacted to enable global DOD authority to train and equip allies to use DOD rather than State Department funds, thereby reducing State Department policy oversight.

A New Capabilities Imbalance

The imbalanced growth of military and civilian capabilities for complex operations from 2005 to 2008 caused several problems that underlined the call by DOD leaders for increased resources for their civilian counterparts. First, the imbalance created the impression internationally that American foreign policy was being “militarized.” Second, military personnel performed functions that civilian counterparts with greater training and reachback to civilian agencies could perform much more effectively. Third, many in the military came to believe that only DOD is at war, not the Nation. Fourth, civilian voices in interagency policy discussions carried less weight because they lacked operational resources. Fifth, as a result, civilian agencies began to balk at the dominant role played by DOD. And sixth, as the prospect of future defense budget constraints became clearer, and ground forces focused almost exclusively on irregular warfare,² some analysts grew concerned that inadequate attention was being paid to preparing for major combat operations.

Broad Policy Options

The Obama administration has several options to consider with regard to building civilian capacity for complex operations:

- It can follow policies that seek to limit the need for complex operations and not develop stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) capacity much further. But while it may be able to avoid wars of choice, like Iraq, there will likely be other contingencies, small and large, where benign neglect may not be an option.
- It can continue to let DOD shoulder the main burden, with military personnel performing essentially civilian functions, augmented, where necessary, by DOD civilians. But this does not resolve the issues of balance and effectiveness noted above.
- It can rely more on civilian contractors. But, as chapter 8 suggests, there are limits to the use of contractors, and the United States may already be exceeding those limits.

- It can accelerate efforts to build the capacity of civilian agencies by providing additional resources, creating new authorities, and changing existing interagency structures.

This book recommends pursuing the fourth course of action. What capacity to build, how much of it, and how to organize and manage it are the topics at the center of this volume.

The issue of addressing the imbalance in executive branch capabilities was highlighted by Presidential candidate Barack Obama, who pledged “to increase both the numbers and capabilities of our diplomats, development experts, and other civilians who can work alongside our military.” The Obama administration will have the opportunity to retool the U.S. Government for the 21st century and strengthen America’s civilian capacity to meet a wide array of complex global challenges.

This Book

We have titled this book *Civilian Surge* to convey the idea that a significant injection of the civilian expertise that resides in agencies other than DOD is critical to the success of complex operations. The title is not intended to convey the idea that the need for this civilian capacity is short term. In fact, a sustainable capacity is required. The book was written by a team of experienced analysts drawn primarily from National Defense University. Chapters were prepared under the general direction of the editors. While there is some duplicate and occasionally contradictory advice, compelling findings and recommendations emerge. Each chapter concludes with a set of findings, the most important of which are summarized below.

Major Findings

Chapter 2 concludes that complex operations encompass 6 broad categories of missions, with 60 associated tasks, 48 of which in 5 categories are probably best performed by civilians. This chapter finds that 5,000 deployable, active-duty government civilians and 10,000 civilian reserves would be needed to perform these 48 tasks on a sustained basis in one large, one medium, and four small contingencies. In today’s global security environment, structuring civilian and military capabilities to meet this 1–1–4 standard is prudent. This requirement substantially exceeds current executive branch planning assumptions, which call for 2,250 active-duty civilians and 2,000 civilian reservists.

Chapter 3 finds that lead agency and lead individual approaches are inadequate to deal with complex missions involving multiple departments and agencies. It recommends the use of “empowered cross-functional teams” with sufficient authority and resources to control departmental and agency activities within the scope of specific mandates. The National Security Council’s oversight role also needs to be strengthened.

Chapter 4 concludes that DOD has adjusted well to its new, complex missions since 2003; that, in anticipation of constricting defense budgets, DOD needs to invest in high-end military capabilities; and that, as a result, DOD needs its civilian partners to build up their capacity to conduct complex operations. Recently, DOD has enhanced its authorities to deploy its own civilians, should other departments fail to deliver. DOD plans to organize and train these personnel should be more closely coordinated with similar planning by the State Department.

Chapter 5 recommends that the State Department concentrate on developing “S&R-savvy” diplomats, who should be plugged directly into “seventh-floor” executive crisis management activities. It further recommends that key interagency planning and operational functions should be moved out of the State Department to a new interagency coordinator, allowing State to more strategically target its resources for diplomatic readiness needs in underserved regions. Taken together, the findings in chapters 3 and 5 lead to the conclusion that a new, empowered, cross-functional interagency team should inherit several of the functions of S/CRS.

Chapter 6 suggests that USAID should be the operational agency charged with training and equipping civilians for complex missions. This will require doubling its personnel strength and endowing it with new authorities akin to those associated in the past with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and new funding to reimburse other agencies that provide personnel for overseas deployment. USAID also will need to undergo a significant cultural change. To promote that change, and to reflect its new mission, USAID might be renamed the U.S. Agency for Development and Reconstruction (USADR). The reconstituted USAID/USADR might have two basic divisions, one for each major function.

Chapter 7 demonstrates that domestic civilian agencies and the Intelligence Community have significant skills that would prove most useful to the successful completion of a complex operation. But overcoming bureaucratic, structural, and cultural barriers of domestic agencies may require special legislation. Domestic civilian agencies should be given a statutory

mission to participate in overseas complex operations, just as many of them now have with respect to domestic contingencies, as well as modest budget increases to tie their new responsibilities into existing capacity deployment programs. The Intelligence Community is preoccupied with counterterrorism operations, and additional assets are needed to enable greater contributions to complex operations.

Chapter 8 notes that the use of contractors in U.S. military operations has been a constructive factor since the Revolutionary War. But the ratio of contractors to military personnel is at an all-time high, with the consequence that Federal departments and agencies are losing core competencies, contractors are not well supervised, and cost efficiencies may be less than estimated. The chapter recommends dropping the presumption that favors outsourcing civilian tasks in complex operations, instead increasing the government civilian workforce in some agencies and improving contractor oversight.

Chapter 9 assesses how the Federal Government might organize itself to educate and train the many civilians needed for future complex missions. Efforts to provide this education were initiated in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review but have stalled, in part because the demand for new educational programs has not been fully articulated or resourced and is resisted by those departments and agencies in which education has little traditional support. This chapter recommends that the Obama administration direct efforts to define and develop the learning elements of the emerging national security operations. This will require dedication and a commitment to resourcing across the executive branch and will call for the establishment of a new academic entity for this purpose, possibly at National Defense University.

Chapter 10 estimates the total cost of the required civilian capacity discussed in the previous eight chapters to be about \$2 billion annually. Some of these costs are already embedded in current executive branch budget requests. New approaches, such as a combined national security budget presentation, may be needed to enhance congressional support for these funds.

Chapter 11 discusses how the needed civilian capacity should connect to its military counterpart in an overseas operation. It concludes that important efforts at civil-military integration and cooperation have taken place within the confines of the military, but that these do not address the fundamental problem of the absence of civilian infrastructure to lead U.S.

efforts during complex operations. The chapter recommends the creation of new regional Ambassadors' Councils, surge capacity to absorb inter-agency influx at key Embassies, and easier civilian access to military transportation and materiel during a crisis.

Chapter 12 reminds us that homeland security events, such as the response to Hurricane Katrina and management of the consequences of a major terrorist attack, are also complex operations that require collaboration and skill sets similar to those needed in overseas operations. DOD will likely never be the lead agency in the homeland, given constitutional and legal constraints. Issues of state sovereignty and the unique relationship between a governor and a state's National Guard—in other than Title 10 status—preclude a traditional command and control relationship, even within the uniformed community. Add Federal/state/local/tribal and even private sector entities to the mix, and complexity goes off the chart. Nonetheless, the synergies between homeland and overseas complex operations need better development to take full advantage of the similarities.


Chapter 13 notes that overseas complex operations are seldom undertaken by the United States alone, and that the civilian capacities of other nations should be harnessed at an early stage. Key international institutions include the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the European Union, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. Recent experience in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan indicates that coordination among these institutions has been inadequate and that a “comprehensive approach” is needed. NATO is seeking to develop such a comprehensive approach with the European Union, but Turkey and Cyprus tend to veto such cooperation within their respective organizations, to the detriment of ongoing operations. A major effort is needed to address this problem.

Chapter 14 reminds readers that connecting with nongovernmental organizations and a broad representation of local actors is critical to success in complex operations. In fact, unless we are able to engage effectively with indigenous populations, we cannot achieve the political, social, and economic goals for which the military was committed in the first place. This chapter highlights six key steps to promote engagement with local actors. Success may depend on early engagement and planning, enabled by open communications networks with maximum sharing of unclassified information with civilians, an area that needs more emphasis.

Managing Complex Operations

Figure 1–1 brings several of these findings and recommendations together to depict how complex operations might be more effectively managed in the future. The current lead State Department role in interagency coordination and planning is replaced by an “interagency coordinator,” a strong, empowered, cross-functional interagency team that reports to the National Security Council. A senior member of the National Security Council is responsible for overseeing this coordinator and field operations. The Departments of Defense and State make major financial and personnel contributions to empower the interagency coordinator.

Figure 1-1. **Managing Complex Operations: A New Model**



A reconstituted, enlarged, and refocused USAID/USADR would be the main operational agency to train and equip for complex operations. It would have FEMA-like authorities and resources to reimburse other agencies for

their contributions to a specific operation. Domestic civilian agencies and departments would receive new authorities, budgets, incentives, and responsibilities to participate, working closely with the agency. The civilian reserve corps and contractors would report primarily to USAID/USADR and, in certain cases, to domestic agencies.

Overseas, the regional role of the State Department would be strengthened, and Ambassadors would be in charge of operations in time of peace and deterrence (phases zero, one, and five). Military commanders would take the lead in time of conflict (phases two and three). Command arrangements are most difficult in the immediate postconflict stage (phase four); during this phase, close personal cooperation is required between the Ambassador and the combatant commander. Command should shift to civilian leadership as soon as significant combat operations have ended, as decided by the President with the recommendation of the National Security Advisor.

Notes

¹ The definition of *complex operations* has changed over time—sometimes including combat, sometimes excluding it, sometimes encompassing disaster relief, sometimes not, and usually focusing only on missions overseas. For example, the Center for Complex Operations Web site states that “stability operations, counterinsurgency and irregular warfare [are] collectively called ‘complex operations.’” This book adopts a more expansive definition that includes humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, at home and abroad.

² Department of Defense, *Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept*, version 1.0, September 11, 2007, defines *irregular warfare* as “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.” Available at <www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/iw_joc1_0.pdf>.

Sizing the Civilian Response Capacity for Complex Operations

Christel Fonzo-Eberhard and Richard L. Kugler

A consensus is growing within interagency discourse that the U.S. Government needs to build an improved civilian response capacity for complex operations. How large should this capacity be in terms of manpower, and what missions and tasks should it be expected to perform? More fundamentally, how should the United States go about making calculated decisions in this arena? What analytical standard should it employ to *size* and *design* the civilian force to ensure that a proper mixture of skills is available? This chapter addresses these important questions in ways that can help suggest initial answers and set the stage for further analysis and planning. Subsequent chapters assess the kinds and qualities of civilian skills required.

Civilian response capacity force-sizing issues demand urgent attention, as complex operations have become more and more a function of U.S. foreign policy and national security strategy decisionmaking. Complex operations are those necessitating interagency responses that include not only military forces but also significant numbers of civilians who can perform a wide variety of missions and tasks. These operations can range from relatively small and temporary missions (for example, responding to natural disasters) to quite large and enduring presences (such as performing stabilization and reconstruction [S&R] operations) that could require hundreds or even thousands of civilian personnel for several years. Moreover, these operations do not necessarily occur one at a time. Today, for example, the United States is performing major S&R operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and has deployed about 3,000 military and civilian personnel to staff Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). In these teams, military personnel often are assigned tasks better suited to civilians.

As recent experience shows, complex operations of significant size are best not mounted in an ad hoc fashion. The U.S. Government will be best prepared to execute complex operations if it possesses a skilled, well-trained civilian response capacity that can be applied adeptly to the missions at hand, and if it employs a rigorous analytical framework to size and design this force. This chapter proposes that a civilian force be constructed for surge and sustainment of one large, one medium, and four small complex operations.

Main Judgments

The stage for analysis and debate on this subject has been set by the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2009,¹ which called on the State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) to create two bodies: a Response Readiness Corps and a Civilian Reserve Corps. The proposed Response Readiness Corps will have 2,250 full-time Federal employees, divided into an active component of 250 full-time personnel and 2,000 standby personnel. The proposed reserve corps will have 2,000 volunteers drawn from the private sector and state and local governments who can provide a mobilization capacity with specific skill sets to supplement the active/standby components when necessary.

Conditions were in place for this architecture before passage of the NDAA; National Security Presidential Directive 44 actually tasked State (S/CRS specifically) to develop a robust civilian response, and then passage of the fiscal year (FY) 2008 supplemental in the summer of 2008 provided S/CRS with \$50 million and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) with \$25 million to begin standing up the civilian response capacity with the hiring of 100 active component personnel and the identification and training of 500 standby component personnel. The NDAA has now officially authorized S/CRS to build the civilian response capacity, including its reserve component. The reserve component has not been funded yet, so the focus is on the active and standby components. Until further appropriations bills are passed, S/CRS will not be able to build up to proposed numbers. The George W. Bush administration requested \$248 million in State's FY09 appropriations request, which has yet to be passed.

The NDAA legislation clearly is a step in the right direction. But in authorizing a civilian response capacity of 2,250 active/standby personnel and 2,000 reservists, does it provide sufficient manpower to meet future requirements for complex operations and S&R missions?

This chapter judges that the proposed 250 full-time and 2,000 standby personnel likely will be too few and argues that the civilian response capacity can best be sized and designed by employing an analytical framework that considers a wide spectrum of potential scenarios and requirements. No single scenario and associated manpower requirement are capable of capturing the multiple possibilities ahead, but a wide spectrum of scenarios can help bound the range of uncertainty and enable the United States to make sound decisions on how to prepare to respond flexibly and effectively to a constantly changing future in which requirements for complex operations ebb and flow. By employing a multi-scenario framework, we conclude that an active/standby civilian response capacity of 5,000 personnel backed by a reserve force of 10,000 personnel makes strategic sense.

Such a force is significantly larger than that envisioned by the NDAA, but it does accord with how the Department of Defense (DOD) goes about sizing its Active and Reserve military forces for multiple contingencies. In the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), DOD assessed that its military forces should be capable of steady-state and surge operations for defending the homeland; prevailing in the war on terror and conducting irregular operations; and conducting and winning conventional campaigns.² Within this framework, DOD calls for forces and capabilities that can carry out simultaneous operations of differing sizes and types. In following a similar approach, we envision a civilian response capacity that could handle confidently the range of concurrent scenarios that plausibly could occur, and provide a sufficiently robust mixture of skills and attributes for tailoring U.S. responses to the specific situations at hand. Simply stated, a smaller civilian response capacity would not be large enough, and a larger force (for example, 7,500 active/standby civilians) would be overly endowed.

Civilian response capacity force-sizing can be aided by employing a 1–1–4 sizing construct that envisions multiple concurrent contingencies. That is, the civilian force should be prepared to carry out and sustain operations for one large (for example, Iraq), one medium (for example, Afghanistan), and four small (for example, tsunami relief and humanitarian operations in Georgia) complex operations. A requirement for an active/standby force of 5,000 civilian response capacity personnel would arise, for example, if the large operation requires 2,000 personnel, the medium operation requires 1,000 personnel, and each of the small operations requires 500 personnel. This civilian response capacity, of course, would be available not only for this particular construct, but also for a

range of different contingencies that could require varying sizes and mixes of personnel.

The key point is that this capacity would enable the United States to surge 5,000 active/standby personnel for a number of concurrent contingencies that might arise and to sustain this presence for about a year. A reserve civilian response capacity of 10,000 personnel would permit sustainment of this civilian surge for 2 or more years, following the military practice of preparing one-third of the force for deployment, while one-third deploys and one-third is reconstituted.

Civilian Response Capacity Missions and Tasks—Past, Present, and Future

To create a foundation for appraising future scenarios and their civilian response capacity manpower requirements, analysis can best begin by addressing why and how significant numbers of skilled civilians might be needed for performing specific missions and tasks in complex operations. The term *complex operations* is relatively new, but the practice of employing U.S. military and civilian personnel to help bring security, governance, and reconstruction to foreign nations is not. After World War II, the United States performed occupation duties in Germany and Japan in ways intended to rebuild these conquered countries, install democratic governments, and ignite economic recovery. In both cases, the U.S. military was mainly responsible for S&R operations, and civilians supplemented the effort. In Germany, about 8,000 U.S. Army Civil Affairs personnel were initially employed for this purpose, and civilians numbered about 1,400 during the years in which the Marshall Plan was in full flower. In Japan, about 2,000 Army Civil Affairs personnel were used, and civilians numbered about 200. In both countries, reliance on the U.S. military and indigenous institutions kept U.S. civilian manpower requirements relatively low. Moreover, both countries already possessed modern institutions and economies, which also reduced the need for U.S. civilians.³

The first big U.S. experience performing S&R operations in an underdeveloped country came in Vietnam from 1965 to 1973. In that country, about 1,500 civilian personnel were initially deployed to occupy positions of the State Department, USAID, and the U.S. Information Agency. Beginning in 1967, an additional 1,300 civilians were deployed to help staff the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program, which endeavored to bring security and development to 44 provinces and 250 districts across the country. In addition, about 6,400 military personnel were assigned to CORDS, bringing its total to nearly 8,000, plus

several thousand South Vietnamese military and civilian personnel. The CORDS program was the biggest S&R effort ever launched by the U.S. Government. On the whole, it made significant progress toward performing its mission, although it was reduced as the United States withdrew from South Vietnam in the early 1970s. In the end, it was negated by North Vietnamese conquest in 1975. Even so, CORDS' large size helps illuminate the substantial number of military and civilian personnel that can be needed when the goal is to bring security and development to a chaotic, violence-plagued country.⁴

Today, the United States finds itself performing major S&R operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, where PRTs are the main institutional instrument for performing these missions. Of the 28 PRTs in Iraq, 25 are led by the United States, and Britain, Italy, and the Republic of Korea each lead one. The U.S.-led PRTs are assigned across Iraq's 18 provinces and are headed by State Department personnel, even though several are embedded in U.S. Army Brigade Combat Teams. In Afghanistan, there are 12 PRTs led by the United States, plus 14 led by International Security Assistance Force partners. In contrast to Iraq, the PRTs in Afghanistan are led by military officers. Currently, no standard U.S. Government-approved model exists for designing PRTs. As a result, they are normally sized and designed on a case-by-case basis. In both countries, PRTs typically average 50–100 personnel, although in a few cases the number evidently rises to 250. In Afghanistan, PRTs are manned predominantly by military personnel, who provide such traditional military services as administration, intelligence, military police, demining, security protection, civil affairs, and logistic support. Also assigned to these PRTs are small contingents of four to eight civilians from the State Department, USAID, and other Federal agencies.

In Iraq, about 2,000 U.S. personnel are assigned to PRTs; at least 50 percent and sometimes up to 75 percent generally are civilians. In Afghanistan, about 1,000 personnel, of whom over 90 percent are military, are assigned to PRTs. In both cases, many of these military assignments could be better filled by civilians. Additional civilians are assigned to Embassy staffs in both countries. In Iraq, an Embassy staff of 900, coupled with about the same number of civilians assigned to PRTs, elevates total U.S. Government civilian personnel there to under 2,000. But fewer than 100 civilians assigned to PRTs in Afghanistan means that, even counting U.S. Embassy personnel there, the total U.S. civilian presence in Afghanistan is significantly smaller than in Iraq—a reality that limits the effectiveness of civilian-performed S&R operations there. For both Iraq and Afghanistan,

the number of civilians capable of S&R missions is well below the number of civilians assigned to Vietnam, where military personnel were often used to perform civilian functions.

Analysts have questioned whether enough PRTs are present in Iraq and Afghanistan, and whether individual PRTs are large enough to accomplish their S&R goals. The troubled situations in both countries—not only continuing violence but also slow progress toward economic and political reconstruction—suggest that more U.S. civilian personnel would be helpful, especially in Afghanistan.

Particularly in Afghanistan, PRTs are still constituted for military functions and lack the large numbers of civilians needed to perform such duties as building governments, repairing infrastructure, and opening schools. In both countries, PRTs rely heavily on private contractors. Even so, the teams in Iraq and Afghanistan may provide misleading role models for calculating the larger number of civilian U.S. employees required for situations in which emphasis is placed not only on security, but also on development.⁵ Furthermore, we argue that skill sets should not be confined solely to the PRTs, but that critical ones should also reside in Embassies.

Insights into future civilian requirements for complex operations can be gained from table 2–1, which displays the missions and tasks that military and civilian personnel can be called on to perform in various situations.⁶ While the table is not exhaustive, it shows that complex operations can involve fully 60 associated tasks in 6 broad mission categories: restore and maintain security, promote effective governance, conduct reconstruction, sustain economic development, support reconciliation, and foster social change. Although mission category 1 is performed by military personnel, mission categories 2 through 6, which include 48 tasks, are mostly best handled by civilian personnel, with the military in support in some cases. Of course, not all of these missions and tasks need be performed with equal fervor in every situation. But taking into account the wide spectrum of situations that can occur, along with the possibility of simultaneous events, the table supports the judgment that civilian preparedness requirements for these missions could be relatively high. This especially is the case because fairly large numbers of civilians could be required for each category and the full set of tasks within it. For example, if each of the 9 tasks of mission category 4 (sustain economic development) requires 100 active/standby trained personnel, the total requirement for that category is 900 personnel. If the same calculation is applied to all 5 civilian categories and their associated 48 tasks, the total requirement is 4,800, or about 5,000 personnel.

Table 2–1. Missions and Tasks for Complex Operations

Mission Category 1: Restore and Maintain Security

- Perform critical command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations, including intelligence-gathering and analysis
- Conduct combat, security, and law enforcement operations
- Combat terrorism
- Provide physical security to individuals and groups
- Secure key sites and infrastructure
- Collect, secure, and destroy small arms/light weapons and military equipment; seize illegal weapons
- Conduct demining and ordnance disposal
- Identify, detain, and process insurgents and suspects
- Demobilize and reintegrate former insurgents, militias, and armed factions
- Secure borders and key entry/transshipment points
- Train and support indigenous security and police force
- Eliminate or suppress criminal gangs, militias, and factional violence

Mission Category 2: Promote Effective Governance

- Provide temporary governance in absence of political institutions
- Restore political control over urban areas
- Develop local and national political capacities for effective governance
- Support representative government at the local and national levels
- Conduct, supervise, and safeguard elections
- Establish legal and judicial structures and institutions
- Effect and enforce the rule of law
- Arbitrate and mediate local disputes and agreements
- Support or conduct war crimes tribunals
- Provide legal and political expertise, training, and education

Mission Category 3: Conduct Reconstruction

- Provide humanitarian relief to indigenous populations
- Operate refugee camps
- Feed and shelter urban populations in the wake of combat and security operations
- Support nongovernmental organization (NGO)/intergovernmental organization (IGO) humanitarian efforts
- Ensure freedom of movement; enable local commerce
- Protect human and civil rights
- Perform civic action and reconstruction projects to restore essential services
- Repair, rebuild, and maintain critical physical and social infrastructure
- Construct housing and rebuild political, cultural, and religious centers

Mission Category 4: Sustain Economic Development

- Secure and protect economic and commercial activities, including local commerce and trade and commercial lines of communication
- Open and protect urban market places
- Operate government or commercial economic activities or infrastructures, including finance systems
- Prevent or suppress illegal smuggling or criminal activities that compete with economic growth
- Support or enforce tax and revenue collection
- Provide logistics, transportation, or other capabilities necessary for movement and marketing of goods and services
- Encourage and support property ownership
- Restore and protect urban commerce centers and manufacturing
- Protect harvests and agricultural development

Mission Category 5: Support Reconciliation

- Conduct truth commissions and tribunals
- Capture, detain, and try terrorists and criminals
- Conduct war crimes trials
- Facilitate return of displaced persons
- Enforce reparations and restitution
- Mediate and arbitrate disputes
- Build local capacities for conflict resolution
- Support capacity-building agencies, NGOs, and IGOs
- Effect long-term political and social reforms
- Promote civil and human rights
- Prevent reemergence of factions and repressive groups
- Provide for educational system that promotes reconciliation

Mission Category 6: Foster Social Change

- Encourage long-term, grassroots political and social reform
 - Enforce civil and human rights and the rule of law
 - Build capacities for dispute resolution
 - Prevent reemergence of factions and extremism
 - Avoid the use of repression or other totalitarian measures
 - Provide for general education of the populace
 - Ensure essential tasks are integrated and support change
 - Remain engaged for an extended period
-

This basic methodology of equally allocating civilian personnel requirements among the various mission categories and tasks, of course, is illustrative. A fully developed analysis, especially one used for actual programming, would necessitate a detailed appraisal of manpower needs for each category and task. Final numbers might be lower or higher in each case. For the force-sizing purposes of this chapter, however, what matters is the aggregate total of civilian manpower. An important bottom line is that an active/standby civilian response capacity of 5,000 personnel, if properly distributed, would provide a fairly large pool of trained experts in each category. This sizable, diverse pool, in turn, would help provide the flexibility, adaptability, and modularity to tailor complex operations to the missions and tasks at hand in each case, without concern that the act of responding effectively to one contingency would drain the force of expertise in key areas needed to handle additional contingencies.

An active civilian force of 5,000 personnel, with an internal distribution of 100 specialists for each of the 48 tasks, would provide significantly better performance features than only 2,500 personnel and 50 specialists for each task. Such a force would help ensure that if the 1–1–4 construct must be fully carried out, there will be not only enough civilians in aggregate, but also enough to perform all 48 tasks in each contingency. For example, there would be enough task-specialized civilians to simultaneously perform the full set of tasks for such key missions as promoting effective governance, conducting reconstruction, and sustaining economic development in all contingencies of this construct. In addition, this force could provide valuable flexibility and adaptability for situations in which requirements for individual tasks in one or more contingencies might rise above the norm. That is, extra civilians could be diverted from places where they are not needed to places where they are needed. A smaller force of 2,500 personnel would not provide nearly this amount of flexibility.

In evaluating this judgment, a sense of perspective can be gained by examining how a civilian response capacity of 5,000 active/standby personnel compares to alternative forces of lower and higher numbers. Table 2–2 displays three options. Option 1 is 2,250 personnel; option 2 is 5,000 personnel; option 3 is 7,500 personnel. Compared to option 1, option 2 is better not only because it provides over twice the number of total personnel, but also because it provides more than double the number in each category. The risk of option 1 is that it might be overwhelmed by multiple contingencies that create a higher level of total manpower requirements, or by individual contingencies that could create unusually high demands in one or more categories. By virtue of being larger and better endowed internally,

option 2 significantly reduces these risks, while buffering against the additional risk that shortages in civilian manpower could compel unduly high reliance on scarce military forces to perform missions and tasks that are better carried out by trained civilians.


Table 2–2. **Alternative Civilian Response Capacity Forces**

	Active Personnel		
	Total	Per Category	Cost/year (\$ billion)
Option 1	2,250	450	.94
Option 2	5,000	1,000	2.1
Option 3	7,500	1,500	3.2

Option 3 is 50 percent larger than option 2, costs 50 percent more, and would be proportionately harder to create and sustain over a long period of time. Compared to option 2, the issue is whether the strategic benefits of option 3 would be commensurate with its higher costs and difficulties. Whereas some observers may argue in favor of option 3 (or even larger forces), economists likely would apply the logic of a curve of diminishing marginal returns to the calculus to determine whether option 2 falls on the knee of the curve—the point at which most strategic benefits have already been attained and the expense of additional assets would not be justified because the marginal payoffs would be relatively smaller. The latter could be the case for civilian response capacity force-sizing if, for example, the probability of each option being fully needed at any one time decreases as the size of these three options increases. In this event, the “strategic payoff” of option 3 might be only 10 percent higher than option 2, even though option 3 has 50 percent more manpower. Figure 2–1 displays such a curve, assuming that option 2 falls at the knee of the curve. The reasons why this assumption is likely to be valid are discussed later in the chapter.

Finally, it is important to note that, if an active/standby civilian response capacity of 5,000 personnel is selected, it does not define the total number of civilian response capacity personnel that would need to be available. Reserve personnel assets would also be needed, especially to provide long-term sustainability by permitting rotation of deployed personnel after their tours of duty are completed and replacement with trained sub-

Figure 2–1. Curve of Diminishing Marginal Returns for Alternative Force Sizes



stitutes. The need for such reservists is a key reason why the NDAA called for a Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC) of 2,000 personnel. But are 2,000 reservists enough to execute the missions and tasks outlined above? An answer to this question can be suggested by examining how the U.S. military handles the task of maintaining a large rotational base to back up forces that might be initially deployed to overseas contingencies. Essentially, all three Services seek to have two units of usable reserves for each initially deployable unit—for example, two Army divisions to back up each deployed division to provide long-term sustainability. By following this practice, DOD seeks to have sufficient forces in its rotational base to perform two additional tours of duty in the lengthy period after initially deployed units have completed their tours. As a result, military personnel are called on to perform deployment missions only 1 year out of every 3.

If this logic is applied to the civilian response capacity calculus, it suggests that an active/standby force of 2,500 personnel should be backed up by a reserve force of 4,500 personnel, not 2,000. It further suggests that an active/standby CRC of 5,000 personnel should be backed up by a reserve

force of 10,000 personnel. In addition to providing long-term sustainment, a reserve civilian response capacity of this size would provide a valuable surge capability in case the active/standby force becomes overwhelmed by unexpected events, plus additional manpower pools for performing specific missions and tasks that might arise. The key conclusion is that if an active/standby civilian response capacity of 5,000 civilians is created, a backup reserve force of 10,000 personnel would serve more purposes than one.

Civilian Response Capacity Scenarios and Requirements

The future U.S. civilian response capacity will be deemed adequately large only if it can meet manpower requirements for complex operations that might lie ahead. How can these deployment and performance requirements best be gauged? Scenarios—hypothetical contingencies abroad—can help answer this question. As any experienced analyst knows, scenarios cannot be used to predict the future, nor should they bind the United States to specific dictates. Actual contingencies can prove to be very different from the events contemplated by scenarios. But scenarios can help illuminate the broad trends ahead, facilitate sensitivity analysis, and ensure that U.S. policies, plans, and programs are in the right strategic ballpark. By postulating specific contingencies, they also can be used to help gauge overall civilian response capacity manpower requirements and judge how alternative policy options perform in light of these requirements. In essence, they can be employed to generate yardsticks for determining how future civilian response capacity requirements are best satisfied by concrete capabilities.

A 1–1–4 force construct could be used to size the future civilian response capacity and, as argued below, would help affirm S/CRS's requirement for 5,000 active/standby personnel. Using this single-point standard exclusively, however, would be unwise in current circumstances. In the recent past, DOD has been able to use such a standard because the strategic rationale for its existing force posture has been developed and tested for many years, and its current task is mostly limited to making marginal upward or downward changes in force levels. By contrast, the act of shaping the civilian response capacity is plowing entirely new strategic ground, and there is no lengthy backdrop of much-debated theories to help govern the process of deciding. Also important, the surrounding issues are unfamiliar, complex variables are at work, and uncertainties abound. No single-point standard is capable of firmly identifying a fixed civilian response capacity manpower level above which success is ensured, and below which

failure is guaranteed. Such a standard would merely endorse one particular theory of requirements in absence of other theories that might show different results, and it would ratify one policy option without showing how it compares to and contrasts with other options. As a result, senior decisionmakers would be hard pressed to gauge the choices open to them and the soundness of their own judgments.

In the eyes of senior U.S. officials in pursuit of sound judgments, the critical issue is likely to be the confidence level. These officials are likely to ask two interrelated questions: how much confidence and assurance does the United States want to possess in a world of proliferating complex operations and S&R missions, and how much risk is it willing to run? How do alternative levels of civilian response capacity provide different levels of confidence and risk? These important questions can best be addressed not by relying on a single-point theory of scenarios and requirements, but instead by postulating a spectrum of scenarios and requirements ranging from relatively undemanding to quite demanding settings, and then using this spectrum to weigh and balance alternative policy responses in terms of confidence and risk. Such an approach is followed here.

A good place to begin constructing such a wide spectrum is by displaying a range of individual scenarios that might plausibly occur, together with a range of notional civilian response capacity manpower requirements for each case to staff Embassies as well as PRTs. Table 2–3 illuminates how and why, even for individual scenarios, civilian response capacity requirements are a variable, not a constant. In particular, requirements are influenced by two key variables: the size and population of the country in which complex operations are to be mounted, and the nature of security conditions within that country, along with the scope of U.S. goals and missions in dealing with these conditions. As the size of these two variables increases, civilian response capacity requirements grow proportionately. For example, a country of 20 million people would require twice the number of civilian response capacity personnel as would a country of only 10 million people, if all other calculations are equal. That country of 20 million might necessitate 1,000 civilian response capacity personnel if security conditions, goals, and missions yield a requirement for 1 person per 20,000 population. But if security conditions, goals, and missions mandate a larger presence of 1 person per 10,000 population, the civilian response capacity requirement would increase to 2,000.

Another important variable is the presence or absence of coalition partners: as coalition contributions increase, U.S. requirements decrease, and vice versa. Assuming that coalition partners, plus nongovernmental

organizations (NGOs) and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), will normally contribute about one-third of total manpower requirements, table 2–3 postulates that the United States will regularly be called on to commit the remaining two-thirds. With this division of labor in mind, table 2–3 displays a spectrum of categories of contingencies, varying from small to very large as a function of the population in each case. Within each category, it displays a likely range of U.S. civilian response capacity manpower requirements—as a function of population levels, security conditions, and U.S. goals and missions—and a midpoint estimate of requirements.

The numbers in table 2–3 should be treated as illustrative rather than definitive, but even so, they impart important strategic messages—one of which is that civilian response capacity manpower requirements for a single contingency can vary significantly. Using midpoint estimates, requirements could range from as few as 450 personnel to as many as 3,350, but could rise to a high of 4,450 in the event a very large contingency occurs in which the United States pursues ambitious goals. Another message is that an active/standby force of 5,000 personnel could handle the entire spectrum of individual contingencies; indeed, it could handle most of them even if coalition partner contributions were less than postulated in table 2–3. By contrast, even assuming a one-third contribution by coalition partners, a smaller force of 2,250 active/standby personnel could meet requirements only for contingencies that are no larger than the midpoint range of the large category. In other words, the United States would possess insufficient civilian response capacity manpower if it becomes involved in a large or very large contingency for which it must pursue ambitious objectives.

The bottom line is that in preparing for a single contingency, the United States will enjoy higher confidence levels, and face fewer risks, if it fully funds and deploys an active/standby force of 5,000 personnel rather than 2,250. The same conclusion applies to a reserve force of 10,000 personnel rather than only 2,000, because it would provide much greater staying power. Assuming funding is allocated and matches the requirements, this force would allow for the launch and sustainment of a surge.

Exactly where and how might such scenarios and contingencies take place? Although the answer is uncertain, table 2–4 provides 16 examples. While this list is far from exhaustive, it shows that future complex operations could plausibly be launched in many places, on all continents. The table also shows that in shaping potential S&R requirements, Iraq and Afghanistan are far from the biggest imaginable scenarios and contingencies. Their populations are only 27 million and 33 million, respectively. An

Table 2–3. **Civilian Manpower Requirements for Two Scenarios**

Category	Population (millions)	Moderate Goals	Ambitious Goals	Midpoint
Small	1–10	300	600	450
Medium	10–25	650	1,350	1,000
Large	25–50	1,400	2,800	2,100
Very Large	50–75	2,250	4,450	3,350

S&R operation in Ukraine or a humanitarian relief operation in Burma could require adequate civilian response capacity assets to deal with populations of nearly 50 million people. If relations with Iran continue to deteriorate and result in conflict with that country, an S&R operation there would have to deal with 68 million people, or nearly three times the population of Iraq. Nor does Iran define the upper boundary for very large contingencies. Pakistan, which could collapse into a failed state requiring outside intervention, has a population of 162 million people.

Table 2–4. **Illustrative Future Scenarios for Complex Operations**

Small Contingencies	Population (millions)
Tsunami relief in Asia	1–5
Hurricane relief in Caribbean	1–5
Humanitarian operation in Darfur	4
Humanitarian operation in Georgia	5
Stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) operation in Chad	10
S&R operation in Cuba	11
Medium to Large Contingencies	
S&R operation in Syria	16
S&R operation in North Korea	24
Enduring S&R operation in Iraq	27
Enhanced S&R operation in Afghanistan	33
S&R operation in Ukraine	46
Humanitarian operation in Burma	47
S&R operation in Colombia	48
Very Large Contingencies	
S&R operation in Iran	68
S&R operation in Pakistan	162
S&R operation in Indonesia	235

What is the likelihood that such scenarios and contingencies will actually occur? Although the future cannot be predicted, small contingencies are a recurring feature of today's world and seem equally likely to occur with comparable frequency in the years ahead. As for medium to large contingencies, two sizable S&R operations are already taking place in Iraq and Afghanistan. Even though U.S. combat forces may eventually withdraw from Iraq, S&R assets may be called on to remain there for some time. Given Afghanistan's troubled situation, S&R requirements seem likely to increase there before they decline. North Korea, Ukraine, and Burma are also countries where events could compel S&R operations. Nor can very large scenarios be dismissed, even though their likelihood seems lower than for lesser contingencies. Iran and Pakistan are two distinct possibilities—Iran as a consequence of outside military intervention, and Pakistan because of political and social instability.

The need for an active/standby force of 5,000 personnel becomes even more apparent when the requirements for concurrent scenarios are taken into account. Table 2–5 displays manpower requirements for eight scenario clusters ranging from relatively undemanding to highly demanding. As the table shows, scenario cluster (SC) 1 is composed of two small contingencies, and its manpower requirements are only 600–1,200 personnel, with a midpoint of 900. As more and larger scenarios are added, manpower requirements rise. SC2 (4 small contingencies) requires 1,200–2,400 personnel, with a midpoint of 1,800. SC3 and SC4 require still more manpower. SC5, the construct contemplated by this chapter, is composed of 1 large, 1 medium, and 4 small contingencies. It requires 3,250–6,550 personnel, with a midpoint of 4,900. SC6, SC7, and SC8 reflect clusters of concurrent scenarios that are more demanding than SC5. The most demanding, SC8, contemplates 2 small, 1 large, and 2 very large contingencies and generates manpower requirements of 6,500–12,900 personnel, with a midpoint of 9,700. The central message is clear. An active/standby force of only 2,250 personnel could be overwhelmed quickly by multiple concurrent contingencies of significant size and manpower requirements. By contrast, a force of 5,000 personnel would be significantly better able to handle multiple contingencies, including the construct put forth by this chapter, if U.S. goals are not highly ambitious in each contingency. Such a force would become overwhelmed only if five contingencies occur concurrently and if three of them are large or very large.

The strategic picture portrayed by figure 2–2 can be clarified by examining figure 2–3, which places the eight scenario clusters on the x axis and civilian response capacity manpower requirements on the y axis.


Table 2–5. Eight Scenarios for Complex Operations

Scenario Cluster	Number and Size of Contingencies	Manpower Requirement	Midpoint
1	2 small	600–1,200	900
2	4 small	1,200–2,400	1,800
3	2 small, 2 medium	1,900–3,900	2,900
4	4 small, 2 medium	2,500–5,100	4,000
5	4 small, 1 medium, 1 large	3,250–6,550	4,900
6	2 small, 3 large	4,800–9,600	7,100
7	2 small, 2 large, 1 very large	5,650–11,250	8,450
8	2 small, 1 large, 2 very large	6,500–12,900	9,700

Connecting the data points draws a band of requirements that connects all eight clusters. Banding all the scenario clusters together helps bound the range of uncertainty in calculating manpower requirements and suggests a “strategic space” that should be examined by civilian response capacity force sizing. As figure 2–2 shows, manpower requirements rise steadily as the band of requirements moves from SC1 to SC8. A main implication is that a civilian response capacity will provide high confidence in situations where it matches or exceeds this band of requirements, and will create risk in situations where it falls short of this band. Figure 2–2 also displays where a force of 5,000 falls along this band. Such a force is capable of fully meeting requirements for SC1 through SC4 and meets the midpoint requirement for SC5. But it falls short of meeting most potential requirements for SC6 through SC8. This force thus provides a mixture of confidence and risk—confidence that the less demanding situations can be handled, but risk that the more demanding situations cannot be handled. By itself, this band of requirements does not validate a civilian force of 5,000 active/standby personnel as the only sound choice, but it does illuminate the tradeoffs between confidence and risk that will be incurred if this posture is chosen.

A comparative perspective for evaluating a force of 5,000 personnel is provided by figure 2–3, which displays capacity lines for all three options considered by this chapter: option 1 (2,250), option 2 (5,000), and option 3 (7,500). Option 1 matches or exceeds only a small portion of the band of requirements (the less demanding scenario clusters). Option 2 does a significantly better job of matching or exceeding requirements for the more demanding clusters. Of the three options, option 3 does the best job of meeting the full spectrum of requirements along the entire band. But


Figure 2–2. Band of Civilian Response Capacity Requirements



although it outperforms option 2 in handling the most demanding clusters of contingencies, these large clusters are less likely to occur than the smaller clusters. As a result, option 3 provides higher confidence and lower risks than option 2, but it buys insurance against clusters of multiple, big-time contingencies whose probability of simultaneous occurrence is not high. This drawback does not necessarily disqualify option 3 from serious consideration if the manpower and budgetary resources are available. But it does create cautionary arguments against this option because, when compared to option 2, its marginal benefits may not be worth its extra costs—that is, option 3 may fall above the knee of the curve on the marginal returns chart discussed earlier. For this reason, figure 2–3 portrays a “sweet spot”: the zone in which a civilian response capacity adequately meets requirements, makes strategic sense, provides high confidence levels, does not entail imprudent risks, and meets cost effectiveness criteria. This sweet spot corresponds to option 2. The main implication of figure 2–3 is that, taking into account all relevant factors, option 2 is about the proper size; option 1 is too small, and option 3 is unnecessarily large.

Assuming that option 2 is selected, brief commentary about the pace for implementing this option is appropriate. Although a sense of emergency may not be necessary, a sense of steady pace and prompt achieve-

Figure 2–3. Comparing Civilian Response Capacity Policy Options



ment of key civilian response capacity manpower goals is needed. The United States cannot afford to be leisurely about how it implements this plan. Three implementation options help illuminate the broad choices here: schedule A (the fastest) would complete the entire plan in 5 years; schedule B (the middle ground) would complete the plan in 7½ years; schedule C would complete the plan in 10 years. Schedule A would require creating 1,000 active/standby civilian response capacity personnel per year; schedule B, 667 personnel; and schedule C, 500 personnel. Similar options and proportionately similar schedules would apply to creating civilian response capacity reserves of 10,000 total personnel. Of these three alternatives, schedule A clearly is the best in strategic terms because it would enlarge the civilian response capacity fastest. But it may stretch the art of the possible in terms of available manpower and budgetary resources. Even taking into account these constraints, schedule C, a 10-year plan, is probably too slow because it would leave the U.S. Government with too few civilian response capacity personnel for too long. These tradeoffs leave schedule B, a 7½-year plan, as striking a balance between strategic imperatives and resource availability.

Finally, contributions by allied partners should be taken into account in developing a U.S. Government plan. This chapter has assumed that partners will normally be able and willing to meet about one-third of civilian response capacity manpower requirements for complex operations. To the extent that partners cannot be relied on to make such contributions, it enhances the case for option 2 (5,000 personnel) over option 1 (2,250), and it could elevate the importance of option 3 (7,500 personnel). Even if partners can be relied on to make one-third contributions, however, this does not mean that their efforts should rest there. If they can be encouraged to field larger forces, they would provide valuable additional resources to handle unexpectedly large contingencies, and they would help shift the U.S./partner division of labor in more balanced directions. A larger allied contribution likely would not undermine the strategic case for option 2, but it could reduce the incentives for pursuing option 3, and thereby increase option 2's confidence levels while diminishing its risks. Thus, a U.S. effort to create a larger American civilian response capacity should be accompanied by diplomatic outreach aimed at persuading key partners, as well as NGOs and IGOs, to do the same.

Conclusion and Findings

The United States faces an imperative need to create a significant civilian response capacity to be able to effectively carry out complex operations and S&R missions. To help inform the creation of an adequate civilian force structure, the United States needs a rigorous analytical standard for the size, design, and missions of the civilian force. Several key findings emerge from this chapter.

Congress must appropriate funds over the next 5–10 years to create a civilian response capacity that endures and is prepared to support multiple complex operations.

Unless Congress provides an appropriation that adequately covers the force needed over the next few years, the civilian response capacity will not come to fruition.

A 1–1–4 civilian response capacity of 15,000 (5,000 active/standby personnel and 10,000 reservists) is required to provide an adequate rotational base for deployments lasting more than a year.

A 1–1–4 sizing construct allows for multiple, concurrent contingencies of varying sizes. The key point is that this force would enable the United States to surge 5,000 active/standby civilian personnel for a number of concurrent contingencies that might arise and to sustain this presence

for at least 1 year. A reserve force of 10,000 personnel would permit sustainment of this civilian surge for 2 or more years, following the military practice of preparing one-third of the force for deployment while one-third deploys and one-third is reconstituted.

The United States must prepare for individual and concurrent contingencies and develop the necessary skill sets for deployment in multiple areas of missions and tasks—and 5 of 6 broad civilian response capacity mission categories and nearly 50 individual tasks.

Adequate training and education must be provided for civilians to be able to conduct the majority of the tasks currently undertaken by the military. Unless training, retraining, and education elements are in place and properly funded, the civilian response capacity will not be able to effectively carry out many of the tasks described in this chapter.

A wide spectrum of scenarios and options is needed to help inform policy choices and alert senior U.S. officials to the tradeoffs in making judgments about confidence levels and risks associated with complex operations and foreign policy.

Scenarios cannot be used to predict the future, nor should they bind the United States to specific dictates. Actual contingencies can prove to be very different from the events contemplated by scenarios. Scenarios can help illuminate the broad trends ahead, facilitate sensitivity analysis, and ensure that U.S. policies, plans, and programs are in the strategic ballpark. By postulating specific contingencies, scenarios can be used to help gauge overall civilian response capacity manpower requirements and judge how alternative policy options perform in light of these requirements.

U.S. plans for building a civilian response capacity should be accompanied by diplomatic efforts to persuade allies and partners to take similar steps.

Many of the S&R tasks are best accomplished by and with partner nations that know the local geography, language, and culture. Sending our civilian and military corps to do the bulk of S&R without the involvement of capable allies and partners places an unnecessary burden on our resources and increases the risks that we will fail at the missions that further our national security interests.

Notes

¹ See S. 3001, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Title XVI—Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management.

² During the 1990s, DOD employed a 2-major-theater-war force-sizing standard, which called for sufficient forces to wage two major concurrent wars in the Persian Gulf and Korea. In 2001, DOD switched to a more flexible 4–2–1 standard that called for sufficient forces to handle daily strategic affairs in four key regions, to rebuff major enemy aggression in two theaters, and to wage decisive operations, including major counterattacks, in one of these theaters. DOD’s *Quadrennial Defense Review* of 2006 put forth a more generic construct, but called for a force posture similar to that mandated by the 4–2–1 construct. See Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review 2006* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2006).

³ For historical data on civilian manpower in Europe and Japan after World War II, see U.S. *Department of State Foreign Service List, 1944–1954*. The occupations and reconstruction of Germany and Japan were significantly aided by the facts that combat had ended there and, in both countries, the populations were responsive to U.S. leadership in building democratic governments and capitalist economies.

⁴ See chapter 11 for CORDS data and analysis.

⁵ For analysis, see U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, “Agency Stovepipes vs. Strategic Agility: Lessons We Need to Learn from Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan,” April 2008, available at <http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/Reports/PRT_Report.pdf>.

⁶ Table 2–1 is adapted from a presentation by Dr. Robert Scott Moore. Used with permission.

Redesigning White House and Interagency Structures

Christopher J. Lamb

Sizing a civilian response capacity for complex operations is relatively straightforward compared to the challenge faced by the President to ensure a unified effort from across the Federal Government. In memoirs and other accounts of their experience, Presidents have frequently lamented the way strong Federal departments and agencies pursue their own objectives, irrespective of the President's direction. This centrifugal tendency is especially problematic in matters of national security, where the need to act quickly with unified purpose and effort is critically important, and increasingly so. The security environment is changing in ways that raise complex challenges that require the close integration of diplomatic and military power:

The institutions that guided our country through the Cold War are struggling to deal with challenges that mid-century policymakers could not have anticipated. Failing states, ethnic- and religion-driven turmoil, non-state terrorism, natural resource competition and humanitarian crises were not on the table when Washington designed "modern" departments of state and defense in the 1950s and '60s.¹

Getting the Departments of State and Defense to work together better was a primary objective during the 1990s.² Few observers would disagree with former Secretary of Defense William Perry's assertion in the late 1990s that "since the end of the Cold War, the political and military issues have become so complicated and inextricably linked [that] it is absolutely imperative that the State Department and Department of Defense have a close working relationship." Given the increasingly complex security environment we face today, this assessment should be expanded to include many other departments and agencies.

It remains difficult, however, to achieve the requisite degree of cooperation among departments and agencies. As many studies and commissions of inquiry into poor national security performance of one sort or another emphasize, national security departments and agencies do not naturally collaborate. The 2005 findings of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction are illustrative:

Everywhere we looked, we found important (and obvious) issues of interagency coordination that went unattended, sensible Community-wide proposals blocked by pockets of resistance, and critical disputes left to fester.³

In response to mounting evidence of insufficient unity of purpose and effort in national security undertakings, independent research centers and studies have argued for reforms, particularly in complex contingencies.⁴ The 9/11 terror attacks and the subsequent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq stimulated calls for reform.⁵ For example, the Iraq Study Group Report recommended that:

For the longer term, the United States government needs to improve how its constituent agencies—Defense, State, Agency for International Development, Treasury, Justice, the intelligence community, and others—respond to a complex stability operation like that represented by this decade’s Iraq and Afghanistan wars and the previous decade’s operations in the Balkans. They need to train for, and conduct, joint operations across agency boundaries, following the Goldwater-Nichols model that has proved so successful in the U.S. armed services.⁶

Similarly, Congressman Ike Skelton argued:

Interagency reform is critical to achieving the level of coordination among all agencies of government that is necessary to completely execute the Global War on Terror and to meet future challenges. . . . I’m convinced such reform can bring all the instruments of national power to bear more effectively on the challenges we face in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Global War on Terror and even here in homeland security. We must do it and we must get it right.⁷

Agreement on the need for interagency reform does not include consensus on how to go about it. President George W. Bush's national security team was particularly conflicted over how to conduct interagency reform. In its second term, the Bush administration instituted a number of interagency reforms, but could not agree on whether more fundamental changes to the national security system were required. An April 2008 House Armed Services Committee hearing highlighted the differences on how to improve the integration of the national security bureaucracy. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates testified together on the value of their collaborative efforts to use security assistance to help friendly powers fight terrorists. However, on the more general question of whether major structural reform of the national security system is required, they were of two minds. Secretary Rice indicated that the administration already had fixed the most urgent problems:

I'm very much of the view that it is fine to think of trying to plan for the reconstruction of the interagency—of the interagency process. But really, we have gone a long way to creating new tools of interagency coordination. They may well have been born of necessity. They may well have been ad hoc in character at first. But . . . I think that the history will look back on this time as a time in which necessity was, indeed, the mother of invention. It is often the case that that which is invented in response to new and real on-the-ground contingencies turn out to be the best institutions for the future.⁸

In contrast, Secretary Gates testified that a major overhaul of the system is required:

Over the last 15 years, the U.S. Government has tried to meet post-Cold War challenges and pursue 21st-century objectives with processes and organizations designed in the wake of the Second World War. . . . Operating within this outdated bureaucratic superstructure, the U.S. Government has sought to improve interagency planning and cooperation through a variety of means: new legislation, directives, offices, coordinators, "tsars," authorities, and initiatives with varying degrees of success. . . . I'm encouraged that a consensus appears to be building that we need to rethink the fundamental structure and processes of our national security system.⁹

Secretary Gates continued by noting the rethinking could include a new National Security Act for the 21st century, something Members of Congress also are increasingly willing to consider.¹⁰ Whether such fundamental reform of the White House and interagency structures is actually necessary depends largely on how one assesses the causes of insufficient interagency collaboration.

Identifying the Problems¹¹

The fact that there is so much agreement on the need to coordinate all elements of national power, and yet it remains so difficult to do, suggests there are deeply rooted and perhaps mutually reinforcing causes of the problem. For example, the sheer size and complexity of the Federal Government militates against unity of effort.¹² Departments and agencies have a difficult time reaching internal policy agreement, much less coordinating their efforts across the U.S. Government. Nonetheless, some salient impediments to Federal Government unity of effort can be identified. One way to highlight explanations for insufficient unity of effort is to consider the management of a complex contingency in the abstract, from the assessment of the problem, to development of policy, to strategy, to plans, to execution and periodic evaluations of progress toward objectives.

Assessment

The process of issue management begins with an assessment of the problems that give rise to the complex contingency. To develop effective policy and strategy, decisionmakers must understand the nature of the problem they are confronting. Theoretically, the U.S. Government has vast information and analytic resources to assist decisionmakers with problem assessment. Yet the system has difficulty bringing all the information and analytic resources to bear effectively. For example, during the Kosovo crisis in the Clinton administration, the Intelligence Community produced volumes of products on Serbian leaders, strategy, and disposition of military forces. However, as one White House participant later noted, it was not until the crisis was well under way that an integrated assessment of Serbian political-economic relationships provided key insights into ways the United States could influence Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic's decision-making.¹³ The valuable product did not come from the Intelligence Community, but rather from one of the many information and analytic nodes in the broader national security system. It found its way to the White House, but not as the result of established processes. Currently, the ability of the national security system to locate, integrate, and access all of its

information and analytic resources is actually quite limited, and decision-making suffers accordingly.

Policy

Assuming the problem is well understood, decisionmakers must then reach agreement on U.S. Government policy. Sometimes the discussion of policy options is assigned to a lead agency, usually the Department of State, and sometimes the National Security Advisor and his staff lead the effort. Either way, it is not uncommon for departments and agencies to disagree about policy. A classic example is the policy conflict over Haiti in the early 1990s. The Department of Defense (DOD) was skeptical of the Haiti mission in general and did not want to commit any forces to an ill-defined mission there. DOD thus insisted it would not insert troops into a chaotic situation; the environment would have to be calm, which most agreed it was not. The Department of State held that if it could just get U.S. forces into Haiti, their mere presence would provide the leverage necessary to control the situation and facilitate a return to democratic government. State wanted U.S. forces to enter Haiti regardless of the prognosis for turmoil. The National Security Council (NSC) staff used a common technique to overcome these diametrically opposed perspectives; it fudged the issue when writing up the results of an interagency meeting, allowing both departments to believe that their positions were accepted. The Department of State was pleased that it had succeeded in getting the USS *Harlan County* dispatched to Haiti, where it was assumed it would offload U.S. troops whose presence would have a quieting effect. DOD was pleased that it was only committed to a humanitarian mission in a permissive security environment, so it just sent civil affairs and other noncombat forces. The result of the papering over of fundamental differences was an international embarrassment. The USS *Harlan County* was greeted at the docks of Port-au-Prince by a Haitian mob that threatened the ship and ultimately succeeded in forcing it to depart. During the confrontation, the Department of State was disappointed to discover that forces aboard the USS *Harlan County* were not equipped to disperse the mob. Defense was surprised the ship was ordered to Port-au-Prince but was glad to have avoided what was considered an ill-defined mission. Papering over the policy difference of opinion to permit movement to the next step in the process turned out to be a major mistake.¹⁴

Historically, policy differences on issues of major import, such as the use of force, are common, even if the departmental positions are not as predictable as is commonly assumed.¹⁵ For example, comparing the case of

Haiti to the case of Iraq, the Departments of State and Defense were again at odds, but switched their positions on the advisability of intervening. DOD leaders favored intervention, while many in the Department of State were against going to war. Even though Secretary of State Colin Powell ostensibly favored going to war, subordinate leaders did not, and the inevitable frictions made unity of effort impossible, as an inside account of the decisionmaking process on Iraq from a former defense official highlights:

A country that has its major agencies at war is not going to fight a war well. . . . And State and Defense were at war—don't let anyone tell you different. Within policy circles, it was knee-jerk venom, on both sides. Neither side was prepared to give the other a break. It began in 2001, got exacerbated during the buildup to Iraq, and stayed on.¹⁶

Sometimes, however, the national security system can produce unity of purpose in the form of clear policy on a complex contingency. Then the question becomes how best to implement the policy, beginning with a review of different strategy alternatives.

Strategy

Assuming agreement on national policy for a complex contingency, there is still the question of which strategy to employ in pursuing the policy. There is usually more than one way to solve a problem, and the alternative courses of action typically have advantages and disadvantages. Strategy is the choice of a course of action, taking into account objectives and the ways and means to achieve them, while minimizing the disadvantages and trying to maximize the advantages. Even when departments and agencies agree on policy, they can disagree strongly on the strategy for its implementation, as proved true initially on the strategy for conflict resolution in Bosnia:

In theory, the views of senior officials, including any disagreements, were then brought to the President for final policy decisions. . . . People hated to take their disagreements to the President; it was as though a failure to agree somehow reflected badly on each of them, and consensus, rather than clarity, was often the highest goal of the process. . . . Although no one could ignore the crisis, there was little enthusiasm for any proposal of action, no matter what it was. The result was often inaction or half-measure[s] instead of a clear strategy.¹⁷

The inability to generate and sustain clear strategy choices, amending them as circumstances dictate, is not a new phenomenon or one limited to any particular administration. Decades ago, Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson unleashed a scathing criticism of the tendency of the National Security Council, its staff, and its processes to produce incoherent strategy:

The American people and even the Congress get the impression that when the [National Security] Council meets, fresh and unambiguous strategies are decided upon. This is not the case, though it ought to be the case. The NSC spends most of its time readying papers that mean all things to all men. An NSC paper is commonly so ambiguous and so general that the issues must all be renegotiated when the situation to which it was supposed to apply actually arises. By that time it is too late to take anything but emergency action. . . . Because the NSC does not really produce strategy, the handling of day-to-day problems is necessarily left to the Departments concerned.¹⁸

The inability to conceive clear strategy choices and act upon them is still a problem for the national security system, according to the Government Accountability Office (GAO).¹⁹ After considering all the classified and unclassified documents that collectively define the U.S. strategy in Iraq, the GAO concluded the United States still lacks the key characteristics of an effective national strategy.

Plans

It is impossible to effectively plan for executing a strategy if the strategic course of action is not first agreed upon. In DOD parlance, if the commander’s intent is not clear, then sound, detailed plans cannot be formulated. Yet most commentary on the lack of interagency cooperation passes quickly over policy and strategy differences and stresses the importance of planning. Perhaps it is thought that interagency planning activity will highlight strategy differences for resolution. Sometimes this happens. For example, it is commonly believed that the Clinton administration’s Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD–56), “Managing Complex Contingency Operations,” was a step forward in improving interagency strategy and planning.²⁰ It evolved from experience in preparing for the intervention in Haiti and was used for Bosnia and Kosovo and other complex contingencies. It provided an approach to identifying issues and possible solutions, using an Executive Committee of Assistant Secretary–rank

individuals from the diverse agencies involved. It was reinforced with common planning products and activities, including an integrated, interagency political-military implementation plan, interagency rehearsals and after-action reviews, and training programs for participants. A strength of PDD-56 was that it allowed senior officials to meet and review policy and strategy options, identifying differences and alternative courses of action that then guided more detailed planning efforts.

Such planning activities, however, may expose strategy differences without resolving them. This certainly proved true in the war on terror in the case of information strategy and plans. Realizing that public support is critical to a successful counterterror strategy, an interagency effort was launched to develop an information campaign immediately following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Generic themes for the information campaign and more specific themes by region and country were developed by DOD, which coordinated and obtained interagency approval for them. These themes were passed to U.S. Central Command approximately a month after the attacks and were used to guide psychological operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Shortly thereafter, the Department of State produced a revised set of themes that differed in important respects from those of the Department of Defense. In general, the Department of State wanted less aggressive themes that would make it possible to secure the broadest range of support, whereas DOD was trying to clearly demarcate U.S. policy and rally others against the use of terrorism under any circumstances. Even with National Security Council leadership weighing in, the two departments were unable to reach agreement; different themes reflected different views on policy and strategy issues.²¹

From this inauspicious start, the interagency planning effort deteriorated to the point where national-level themes were not developed for Operation *Iraqi Freedom*. Other than periodic public affairs guidance on issues of the day, no other national guidance for strategic information plans was released. In short, instead of leading to the resolution of strategy differences, the planning was abandoned, with the result that psychological operations in Iraq were less effective.²² The Department of Defense 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review concluded that victory in the war on terror ultimately depends on strategic communications, but the report did not identify means to resolve longstanding tensions between the different strategic communications disciplines that are led by different government agencies.

Nevertheless, if policy and strategy are agreed upon, planning is the logical next step. For example, the National Security Strategy for the war

on terror led naturally to the decision to empower the Department of State to improve planning and execution of plans for reconstruction and stabilization operations.²³ On December 7, 2005, the Bush administration replaced PDD-56 with National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44), "Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization." In contrast to the Clinton administration's NSC-centric approach, NSPD-44 gave the Secretary of State responsibility for coordinating and leading the integration effort (see table 3-1). The Department of State's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) leads the process. NSPD-44 is backed up with an Interagency Management System (IMS) that was intended to push integration down through regional and country-level U.S. Government implementing bodies so that it would affect operations in the field. IMS is based on three levels of civil-military teams designed to ensure a unified effort in a complex contingency. At the national level, the Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group provides planning guidance and mobilizes resources. This team is co-chaired by the regional assistant secretary of state for the country in question, the S/CRS coordinator, and the appropriate National Security Council senior director. At the theater level, the Integration Planning Cell, a group of subject and regional experts, deploys to the relevant geographic combatant command or multinational headquarters to assist with interagency planning. Finally, Advance Civilian Teams deploy directly to the Embassy to provide the Ambassador with support in managing "interagency field management, deployment, and logistics capabilities, developing and implementing activities through regional field teams."²⁴ The advertised value of the IMS is that it "clarifies roles, responsibilities, and processes for mobilizing and supporting interagency reconstruction and stabilization operations [providing] the tools to ensure unity of effort, guided by whole-of-government planning."²⁵

PDD-56 relied explicitly on the "personal accountability of Presidential appointees" to ensure integration, and NSPD-44 implicitly does the same. Unfortunately, in both cases the political leadership proved unwilling or unable to execute the intent of the Presidential directives. Like PDD-56, NSPD-44 has not been fully implemented. The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization was understaffed and was not provided sufficient authority or funding to execute its responsibilities.²⁶ Its first coordinator resigned in frustration after only 14 months of service.²⁷ The GAO found in 2007 that the NSPD-44 framework has never been fully applied, is not approved in its entirety by the NSC, contains unclear guidance, and is resisted by some departments and agencies

Table 3–1. **Comparison of Presidential Decision Directive 56 and National Security Presidential Directive 44**

1997 Presidential Decision Directive 56¹

Scope: “Complex contingency operations” such as peace operations and humanitarian intervention that presumably will not involve combat

Coordinating Structure:

Executive Committee (EXCOM) of diverse agencies (Assistant Secretary rank), normally chaired by National Security Council (NSC)

Products and Process:

Policy: EXCOM develops policy options for consideration by senior policymakers

Planning: integrated, interagency political-military implementation plan

Execution: rehearsal identifies implementation issues; during execution, regular reviews ensure milestones are met and adjustments made

After-action Review: post-event assessment of interagency performance captures lessons

Training: Deputy Assistant Secretary–level managers trained in planning and execution

Agency Review and Implementation: agencies assure lessons disseminated and acted upon

Assessment of Utility:

Helpful for policy coordination but too detailed to keep pace with events. Never fully implemented because departments and agencies were skeptical of its value.

2005 National Security Presidential Directive 44²

Scope: “Reconstruction and stabilization” activities for areas at risk of, in, or in transition from, conflict; clearly can include sustained combat operations

Coordinating Structure:

Policy Coordination Committee (Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary rank) of diverse agencies, chaired by State and NSC staff member

Supporting Structure, Products, and Process:

Supporting Interagency Management System structure at multiple levels:

- Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group at the Assistant Secretary level
- Integration Planning Cell that deploys to Combatant Commands
- Advance Civilian Teams that deploy to the field to support the Chief of Mission

Tools to ensure unity of effort:³

- Interagency conflict assessment methodology
- Essential tasks matrix and best practice guides
- Interagency process to capture/share lessons

Assessment of Utility:

Helpful focal point in State Department for interagency coordination, but State’s coordinator does not have clear authority or resources to implement the directive’s intent

that consider it too cumbersome and time consuming for the results it produces. Steps are being taken to address concerns, but the GAO concludes that differences in planning capacities and procedures among U.S. Government agencies pose obstacles to effective coordination.²⁸

NSPD-44, like its predecessor, PDD-56, is a helpful attempt to forge a common set of procedures for interagency planning for contingencies, but it must overcome powerful, entrenched agency cultures. The same is true of other planning initiatives, like the repeated attempts in recent years by the National Security Council and the Departments of Defense and State to improve cooperation on war plans. Bureaucracies exist to pursue mandates, and they recruit, train, and reward staff who do a good job of understanding and pursuing those mandates. In turn, staffs that are geared toward fulfilling those mandates naturally generate an agency culture that colors the way they interpret a national security problem. DOD personnel, who live in a planning culture, often recommend more national-level planning as a solution to insufficient interagency collaboration. On the other hand, the Department of State, sensitive to subtle and fast-moving political dynamics, tends to regard planning as a waste of time or, worse, an exercise that empowers DOD to control outcomes based on its operational needs and irrespective of political developments. These different agency cultures are enduring. One study of interagency coordination problems cites a 1961 Joint Staff memorandum that indicated the difficulty of achieving coordinated interdepartmental planning because other agencies of the U.S. Government do not understand “systematic planning procedures,” and each agency has its own approach to solving problems:

The State Department, for example, values flexibility and its ability to respond to daily changes in a situation more than it values planning, while the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] is reluctant to coordinate for security reasons, and the former U.S. Information Agency held Defense and the CIA at arm’s length for fear that it would be seen as a mere dispenser of propaganda.²⁹

Despite the efforts of the Clinton and Bush administrations, it is still the case that the Department of State is suspicious of interagency planning, the CIA is secretive about its activities, and DOD believes that more systematic and detailed planning is the preferred solution.

Execution

The absence of common policy, strategy, and plans notwithstanding, the United States often executes complex contingencies. In doing so, it confronts impediments to unity of effort that are particularly deleterious to effective operations. For example, command and control of interagency operations is contested and confused in contingencies, with multiple chains of command operating between Washington-based headquarters of diverse agencies and their representatives in the field. As Secretary of State Rice noted with respect to the authority of Chiefs of Mission at American Embassies:

It's become an almost impossible task of coordinating massive numbers of agencies on the ground. Whatever we do back here in Washington, if it doesn't translate onto the ground, if the decisions aren't made on a timely basis on the ground, things are not going to flow properly.³⁰

The Ambassador's "almost impossible task" is truly impossible during a complex contingency when large military forces are involved. This proved to be the case in Iraq. A former Marine colonel dispatched by the Pentagon to help set up the Iraqi civil defense corps recalls the impact of competing chains of command:

It was Alice in Wonderland. . . . I mean, I was so depressed the second time we went there, to see the lack of progress and the continuing confusion. The lack of coherence. You'd get two separate briefs, two separate cuts on the same subject, from the military and from the civilians.³¹

As a recent study noted, if the personalities of the Ambassador and the senior military officer in charge click, then a great deal can be accomplished, but this is neither the norm nor a reliable solution. In reality, the "United States has not had a structured solution for civil-military integration in irregular conflict at the country level since CORDS [Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support]."³²

Ineffective resource allocation is another equally critical and persistent problem in executing complex contingencies well. The Federal budget system is not capable of linking strategy and plans to resource allocation. Departments and agencies give precedence to their priorities at the expense of executing national missions.³³ Whenever new offices, cross-agency initiatives, or operations begin without additional resources being

provided, participating departments and agencies typically resist providing them. They naturally prefer to husband resources for what they consider their primary missions. For example, the lack of new funding ultimately contributed to the demise of the Emergency Mobilization Preparedness Board in the Reagan administration, despite initial successes and the high priority otherwise accorded the effort.³⁴ Many attempts at interagency collaboration flounder as soon as it is clear that the resources required for the effort must come from existing programs cherished by the departments and agencies.

In addition, civilian agencies lack the resources to surge in support of major operations, and Congress is not inclined to provide them, as the case of the Department of State's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization illustrates. Moreover, many of the capabilities required for complex contingencies fall outside the primary mandates of the major national security organizations. Since they give priority to their core missions, capabilities required for executing nontraditional missions are frequently lacking or inadequate. The Department of State, for example, has never been inclined to resource public diplomacy as well as it does private diplomacy, and, as the Secretary of Defense recently noted, DOD similarly is not inclined to resource capabilities for irregular warfare.³⁵

Evaluation

PDD-56 and NSPD-44 both required postcontingency operation assessments that would produce lessons to improve performance in subsequent operations. There are several impediments to such evaluations of performance. First, the same knowledge management impediments that limit issue assessment prior to policy development hamper the gathering, analysis, and dissemination of lessons. More importantly, the system as a whole is disinclined to constantly and objectively assess performance. Doing so exceeds available resources and opens up political vulnerabilities for an administration. Critical performance reviews could undermine the political support necessary for sustained engagement or could damage the administration more generally. The Bush administration's reaction to the Iraq Study Group report is a case in point. The President praised the report as serious and constructive but rejected its findings and recommendations, which ran counter to his administration's policies. Finally, hard-won wisdom on any given issue is often lost during political transitions as key leaders depart, although steps have been recommended to minimize the impact.³⁶ All these phases of complex contingency management—from policy through evaluation—have a common element: the lack of unity of

effort. Over the course of recent decades, interagency planning, training, and education initiatives have helped diminish but have not eliminated the strong impediments to interagency collaboration, which persist as a problem despite nearly universal agreement that eliminating them is a prerequisite for success in the war on terror. Under the current national security system, neither lead agencies, nor lead individuals, nor committees are effective at integrating the elements of national power routinely. This suggests that the core problem for interagency integration is the relative weakness of the integrating structures available to the President. As one combatant commander well respected for his experience in managing complex contingencies has argued:

There was no single authority in the bureaucracy to coordinate the significant programs we CINCs [Commanders in Chief] designed. The uncoordinated funding, policy decisions, authority, geographic assignments, and many other issues separated State, Defense, Congress, the National Security Council, and other government agencies, making it difficult to pull complex engagement plans together.³⁷

Origins of a Core Problem

The architects of the National Security Act of 1947 confronted a world where competing ideologies, weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, and historical trends presented the United States with an unprecedented set of complex security challenges that required integrated responses. In a favorable summary of the Eberstadt Report,³⁸ which was a precursor to the new legislation, an assistant to President Harry S. Truman highlighted the report's emphasis on integrating the elements of national power:

No less important than the integration of our foreign and our military policies is the integration of the military program into the civilian economy. Modern wars bring the total resources of combatant countries into the conflict.³⁹

Those drafting the new national security act thought the President needed additional tools to assist with integrating national security. They created the CIA and the position of Secretary of Defense to help integrate intelligence and military capabilities. They also created the National Security Council to help unify the efforts of multiple departments and agencies involved in national security. Draft language for the 1947 act initially pro-

vided that the National Security Council's role would be "to *integrate* . . . policies," but at President Truman's insistence, the wording was changed to "advise the President with respect to the integration of . . . policies."⁴⁰ Defending Presidential prerogatives, President Truman ensured that the NSC remained advisory in nature.

Thus, one legacy of the National Security Act of 1947 is stronger functional organizations for national security, but a relatively weak mechanism to ensure that the collective efforts of those functional organizations are well integrated. Only the President can direct the cabinet officers to collaborate, but he does not have the time to do so. On occasion, particularly in a national security crisis, the President can convene the National Security Council and oversee the integration of disparate activities. But for routine integration of policy and its execution, and even for high-priority initiatives of long duration, he must delegate the responsibility for integration. In fact, the need to delegate has escalated since 1947. The number of departments and agencies involved in the growing number of national security missions is increasing. In this way, the same complex environment that encumbers the President with a growing set of responsibilities also increases the demand for integration across departments and agencies.

In the past decade, a variety of nonstructural adjustments to the national security system have been tried in the hope of improving unity of effort. These initiatives—primarily process, education, and training reforms—are useful and make cooperation easier, but none has really fixed the problem. As a congressional investigation into the performance of PRTs concluded, unity of effort is impossible without Presidentially delegated unity of command:

Coordination is necessary, but not sufficient. While we know that many people in many places are trying to make improvements to interagency planning and operations throughout the government, without direct Presidential involvement, these efforts are not enough. Action is needed. At the end of the day, someone has to be in charge. The subcommittee found a lack of unity of direction and "unity of command." This results in a lack of unity of purpose. Among the efforts at staffing, training, applying lessons learned, and planning, there is no one person or organization in the lead for the "whole of government." When "no further action" is taken, but the mission is not complete, someone must step up to lead. That leader must

be empowered to direct the “whole of government” PRT, and larger, stabilization and reconstruction efforts.⁴¹

Better means of assisting the President with integration must be found, and that means a better mechanism to which the President can delegate authority as he sees fit. Unfortunately, the structural remedies for improving unity of command on interagency missions with which we are most familiar also prove to be most inadequate. Therefore, creating unity of effort in interagency missions will require more dramatic changes, as argued in the following section.

Solutions to the Problem

Some combination of new authorities and structures that would allow the President to delegate authority for interagency integration is needed. To date, the most common means for generating unity of effort through Presidentially delegated authority are two-fold: assigning responsibility for integration to a lead agency, or asking a senior individual, usually on the National Security Council staff, to oversee the integration. These options and variations on them are considered first.

Lead-agency Approaches

The common means for generating unity of effort through Presidentially delegated authority is assigning responsibility for integration to a lead agency to oversee the integration. On occasion, this approach works. It is particularly successful when the required degree of collaboration with other departments and agencies is low, and the activity in question is widely acknowledged to be the singular responsibility of a particular organization. Otherwise, as long experience teaches, the lead-agency concept does not work well for reasons readily identified by senior participants at a conference convened to consider limitations on the conduct of foreign policy:

Participants argued that . . . issues are too narrowly defined as either a military, diplomatic, or assistance challenge. The result of such a focused definition is that the tasking ends up going to one agency. Inevitably, the agency develops and invests in a particular implementation strategy, but when the administration tries to integrate that strategy into some sort of an inter-agency process, the result is an uphill turf battle.⁴²

More succinctly, as a senior National Security Council official who served in four administrations notes, *lead agency* really means *sole agency*, as no one will follow the lead agency if its directions substantially affect their organizational equities.⁴³

Variations on lead-agency approaches are possible, but they really amount to giving an individual from an agency, such as a special envoy, greater authority, or creating new organizations within agencies that have more authority for interagency coordination (for example, the National Counterterrorism Center [NCTC], S/CRS, or Joint Interagency Task Force–South). Both empowered individuals and new organizations are considered below. Here it is only necessary to note that to the extent a lead individual or new organization is seen to reflect the organizational interests of one department or agency, its credibility for integrating interagency effort is correspondingly reduced. In this regard, the lead-agency approach is intrinsically handicapped except for those problems that require only a modest degree of interagency collaboration and are widely perceived as such.

Lead-individual Approaches

The inadequacy of the lead-agency approach has encouraged Presidents to rely more on lead individuals to oversee integration—either new people in new positions of authority, often called “czars,” or the National Security Advisor or some other senior official on the National Security Council staff. This practice also fails consistently, as the individuals in question simply lack the authority to direct the activities of cabinet officers. The actual authority given to czars varies widely but in practice is quite limited. They are “advisors” to the President and are not empowered to command cabinet officers or their subordinates to take action. Senators questioning President Bush’s war czar for Iraq and Afghanistan, Lieutenant General Douglas Lute, made this point during Lute’s confirmation hearings:

Your appointment represents a devastating critique of the national security apparatus of this White House, because all you’re being asked to do was what [National Security Advisor Stephen] Hadley and [Secretary of State Condoleezza] Rice were supposed to be doing for the last several years—identify problems, coordinate resources, bring them to the attention of the President, get Presidential direction. And that has been abysmal. . . . I’m afraid that your position will be someone who’s

there to take the blame but to not really have the kind of access to the President and the resources you need to do the job.⁴⁴

While harsh, this critique rings true. How can a lieutenant general be expected to impose order on complex interagency operations that defy the best efforts of the National Security Advisor and other senior leaders on the National Security Council?

Since czars never outrank or have de facto directive authority over departments and agencies, they must cajole and persuade them to cooperate by drawing attention to problems and suggesting solutions. Many resign in frustration after discovering they cannot accomplish the mission in the face of cabinet-level resistance, or they work their agenda informally as best they can. The underlying assumption in the underempowered lead-individual approach is that merely tracking implementation carefully will ensure unity of effort. This assumption is false and misidentifies the core problem. The problem is not so much lack of attention to the issue, which a full-time, dedicated lead individual could correct; it is the lack of authority to require integrated efforts.

Accordingly, many recommendations for interagency reform increase the authority of the lead individual. The easiest way to do so is to use an existing, well-recognized institution: the National Security Council. The weaker option is to empower NSC staff for limited interagency functions, such as planning. The Center for Strategic and International Studies' *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols* series of reports makes several interesting recommendations in this regard. It recommended that the President designate a Deputy Assistant to the President on the NSC Staff with lead responsibility for "integrating agency strategies and plans and ensuring greater unity of effort among agencies during execution."⁴⁵ In a subsequent report, the recommendation was changed to establishing a new NSC Senior Director and office dedicated to integrating interagency planning for complex contingency operations because it seemed to fit better with the integrated NSC and Homeland Security Council structures also recommended by the report. Either way, the purpose of the position and office was to oversee interagency planning for complex contingencies. It was to be given staff and resources sufficient to support at least three simultaneous planning efforts.⁴⁶ The problem with such recommendations is that even if the interagency planning is done, departments and agencies have proven willing to ignore the planning during implementation if it militates against their organizational interests.

A more comprehensive approach, sometimes attributed to Richard Nixon, is to give the National Security Advisor supra-cabinet authority for overseeing the implementation of all national security policy, a sort of “super-secretary,” half–White House and half–cabinet official position.⁴⁷ The President would still personally guide strategic planning and delegate authority to the National Security Advisor to coordinate the interagency process,⁴⁸ as the President’s time constraints permit. But because the President will not be able to personally direct the integration of department and agency efforts on the vast majority of national security missions, the new National Security Advisor (or super secretary) would take on these duties and be empowered for that purpose.

The problem with recommendations to strengthen the National Security Advisor is that doing so just reinforces the conflicting roles that all National Security Advisors must play:

There is, first of all, the inherent tension between the need of the national security adviser to be an effective and trustworthy honest broker among the different players in the decision-making process and the desire of the president to have the best possible policy advice, including advice from his closest foreign policy aide. The roles are inherently in conflict. Balancing them is tricky and possible only if the adviser has earned the trust of the other key players. As Sandy Berger argued, “You have to be perceived by your colleagues as an honest representative of their viewpoint, or the system breaks down.”⁴⁹

In the current system, anything that empowers the National Security Advisor as an independent advisor to the President at the expense of the cabinet officials will ultimately undermine implementation. Arguably, Nixon tried this idea informally by allowing Henry Kissinger to serve as both Secretary of State and National Security Advisor. In that case, the super-secretary was able to centralize some policymaking but could not improve implementation of institutional resistance. As Kissinger reflected: “It did not work. . . . For two years I was exposed to the charge that I had an unfair predominance over the policymaking process. . . . My dual position was, in fact, a handicap and a vulnerability.”⁵⁰ Thus, powerful National Security Advisors like Henry Kissinger found that even when they “won” at policy development, the cabinet-level agencies could resist the policy during implementation.

To safeguard the National Security Advisor's honest broker role, some recommend that other senior individuals or positions be given integration duties—"czars," but ones properly empowered to effect integration. Kori Schake and Bruce Berkowitz at the Hoover Institute have recommended "Presidential policy directors" who would be the national security equivalent of combatant commanders in their ability to exercise authority on behalf of the President. These new positions would be based in the Executive Office of the President and in effect would be new structures that would concentrate policy development in the White House.⁵¹ In this approach, the National Security Advisor is free to continue to function as an "honest broker" for running the policymaking apparatus, and the empowered czar tends to implementation. This option gives a Presidential representative not only a lot of top-down, directive authority, but also access to diverse expertise as he would be overseeing groups with representatives from all the relevant departments and agencies. It is a viable option for integrating interagency missions, but it has two limitations. First, it is focused on implementation and does not include policymaking. If policy is the result of compromise, it can be unclear and difficult to implement well. Second, it is a directive and not a collaborative option, so the level of support from the participating departments and agencies would probably be less than desirable.

Reform or Create New Organizations

Some recommendations make the case that reformed or new organizations rather than empowered individuals are required to ensure integration. Often but not always, this involves reforms to the NSC. One popular recommendation is to bring back the Eisenhower-era Operations Coordinating Board (OCB), the purpose of which was to follow up on all NSC decisions and make sure they were implemented. The OCB met each week at the Department of State with diverse interagency representation. More than 40 interagency working groups were established with experts for various countries and subjects, and the 24-person staff of the OCB supported and oversaw the work of these groups.⁵² Alarmed by the inability of the national security system to effectively implement decisions to intervene in complex contingencies, many believe the NSC needs some sort of dedicated staff effort to monitor and direct the way the various departments and agencies implement policy.

While the OCB had the advantage of dedicated personnel monitoring implementation, it nonetheless suffered from the same interagency committee dynamics that limit the utility of more contemporary interagency

committees. Critics contended the OCB's interagency committees were ineffectual, particularly Senator Henry Jackson, whose Senate Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery held hearings in 1960–1961 on the Eisenhower system. Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson called it “agreement by exhaustion,”⁵³ and George Kennan, Paul Nitze, Robert Lovett, and other former Truman administration officials criticized the system so thoroughly that it was discredited for decades. They insisted the system was “ponderous, bureaucratic machinery” that suffered from all the weaknesses of committees:

Composed of representatives of many agencies, its members were not free to adopt the broad, statesmanlike attitude desired by the President, but, rather, were ambassadors of their own departments, clinging to departmental rather than national views. To make matters worse, critics added, the NSC system by its very nature was restricted to continuing and developing already established policies and was incapable of originating new ideas or major innovations.⁵⁴

Eisenhower's critics thought they were attacking his administration, but they really identified a more general problem with interagency committees headed by NSC or other officials. When departmental interests conflict, interagency bodies tend to stalemate over policy or dilute it by reaching lowest common denominator agreements and papering over differences. Lowest common denominator policies permit action, but the departments and agencies involved in execution are provided with considerable leeway in their interpretation of policy direction. As a result, implementation suffers as organizations fail to take important actions or work at odds with each other. As Jackson's subcommittee noted:

Department heads have traditionally tried to keep the product of coordination from binding them tightly or specifically to undesired courses of action. The net result has tended to be “coordination” on the lowest common denominator of agreement, which is often tantamount to no coordination at all.⁵⁵

The tendencies identified by the Jackson subcommittee were not unique to the Eisenhower administration but rather persist across administrations. One of President Reagan's National Security Advisors terminated an interagency structure, dismissing it as only a “talking society.”⁵⁶ Even President George H.W. Bush's administration, which instituted a well-regarded

NSC system that has generally remained intact ever since, experienced problems with the general ineffectiveness of interagency committees:

When it came time for decision, most representatives . . . came armed with a mandate to defend at all costs their particular bureaucratic sacred cows. But otherwise they were unwilling to support any policy decision in which they took no interest and voiced no opinion. No one from the Treasury could speak for anyone else. The Department of State would be represented by as many as ten or fifteen separate offices or bureaus, each claiming primacy within the department on at least a part of the action. Representatives of OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] . . . and JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] . . . typically engaged amiably in the debate but then refused to commit (or “reserved”) on any decision or even to disclose what course of action their superiors might wish to see adopted. The intelligence community’s role was to demonstrate that any possible course of action was fraught with danger or otherwise doomed to fail, while advancing the seemingly inconsistent view that events in the outside world were driven by deep impersonal forces not susceptible to human intervention.⁵⁷

The Clinton administration’s interagency committees similarly had difficulty resolving issues: “Interagency Working Groups (IWGs) quickly became very large and unwieldy; different IWGs with overlapping responsibilities disagreed on policy options, and senior NSC officials were reluctant ‘to butt heads’ to resolve the differences.”⁵⁸ Interagency decisionmaking in the Bush administration on Iraq reflected the same lack of authority: “[o]n issue after issue, where there were disagreements they were not brought to the surface to be presented to the President for decision. Rather, basic disagreements were allowed to remain unresolved—as long as a degree of consensus could be produced on immediate next steps.”⁵⁹ The National Security Advisor “relied on her practice of bridging or blending key elements of the views of several interagency players—an approach that tended to paper over, rather than resolve, important differences of opinion.”⁶⁰

Later historians gave President Eisenhower better marks for his management of national security strategy, but it was not because the system he employed was reconsidered and found effective. It was because it became apparent that, on matters of significant import, like the Suez crisis of 1956, the Quemoy and Matsu offshore Chinese island crises of 1955 and 1958,

and the Lebanon crisis of 1958, Eisenhower bypassed the system and worked crisis resolution directly with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and other key advisors in small meetings in the White House. In fact, this is the norm for almost all Presidents.

In short, having someone in the White House tracking progress on implementation is better than not tracking implementation. However, NSC staff members do not have sufficient authority to direct the activities of cabinet officers and their subordinates. Putting someone on the NSC staff in charge of monitoring department and agency implementation activities is really just a reformulation of the ineffective lead-individual approach discussed above, with more or less fanfare, depending on who the individual is.

Another popular recommendation for improving unity of effort through reformed structures is to increase the membership and scope of the President's security councils. For example, making the Secretary of the Treasury a statutory member of the National Security Council is a recurring idea.⁶¹ Truman had directed the Secretary of the Treasury to attend all meetings, and subsequent Presidents also have asked for attendance either regularly or depending on the issue being addressed. The Clinton administration officially expanded NSC membership to include the Secretary of the Treasury, and other economic policy leaders such as the U.S. Representative to the United Nations and the newly created Assistant to the President for Economic Policy (who also headed Clinton's newly created National Economic Council). Yet some feel making the Secretary of the Treasury a statutory member of the NSC would provide more legitimacy and authority for integrating economic concerns with more traditional diplomatic and defense issues.

More recently, recommending the amalgamation of the National Security Council and the Homeland Security Council has become popular. Some argue that combining the two into a single organization with a single staff would "greatly enhance the Federal government's ability to develop holistic strategies and policies, and . . . ensure that the homeland security aspects of national security policy are also supported by the political and bureaucratic power of the White House."⁶²

As with the lead-agency and lead-individual options, this solution misidentifies the core problem. Expanding or consolidating membership assumes that temporary collocation of senior department and agency representatives will improve unity of effort. But again, the problem is not lack of opportunity to share information, and expanding membership or combining advisory panels will not solve the problem for the President. Adding

members to already ineffectual interagency committees still leaves the President without an effective integrating mechanism. In fact, simply expanding the number of strong leaders and diverse functional interests on an interagency advisory committee to the President may just reduce the chances that it can function effectively. Like the ever-popular recommendations to provide special advisors to the President for science and technology or some other important subject or interest area, they simply expand the President's span of control problem without providing the means for anyone other than the President to actually integrate the diverse departmental and agency activities in pursuit of national objectives.

Finally, it is possible to create new organizations with interagency representation and charge them with integration responsibilities as a means to facilitate unity of effort. For example, the Center for Strategic and International Studies has recommended new structures be used for each complex contingency. An Interagency Task Force in the field and a headquarters element that could deploy to support it would be used to integrate the efforts of all departments and agencies and achieve greater unity of effort on the ground.⁶³ This prescription was applied to some extent by the Interagency Management System noted above.

Other new interagency structures also have been created or are under way. At the regional level, each combatant command has a joint interagency task force, and the recently created U.S. Africa Command will have even broader representation from different agencies. At the national level, the most prominent recent new structure is the National Counterterrorism Center. The 9/11 Commission recommended the creation of the NCTC to improve interagency strategic intelligence and operational planning in the war on terror. The NCTC "is responsible for conducting net assessments of the terrorist threat and strategic operational planning with the goal of integrating all instruments of national power," but it does not have responsibility for actual execution of operations.

The NCTC, like S/CRS and all other such new interagency structures, is having difficulty pursuing its mandate with respect to information-sharing and clarifying its role and authority vis-à-vis other counterterrorism organizations.⁶⁴ While such organizations theoretically could be helpful, they are not typically productive because of their limited authority. To begin with, they do not control resources and must fight for the most rudimentary support, such as staff and facilities. This proved true for the National Counter Intelligence Executive,⁶⁵ Department of State's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence's (ODNI's) National Counterterrorism

Center.⁶⁶ The same is true of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams used in Iraq and Afghanistan. In what might seem like a Freudian slip, these novel interagency structures were often referred to early on as *provisional* reconstruction teams by government and news media alike. Judging from the way they were staffed and resourced, they were indeed provisional.⁶⁷

Second, the authority of all these interagency structures is limited enough or ambiguous enough that they cannot direct the behavior of any department or agency. Hence, they have difficulty getting the departments and agencies of the national security system to act in a collaborative manner. An organization like the NCTC is located in a parent national security organization, ODNI, which limits its perceived objectivity. Its mandate is limited to net assessments and planning, it cannot intervene to ensure operations are consistent with policy, and it does not have sufficient authority and resources to produce desired outcomes. It is not uncommon to see the leaders of such organizations depart in frustration. Because such new, cross-functional organizations are manifestly underempowered to execute the responsibilities they are given, an obvious option is to create a version that is fully empowered to integrate the activities of multiple departments and agencies.

Cross-functional Teams

Finally, cross-functional teams are another new organizational structure that could be used to create better interagency integration. Small, empowered interagency teams have been recommended in testimony to Congress as a more collaborative and flexible option for improving unity of purpose and effort.⁶⁸ A recent interagency long-range collaborative study effort called Project Horizon recommended similar structures, calling them “interagency fusion groups”:

[w]orkshop participants identified the requirement for the President to have a streamlined ability to form issue-focused, time-limited interagency bodies with meaningful executive authority. This institutional capability would enable the prompt assembly of a critical mass of expertise, experience, and resources from all appropriate agencies under the leadership of an empowered senior officer to plan and execute unified U.S. government action in a specific domain for a finite period under clear sunset provisions. The formation of these groups would be initiated by the President, in close consultation with Congress. These limited life entities would address those longer-term challenges such as energy security, environmental and

health security, and economic competitiveness, as well as more immediate and sustained crisis response actions.⁶⁹

While some recommendations for cross-functional teams provide scant details, they all appear to share the requirement for sufficient authority and command of resources to control departments and agencies within the scope of their specific mandates. These cross-functional teams with empowered leadership must be given proper, clear, but limited objectives; control of resources, to include office space, information technology resources, administrative support, and members committed for specific durations and levels of effort; and unrestricted access to information. Members assigned to a team to represent bodies of functional expertise in diverse national security agencies must be approved by the team leader and given incentives to collaborate with the other members and not simply represent their parent organizations' interests. For example, the team leader must be able to return the experts in question to their parent organizations and must have a say on their performance evaluations. Most importantly, the President must make clear to cabinet officers (who then must make clear to their departments) that they are to support the inter-agency team's efforts rather than protect their departments. The team must be rewarded based on both individual and group performance. If the inter-agency team is not empowered in these ways, it most likely will fail.

Surprisingly, the cross-functional team approach has actually been done before on a limited basis. One could argue the Bosnian Train and Equip Program was a cross-functional team empowered by the mutual agreement of senior leaders in the Clinton administration. The Dayton peace accords paved the way for an international peacekeeping force in Bosnia. The accords were made possible by, among other things, a U.S. commitment to the Bosnian Federation government to help train and equip their forces so that they would enjoy a rough parity with Serbian military forces. The little-mentioned but ultimately successful interagency task force that conducted the mission was called the "Task Force for Military Stabilization in the Balkans." It was led by a DOD official who moved to and operated out of the Department of State with the title and rank of Ambassador, and was supported by full-time staff from three government entities. The small task force successfully raised and administered hundreds of millions of dollars in military assistance—including congressionally mandated U.S. military assistance, as well as foreign contributions—to good effect, without mishap or waste. It drew on diverse diplomatic, military, security assistance, intelligence, public affairs, and legal expertise.

The task force encountered significant institutional resistance from its members' parent organizations. CIA analysts worried that training and equipping Bosnian forces would stimulate conflict by making them more powerful than the Serbs. The U.S. Army resented task force attempts to squeeze all possible resources from the drawdown authority provided by Congress. Mid-level Department of State officials considered the train and equip effort a political liability that was difficult to square with the peacekeeping effort. Nevertheless, the task force accomplished its objectives, and it is worth noting why. The leader, James Pardew, was an extraordinarily competent individual with experience in the military and the Balkans. He benefited from the support of senior leaders in the NSC and the Departments of Defense and State, who intervened at key junctures to overcome bureaucratic resistance. Finally, the task force effectively controlled substantial resources that allowed it to achieve goals as it judged best under immediate circumstances.

Conclusion and Findings

The review offered here supports several findings.⁷⁰ First, it is clear that Presidents have long struggled with the tendency of strong Federal departments and agencies to pursue their own objectives, irrespective of broader national security objectives. Second, the need for interagency unity of purpose and effort is increasingly acute in light of the changing security environment. Third, it is clear that interagency cooperation breaks down in all phases of the national security process, from assessment to implementation, and generally for the same reasons. Fourth, targeted efforts to improve the integration of multiple agency efforts in just one phase of the process (for example, PDD-56 for planning) or for one mission (for example, NSPD-44 for postconflict stabilization and reconstruction) have not been properly empowered and consistently applied. Fifth, the most popular solutions for comprehensively improving interagency collaboration to date have not worked well. Sixth, there are alternatives that would solve the interagency collaboration problem, but they require significantly limiting the current authorities of cabinet-level officials in certain instances.

Create empowered, cross-functional teams to integrate all elements of national power.

The single most important requirement for success in complex contingencies is the rapid integration of all elements of national power, which is precisely what leaders responsible for running our aging system complain it cannot do. For 60 years, Congress and the President have tinkered

with this system, creating new functional organizations, using lead agencies and “czars” with great responsibilities and few authorities to compel collaboration across diverse departments and agencies. New procedures and education programs have also been created. None of these reforms has removed the major impediment to meaningful unified action: the fact that only the President can check the nearly independent authorities of the various national security departments and agencies. Seven years after the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the difficulties in executing a national strategy in Iraq, it is clear that the President needs additional authoritative mechanisms to which he can delegate his authority for integration when it seems prudent to do so, ones that can rein in the centrifugal tendencies of semi-autonomous and statutorily powerful cabinet officials and their agencies.

Empowered cross-functional teams, by whatever name, seem the most likely answer to the President’s need for a structure that can assist him in producing a unified effort to execute a national security mission. Such organizational structures are largely alien to the U.S. Government, although they are widely used in other organizational settings. Their very novelty will no doubt be an argument for bypassing them in favor of more familiar but less than effective solutions. It would be a mistake to accept more easily implemented but less productive options.

Seek a new National Security Act that mandates reorganization.

Reorganization has a bad reputation, because it often is undertaken without due attention to the root causes of poor performance.⁷¹ As a result, the reorganization efforts often fail to eliminate the real impediments to better performance, but do succeed in creating administrative turbulence and confusion. Reorganizations that actually address core problems, however, like the Goldwater-Nichols reforms of the Pentagon, can be quite effective. In this one critical respect, the Goldwater-Nichols legislation is indeed a model for a new National Security Act for the 21st century. The new national security act must be based on an unblinking look at the problems that actually inhibit performance, and it must accept nothing less than solutions that directly resolve those problems. Absent such fundamental change, there is no reason to expect a significant improvement in performance in complex contingencies.

Notes

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³ *The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, Report to the President*, March 31, 2005, available at <www.wmd.gov/report/wmd_report.pdf>.

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⁵ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report*, available at <www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf>; Amy Zegart, *Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of 9/11* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).

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⁷ Ike Skelton, comment available at <http://www.house.gov/hasc_democrats/Issues%20109th/NDAAY07/full%20cmte%20marks/Full%20Cmte%20issues%20205.3.06.htm>.

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⁹ Robert Gates, testimony to the House Armed Services Committee, April 15, 2008.

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¹¹ The problem analysis here draws heavily from two sources: Christopher J. Lamb, "Overcoming Interagency Problems," prepared statement before the Terrorism, Unconventional Threats, and Capabilities Subcommittee on Implementing the Global War on Terror, U.S. Congress, House Armed Services Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, March 15, 2006; and the Project on National Security Reform's Structure Working Group report.

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¹³ Off-the-record discussion with the author.

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¹⁵ Christopher Lamb, *Belief Systems and Decision Making in the Mayaguez Crisis* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1989), 252–256.

¹⁶ Joseph J. Collins, *Choosing War: The Decision to Invade Iraq and Its Aftermath*, Institute for National Strategic Studies Occasional Paper 5 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, April 2008), 26.

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¹⁹ Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Committees, *Rebuilding Iraq: More Comprehensive National Strategy Needed to Help Achieve U.S. Goals*, GAO–06–788 (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, July 11, 2006), 4.

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²⁶ Gabriel Marcella, "National Security and the Interagency Process," in *Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy*, ed. J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, July 2004).

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Notes: Table 3–1

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Reconsidering the Defense Department Mission

Terry J. Pudas and Catherine Theohary

Following the Vietnam War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States deactivated and shed a large portion of its force structure and capability that had been focused on nation-building. That which it did not shed was largely put in the Reserve Component and National Guard. A number of reasons accounted for this seeming predicament. Policy shifts following the Vietnam experience, resource allocation decisions made mainly during the years of the Reagan buildup, and a significant manpower drawdown moved resources away from hard power programs toward more socially oriented ones—considered the “peace dividend” following the end of the Cold War. U.S. Army end strength went from 772,000 in 1989 to 529,000 in 1994, a decrease of 31 percent.¹ The same percentage of cuts was made to the Reserves and National Guard. During the Cold War, defense was organized around a more capital-intensive force structure focused on deterring the Soviet Union, at the expense of more labor-intensive nation-building capabilities. After Vietnam and the creation of the all-volunteer force, the Total Force construct resulted in a significant amount of the combat service support capability—that which could be used for stabilization and reconstruction such as military police, civil affairs, engineering, and medical units—being placed in the Reserves. By the end of 1973, 66 percent of combat support/combat service support capability resided within the Reserve Component.²

Experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq have prompted a rethinking of the role of the Department of Defense (DOD) in national security. A number of intellectual camps have emerged, advocating everything from wholesale reorganization of DOD, especially the roles, missions, and future capabilities of its ground forces, to a more cautious and deliberate rebalancing approach away from the traditional high-end hard power to an emphasis on soft power capabilities. Most recently, a new camp worries

that DOD may have overstretched in the direction of soft power capabilities at the risk of drawing down too far on hard power capabilities. In an example of this debate, Defense Secretary Robert Gates was recently quoted as saying, “We should not starve the forces at war today to prepare for a war that may never come.”³ Gates has also coined a term for this military propensity: “next-war-itis.”

In contrast, Air Force Major General Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., has argued that “we need the bulk of the Army prepared to go toe-to-toe with the heaviest combat formations our adversaries can field.”⁴ Regardless of position, it seems useful to examine the most recent experiences, the changing nature of the security environment, and DOD shifts in strategic emphasis. Clearly, part of the debate centers on these real or perceived trends. Are these truly enduring trends in the future global security landscape that mandate dramatic and fundamental changes in capabilities, or are they merely shifts that could be reversible, and, if misinterpreted, might poorly posture the department to fulfill its core mission of “detering war and protecting the security of our country?” This chapter will examine the major DOD shifts in strategic emphasis as a result of recent Afghanistan and Iraq experiences, and the resultant changes to policy, strategic capabilities, and organizations. It will also propose an alternative logic for determining the right balance of capabilities and capacities for the future and provide some thoughts on managing risk in a tight budget environment.

The U.S. Military in Complex Operations

The military has a long, episodic history in nation-building. The Army’s West Point curriculum was and still is centered on civil engineering. The Army established the Corps of Engineers as a separate, permanent branch on March 16, 1802. This branch has played a significant role in all of the Nation’s wars and interventions. As the American West was being settled, the U.S. Army contributed to building bridges and roads and other construction projects.

After World War II, the military focused its efforts on rebuilding Germany and Japan. Historians largely view these protracted efforts as successes. A RAND study of nation-building⁵ details the reconstruction contributions of the U.S. military during this time. In Germany, it was instrumental in providing security, initial civil administration, and humanitarian assistance. The use of nuclear weapons and a faulty food distribution system had created a much more dire set of circumstances in Japan. In both of these nation-building experiences, the role of the U.S. military was the key to success.

Complex Operations, 1975–2003

Complex operations are those operations that require close civil-military planning and cooperation in the field. Prior to Operation *Iraqi Freedom*, the last major protracted military operation that could be labeled complex was the Vietnam War (1961–1973). The perceived failure of the military to achieve its stated objectives of containing communist aggression and winning the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese people severely altered long-held doctrinal views of the United States as “world police.” Subsequent interventions seemed to reinforce the idea that quick, decisive, and overwhelming force, not nation-building activities, is the key to a successful military operation.

The Vietnam conflict is considered by many to be the first case of a “war without fronts,” often used synonymously with the term *quagmire*. Military frustrations in fighting a protracted, limited war with little popular support led to a resolve to avoid such entrenchment in the future. Public perception of failures in Vietnam also led to the development of a policy whereby commitment of troops would require that vital national interests be at stake. Following the Vietnam War, new technological developments and tensions with the Soviet Union prompted a philosophical shift in U.S. defense thinking toward the Schlesinger doctrine, named after James Schlesinger, President Nixon’s second Secretary of Defense. Designed to balance Soviet capabilities with equal force, it was the beginning of what came to be known as the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union. In addition, the decline of popular support for the Vietnam War led to the Abrams Doctrine, named after General Creighton Abrams. Later named the Total Force Concept, it integrated Reserve and Active forces so closely that fighting a major conflict would be impossible without activating the Nation’s strategic reserves, an action that would require the full support of the American public. In a 1984 speech, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger laid out a checklist of points to consider when contemplating the use of force.⁶ Under the Weinberger Doctrine, combat troops were to be committed only with clearly defined political and military objectives, only as a last resort, and with a “reasonable assurance” of public and congressional support.

The next significant U.S. military intervention was the October 1983 invasion of Grenada, a stability operation following the overthrow of Marxist President Maurice Bishop. In this action, as in Vietnam, the U.S. force of fewer than 8,000 Soldiers found greater resistance from the opposition, and sustained significant casualties; the official death toll was 19 U.S.

Soldiers. Though a quick and decisive move by comparison, Operation *Urgent Fury* is said to have illuminated other problems within U.S. ranks, such as inadequate intelligence, poor communications, and inter-Service rivalries. In December 1989, the U.S. military invaded Panama in Operation *Just Cause*. This intervention's stated objectives included the protection of the Panama Canal, the promotion of democracy, and an end to drug trafficking. Involving over 27,000 troops, the largest operation since Vietnam quickly overwhelmed the Panamanian defense forces and resulted in the capture of Manuel Noriega.

When Iraq invaded Kuwait the following year, the United States led an international allied force coalition and deployed over 500,000 personnel to the Persian Gulf in Operation *Desert Storm*. Many attribute the success of this operation to the popular support maintained throughout, as well as the use of overwhelming force to achieve clearly articulated and "winnable" objectives. This is also thought to be a validation of the doctrine of General Colin Powell, then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Expounding on the Weinberger Doctrine, the Powell Doctrine detailed a series of specific conditions that had to be met before the United States would engage in any military action. Criteria included clear objectives, risk analyses, public and international support, and a plausible exit strategy. This has been interpreted to mean that to avoid endless entanglement (that is, a quagmire), the United States should not involve itself in nation-building exercises.

When troops were sent to Somalia in 1992 in Operation *Restore Hope* to reinforce a United Nations humanitarian famine relief mission, the U.S. military found itself again engaged in peacekeeping and nation-building activities. However, a firefight in 1993 in which many U.S. troops were killed led to a hasty withdrawal.

In 1994, in Operation *Uphold Democracy*, U.S. troops were sent to Haiti in an effort to restore President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power and stave off a potential refugee crisis. After the invasion, troops remained to pursue a nation-building agenda of peacekeeping, humanitarian, and engineering activities to promote stability. However, deteriorating stability over a 5-year period led the military to recommend withdrawal in 1999.

Operation *Deliberate Force* in 1995 was the largest North Atlantic Treaty Organization allied military action of its kind and is cited as the only recent example of a successful limited war. Two weeks of overwhelming precision airstrikes on Bosnia and Herzegovina brought warring sides to the negotiating table and ultimately led to a peace settlement in Dayton, Ohio.

Complex Operations, 2003–Present

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld sought to increase force readiness and reduce troop presence within a theater using high-technology combat systems and platforms, a concept popularly known within the U.S. military as *transformation*. The beginning phases of Operation *Enduring Freedom* in Afghanistan in October 2001 and Operation *Iraqi Freedom* in March 2003 are examples of this concept in practice. In Iraq, precision strikes and overwhelming force from the air quickly toppled the Ba’athist regime. However, the U.S. military’s emphasis on airstrikes and a small ground force footprint is largely considered to have contributed to instability and the rise of the insurgents we are battling today. It should be noted that the number of ground troops to be employed in the operation was not without controversy. In 2003, then-Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki was vocal in his view that the military’s plan called for insufficient numbers of ground forces to be able to secure the country’s borders and protect internal infrastructures.⁷ Rather than the 300,000-plus troops that General Shinseki recommended for postinvasion Iraq, in May 2003 there were a mere 37,350 total troops in theater that could have been used to assist in stabilization and reconstruction efforts.⁸ Instead, these troops were focused mostly on traditional combat support.

Evolution of Doctrine

We don’t do nation-building. Criticism of nation-building in the 1990s came from a view that equated the term with international social work that was not in our national interest. For example, at a debate in October 2000, then-Governor George W. Bush said that Somalia “started off as a humanitarian mission, then changed into a nation-building mission and that’s where the mission went wrong. The mission was changed. And as a result, our nation paid a price, and so I don’t think our troops ought to be used for what’s called nation building. I think our troops ought to be used to fight and win war.”⁹ Our post-9/11 experiences revived the reality that victory in war—or “winning the peace”—is not achieved through one-time shots with massive firepower or overwhelming force, but that security is won through more soft power means that ultimately are about people. Winning the hearts and minds of the people—an activity abandoned following the Vietnam experience—requires a new, preventative, “long war”-style way of thinking.

We are nation-building once again, but with a different rationale underlying the national interest. Regarding the use of soft power to achieve U.S. objectives, Defense Secretary Robert Gates has stated that “one of the

most important lessons from our experience in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere has been the decisive role reconstruction, development, and governance play in any meaningful, long-term success.” As a result of unanticipated attacks, such as 9/11, ongoing ground struggles in Afghanistan and Iraq, and natural disasters at home and abroad, DOD roles and missions have shifted from an emphasis on purely offensive kinetic capabilities to a more balanced approach that incorporates prevention and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief as major mission focus areas. According to the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), “Preventing crises from worsening and alleviating suffering are goals consistent with American values. They are also in the United States’ interest. By alleviating suffering and dealing with crises in their early stages, U.S. forces help prevent disorder from spiraling into wider conflict or crisis. They also demonstrate the goodwill and compassion of the United States.”¹⁰

But how much of this mission should the Department of *Defense* take on? There is consensus now that ensuring national security involves more than traditional defense instruments. The debate surrounds the issue of the makeup and roles and missions of the new national security team. For DOD, this translates into a resource dilemma. How much of the DOD budget might be transferred to other Federal departments and agencies to develop the required capabilities, and how much of the Defense Department’s resources that are programmed for high-intensity conflict capabilities should be redirected toward irregular warfare and stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) capabilities?

The stated objective of Operation *Iraqi Freedom*—to liberate the Iraqi populace through regime change—was achieved quickly. However, the military and the U.S. Government generally were unprepared for the aftermath of major combat operations. The organization, capabilities, and policy of the pre-9/11 force structure were a legacy of three decades of post-Vietnam DOD “healing.” Stabilization and reconstruction had not been sufficiently, if at all, built into war planning. As a result, there was no capability in place to prevent the chaos that ensued (such as looting and violence). Because the majority of capabilities to support stabilization and reconstruction had been moved to the Reserves, there was no robust S&R capability able to rapidly deploy. This required a massive activation of what had been considered strategic reserve units and prompted a new debate concerning planning considerations for these types of complex operations. The lessons of 2003/2004 taught policymakers not only that contingency planning needs to be incorporated into plans for postcombat operations, but also that new capabilities and capacities would need to be

developed to meet the challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan. In response to the paradigmatic shifts in defense planning doctrine, DOD was quick to lead the charge in developing new organizational structures, cooperative partnerships, and initiatives to support its changing mission.

Department of Defense Directive 3000.05. From spring 2003 to fall 2005, a debate raged within DOD regarding stabilization and reconstruction. Many in the military did not readily accept responsibility for this activity and felt it was the purview of other agencies of the U.S. Government. The department finally conceded that there was an immediate need for this mission and that no other agency had the capability to fill the gap. The debate ended in November 2005 with the publication of DOD Directive 3000.05, "Military Support to Security, Stability, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations," which declared that stability operations are a DOD core mission and "shall be given priority comparable to combat operations." It established how DOD would address and develop its capabilities, capacities, and functions, and committed the department to supporting U.S. reconstruction and stabilization efforts. Stability operations tasks include helping rebuild indigenous institutions, including various types of security forces, correctional facilities, and judicial systems necessary to secure and stabilize the environment; reviving or building the private sector, including encouraging citizen-driven, bottom-up economic activity and constructing necessary infrastructure; and developing representative governmental institutions. This directive signaled a major shift in thinking for DOD, which historically has been against placing the military in the role of a stabilizing nation-builder. Many still question the proper role of DOD in creating judicial systems and the far-reaching economic development activities it has undertaken. Some also find troubling the fact that Directive 3000.05 also places the military in a position to lead and execute postconflict stabilization operations when the civilian entities cannot do so, for lack of either resources or inherent deployable capabilities.

Maritime strategy. The need for security and stability in the maritime domain is described in *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*. A key theme in the strategy is the focus on preventing conflict as well as being prepared to win potential conflicts. Under this strategy, maritime forces will be employed to build confidence and trust among nations through collective security efforts that focus on the common threats of terrorist networks, pirating, disasters, and other crises at sea. The Global Maritime Partnership initiative has been launched to serve as a catalyst for increased interoperability in support of cooperative maritime security. This concept,

originally known as “the 1,000-ship Navy,” calls for policing and protecting the maritime commons against a wide spectrum of threats. The idea behind the concept is that because such a task would require “substantially more capability than the United States or any individual nation can deliver,” a transnational network could be created that would include navies, the shipping industry, and law enforcement agencies.

The concept has been generally praised but is not without its critics. Some fear that this will be seen as a U.S. Government initiative to bend international maritime forces to an American agenda. Many obstacles to implementation exist, such as information-sharing within law enforcement and intelligence agencies, and spotty track records of cooperation with international partners.

Army Field Manual 3–0. As U.S. Army Chief of Staff General George W. Casey, Jr., asserted:

What’s clear to us is that every operation—whether it is major combat operations, irregular warfare or even peacetime engagement—will include some form of offensive operations, some form of defensive operations and some form of stability operations.¹¹

Army Field Manual (FM) 3–0, published in February 2008, is the first significant revision in Army capstone operational doctrine since 9/11, and gives stability operations, as required by the 3000.05 directive, equal status with offensive and defensive operations. Since the last edition of FM 3–0 in June 2001, historic changes to the international security environment have altered the operational environment, so the updated version captures a new operational concept where commanders employ offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously. This has major ramifications for training, planning, and decisionmaking, and represents a significant challenge to military forces.¹²

While serving as the Commanding General of Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, General David Petraeus was instrumental in shifting Army doctrine away from its traditional conventional warfare focus and instead emphasizing the importance of media as the new battlefield, taking the Army in a small wars direction that the Marine Corps had already begun to take. The Army and Marine Corps Field Manual 3–24, *Counterinsurgency*, published in late 2006, places the center of gravity of counterinsurgency in the mass of moderate civilians, recognizing that winning them over—rather than just killing in-

surgents—is the key to winning the peace. Likewise, upon assuming his position, Defense Secretary Gates immediately placed emphasis on the Stability and Reconstruction Force—much to the chagrin of the Air Force, Navy, and outgoing Secretary Rumsfeld.

Army Field Manual 3.07. Published October 2008, FM 3.07 takes the elevation of stability operations even further by emphasizing a “comprehensive approach,” which recognizes the role of not only the interagency, but also foreign governments, nongovernmental organizations, and local groups. Though civil affairs and related activities have long been a part of military operations, the recognition of the Soldier as an agent of U.S. public diplomacy abroad is new. The manual describes the “information environment” in which troops will be operating and places importance on communicating American values and beliefs to a global audience through actions and words. FM 3.07 marks a major shift in military thinking; unlike field manuals of the past, it emphasizes the importance of these activities prior to conflict rather than postconflict and in peacetime situations. Some critics of this approach point out that this means American public diplomats now wear combat boots.¹³

Recent Buildup for Complex Operations

The U.S. Government has been relying on not the civilian instruments of foreign assistance, but the military to achieve our strategic goals. This is not because DOD has grabbed the mission away from other agencies. As the government’s veritable 800-pound gorilla, it has been forced to fill the void. DOD’s role as a direct provider of foreign assistance as a share of U.S. official development assistance leaped from 5.6 percent in 2002 to 21.7 percent in 2005.¹⁴ Yet with the exception of civil affairs units, DOD efforts to build capacity for complex operations have largely amounted to a reshuffling of existing capabilities and programs and the creation of new offices. The Army budget has increased \$111 billion from 2005 through 2009, while the Navy’s has decreased by \$42 billion and the Air Force’s by \$3 billion. The Army has planned increases in military police, civil affairs, psychological operations, construction engineers, military intelligence, Special Forces, infantry, and aviation. At the same time, the Army has been reducing its troop levels in the areas of field artillery, air defense, combat engineers, armor, and combat service support headquarters.

Overall, the total force structure that is used to implement complex operations has changed considerably for the Army but very little for the other Services. This may be a manifestation of the fact that the Navy and

Air Force acknowledge their obligations but do not accept these new missions as the true future for their existence.

Training and education initiatives. In an effort to integrate the total force with senior military and civilian professionals throughout all branches of the Federal Government, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review describes the department's support for the creation of an interagency National Security Officer Corps. The department is also looking to transform National Defense University to support the education of U.S. national security professionals.

Another recent creation is the Center for Complex Operations, a DOD-led collaborative effort with the Department of State and United States Agency for International Development (USAID).¹⁵ The organization is a developing "community of practice" of civilian and military complex operations training and education institutions and practitioners. The center's goal is to enhance the U.S. Government's ability to prepare for complex operations by catalyzing cooperation, coordination, and synchronization among education, training, lessons learned, and research institutions and organizations.

The emphasis on training and preparing troops for counterinsurgency and stability operations has led some practitioners to question whether we are losing preparedness for a high-intensity conflict in a major theater. For example, at the National Training Center in Fort Irwin, California, which is the main training ground for U.S. forces, high-intensity exercises with heavy armaments such as battle tanks have been held less and less frequently over the past several years. Since 9/11, the Army has retrained about 116,000 people—nearly a quarter of the Active-duty force—for jobs more suited to small wars than big ones. People who had trained to fire artillery, for example, have been reeducated as military police. Some argue that we have already passed the point at which most artillery units will be able to retrain themselves. It will take the average unit 6–12 months to retrain with outside support. Yet General Casey said recently that Army units spending 18 months or more at home are spending part of that time honing conventional warfare tactics, and that "we are at a point now where I am comfortable, if we had to change gears pretty quickly, we'd be able to."¹⁶

Foreign Area Officers. The Foreign Area Officer (FAO) is a longstanding career track within the Army, and similar assignments now exist in each of the Services. The program identifies and trains selected officers to develop and maintain regional expertise. Army FAOs are the largest cohort,

divided into nine regions. The current regional distribution is a legacy of the Cold War, heavily weighted on Europe/Eurasia and Latin America. To reflect the changed security environment, a rebalancing is needed to develop more FAOs with North Africa/Middle East expertise. This effort is under way, but will not be immediately realized. It takes time to become an effective FAO; 4 years are needed for language training, an advanced degree in regional studies, and a regional tour. This means that more recruits will be needed to meet future demand. The personnel system has not incentivized this career track. The promotion opportunities and path to general officer from this track has been mixed, resulting in fewer officers considering this as a career option. According to some studies, the officer corps has created a culture that discourages any career track that deviates from a combat focus.

Language capabilities. In May 2007, DOD announced implementation of a pilot program for a Language Corps, to include no fewer than 1,000 members drawn from all sectors of the American population. The corps will be an entirely civilian, volunteer organization managed by DOD for the Federal sector. Members will have the opportunity to join a national pool or a dedicated pool of linguists. The national pool will consist of a large database of volunteer members with certified language skills who may be available for activation for Federal service during times of war, national emergency, or other national needs. The dedicated pool will be composed of a smaller number of members who will have contractual arrangements with dedicated Federal sponsors to perform specific responsibilities and duties and serve a specific number of days per year.

In December 2005, DOD launched a program to help native speakers of languages deemed critical to national security acquire English proficiency so they may function effectively in Federal Government or private-sector positions. Participants in the English for Heritage Language Speakers program, managed by National Defense University's National Security Education Program, undertake a 6-month, 720-hour intensive course designed to raise English language skills, while familiarizing students with the Federal Government's use of language.

Reorganization for Complex Operations

Civilian Functions in DOD

Stability operations capabilities. To assist the Secretary of Defense with implementation of DOD 3000.05, the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations Capabilities was recently created.

To complement this office and assist with implementation, a division dedicated to stability operations was established within the Department of the Army. The intent of these organizational changes is to enhance doctrine, training, education, experimentation, and planning for stability operations throughout DOD. As part of its congressional oversight, the Stability Operations office is required to submit a yearly implementation report to Congress. The latest report highlighted the fact that “[t]he greatest challenge to the U.S. Government’s ability to conduct SSTR [stability, security, transition, and reconstruction] operations is the lack of integrated capability and capacity of civilian agencies with which the military must partner to achieve success.”¹⁷

Public diplomacy/strategic communications. Although public diplomacy has long been viewed as primarily the domain of the Department of State, DOD has assigned itself the additional mission to counter terrorist propaganda in key regions and countries of the world. Recognizing the importance of soft power in the information environment, the 2006 QDR identified strategic communications as one of five key areas for development. Since then, the department has been transforming its plans, structures, institutional cultures, and capabilities to support this mission. While acknowledging that strategic communications must be a government-wide responsibility, the 2006 QDR also calls for increasing supporting capabilities in public affairs, defense support to public diplomacy, and information operations and psychological operations. The stated purpose is to discourage sympathy for terrorists and their efforts to recruit; to marginalize radical Islamic ideology; and to increase popular support for U.S. operations and multilateral counterterrorism activities.

In November 2006, the Office of the Under Secretary for Policy underwent a dramatic reorganization. In addition to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations, a new office was created to focus exclusively on public diplomacy. The Support for Public Diplomacy office was established in December 2006 to ensure collaboration between the Departments of State and Defense, and between policy ideas and actions. DOD’s official position is that OSD Policy assists in defining objectives and coordinates themes, in partnership with State, as well as other U.S. Government agencies, foreign allies, and the private sector and supports the development and dissemination of a single core message through multiple means.¹⁸ A vital element of this effort is helping combatant commanders implement Countering Ideological Support to Terrorism strategies. Overseas, military teams of 3–4 persons are sent to key countries to carry out

informational programs. These Military Information Support Team (MIST) activities are intended to be closely coordinated with U.S. Embassies abroad. All MIST proposals must be vetted by Ambassadors, whose concurrence is required before teams can be deployed. This ensures that their public diplomacy activities do not conflict with those of the State Department. This is a relatively new initiative, and its success has yet to be determined, although some anecdotal evidence is emerging.¹⁹

Section 1206. Beyond implementing traditional military-to-military programs supported by State Department funds, DOD has been granted temporary authorities by Congress to use directly appropriated funds for prevention and postconflict response, concentrated in conflict-ridden, nonpermissive environments where civilian actors have difficulty operating, or where civilian capacities are weak or absent. Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year (FY) 2006 gave DOD authority to train and equip foreign military forces to engage in counterterrorism or stability operations, using funds appropriated for operations and maintenance. Funds may only be obligated with the concurrence of the Secretary of State. Obligations totaled approximately \$106 million in FY2006 and \$289 million in FY2007. In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on April 15, 2008, both Secretary of Defense Gates and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice recommended extending Section 1206 and increasing the funding level to \$750 million. Secretary Gates has recommended that the program be made permanent, citing DOD's enduring mission to build partner capacity. Although recognizing the importance, and underfunding, of this mission, Members of Congress—particularly the Senate Foreign Relations Committee—have expressed concern that the executive branch is turning to the amply larger defense 050 account as a means to fund the foreign affairs 150 budget account. Fears are that this represents the creeping militarization of foreign policy and that “such bleeding of civilian responsibilities overseas from civilian to military agencies risks weakening the Secretary of State's primacy in setting the agenda for U.S. relations with foreign countries and the Secretary of Defense's focus on war fighting.”²⁰

Commander's Emergency Response Program. Another notable new funding mechanism is the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP). The CERP originally redistributed funds seized from the Ba'athist regime to otherwise unfunded or nonexistent civil authorities in Iraq following Operation *Iraqi Freedom*. CERP gave military commanders on the

ground the money and authority to execute projects to meet emergency needs of the Iraqi people following *Iraqi Freedom*, such as clearing destroyed vehicles, bulldozing garbage, distributing rations, rehabilitating jails and police stations, tending to urgent medical needs, and repairing roofs, wells, and sewers.²¹ Now a mix of seized and appropriated U.S. Government funds, the CERP budget for fiscal year 2007 was \$750 million. The program is now also used in Afghanistan.²²

Provincial Reconstruction Teams. First used in Afghanistan in 2002, a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) is a military/civilian unit that assists with security, stabilization, and reconstruction efforts in unstable nations and complex environments. Originally a U.S.-led effort, teams are a model of international civil-military integration, providing a way for civilians to work in dangerous environments under the protection of the military. The military provides security, life support, and transportation for diplomatic and development operations, yet does not have authority over policy, mission, or funding; each agency's role is of equal value and priority. Critics of the programs note that the different agencies, funding sources, and authorities may lead to a lack of program coherence, or that they lack clear lines of authority, agreed missions, and measurable objectives.²³ As of March 2008, there were 26 PRTs in Afghanistan and 28 in Iraq. It is interesting to note that the PRTs in Iraq differ in structure and command from those in Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, U.S.-led PRTs consist of 50–100 personnel, with a military lead and only 4–8 U.S. Government civilians or contractors. In Iraq, Department of State personnel lead PRTs that are composed of mostly civilian or contractor staff. Although both constructs have shown promise and exhibited progress, there is probably not a one-size-fits-all model. Future interventions and PRTs will likely be situation-dependent.

Human Terrain Teams. The Human Terrain Team counterinsurgency program, begun in late 2003, embeds anthropologists with combat brigades in Iraq and Afghanistan to help tacticians in the field understand local cultures.²⁴ “Academic embeds,” as the social scientists on teams are known, help troops understand relevant cultural history, engage locals in a way they can appreciate, and incorporate knowledge about tribal traditions in conflict resolution. The aim is to improve understanding of social connections in the tribal cultures encountered during operations aimed at stabilizing an area in the aftermath of major combat. Specific activities in Afghanistan include improving the performance of local government officials, persuading tribesmen to join the police, easing poverty, and pro-

protecting villagers from the Taliban and criminals. According to Colonel Martin Schweitzer of the 82^d Airborne Division, the unit's combat operations were reduced by 60 percent over a period of 8 months, enabling Soldiers to focus on improving security, health care, and education for local populations. This, too, is a relatively new initiative, but an indication of DOD's frustration with how to "win the peace."

Counterinsurgency and Civil Affairs

Recognizing the 21st-century shifts in strategic context, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review called for a greater emphasis on irregular, unconventional warfare, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and military support for stabilization and reconstruction operations—also known as nation-building. The ultimate intent is to bring unstable, postconflict nations to a level of self-sufficiency such that U.S. military presence is no longer required. To reach this goal, the QDR called for the expansion of general purpose as well as Special Forces units that may be used for nation-building efforts, to include a 33 percent increase in psychological operations and civil affairs personnel. The QDR also separates what it refers to as "steady-state" and "surge" activity for the military: under the surge scenario, the military must be prepared to wage two nearly simultaneous conventional campaigns (or one conventional campaign if already engaged in a large-scale, long-duration irregular campaign), while selectively reinforcing deterrence against opportunistic acts of aggression. The Services must be prepared in one of the two campaigns to remove a hostile regime, destroy its military capacity, and set conditions for the transition to, or for the restoration of, civil society.

The DOD civil affairs force structure consists of civil affairs units in the U.S. Army, Marine Corps, and Navy. The U.S. Army is restructuring its civil affairs units, prompted by emerging DOD missions that are heavily dependent on the military-civil context (for example, combat in populated areas, stability operations, security cooperation, and restoration activities), changes in the organizational structures of the combatant commands and the military Services, and increasing operational demands. However, as the vast majority of this capability remains in the Reserves, it is unclear that the Army truly views this mission as an enduring requirement. The Navy established a new command, the Military Civil Affairs Group (MCAG), whose mission is to assess, plan, and execute civil affairs activities in the maritime operational environment. Specific areas of operation include commercial port operations, harbor and channel construction and maintenance, and marine and fisheries resources. MCAG forces will also serve as first responders for disaster relief operations.

Currently, there are over 8,000 Soldiers, Marines, and Sailors in the DOD civil affairs force structure. The number of civil affairs forces is increasing throughout the Services. The Army plans to increase the number of civil affairs Reservists from 6,248 to over 7,100 and of Active Component troops from 1,299 to over 2,400 by 2013.²⁵ The U.S. Air Force does not have civil affairs units, but some Airmen have completed U.S. Army civil affairs training. The Navy's MCAG has a planned strength of 431 using Active Component Sailors and Reservists. The Marine Corps, which has a total of 312 billets divided between its two Reserve Civil Affairs Groups and 24 Active Component billets, plans to add 173 Active Component civil affairs billets.²⁶

The need to consider rebalancing the total force between Active and Reserve Components was articulated in the Defense Science Board *2004 Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities*. The study observed that "it typically takes five to eight years to disengage from a stabilization and reconstruction activity—and sometimes longer—there is an accumulating need for skilled personnel stationed abroad."²⁷ A more recent board study observed that "the implication for force structure is significant. . . . Tomorrow's force (active and reserve components) needs a much stronger set of capabilities directed toward S&R, particularly knowledge of culture."²⁸

Despite the robust debate on the future security environment, if history has taught us anything, it is that it is impossible to predict the future. Therefore, our goal should be to create a future force structure that is applicable across the broad range of alternative futures. The department should resist moving to a bifurcated force wherein one part of the force is trained for counterinsurgency and stability operations, and the other solely for high-intensity conflict. Although stabilization and reconstruction is now a priority, it is not the only priority; other pressing concerns are the possible rise of a peer competitor in China, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, competition for energy resources, instability in the Middle East, and aggressive behavior by Russia. As such, DOD must also prepare to engage in any one of these areas. One approach may be to increase the use of the National Guard and Reserves for S&R-type interventions. This will relieve the stress on the Active Component, allowing it to refocus effort on preparing for major conventional conflict.

Organizational Changes at Combatant Commands

Since 2003, there have been numerous initiatives aimed at enhancing interagency coordination at the combatant commands. The goal is to create

a more integrated approach to dealing with security challenges. Many of these initiatives are still nascent, and the track record for improving whole-of-government effectiveness is mixed. Several of these initiatives are discussed below and in chapter 11.

U.S. Africa Command. After a decade of thinking on the topic, DOD realized the emerging strategic importance of Africa and acknowledged that peace and stability on the continent are in the national security interests of the United States. On February 6, 2007, President Bush and Defense Secretary Gates announced the creation of U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM), an organization that enables DOD to better focus its resources on existing U.S. development and security initiatives in the region and provides African nations and regional organizations an integrated DOD coordination point to help address related needs.

The goal for the nascent command will be to incorporate partner nations and humanitarian organizations, from Africa and elsewhere, to work alongside the U.S. staff on common approaches to shared interests. USAFRICOM is intended to build a more integrated staff structure, one that includes significant management and staff representation by the Department of State, USAID, and other U.S. Government agencies involved in Africa. This is a major departure from the typical DOD command structure and reflects an understanding of the key relationships between security, development, diplomacy, and prosperity in Africa. However, the concept has not been without criticism; in fact, the government has had much difficulty in finding a partner African nation to host the USAFRICOM headquarters, as well as in hiring civilians to staff the organization. Questions of chain of command issues and implications for the military remain.

U.S. Southern Command. U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) is leading an effort to harness the skills and expertise of interagency partners to address emerging challenges facing Central and South America and the Caribbean. USSOUTHCOM's Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-S) is the catalyst for integrated and synchronized interagency counterdrug operations and is responsible for the detection and monitoring of suspect air and maritime drug activity in the Caribbean Sea, Gulf of Mexico, and the eastern Pacific. Its work is driven by contributions from across the Federal Government, including the State Department, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the U.S. Coast Guard. It also works closely with counterparts from many partner nations.

For several years, USSOUTHCOM has been participating in Operation *New Horizons*, an engineering and humanitarian civic assistance exercise designed to train Guard, Reserve, and Active-duty units in civilian construction or medical care services. Participating American troops build basic infrastructure (roads, bridges, schools, wells) and provide medical, dental, and veterinary services within the USSOUTHCOM area of operations.

Joint Interagency Coordination Groups. The role of a joint interagency coordination group (JIACG) is to coordinate U.S. Government civilian agencies' operational planning in contingency operations. It supports day-to-day planning at the combatant commander headquarters, advises planners regarding civilian agency operations, capabilities, and limitations, and provides perspective in the coordinated use of all elements of national power. Functionally, JIACG tasks include working civil-military campaign planning issues and conducting outreach to key civilian international and regional contacts. Operational JIACGs have been established at all regional combatant command headquarters, although their exact composition, organizational structure, and effectiveness vary.

Though the combatant command JIACGs are an example of effective interagency cooperation, the JIACG construct has not yet been formalized in Washington. The remaining limitation is that the National Security Council, currently the only body with the authority to issue guidance, has not published JIACG doctrine, and thus far the Deputies Committee has only issued nonbinding guidance. Since the JIACG is essentially a "coequal group," there is the continuing issue of lead agency status.²⁹

The Coming Defense Budget Crunch

Defense spending as a percentage of gross domestic product declined sharply after the Cold War, reaching its lowest point around 2000. Although it has since been on the rise, the defense budget is expected to decrease again projecting out into 2016. Budget pressures come from a variety of external and internal factors. Internally, the cost for resetting the force will be significant. At the same time, costs are escalating for the majority of the department's high-end programs. Rising costs of medical and other benefits for military personnel will further decrease discretionary spending. The increase in end strength for Active-duty Army and Marine Corps by 92,000 personnel, a plan proposed by the Bush administration, is projected to cost billions. The proposed combined increase of Army Reserve and National Guard personnel will further aggravate this trend.³⁰ External pressures on government spending will continue to rise as a large segment

of the population reaches retirement age, increasing demand on Social Security and Medicare. This will further divert spending to the overall nondiscretionary portion of the budget. Given these factors, what is the most prudent way to spend valuable taxpayer dollars on defense?

The answer to this question will be strategy-driven, and that strategy will be based on perceived trends. It seems unlikely, given the global security environment, that the United States will retrench to a “fortress America” construct. The dynamics of globalization and its implications for both global security and continued U.S. prosperity will require increased forward engagement and stabilizing interventions. In today’s globalized economy, our prosperity depends upon a stable, secure international system. As such, the United States will continue to be engaged around the world with allies and partners conducting preventative interventions, exporting security, and supporting stability operations. This means that a force structure capable of addressing these steady-state challenges is imperative. A Defense Science Board study has illuminated the likelihood of future interventions focused on stability operations as opposed to major combat operations, and identified cost disparities, asserting that we have engaged more frequently in stability operations than combat operations since the end of the Cold War, on an average of every 2 years: “Since the end of the Cold War, 80 percent of our supplemental funds for operations have been for stability operations and 20 percent have been for combat operations.”³¹

DOD Efforts to Build Partnership Capacity

A major theme in the 2006 QDR was the emphasis on building partnership capacity, which requires improving and enhancing coordination of interagency processes and unity of effort, as well as expanding capabilities of other agencies. Recognizing that our military is overstretched, the QDR also calls for increased cooperation in building the capacity of partner nations, allies, and indigenous forces to reach U.S. national security goals.

Authorities

In recognition of “an enduring Defense Department mission to build partner capacity,” Secretary Gates has actively sought congressional funding mechanisms and ways through which DOD and other agencies may collaborate more effectively. With the assertion that waging the global war on terror requires new thinking and increased interagency cooperation, Secretary Gates and Secretary Rice agreed to seek a 5-year extension of another piece of legislation, known as Section 1207, which allows the

transfer of DOD funds to the State Department to bring in civilian expertise to assist U.S. military global stabilization and reconstruction efforts. This legislation, since renamed Section 1210 in the FY08 National Defense Authorization Act, authorized the transfer of up to \$100 million of DOD funds to the State Department; a requirement of program funding is that they focus on security and stability objectives in countries where a failure to act could lead to the deployment of U.S. forces. Secretary Gates also asked Congress to increase that program's ceiling to \$200 million. This funding instrument is a mechanism to help the State Department build its own stabilization and reconstruction capacity.

Consequences of Recent Buildup

Reorganization, training, and buildup for complex operations have no doubt led to more effective current operations. But the long-term consequences and strategic risks are being debated. First is the question of whether the military is prepared to fight major combat operations. Next, there is a question regarding the role of civilians. If reconstruction is inherently a civilian effort, should the military be engaged in long-term S&R operations around the globe? Some argue that the military is moving too far toward S&R, cutting into civilian territory and putting other military missions at risk.

DOD Directive 3000.05 and the 2006 QDR supposedly reflect the realities of a new security environment and a shift in emphasis toward prevention and shaping the future. Generally, this shift should be viewed positively, since DOD has significant capabilities and capacities that rightly should be brought to bear on stabilization and reconstruction, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief efforts. However, this shift was largely out of necessity because of the lack of capacity in other U.S. departments and agencies. In a hearing on civilian national security capabilities before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Richard Lugar noted that "defense agencies increasingly have been granted authority to fill gaps in foreign assistance and public information programs, but the military is ill-suited to run such programs. A far more rational approach would be to give the State Department the resources it should have to achieve what clearly are civilian missions."³² Although cooperation between agencies works well, there are several areas where sharing resources presents a growing problem for the Defense Department. For example, the Department of State has traditionally had a coordinating role with respect to nongovernmental organizations and international organizations, but increasingly the military is working side by side with these groups. It is important to avoid

the perception that the United States is militarizing foreign policy. Problems include lack of trust or belief that the military is “here to help,” and a perception of the United States as a colonial power or exploiter of the resources of weaker states. The U.S. military’s high visibility in reconstruction projects may be at cross-purposes with the intended influence mission by instead emphasizing the “occupation” nature with local populations.³³

In nonpermissive environments, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, a significant military presence to provide security and conduct operations is both welcome and necessary. However, of concern to some are the military operations other than war, such as providing aid for governance and development assistance in peaceful environments. A report to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations notes that “the number of military personnel and Defense Department activities in non-combat countries is increasing significantly. Left unclear, blurred lines of authority between the State Department and the Defense Department could lead to interagency turf wars that undermine the effectiveness of the overall U.S. effort against terrorism.”³⁴ A major concern is that foreign assistance—a foreign policy, diplomatic tool—is being taken out of the hands of diplomats and brought solely under military control.

Civilian Expeditionary Capability

The current structure of the Armed Forces is based on the Total Force concept, which recognizes that all elements of the structure—Active-duty military personnel, Reservists, defense contractors, host-nation military and civilian personnel, and DOD Federal civilian employees—contribute to national defense. To ensure that Federal civilian employees will deploy to combat zones and perform critical combat support functions in theater, DOD established the Emergency-Essential program in 1985. Under this program, DOD designates as “emergency-essential” those civilian employees whose positions are required to ensure the success of combat operations or the availability of combat-essential systems. DOD can deploy Federal civilian employees on either a voluntary or an involuntary basis to accomplish this mission. In recent years, Federal civilian personnel have deployed along with military personnel to support a range of essential missions, including intelligence collection, criminal investigations, and weapons systems acquisition and maintenance. Since the beginning of the global war on terror, the role of DOD’s Federal civilian personnel has expanded to include participation in combat support functions in Operations *Enduring Freedom* and *Iraqi Freedom*. Since 2001, approximately 7,500 DOD civilian employees have deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq.

In September 2007, DOD had 300 civilian employees serving in Afghanistan and 1,750 in Iraq.³⁵ These volunteers initially endured significant inequities in benefits and services compared to their uniformed counterparts. DOD is planning for even more civilian volunteers to deploy in the future. The department lobbied for and received new legislation and authorities to provide increased pay and benefits to volunteers. Additionally, in February 2008, the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) released a memo titled “Building Increased Civilian Deployment Capacity” that promulgated policies to “promote opportunities for DoD civilians to contribute their talent to the DOD’s mission.”

As part of this initiative, DOD is looking to build a civilian expeditionary workforce capability for contingencies, emergencies, and combat operation missions, as well as SSTR operations. Out of a nearly 700,000-member workforce, 9,000 are already designated as emergency-essential. To augment these positions, a civilian workforce is being developed to rapidly respond to noncombat mission requirements. Non-combat-essential positions are being designated to support humanitarian and other missions, in peacetime or crisis, with deployability required as a condition of employment. Another initiative is the creation of capability-based employee volunteers to support voluntary identification of capabilities that could support emergency-essential or non-combat-essential requirements outside the scope of an employee’s position. To fill manpower requirements when these employees are deployed, DOD is keeping an inventory of former and retired employees who are prepared to support backfill and deployed requirements.

On January 23, 2009, Department of Defense Directive 1404.14 was reissued under the title “DOD Civilian Expeditionary Workforce.” This directive outlines and provides guidance about a new initiative to train and deploy civilians in support of military missions and operational requirements around the globe. Under this program, certain duty positions may be designated as deployable, using the existing category of Emergency-Essential civilian and new categories of Non-combat-Essential, Capability-Based Volunteers, and former DOD employees. These four categories make up the DOD Civilian Expeditionary Workforce. Employees in those positions will be asked to sign an agreement that they will deploy if called upon. If an employee chooses not to deploy, efforts will be made to reassign the employee to a nondeploying position.

This expeditionary workforce structure is a DOD initiative, not to be confused with the State Department’s Civilian Response Corps, which is

run by the State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. In fact, there are concerns that the two entities respond to entirely different chains of command when deployed overseas, which complicates coordination and unity of effort. The reality on the ground runs counter to the rhetoric promoting whole-of-government approaches to stability and reconstruction operations.

Reliance on Contractors

DOD outsourcing initiatives over the last decade have resulted in heavy reliance on more contracted services and support. (Outsourcing is also addressed in detail in chapter 8.) In an August 1996 Defense Science Board report, the task force reported, "All DOD support functions should be contracted out to private vendors, except those functions which are inherently governmental, are directly involved in warfighting, or for which no adequate private-sector capability exists or can be expected to be established."³⁶ It is unlikely that there will be a reversal of this trend. In March 2007, Secretary Gates reported that approximately 126,000 private contractors in Iraq were working for companies under U.S. Government contracts. The Army accounts for about 60,000. By contrast, there were only 9,200 contractors supporting all four branches during the 1991 Gulf War. The dramatic increase is clearly a result of the protracted S&R efforts undertaken by DOD. This is not a new phenomenon, however, as the U.S. military has relied on contractor support throughout its history. The United States has hired contractors to perform noncombat functions since the Revolutionary War. Contractors typically provide services judged too menial or too specialized for government personnel to accomplish themselves. Those services generally fall under the following broad categories: transportation (moving people, supplies, and equipment), engineering and construction (building and repairing bases, bridges, roads, railways, and communications systems), maintenance (providing technical support for increasingly complex equipment), base operations (providing food and housekeeping services on bases), and medical (using civilian surgeons, nurses, and attendants).³⁷

Recently, there has been significant debate surrounding the unprecedented ratio of military to contractor personnel in Iraq (1:1). Since the rules governing the conduct of contractors are not as stringent as for the uniformed military, there are some who suggest that contractors have a negative effect on efforts to positively shape the security environment. There have also been numerous reports of poor performance and fraud.

The shift in strategic emphasis toward prevention, nation-building, and stabilization and reconstruction has somewhat blurred the lines between inherently governmental functions and those capabilities directly involved in warfighting. The real question is not about contractor support, but whether DOD should be involved in contracting activities that support non-security-related infrastructure projects and economic development activities. Here again, ambiguity exists in the roles and missions debate in S&R. Many argue the current construct creates tension between the State Department foreign assistance efforts and long-term economic development goals.

Conclusion and Findings

The ability of DOD to adjust to a new security strategy in a 5-year period is a testament to the agility and quality of the military. Fears are being expressed that the emphasis on complex operations is too great; from the DOD perspective, there is now a higher risk associated with a major theater war. As our ground troops are currently focused on irregular warfare and stability operations, there would be fewer ground forces available in the early stages of high-intensity combat. In addition, we are now raising a leadership cadre experienced only in stability operations and irregular war. After nearly 6 years of focusing exclusively on irregular warfare and S&R activities, it is unclear that the military and its new crop of senior leaders are adequately trained or intellectually prepared for a large-scale conventional conflict. DOD must ensure that capabilities for such a conflict are adequately funded and do not fall victim to budget cuts. In the area of training and education (specifically, in DOD academic institutions and at the National Training Center), the department must give increased emphasis to preparing for large-scale conventional conflict.

With these considerations in mind, the authors make the following recommendations to DOD.

Anticipate declining budgets.

The likelihood of future counterinsurgency and stability operations has increased, and the time it takes to disengage from a postconflict environment is long. Budget pressures and reduced availability of funds for discretionary spending will force DOD to cut costs. To keep its bases covered, DOD should look for high-end investments that can be used for low-end missions.

Although the surge in DOD buildup for complex operations has led to many successes, capacity in many areas is still an issue. There is a reluc-

tance to trade away hard-power kinetic capability to resource the missions stated in DOD Directive 3000.05. These tasks are by nature labor-intensive and, if the current strategy and policies continue, will require a larger capacity in the future. Many of the associated skill sets (Foreign Area Officers, language skills) require extended periods of time to develop. FAO and regional language skills are applicable to both low-intensity interventions and high-intensity conflict. The department should prioritize those capabilities and invest in both training and infrastructure.

Maintain a competitive advantage.

DOD should continue to invest in high-end capabilities, key among which are our high-tech command and control architectures and intelligence-gathering assets. Other asymmetric advantages are in the areas of “first battle” training, strategic mobility and sustainment, and medical services.

Budget pressures and decreasing discretionary spending will complicate choices and influence the traditional force-sizing construct. A smaller force may be needed to defeat opponents than is needed for protracted S&R operations. Stabilization and reconstruction operations are manpower-intensive and thus usually require a larger deployed force than most conceivable major combat operations. Furthermore, because stabilization operations tend to last a long time, they require a rotation base that is larger than the deployed ground force.

Hedge for more complex operations.

As noted, many of the skills needed for stabilization efforts are manpower-intensive and take a long time to develop. DOD should train a larger force for stability operations and make related elements a bona fide career track. To attract top-notch officers to these communities, the department must ensure that promotion opportunities are equal to those in the combat arms specialties.

Build partnership capacity.

There are more calls for civilian agencies to pick up the slack, as evidenced by section 1207 funding for the State Department and recent testimony by Secretary Gates. DOD should immediately undertake a bottom-up review of the effects that the 3000.05 directive has had on the ability of the force to respond to a potential conventional threat. All capabilities and activities that are the purview of other agencies and departments of the U.S. Government should be transferred to the appropriate entity expeditiously. This may also require a redistribution of resources.

There is growing concern that progress is too slow on the civilian side; as a result, the Pentagon has been mobilizing its own civilians. A 2008 initiative founded by David Chu, then Undersecretary for Personnel and Readiness, enables civilian employees to volunteer for service in Iraq and Afghanistan without penalty. The continuation of this program is the Defense Department's newly designated Civilian Expeditionary Workforce. This is only a partial answer, however, as it creates the dilemma of having a solitary department at war. As noted elsewhere, the side effects are that the State Department has much less clout in foreign policy circles. Similarly, S&R operations may detract from the military's traditional focus, and risk making the military the dominant face of U.S. foreign policy. Another hazard is that although employees under the new program will be trained and equipped to support military missions and operations other than war, the military does not have the resident civilian expertise inherent in other domestic civilian agencies.

Increase civilian expeditionary capability.

Tasking civilian entities within DOD is only a 50-percent solution; civilian agencies must be empowered to lead. DOD should lobby for greater leadership from the civilian sector and other agencies to perform the traditionally civilian aspects of these operations. This may necessitate a transfer of resources from one agency to another.

Fundamental to a new risk strategy will be the capability and agility to quickly rebalance force structure within the timelines of new and changing security challenges. The rate of change in the global security environment is dramatically faster now than in past decades and will require adoption of new processes that will be characterized by collaboration and information-sharing across the department, with other agencies, and with industry. DOD processes for developing defense planning guidance and validating requirements must be reassessed more frequently. Evaluating the future security environment on a quadrennial timeline is no longer in synch with the rapidly changing security environment of today. The Defense Department and the U.S. Government as a whole should be engaged in developing a long-term grand strategy based on prevention. It is not clear that the U.S. Government will be eager to commit to a new, protracted S&R intervention in the near future. Unfortunately, it may not always have a choice.

Notes

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²³ “Agency Stovepipes vs. Strategic Agility: Lessons We Need to Learn from Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan,” House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, April 2008.

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³⁵ Patricia Bradshaw, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (Civilian Personnel Policy), testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, September 18, 2007.

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Complex Operations: Recalibrating the State Department's Role

James A. Schear and Leslie B. Curtin

What role should the U.S. Department of State play in efforts to stabilize countries beset by internal crises, conflict, and dysfunctional governance? The question defies a simple response. The risks associated with fragile or failing states vary widely. In cases where state collapse carries with it the specter of insurgency, mass violence, terrorist safe havens or human dislocations, the tasks of paramount importance for the U.S. Government span traditional bureaucratic boundaries.

Like any foreign ministry, the State Department's focus traditionally has been Westphalian—to manage U.S. relationships across sovereign boundaries with other functioning states, be they allies, partners, competitors, or enemies. Yet recent years have witnessed the steady rise of empowered transnational actors—militia groups, terrorist networks, narcotraffickers, pirates, and other criminal enterprises—whose strength and agility may far exceed what weak governments can muster to police their own territories. When American forces toppled Afghanistan's Taliban regime in 2001, and Saddam's tyranny in Iraq barely 18 months later, policymakers in Washington did not imagine they would find themselves embroiled in extended irregular warfare campaigns. As history has chronicled, the United States greatly underestimated what it would take to orchestrate successful stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) efforts following the initial phases of these interventions.

From a security perspective, effective state-building is the essential element of any complex operation. Devising effective ways and means to assist in the construction or restoration of governance and all that goes with it—economic opportunity, public welfare, and the rule of law—is vital in any strategy for winning wars, not merely battles. That fact inevitably makes this mission a joint civil-military enterprise—one that soldiers

cannot do alone. “We cannot kill or capture our way to victory,” observed Defense Secretary Robert Gates. “America’s civilian institutions of diplomacy and development have been chronically under-funded for far too long.” And even if doing the job under fire may not be all that common in the future, Gates added, “What is likely . . . is the need to work with and through local governments to avoid the next insurgency, to rescue the next failing state, or to head off the next humanitarian disaster.”¹

Turning this essential insight into concerted action is nevertheless a Herculean task. To start with, outdated perceptions need to be tossed aside. Just as military commanders have had to move beyond the notion that irregular warfare is basically about destroying the enemy rather than protecting local communities, diplomats and aid providers must let go of the notion that they can sit safely on the sidelines of conflict until the smoke clears. Indeed, while many observers worry about foreign assistance becoming “militarized,” it is not just the instrument but also the environment that is changing. Today’s prevalent conflicts have become progressively “civilianized” in terms of the state-building tasks on which a decisive outcome hinges. Thus, mutual effort is required, which raises the obvious, if awkward, question of who leads on the civilian side.

For many, the answer is found in Foggy Bottom. After all, the State Department is like no other institution—it sits at the apex of America’s foreign policy apparatus. Its statutory base, Presidential taskings, and global writ give it a clear and unquestioned authority to speak for and act on behalf of the United States in any foreign affairs domain. As a candidate, President Barack Obama expressed strong support for the concept of building greater civilian capacity to work alongside the military in complex operations.² As his administration takes stock of its options, any new initiatives in this area will inevitably be compared to or contrasted with prior transformative efforts. This inevitably puts the spotlight on the State Department: broadly, how well has the department done in boosting civilian capacity to prepare for and conduct S&R missions? What progress or challenges have such efforts encountered, and why? And how might State’s role be recalibrated in light of that experience?

Harbingers of Change

In response to state-building shortfalls that have plagued postinvasion operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the George W. Bush administration in its second term embarked on a Department of State-centric remedial approach. At the broadest level, the administration’s “Transformational Diplomacy” initiative became an umbrella of sorts for the pursuit

of departmentally focused capacity-building. Launched by then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, its core objective was to realign diplomatic resources away from Western Europe and toward regions of the world facing transnational challenges and, in so doing, strengthen pursuit of U.S. democracy-building objectives and forge closer connections between the State Department and civil society actors in foreign venues.³ A separate, but closely related, initiative was the establishment of a new State Department post, the Director of Foreign Assistance—the so-called “F” office—as a way to improve government-wide coordination of aid programs, but especially to more fully integrate programs managed by bureaus within State and those managed by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). The ultimate goal was to ensure that foreign policy objectives in the areas of security, economic growth, democracy and governance, health, education, and humanitarian assistance would be reflected in programs and funding decisions.

While these two steps are emblematic of the Bush administration's aspirations to realign and better integrate State's capacities, it was actually a third step—the creation of in-house capacity for undertaking S&R missions—that sought to relate the department's larger transformational agenda to more immediate on-the-ground needs. By Presidential directive, the Secretary of State was empowered to “coordinate and lead integrated United States Government efforts, involving all U.S. departments and agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct S&R activities, and to coordinate efforts with the Department of Defense to ensure harmonization with any planned or on-going U.S. military operations across the spectrum of conflict.”⁴ At State, this task was given to a newly created Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), which reports directly to the Secretary. Its mandate, as defined by the Presidential directive, is to improve “coordination, planning, and implementation for reconstruction and stabilization assistance for *foreign states and regions at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife*.”⁵ This mission also called for steps to ensure overall program and policy coordination and to develop a larger civilian talent pool from which to draw for field expertise across such public service sectors as civil administration and basic services to economic development, the rule of law, and security sector reform.

Lightning-rod Issues

Any effort to restructure or strengthen the State Department immediately confronts a basic reality: a crowded field. It is hard to find another

executive branch institution that has been more buffeted by criticisms, complaints, and calls for reform than State. The recent effort to launch State-centric initiatives into the arena of complex contingencies is only the latest twist in a long-running controversy over how best to recalibrate the department to overcome its own limitations or compensate for weaknesses elsewhere.

Over the past decade, the department's administrative and resource deficiencies have received the lion's share of attention. High-level commissions and study groups have called attention to, *inter alia*, deficiencies in State's recruitment and personnel management practices, budgeting, facilities and information technology infrastructures, and other administrative incapacities.⁶ Shining a spotlight on these types of shortfalls is important—and some progress has been made in correcting them—but if the problem of “fixing” State were purely a matter of rectifying management gaps or expanding resources, the path to a solution would be obvious, if not necessarily easy. In fact, the controversy about State's track record arises from two sets of neuralgic, “lightning-rod” issues. The first concerns State's purported inability to balance competing internal priorities, and the second centers on its problems in reaching across bureaucratic boundaries.

Balancing Challenges

The State Department is certainly not alone in its institutional need to balance day-to-day needs against looming challenges, but its penchant for focusing on current diplomatic priorities at the expense of long-range planning has long been a rallying point for its critics. No less a luminary than former Secretary of State Dean Acheson lamented this problem nearly a half-century ago, citing it as one reason for the U.S. Government's belated recognition of the looming threats posed by Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan during the 1930s.⁷ Similar complaints have been voiced many times since then.

Another balancing-act issue has involved how to navigate between specific geographic perspectives and crosscutting functional priorities. State's natural proclivity has been to place a high premium on the work of its regional bureaus, where policy development and day-to-day diplomacy are orchestrated via the foreign official community in Washington and through American Embassies and diplomatic posts in more than 180 countries. The fate of certain functional specialties—public diplomacy, trade, human rights, law enforcement, arms control, refugee and migration assistance, environmental assistance, and women's issues, to name just a few—has always been contentious. The approach of embedding expertise

in separate agencies has led to “who’s in charge” criticisms, while merging or (re)aligning such functions back into State has triggered debates over resources and “fit” with State’s professional culture.⁸

Cross-boundary Challenges

In terms of State’s interagency reach, the criticisms have been sharp and at times partisan. Without question, the biggest issue has been State’s relationship with the White House, in particular its alleged support of, indifference to, or hostility toward a given President’s agenda. President Truman berated the department for trying to undermine his support for the creation of Israel.⁹ President Nixon’s animus toward State, which he regarded as disloyal and a source of press leaks, was legendary.¹⁰ More recently, in 2003, former House Speaker Newt Gingrich charged that the State Department was engaged in a “deliberate and systematic effort” to undermine President Bush’s foreign policy.¹¹ One observer who learned from his own personal experiences—Henry Kissinger—has framed the tension more in institutional terms, citing an inevitable mismatch between State’s enormous span of responsibility and a President’s inherent need for focus.¹²

Beyond the White House lies the rest of the interagency community. Here, the refrain has been that State lacks the necessary clout to drive policy formulation or the technical expertise to manage implementation processes, especially on issues where bureaucratic equities overlap. Whether the problem stems more from bargaining dynamics (for example, the need for an impartial arbiter) or institutional character traits (for example, a Foreign Service culture that places a greater premium on artful compromise than forcing hard choices) is open to debate. What is clear, and starkly so, is that State has long climbed a steep hill of skepticism whenever it has found itself attempting to forge unity of effort on contentious issues.

Although some of these criticisms might be dismissed as echoes from the past, they are relevant to assessing State’s potential role in complex operations. Without question, each of the lightning-rod issues noted above weighs heavily in this mission area. Having a robust capability for complex operations requires maintaining a judicious balance between oversight of current contingencies and readiness to undertake long-range planning. It also requires a careful blending of functional disciplines, program management, regional expertise, and diplomatic skill. The key tasks at every stage are, perforce, interagency activities, with multiple funding streams and legal authorities, so assertive White House backing is a *sine qua non* for success.

It is against this background that we take stock of the State Department's efforts with a view to assessing whether current trend-lines, on balance, suggest a reinforced or altered approach to building civilian capacity via State-centric initiatives.

State's Accomplishments

The best measure for State's progress in the S&R domain is found in the office set up for this purpose. After nearly 4 years, S/CRS remains a work in progress. Its size—a staff of nearly 80—gives it heft by comparison to other offices. But how is it progressing in terms of its mission?

Since its inception, S/CRS's efforts have revolved around five core missions, each of which can be considered a building block of a comprehensive strategy for S&R activity:

- interagency planning and management
- early warning, conflict assessment, and conflict prevention
- training for S&R operations
- support to Embassies for integrated stabilization assistance programs
- civilian expeditionary capacity-building.

S/CRS has achieved some noteworthy progress in each of these areas, as set forth below.

Interagency Planning and Management

On the interagency planning front, S/CRS can fairly claim credit for significant steps forward. From late 2004 through 2005, the office led an interagency effort to validate, expand, and obtain broad support for a Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks framework—an endeavor that, as former S/CRS head Ambassador Carlos Pascual observed, helped to create a “common approach and vocabulary between civilians and the military.”¹³ S/CRS led a series of interagency working group discussions to reaffirm and amplify tasks contained in the original framework. That framework was divided into five technical areas, significantly expanded, and reshaped into a three-phased response framework: initial response (short-term), transformation (mid-term), and fostering sustainability (long-term). The goal was to provide a widely agreed menu of issues that should be considered when working in conflict-stricken environments. Completed in late 2005, the Essential Task Matrix has become a foundational element in comprehensive postconflict planning.¹⁴

The essential tasks effort aimed at the structure and functions of S&R activities at the field level. A second initiative was developed to forge closer connections between task-driven planning activity and the larger policy formulation and implementation environment. To this end, a U.S. Government Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation has been developed to identify the overarching U.S. policy goals to be achieved, as well as the operational objectives foreseen in those goals, the measures of effectiveness to be applied, and the specific activities aimed at achieving each objective.¹⁵ This effort was developed in close collaboration with Defense Department components and USAID. S/CRS also reached out to other departments and agencies to participate in strategic planning efforts for S&R operations, including the Departments of the Treasury, Commerce, and Justice.

Building on these efforts, S/CRS also spearheaded an initiative to elaborate the larger architecture for integrating crisis response efforts across the interagency community. The Interagency Management System (IMS) consists of three interlinked elements: a country reconstruction and stabilization group, an integration planning cell, and an advance civilian team.¹⁶ The IMS is a multi-tiered organizational design for country-specific planning and implementation activities not only at the strategic and policy levels in Washington, but also at the operational and tactical levels—an innovation compared to 1990s-era efforts.¹⁷

Conflict Assessment and Prevention

The Bush administration's National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44 mandated that State-centric S&R activity should also focus on states or regions *at risk of conflict*, leading S/CRS to press into assessment and prevention-related efforts. In 2007, the Conflict Prevention team within S/CRS led an interagency effort, in collaboration with USAID, to develop a methodology and process for assessing international conflict, the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF). The ICAF is a tool for developing shared understanding among the interagency community of several factors:

- the causes of violent conflict or instability in a country or region
- the situational factors and dynamics that either manage or mitigate the instability (“mitigators”) or cause instability and violent conflicts to increase (“drivers”)
- who the relevant political elites and power brokers are
- what constitutes relevant context and potential triggering events.

The ICAF is a useful tool for mapping U.S. Government efforts to address conflict or instability and remedial action by nongovernmental actors. It can assist in setting priorities for the drivers and mitigators with the greatest impact on conflict. The framework can assist in identifying entry points for possible U.S. Government action and formulating recommendations to strategic and operational level planners. In summer 2008, in conjunction with USAID, S/CRS tested the ICAF in two Washington-based application workshops in which a large segment of the interagency participated. S/CRS is now socializing the ICAF with various regional bureaus in the State Department and the geographic combatant commands.

S/CRS first addressed its mandate to invigorate the conflict early warning structure by collaborating with the Intelligence Community to generate and maintain a watch list of countries at risk of destabilizing conflict. In 2008, S/CRS convened the Intelligence and Analysis Working Group with more than 30 members from the interagency, including the Intelligence Community. The group is examining and improving the usefulness of existing conflict early warning tools and integrating them with the analysis, prevention, and response components of S/CRS.

In 2007, in conjunction with U.S. Joint Forces Command, S/CRS conducted a limited objective experiment using a conflict prevention planning approach of its own design. S/CRS is continuing to develop and will test the approach throughout 2009. A key component of the approach intentionally links interagency prevention planning with existing planning and funding streams, such as the F Country Assistance Strategy and the geographic combatant commands' so-called phase zero and theater security cooperation plans.

Training for S&R Operations

Since its inception, S/CRS has placed strong emphasis on providing training for civilians from various U.S. Government departments and agencies in S&R concepts, principles, strategic planning for conflict transformation, and S&R operations. In fiscal year (FY) 2005, S/CRS engaged the Foreign Service Institute as a partner in developing curricula, hiring subject matter experts, and implementing training courses. As of late 2008, S/CRS had conducted 73 courses with 1,638 students in all courses, reaching 656 participants from 2006 through 2008.¹⁸

S/CRS has also provided leadership in training to U.S. Government personnel who are being assigned to the U.S. Embassies and USAID missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as to civilians, military officers, and contractors who are being deployed to Provincial Reconstruction Teams

(PRTs) in Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition to teaching personnel about the organization, mission, and function of PRTs, training focuses on recent political developments in each country, current government leaders, national development plans, cultural factors and context, and U.S. Government programs in country. Current or previous PRT officers are available to share lessons learned. A unique feature of the training for Afghanistan is that civilians from the State Department, USAID, and the Department of Agriculture train and live with their military counterparts for 2 weeks at the U.S. Army post in Fort Bragg, NC, home of the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade. The predeployment training provides learning tools and improves key skill sets (such as communication, analysis, flexibility, and teamwork) to ensure success of the PRT. Training is also provided in combat lifesaving skills and hands-on force protection procedures.

Integrated Stabilization Assistance Programs

Since 2005, S/CRS has provided technical assistance consultations to regional bureaus or Embassies in response to specific tasks or requests for assistance. This assistance has consisted of preparing conflict assessments, conducting national and provincial level planning for reconstruction and stabilization programs, and keeping monitoring and reporting metrics. Small teams have been deployed to Sudan, Afghanistan, Haiti, Nepal, and Cuba, among other countries. S/CRS has not been successful in obtaining congressional authorization under the Foreign Assistance Act for a Conflict Response Fund for urgent contingencies, so it did not have program funding to lend to these efforts. But S/CRS provided technical assistance (by deploying staff) to regional bureau offices and/or Embassy country teams to help design or coordinate S&R programs using the bureau's or Embassy's funds.¹⁹

DOD, as one of S/CRS's biggest supporters, recognized the need to develop a whole-of-government approach to planning and implementing S&R operations and supported the Bush administration's unsuccessful attempts in FY04 and FY05 to obtain funding under the Foreign Assistance Act for unspecified urgent contingencies. In a welcome initiative, the congressional committees that oversee DOD authorized the transfer of uncommitted DOD operation and maintenance funds to the Department of State. Section 1207, "Security and Stabilization Assistance," of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of FY06 and FY07 authorized DOD to provide up to \$200 million over 2 years for funds, services, and defense articles to State for security, counterterrorism, stabilization, and reconstruction. In addition to promoting a whole-of-government approach to

security and S&R, these funds are to be used for urgent contingencies to prevent escalation of conflict, thereby avoiding the need to deploy U.S. military forces.²⁰

In FY06, DOD transferred \$10 million to State for a program to support basic and investigative training for the Internal Security Forces in Lebanon and to remove unexploded ordnance along the Israel-Lebanon border. In late FY07, DOD transferred over \$99 million to State to reduce gang violence in Haiti; improve governance and security programs at the district level to ensure the rule of law in Nepal; provide small, discrete community-based grants for community mobilization in Colombia; support conflict prevention training and employment opportunities in Yemen; promote security sector reform in Somalia; support rural radio and vocational training in schools in Mali, Mauritania, and Niger to counter Islamic extremism; and strengthen indigenous law enforcement capabilities and eliminate terrorist financing in the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia.

S/CRS assisted Embassy Beirut in determining those Lebanese sectors most in need of funding for the \$10 million FY06 effort, sending out a senior officer in the summer of 2006. Similarly, S/CRS developed the parameters and rationale for the Haiti Stabilization Initiative, a \$20 million program targeting instability and a lack of governance in Cité Soleil, traditionally one of the most volatile urban areas of Port au Prince. These programs have been cited by congressional staffers as most closely reflecting the type of integrated stabilization assistance project legislators envisioned when writing the 1207 section of the NDAA for FY 06.

During FY08, S/CRS sent representatives to Liberia, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and the Horn of Africa to assist in outlining potential 1207 projects while informing country teams of the nature and purpose of this foreign assistance instrument. At the same time, S/CRS's Office of Conflict Prevention designed, in collaboration with DOD, a more deliberative process for receiving, reviewing, and approving Embassy proposals for 1207 projects. Ultimately, S/CRS, along with officers of USAID, E, OSD, and Joint Staff (J5) reviewed 31 proposals from around the world, eventually approving 7, and requesting the entire \$100 million from DOD for these projects. This process, which took place in mid-2008, is chaired by S/CRS, underlining the civilian character of the design and implementation of this authority. Section 1207 of the FY09 NDAA, which was signed into law October 14, 2008, reauthorized the program until September 30, 2009, with an increase in funding up to \$150 million.

Building an Expeditionary Talent Pool

S/CRS has devoted significant effort for the past 4 years to developing the concepts for an expeditionary civilian response capacity to support S&R operations. S/CRS has also worked strenuously to obtain interagency support for the concept and obtain approval of a civilian response capacity from the National Security Council. Expeditionary field operations to meet new S&R challenges require additional, and more specialized, personnel than the U.S. Government's existing capacity can provide. Current response teams are limited to security, consular, critical incident response, and humanitarian relief. The current reliance on contractors to fill the gap is also problematic. The solution requires State, USAID, and other agencies to have a sufficient number of dedicated, trained personnel who can deploy rapidly and a management system that can access trained staff from across the interagency community to follow the first responders. To that end, Secretary Rice and President Bush proposed the Civilian Stabilization Initiative, for which the President requested nearly \$249 million in his FY09 budget.²¹ The civilian response capacity would be under the authority of the Secretary of State.

The initiative was based on the need to address three types of concurrent, high-priority missions overseas. The first type would be a small mission involving little to no military presence, or primarily civilian police, with the United States providing support (for example, an S&R mission like Operation *Uphold Democracy* in Haiti). The second would be a medium mission that would involve U.S. military and civilian support to an international peacekeeping mission (such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's Operation *Joint Guardian* in Kosovo). The third would be a large S&R engagement that could include a major military and civilian intervention in a nonpermissive environment, with the United States responsible for executing or supporting a full range of mission components (for example, a mission like Operation *Enduring Freedom* in Afghanistan).

The initiative would create a government-wide civilian Response Readiness Corps "to provide assistance in support of reconstruction and stabilization operations in countries or regions that are at risk of, in, or are in transition from, conflict or civil strife." The Response Readiness Corps has been authorized as part of the National Defense Authorization Act of FY09.²² The Response Readiness Corps is composed of active and standby components consisting of U.S. Government personnel, including employees of the Department of State, USAID, and other agencies who are recruited and trained (and employed in the case of the active component) to provide such

assistance when deployed to do so by the Secretary. These active and standby components constitute the U.S. Government's *internal* surge capacity.

In addition, plans are under way to establish an *external* surge capacity, the Civilian Reserve Corps, which would authorize the Secretary to employ and train individuals who have the skills necessary for carrying out reconstruction and stabilization activities, and who have volunteered for that purpose. The Civilian Reserve Corps would be made up of 2,000 volunteer experts from the private sector and local and state governments.

The FY08 Iraq and Afghanistan supplemental provided S/CRS and USAID with funds to create, train, and equip 100 new members of the active component and 500 standby officers. As of early 2009, Congress was still debating a bill for an additional \$75 million for the active and standby components of the Response Readiness Corps. When fully funded, there will be 250 active officers and 2,000 standby officers.²³ Funding has not been provided yet to establish the Civilian Reserve Corps.

Assessing the Challenges

How should the foregoing record be assessed? Clearly, S/CRS can fairly claim credit for a number of positive steps. For each of the distinctive areas that S&R capacity comprises—diagnostic assessments, planning, programmatic assistance, training, and the personnel talent pool—there is definite progress to report. But it should also come as no surprise that S/CRS has endured its share of challenges. As with any newly established advocacy office, it has found itself sailing into strong political and bureaucratic headwinds, cast in the role of a “constructive irritant” acting to promote new patterns of collaboration and change. In a pressurized policy environment, that role inevitably generates some degree of uncertainty and acrimony, as offices with overlapping portfolios and resource claims at State and elsewhere adapt to adjustments in organization and procedure.²⁴

Looking broadly, S/CRS has had to wrestle with political, conceptual, bureaucratic, and operational challenges—none of them surprising in light of the circumstances surrounding its establishment, but all nevertheless daunting in terms of the deeper problems they reveal. Let us consider them in order.

Political Obstacles

The fate of S/CRS is unavoidably tied to U.S. experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. In one sense, that connection has been beneficial to the office's visibility: the S&R mission has become concrete. It is not some contrivance of theorists or policy wonks; Iraq and Afghanistan have made it real. On-

the-ground field organizations, most notably Provincial Reconstruction Teams, have become laboratories for innovation in state-building strategies and programs.²⁵ What is more, complaints by U.S. military commanders about having to fill the void in field expertise on the civilian side have definitely helped to focus attention in Congress on the problem.

But along with this reality have come political complications. While U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated how underinvested our country really is in civilian S&R capacity, their sheer size, complexity, and cost have also sucked up enormous amounts of attention, energy, and resources, sometimes to the detriment of systemic reform. Not only have senior American policymakers been distracted by the immediate management demands of these complex operations, but the larger controversy that still swirls around Iraq—as a war of choice—and its tarring effect on the Afghanistan campaign have served to revive Vietnam-era skepticism on the political left regarding the whole concept of counterinsurgency, and on the political right regarding the idea that nation-building, even post-9/11, should ever be a practical aim of U.S. policy.

Politically, these crosscurrents have held S/CRS back. Even with a Republican administration in office, there was trepidation among the organization's loyalists in Congress that strengthening U.S. state-building capacity would tend to draw the country into ill-advised future contingencies. This tendency springs from the premise that interventions like Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kosovo are more likely to be the exceptions than the rule in the future, and that just as military commanders sometimes mishandle defense preparedness by preparing to "fight the last war," so too should Americans be careful lest S&R operators waste valuable resources by preparing to "manage the last post-war."²⁶ Closely coupled with this is skepticism that the State Department can ever be "operationalized"—that is, turned into an on-the-ground service provider rather than an instrument of traditional diplomacy. Both reservations have factored into congressional reluctance to agree to flexible, discretionary funding for S&R operations, and to the more ambitious aspects of the Civilian Stabilization Initiative.²⁷

Conceptual Hurdles

Even as the fortunes of S/CRS are bound, for better or worse, with the Nation's two ongoing, irregular conflicts, State has wrestled with another, more conceptual challenge: how expansive should its S&R portfolio be?

While S/CRS focused its early efforts, understandably, on postconflict scenarios, it has begun to devote more effort to identifying states at risk and

refining concepts and tools for mitigating in advance the conditions that might engulf states in conflict. To be sure, this growing emphasis on a preventive, rather than simply responsive, posture is not inconsistent with NSPD-44's charge for State S&R activities, but it also raises the issue of where to draw the line between S&R-focused activities and the much larger universe of foreign assistance aimed at promoting peace and security, good governance, health and education, economic growth, and stability. This in turn puts S/CRS into a no-win situation. Efforts to draw that line predictably have been viewed by some functional offices in State and USAID as usurping their core functions, while not drawing the line opens up S/CRS to the criticism that it is trying to be everything to everyone—with the attendant risk that if tries to do everything well, it will end up doing nothing well.

Bureaucratic Barriers

While figuring out the place of conflict prevention within the S&R portfolio has generated its share of problems, the Presidential injunction that S/CRS develop “detailed contingency plans” for integrated efforts has raised the question of where, geographically, the office should focus its attention. Providing support for current operations has not been a problem. Indeed, S/CRS has played a helpful role in providing experts for assessments and other analytic support for organizations already in the field. The harder question has been where to shine the spotlight for possible future operations.

Absent any immediate requirement to generate plans for major new contingencies, S/CRS's initial focus has been on building the architecture for an interagency system that would conduct such planning. The resulting IMS framework gives a prominent place to regional perspectives. Thus, the central coordinating mechanism for orchestrating the planning effort would be a country-focused S&R group based in Washington. A regional assistant secretary would co-chair the proceedings with the coordinator of S/CRS. Members of the Response Readiness Corps (active and standby) would constitute the field presence in-country, operating under Chief of Mission authority.

Despite these attributes, the IMS has run into strong headwinds from State's regional bureaus. It has yet to be used, even for small-scale contingencies. Its size and scope have made regional offices reluctant to pull the trigger. IMS language hints at this problem by acknowledging that standing up a new, country-specific group for S&R must take account of political sensitivity surrounding “prospective interventions,” and that steps should be taken to help mitigate potential implications arising from public knowl-

edge of the effort—steps that could include tracking the process in a lower profile manner.²⁸ For the affected regional bureaus, the lowest profile may be to ensure the process is not activated at all. Ironically, in its effort to be collaborative, S/CRS has required regional bureau representatives from State and USAID to participate in an extraordinarily large number of working groups, meetings, discussions, and even a Government Accountability Office audit, as S/CRS was busy developing its concepts, tools, planning methodologies, and civilian capacity-building initiatives. This requirement has triggered complaints about the distracting effect that S/CRS has had on the bureaus' day-to-day work in specific countries or regions.

Such problems indicate something deeper than garden-variety, bureaucratic turf battles. The onset of a foreign crisis that carries with it the specter of violence on a scale sufficient to engage the United States invariably triggers two different types of bureaucratic activities: the first focuses on *crisis management*, conducted mainly by senior policymakers and regionally focused diplomats, the aim of which is to contain or defuse an explosive situation; the second activity is *contingency planning*, orchestrated mainly by functional specialists operating at mid-levels, which aims to manage the consequences of a rapidly unfolding situation by developing response options that address foreseeable needs, advance core U.S. goals, and minimize the risk of unintended effects. Ideally, these two activities should be complementary; in the real world, tensions arise that can delay or complicate a coherent U.S. response.

Crisis managers tend to operate in an exclusive manner. Their inner circle typically is kept very small. This is hardly surprising, for the messages they seek to convey to foreign interlocutors must be carefully targeted and untainted by "noise" within the bureaucracy. Unauthorized leaks of information could embroil delicate mediation between hostile parties whose forbearance is being sought. In some cases, knowledge that preparations are under way to cope with failure could trigger the very explosion that crisis managers are trying to stave off. For contingency planners, however, this exclusivity poses a problem. Holistic planning is by definition inclusive. Any office or component with legal authority and resources needs to be at the table. Personnel staging for deployment need to be prepared for their tasks. Funding allocations or resource mobilization more generally may require affirmative congressional action.

Given these natural bureaucratic asymmetries, it is not surprising that those who shoulder the S&R portfolio would encounter inhibitions on gaining support for the orchestration of major planning activity. The

question—as yet unaddressed—is how to bring these two functions more nearly into sync.

Operational Challenges

Developing the operational capability of S/CRS has been most problematic, due to a lack of resources, high-level commitment, authority, and funding, deficiencies that have prevented S/CRS from testing practically every concept it has developed in the last 4 years. The biggest remaining challenge is to take those concepts and make them operational.

Civilian response system concepts are more fully developed at the strategic level (for example, the Washington-based, country-specific S&R group). At the tactical level—such as in the affected countries—the response mechanisms are also clear. The forward-based teams would be composed of active or standby officers who are hired into the Response Readiness Corps as part of the Civilian Stabilization Initiative. Advance Civilian Teams and Forward Advance Civilian Teams would be first responders.

Other operational concepts in the IMS are much less fully developed. It is not yet clear how the Response Readiness Corps concepts will be integrated into military planning efforts. Small teams of civilians are supposed to be collocated and integrated at the geographic combatant commands during the contingency planning phase for several months as integrated planning cells (IPCs). After the planning phase, the entire IPC team or several of its members would deploy into the affected country. This concept has not been fully developed or tested.

Some critics, particularly in DOD, contend that a permanent civilian presence of a sufficiently robust size, with particular regional expertise and authority to bring resources to the table, is needed in the combatant commands. A temporary IPC team that “parachutes” into the command for a single contingency effort is not sufficient to fully integrate short- or long-term civilian and military planning and operations. Another operational challenge is the need for agencies to “ramp up” efforts to hire, train, and develop deployment mechanisms for the officers (current and projected) who will be hired as part of the Response Readiness Corps over the next several years. Plans for this expansion are still being developed.

Conclusion and Findings

In venturing judgments about the track record above, one has to wrestle with the question of reasonable expectations. The S/CRS experiment was never going to have smooth sailing; it was created to be an agent of change in an underresourced area, operating within a bureau-

cratic environment already marked by overlapping equities and no widely accepted leadership.

Against this background, the foregoing assessment yields four essential insights. First, it is indisputable that significant progress has been made, especially when compared to previous conditions. Like the global stock markets of late 2008, the civilian S&R mission in 2004 had nowhere to go but up. Second, the most noteworthy accomplishments to date are in the areas of planning methodology, process design, DOD-funded assistance programs, field evaluations, and training practices—not trivial items, to be sure, but best viewed as low-cost down payments on a more ambitious capacity that has yet to be built, let alone employed. Third, the scope of the S/CRS portfolio has thrust it into areas of development assistance that are clearly less operationally focused than its architects may have intended. How it adjusts to that fact remains to be seen. Fourth, and finally, with a field activities perspective and contingency preparedness imperative, State's custodians of S&R expertise are destined to be at odds culturally and operationally with important centers of power within State. Having diverse views can be a good thing if it acts as a check on unexamined assumptions or "group think" tendencies. The question that remains is how to manage the resulting tension.

As the Obama administration takes stock of looming national security priorities, its conclusions about the State Department's track record in boosting civilian preparedness for S&R missions will very likely be mixed. Despite the progress chronicled here, the fact remains that S/CRS has not enjoyed steady, high-level support, either within State or the White House; it has lacked adequate clout to seize the initiative on issues where inter-agency fault lines have delayed progress; and its chronic resource shortfalls bespeak a classic dilemma—without consistent funding it cannot demonstrate success, but without success it cannot make a strong claim for funding. What options, then, should the new administration consider?

One approach, clearly, would be to stay the course. The current lead agency design would be kept in place, but the new administration would work with Congress on a plan to mobilize the funding necessary to bring the major cost items into being—specifically, the Civilian Readiness Corps. There is a certain attraction to a "status quo-plus" posture. Breaking loose the resources would be a significant step forward. Moreover, S/CRS now enjoys a statutory base and has slowly built a critical mass of expertise that may prove its worth over time.

On balance, however, we favor another tack—a "recalibrated approach"—that keeps some S&R functions in State but moves other

activities elsewhere. The arguments in favor of recalibration are strong. An interagency framework that casts State in a lead agency role is suboptimal for the stated purpose of institutionalizing S&R capacity over the longer term. Within State, moreover, the S&R portfolio is overly broad and lacks depth. The staffing and management requirements are not well aligned to build on State's underlying strengths; indeed, they force State to apportion chronically scarce resources across a large array of competing diplomatic readiness priorities. And perhaps most significantly, not all of the problems—especially the lash-up between crisis management and contingency planning—can be remedied by additional resources.

How would a recalibrated approach work? Essentially, the idea would be to prudently narrow State's portfolio while liberating the department, actually, to do more. Working closely with Congress and within the ambit of S/CRS's legislative mandate, five key steps would need to be taken.

Field more "S&R-savvy" diplomats.

First and foremost, State should concentrate on rectifying shortfalls in its Foreign Service Officer ranks with the skills and experience to serve in highly ambiguous, conflict-prone settings. Diplomats are (indeed, should be) outnumbered by technical specialists (U.S. Government personnel and contractors) across a range of state-building disciplines in the field. The motivation behind transformational diplomacy is worthy, but its objective in the complex operations arena should be to hire, educate, and promote S&R-savvy diplomats who can ably perform those *diplomatic* tasks that are critical for success in this area—namely, negotiating international mandates, recruiting/engaging would-be coalition partners, leading country teams in conflict-prone regions, and building/sustaining support among host-nation governments.

Move interagency coordination and selected planning functions to the National Security Council.

State should cede the burden of interagency coordination and strategic level crisis action planning to the National Security Council (NSC). This would free up State to be more of an advocate than an honest broker in interagency deliberations, while allowing it to retain influence on, but not necessarily a veto over, decisions on where to focus and when to initiate planning. That said, State should retain an operational level planning team, located within a recalibrated S/CRS office, and equipped with a clear mandate under a revised, NSC-led interagency management system to dispatch planners to the combatant commands or multilateral headquarters.

Strengthen the role of S&R expertise in State's crisis management process.

State should ensure that S&R-related expertise is plugged directly into its 7th-floor crisis management activities, but in ways that avoid triggering adverse reactions in regional bureaus. One way to do this would be for the S/CRS leadership to constitute a small advisory team—available to either the Deputy Secretary of State or the Under Secretary for Political Affairs (whichever the Secretary empowers as crisis manager), as well as to special Presidential envoys—that would have assured access to all of State's crisis-driven planning and diplomatic activities, especially those subject to the oversight of deputies or principals committees. All else being equal, the shift of crisis action planning to NSC level would heighten interest in State's leadership to have that in-house expertise on tap to help ensure its effective participation in a White House–led process.

Relocate responsibility for the S&R Response Readiness Corps to a more field-oriented environment, while retaining authority over deployments.

The lead responsibility for building the capacity of the Response Readiness Corps—the civilian analogue of DOD's Title 10 “organize, train, and equip” functions—should shift to USAID (or the new Agency for Development and Reconstruction proposed in chapter 6), where the initiative would benefit from collocation with other field-oriented components that already provide assistance in conflict prevention and response, support for democratic transitions, and emergency disaster relief operations. At the same time, the actual callup or deployment of such personnel for duty in operational or field level settings would return these elements to the control of the Secretary of State. Meanwhile, the response corps concept should be reassessed to validate its three-tier design and the sizing and skill-set distribution of each tier.

Improve executive branch–Congress partnership on oversight.

The new administration should work on building stronger congressional support for key elements of this recalibrated approach and for sustained funding at the outset. To this end, joint State and USAID leadership, involving the NSC as appropriate, should be designed as the focal points for congressional oversight of this mission area.

The overall intent beyond this recalibrated approach is to offer a more auspicious bureaucratic environment for building civilian S&R talent and capacity over the long term. This path is by no means risk-free. Much depends on how effectively the NSC can serve as an honest broker

or coordinator when disagreements arise, and how insistent State's own leadership would be in working S&R expertise into its decisionmaking apparatus. S&R activities inevitably span bureaucratic boundaries, and no organizational fixes can fully offset the potential of incompatible personalities or turbulent politics to undermine any governmental endeavor. What this approach attempts to do is take the S/CRS mission to the next level, in the process freeing State to do what it fundamentally must in the broader interests of orchestrating this complex endeavor.

Notes

¹ Robert Gates, remarks before the U.S. Global Leadership Campaign, July 15, 2008, available at <www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1262>.

² See, for example, remarks by Barack Obama, August 1, 2007, available at <www.barackobama.com/pdf/Defense_Fact_Sheet_FINAL.pdf>.

³ See, most recently, Condoleezza Rice, "Remarks on Transformational Diplomacy," Georgetown University, February 12, 2008, available at <www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/02/100703.htm>.

⁴ National Security Presidential Directive 44, "Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization," The White House, Washington, DC, December 7, 2005.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ See, most recently, the American Academy of Diplomacy and the Henry L. Stimson Center, "A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future: Fixing the Crisis in Diplomatic Readiness," October 2008, available at <www.academyofdiplomacy.org/publications/FAB_report_2008.pdf>. In the recent past, see U.S. Commission on National Security in the 21st Century (The Hart-Rudman Commission), *Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change: Phase III Report*, January 31, 2001, 52–56, available at <<http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nssg/PhaseIIIFR.pdf>>; and Council on Foreign Relations and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Independent Task Force on State Department Reform, *State Department Reform* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001), 7–10. See also Cindy Williams and Gordon Adams, *Strengthening Statecraft and Security: Reforming U.S. Planning and Resource Allocation*, MIT Security Studies Program Occasional Paper, June 2008.

⁷ Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969), 39. Acheson attributed to State during his tenure a "basic weakness" that reflects a more general characterization of the American personality offered by Townsend Hoopes: "Our difficulty is that as a nation of short-term pragmatists accustomed to dealing with the future only when it has become the present, we find it hard to regard future trends as serious realities." For more recent criticisms of the U.S. Government, see Aaron Friedberg, "Strengthening U.S. Strategic Planning," *The Washington Quarterly* 31, no. 1 (Winter 2007/2008), 47–60.

⁸ *Road Map for National Security*, 53

⁹ See Richard Holbrooke, "Washington's Battle Over Israel's Birth," *The Washington Post*, May 7, 2008, A21.

¹⁰ While Nixon may have been an extreme case, long-time observers noted a Cold War–era tendency for Democratic administrations to see the department as hide-bound and unprogressive, while Republican Presidents viewed State as a bastion for liberals and left-wingers. See Duncan L. Clarke, "Why State Can't Lead," *Foreign Policy* 66 (Spring 1987), 130.

¹¹ Newt Gingrich, "Rogue State Department," *Foreign Policy* 137 (July–August 2003).

¹² Thus, wrote Kissinger, State's vast domain "places the Secretary at a bureaucratic disadvantage. Inevitably, he must grapple with many mundane or highly technical subjects. . . . There is always the risk that the Secretary of State begins either to bore the President with arcane problems that require

urgent Presidential decision, or to appear to him like some special pleader.” Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1982), 433.

¹³ Carlos Pascual, “Building Capacity for Stabilization and Reconstruction,” testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, January 29, 2008. S/CRS’s postconflict reconstruction framework has been based on the pioneering efforts of the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Association of the U.S. Army. See Robert C. Orr (ed.), *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post Conflict Reconstruction* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004).

¹⁴ Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, “Post Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks,” April 1, 2005, available at <www.state.gov/s/crs/rls/52959.htm>.

¹⁵ The draft framework was published as a joint S/CRS and U.S. Joint Forces Command publication, “U.S. Government Draft Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation,” USJFCOM J7 Pamphlet 1.0., December 2005, available at <www.dtic.mil/doctrine/training/crs_pam051205.pdf>. Since then, S/CRS has worked on defining Principles for the Planning Framework as well as a Practitioner’s Guide.

¹⁶ A more detailed description of the Interagency Management System is available at <www.state.gov/s/crs/rls/rm/94379.htm>.

¹⁷ For an overview, see John E. Herbst, “Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations,” testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, February 26, 2008, available at <http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/OITUTC022608/Herbst_Testimony022608.pdf>.

¹⁸ Listing and description of courses may be found at <www.crs.state.gov>.

¹⁹ A useful S/CRS map of worldwide deployments is available at <www.crs.state.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=public.display&shortcut=4AN5>.

²⁰ Robert M. Perito, “Integrated Security Assistance—The 1207 Program,” USIP Special Report 207 (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, July 2008).

²¹ Condoleezza Rice, “Remarks at the Civilian Response Corps Rollout,” U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC, July 16, 2008, available at <www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/07/107083.htm>.

²² P.L. 110–417, Title XVI of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2009, “Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2008.”

²³ The recommended composition of expertise to be embedded in the active and standby components of the Response Readiness Corps includes: S&R *Planning & Operations Management* (primarily State and USAID): core personnel to do assessments, set up base/operations, planning, program design, military liaison, and local engagement; *Criminal Justice* (primarily State, USAID, Department of Justice, and Department of Homeland Security): police, legal, judicial, and corrections personnel to assess, plan, and start up full-spectrum criminal justice operations and development; *Economic Recovery* (U.S. Department of Agriculture, Treasury, Commerce, and USAID): specialists in agriculture, rural development, commerce, tax systems, monetary policy, business services to help stand up economic recovery programs; *Essential Service* (USAID and Department of Health and Human Services): experts in public health, infrastructure, education, and labor to establish or reestablish essential public services; *Diplomatic Security* (State): agents to serve as Regional Security Officers and security planners; *Diplomacy and Governance* (State and USAID): addressing rule of law, human rights, humanitarian protection, governance and democracy, conflict mitigation, civil society and media development, and security sector reform to set up these programs in a crisis environment.

²⁴ For background and perspectives on State’s S&R activities, the authors are grateful for the insights of a number of staff officers and officials at S/CRS, as well as the State Department’s Policy Planning Office and other components in the State Department, USAID, Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff, who agreed to be interviewed for this project during June–July 2008.

²⁵ For a good example, see Michelle Parker, *Programming Development Funds to Support a Counterinsurgency: Nangarhar, Afghanistan, 2006*, Defense and Technology Paper 53 (Washington, DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, September 2008).

²⁶ We are indebted to Gordon Adams of American University for this observation.

²⁷ For a good review of the issues, see Nina Serafino and Martin Weiss, "Peacekeeping/Stabilization and Conflict Transitions: Background and Congressional Action on the Civilian Response/Reserve Corps and other Civilian Stabilization and Reconstruction Capabilities," Report RL32862 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, September 18, 2008).

²⁸ Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, "Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and Stabilization" (unclassified), January 22, 2007, 9.

Strengthening Development and Reconstruction Assistance

Patrick M. Cronin and R. Stephen Brent

The United States must strengthen its civilian capacity to deliver foreign assistance. Whether one examines stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) missions or long-term economic development efforts, the present U.S. programs are failing to meet expectations. Preceding chapters have addressed civil-military issues and options for strengthening civilian agency support for stabilization and postconflict operations. This chapter will examine the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which will be a key agency in implementing future changes. It will also consider other functions of development assistance, including support for health and education, economic growth, and conflict prevention.

The George W. Bush administration raised the profile of development, conceptually elevating its stature by ranking it alongside defense and diplomacy, coining the phrase “the three Ds.” But concept is not the same as practice, and recent experience, especially in Afghanistan and Iraq, has exposed glaring deficiencies in the ability of the United States to deliver nonmilitary aid to contested and war-torn zones. Redressing these shortcomings, particularly in an environment of fiscal austerity, will not be easy; success will require not only resources, but also high-level political leadership, innovation, and strategic patience.

To be sure, the Bush administration’s legacy of bolstering development assistance is better than it is generally credited. It increased aid to Africa and established two major new assistance programs: the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA). The Barack Obama administration, however, will have to go well beyond these initiatives if it is to rejuvenate America’s soft power, bring coherence to badly fragmented foreign assistance programs, and achieve a

heightened capacity for delivering reconstruction assistance. Additional personnel and skills will have to be accompanied by reorganization, new authorities, expanded training, a dedicated cadre of policy planners, galvanized country teams, and improved civil-military cooperation. This chapter examines two options for future aid organization, one of which is to form a new United States Agency for Development and Reconstruction (USADR).

History of U.S. Foreign Assistance

To understand how the United States found itself with the limited foreign assistance capacity that it has today, as well as to underscore the potential influence a robust foreign assistance capacity can deliver, it is necessary to recall early U.S. development programs.

Early U.S. Development Programs

The field of development hardly existed prior to World War II. After the war, the United States led the ambitious and successful Marshall Plan (a recovery program rather than a development program) and gave economic assistance to a number of countries. But it was only in the late 1950s that people began to think seriously about concerted efforts to help poor countries advance. President John F. Kennedy was a student of the new ideas and had a particular interest in Africa. He believed that the United States could do well by doing good—that American aid to poor countries could be a powerful tool in the geopolitical competition with the Soviet Union. When President Kennedy established USAID in 1961, he put the United States in the vanguard of international development.

Kennedy tasked USAID with leading expanded development efforts in Asia, Africa, and Latin America (the Alliance for Progress). Large American aid helped Korea and Taiwan launch their successful growth and export pushes in the 1960s (and would later help Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia do the same). Similar programs in Latin America were less successful—mainly due to less hospitable local environments (bad economic policies, elite politics, and weak private sectors). USAID had in short order become second to none, the world's gold standard with respect to development assistance.

The growing American war effort in Vietnam created a need to deliver state-building assistance in harm's way. USAID expanded dramatically to meet the new demands. By the late 1960s, there were thousands of USAID officers in Vietnam, working hand in hand with the American military to support pacification and development. Integrated military and civilian teams looked a lot like today's Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and

Afghanistan, except that they included vastly more USAID officers than the relatively small numbers in the field today.

In 1973, congressional and public disillusionment with the war and disappointment with the lack of economic progress in Latin America and Africa led Congress to mandate significant changes in American aid. USAID staff levels were reduced, and USAID was directed to focus on poverty reduction and “basic human needs,” such as health and education, rather than economic growth. To implement the new approach, Congress earmarked foreign assistance budgets, narrowly legislating the specific purposes for which money could be used. Health program funding increased because it could be seen as immediately helping impoverished people, could be measured with considerable precision, and could produce results, even where economies and governments were weak.

The end of the Cold War brought another reassessment of American aid. Because of the strategic importance of post-communist transitions, the State Department took the lead in formulating aid policies toward the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, while USAID and other U.S. agencies implemented assistance programs. Aid to other regions declined, as did State Department and USAID staff levels (even as the total number of overseas posts grew). The U.S. Information Agency (USIA) was folded into the State Department, and there was strong congressional pressure on USAID to follow suit. With program demands expanding and in-country staffs shrinking, USAID had to find ways to do more with less. USAID moved away from its earlier model of large, professional staffs leading programs and working directly in ministries and relied increasingly on contractors and grantees. At the same time as USAID was cutting back on personnel, other departments and agencies were expanding their international programs. As the Department of Justice, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Department of Health and Human Services, among others, tapped new areas of American expertise, the proliferation of governmental actors posed serious coordination challenges in Washington and the field.

The Bush Legacy

The Bush legacy in foreign assistance comprises four major initiatives that the Obama administration will have to consider as a starting point for further reform: two costly aid programs (one for health and one for economic development), a reemphasis on creating some postconflict reconstruction and state-building capacity, and a reconsolidation of policy authority in the State Department.

By the time the Bush administration entered office, USAID had become a shell of its former self. It had approximately 1,000 Foreign Service officers and a total workforce of 2,200 direct hires in Washington and the field (compared to a workforce of about 12,000 at the height of the Vietnam War). As part of its reassessment of U.S. foreign policy after 9/11, the administration decided to strengthen aid programs.

It launched two major new development initiatives: PEPFAR (to address the growing crisis of HIV/AIDS) and the MCA (to provide more development assistance to those countries demonstrating the greatest readiness to help themselves).¹ The latter program targeted a limited number of countries selected according to their performance on a set of development indicators, awarding them large grants for fully funded, multiyear programs, called compacts, designed by the countries to improve growth and reduce poverty. Both were to be run by independent organizations—PEPFAR by the Global AIDS Coordinator based in the State Department, and the MCA by the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), a new public corporation with an interagency board of directors.

Both initiatives responded to legitimate needs and received congressional support. PEPFAR has been especially popular and recently received a substantial budget increase that is supposed to continue for the next 5 years. The MCA has addressed a shortcoming in American aid that dates back to 1973: the lack of support for economic growth. Development advocates in Congress and the public like aid to the social sectors (and humanitarian assistance) because its results are visible and can be more readily explained to constituents. However, large social programs without accompanying economic growth are not sustainable and cannot raise income levels. For that, economic growth is vital (if hard to attain). MCA programs try to address this dilemma by focusing growth support on countries with the best development conditions. It stakes out new terrain with its concepts of country-designed growth programs and non-earmarked, multiyear funds. In so doing, it seeks to help recipient nations grow their economy and their middle class.

However, the AIDS and economic programs have limitations. PEPFAR funding levels have been set with little regard for the ability of recipient countries to absorb and manage large influxes of directed health care funds, or for their implications for other U.S. assistance priorities. The MCA received lower funding in the last 2 years as Congress expressed concerns about the failure to spend money in compact accounts, which, like so many other development programs, have been plagued by a slow disbursement rate. Slow disbursements are not necessarily the Millennium Challenge Cor-

poration's fault, because large infrastructure investments emphasized in many compacts take time. Unrealistic expectations of how quickly countries should see the benefits of aid are making it hard for the MCC to sustain support for its business model, which envisages fully funding 5-year compacts at the outset, rather than providing incremental funding, as with USAID projects.

The PEPFAR and MCA programs also hamper coordination and coherence of U.S. development efforts. U.S. development assistance is now provided by three separate entities: two special purpose organizations (PEPFAR and MCC) and USAID (which is responsible for almost everything else). This division of labor has created stovepiping in Washington and confusion in the field. For example, the MCC and USAID both have field missions in developing countries, prompting uncertainty about who "speaks for the United States on development."

A third priority of the Bush administration had been to expand the civilian capacity to support stabilization and reconstruction in Afghanistan and Iraq. In the past decade, the question of enlarging U.S. state-building capabilities has moved tortuously through four phases:

- initial disregard of State Department and USAID plans for postconflict reconstruction based on a desire to leave state-building to others
- recognition that reconstruction was important but suffered from excessive reliance on Defense-managed infrastructure investments (especially in Iraq) and little thought given to operations, maintenance, and capacity-building
- broadening of priorities to include local government, social, and economic development programs and a reluctant expansion of the Department of Defense (DOD) roles in stabilization to make up for capacity constraints within USAID and other civilian agencies
- recent calls by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates for State and USAID to be given more money and people to cope with the social and economic dimensions of conflict and fragile states.

USAID has been given funds to begin expanding its ranks; the goal of USAID's Development Leadership Initiative is to double the number of USAID Foreign Service Officers by 2012. Although the Bush administration created the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization in the State Department (S/CRS) in 2004 to strengthen civilian capacity for conflict prevention and management, the absence of serious funding and authority severely limited the initial effectiveness of this innovation.

A fourth key initiative that is part of the Bush legacy in foreign assistance deals with the overall structure and management of aid programs. In 2006, the Bush administration sought to improve aid coordination by creating a new position of Director for Foreign Assistance in the State Department with the rank of Deputy Secretary and giving the USAID administrator this role as a second management responsibility. The creation of a director has improved budget coordination between State and USAID, but has not guaranteed coordination among the PEPFAR, MCC, and USAID programs, or with domestic agency programs.

Six Challenges

Strengthening the capacity of the United States in foreign assistance—for stability operations and postconflict reconstruction, as well as for poverty reduction and economic growth—will require that the Obama administration go well beyond these four initiatives of the Bush legacy. Both the challenge of coherence across foreign assistance programs and the need to expand and reform existing organizations and their authorities will need to be reviewed. Six critical challenges include improving integration and program coherence, enlarging the capacity for stabilization and reconstruction, strengthening conflict prevention, promoting economic growth, strengthening institution-building, and leveraging U.S. programs internationally.

Integration and Program Coherence

If the United States is to restore development assistance as a major instrument of national security policy, it will have to begin with the question of who is in charge. Thus, the first challenge for the White House is to revisit the debate as to how to minimize the stovepiping of American development programs and find more integrated ways of planning and delivering foreign assistance in war and peace.

As has been noted, the United States presently has three major development programs: USAID, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and PEPFAR. While they may coordinate with each other, few would contend that they achieve a unity of effort that might make them more strategic and effective. The real and perceived disunity causes America to “punch below its weight” and receive less recognition for its contributions to the developing world than it deserves.

The problem is far from just a Washington bureaucratic turf war. One of the lessons of the last 50 years is that implementation in the field is more important for aid effectiveness than strategies or directives issued from donor capitals. This has led to a growing trend among donor agencies to

strengthen field offices and delegate more authority to them. In the past, the United States led in this area because of the strength of USAID field missions. Much maligned in Washington, USAID was often seen in developing countries as the most capable, informed, and responsive of all aid agencies. However, this American advantage has been undermined by the proliferation of U.S. aid programs and the mission creep of micromanagement by both the executive and legislative branches of government. This is not to excuse USAID from all culpability, but until one realigns the major aid missions—as well as crafting a larger new effort for postconflict reconstruction—then it will be difficult for any administration to achieve a high degree of fidelity when it comes to implementing priorities overseas. Mark Twain wrote, “Put all your eggs in one basket, and then watch that basket.” Today, there is a felt need for U.S. foreign assistance programs to be placed under a single, more powerful authority able to look across the seams of different programs and increase the chances of achieving national objectives.

Stabilization and Reconstruction

The current approach to strengthening civilian capacity for postconflict stabilization and reconstruction is to establish a cadre of officials drawn from various U.S. departments and agencies (especially DOD, State, and USAID) who can deploy to crisis zones on short notice, supported by a large reserve corps of specialists outside the government who can be called up for duty in crisis zones. Program and crisis planning is to be led by S/CRS. Other chapters in this book call for larger, quick-response and reserve corps, based on expectations that future conflict demands may be numerous and of long duration.

The scale of future stabilization capacity is a basic policy judgment for the Obama administration. We believe that numerous stabilization operations may be less likely than more prolonged interventions. But no matter what decisions are made on these issues, civilian capacity clearly has to expand. That may be done by the proposed combination of U.S. Government agency and reserve corps capacity, or that capacity plus continued reliance on the contract organizations that have carried much of the weight in Iraq and Afghanistan.

How would these people and organizations be managed? We believe this will require much stronger management and implementation oversight capacity in USAID. Early experiences in Iraq revealed the danger of believing that American civilians with little experience in overseas operations can step into chaotic situations and lead effective stabilization and reconstruction programs. Stabilization has to be led by teams of professionals who specialize

in that work, train for it, and develop plans and doctrines for expeditionary operations in the same way that the military plans for crisis interventions. We believe these functions would best be led by new offices within USAID that build on the existing structures of the Office of Transition Initiatives, Office of Military Affairs, and Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, but are substantially larger. The new offices would recognize that stabilization requires different skills, operational routines, and culture than long-term development. It would hire new staff and set up its organizational processes around this different set of demands. The new offices would form a distinct cone within USAID, with its own budget lines and procurement rules (allowing fast and flexible contracting, authorities to pay contractors to maintain ready capacity, and so forth). These offices would develop close ties with DOD (including joint planning with the combatant commands) and work with other U.S. departments and agencies that have relevant expertise.

If the new administration chooses to take state-building seriously, these functions could amount to a new side of USAID (complementing the existing elements that are focused on long-term development). Some might argue that this new set of functions should become a separate component, possibly tied to State. We believe that would be a mistake, because stabilization operations have to eventually transition to longer term development; USAID can work with both State and DOD (both of which have important roles in stabilization); and we need greater unity of effort in development activities, not less.

Conflict Prevention

A third challenge for the Obama administration will be trying to get ahead of the curve by placing greater emphasis on preventing conflicts in the first instance. While Afghanistan and Iraq have focused public attention on the challenges of postconflict stabilization, they reinforce the short-term, crisis-management mentality of Washington's approach to global affairs. If the United States is to broaden its tools for crisis management, then, surely, conflict prevention must be part of that. It will not be easy. There are no sure-fire methods for preventing conflict, and the United States hardly enjoys sufficient power to prevent every conflict, even if it knew how. But recent research by Paul Collier and others has highlighted the importance of three key elements of a conflict prevention strategy.²

Strengthening conflict mediation and peace enforcement. Because the United States cannot, and in many cases should not, take the leading role in mediation and peacekeeping efforts on the ground, it will have to find ways to strengthen international and regional bodies—most of which admittedly

tend to lack political will or enforcement capacity, or both. This should include strengthening the military capacity of United Nations (UN) or regional peacekeepers and expanding their mission from peacekeeping to peace enforcement.

Increasing support for economic growth. It may seem obvious, especially in an era of global financial turmoil, but it is surprising how little international assistance to countries emerging from conflict is focused on creating sustainable economic growth. Not surprisingly, Collier finds a high correlation between economic stagnation and political instability, and he argues that one of the best ways to reduce conflicts is to help countries improve their growth. This is especially important for countries that have experienced a recent cessation in hostilities. They are at high risk of relapsing into conflict within a decade, but that risk can be reduced if they make economic reforms and receive aid for growth support.

Pressing oil-producing and resource-rich countries to improve transparency. Collier finds that poor countries that are rich in oil, diamonds, or other mineral wealth are prone to authoritarian rule, corruption, and instability (fueled by fights for control of the proceeds). He wants oil-consuming nations to force oil companies and oil-producing nations to accept new norms of payment and budget transparency to reduce theft and abuses and focus oil proceeds more on development. Now that global recession is reducing global demand for oil, it may be possible to begin to address these problems. Moreover, America's concern about energy security is compatible with the need to improve the governance and stability of those developing world countries fueling the U.S. and global economy.

Growth Promotion

The Millennium Challenge Account has promised a game-changing conceptual approach to America's bargain with the developing world by holding out the prospect of lasting poverty reduction through growth. Developing countries demonstrating good performance are offered a chance to design a serious investment to complement other interventions to support growth. However, if the MCA works in theory, it has thus far been less successful in practice. The following three factors help to account for the MCA's limited effectiveness.

An overly narrow interpretation of economic growth. The MCA emphasizes specific investments evaluated with an "investor banker" point of view. The assumption is that the overall system is in good enough shape that good individual investments can spur growth. However, few low-income countries

are in that situation. Most have multiple public and private sector shortcomings that keep private investment and social returns low. Asian experience suggests that these shortcomings can only be addressed through locally led reforms and investments.

An overly optimistic belief in rapid economic transformation. The MCA assumes that countries know how to promote business development and exports and can graduate from aid in 5–10 years. Neither is the case. Most low-income countries have little idea how to strengthen their private sectors or improve exports. They need technical assistance to develop and implement sound growth initiatives. Even with such help, it is unrealistic to hope that they will quickly improve their economic performance and graduate from aid. That will take decades in the best of worlds.

A misinterpretation of the historical record of successful development. The successful experiences of fast-growing countries in Asia do not support the idea that growth follows from “good performance” on policy and institutional indicators. Korea and Taiwan would not have scored well on the MCA indicators in the early stages of their growth pushes, and China would not score well today. Asian fast growers did not “reform first and let businesses develop naturally” (the Washington Consensus prescription). Rather, they intervened actively to promote business development and low-wage, manufactured exports. Local political commitment to business development was more important than economic orthodoxy. Low-income MCA countries will have a hard time expanding their manufactured exports today because of the dominance of Asian producers. They may be able to do better on other aspects of growth promotion, but that will depend on local leadership and evolutionary changes that build business capacity along the way. The best measure of “good performance” is not current rankings on development indicators but how well countries perform over time on business development and nontraditional exports.

Institution-building

USAID needs to enhance its capacity to help developing countries strengthen their institutions, especially their budgeting, financial management, and procurement functions. The agency used to do a lot of this work, but it has been another casualty of the downsizing of the USAID Foreign Service capacity. The need for institution-building is higher than ever, influenced by the desires of many donors to use budget support, the MCC’s need for government capacity to implement compacts, and the demands of the PEPFAR program for local capacity in health. In Iraq, limitations on the

capacities of ministries to program the proceeds from oil wealth are posing major constraints on the pace of transition. In Afghanistan, the next stage of stabilization and reconstruction will depend heavily on strengthening the institutions of the central and provincial governments (complementing the focus on Provincial Reconstruction Teams).

We do not have agreed principles for effective institution-building, but much can be done by USAID teams on the ground with the ability to adapt to local situations. However, this function cannot be contracted out—it has too many elements that are inherently governmental. USAID needs expanded Foreign Service personnel and overseas missions to do this work, which should include placement of Foreign Service Officers within government ministries (which was done in the past, but not in recent years). It will not be feasible to seriously pursue institution-building everywhere—choices will have to be made about which countries to focus on. However, such activities would be highly desirable in Afghanistan, Iraq, and most MCA compact countries. USAID would also have to be given non-earmarked funds for this purpose as well as freedom from excessive demands for “results indicators” (which are hard to measure in this field).

Leveraging International Cooperation

Regardless of whether the Obama administration aims for more effective reconstruction or development programs, no single improvement is more important than the need to forge greater international cooperation. The American debate on development assistance has been surprisingly parochial, given that we are living in an increasingly globalized world. We are not on the cusp of returning to the world of half a century ago, when the United States was a foreign assistance superpower. In contrast to the national security arena, when it comes to development assistance the United States is not even first among equals, but instead one actor among many. Other major players are the European Commission, the World Bank, the UN specialized agencies, and other bilateral donors, plus huge private donors such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. U.S. reform proposals have paid little attention to how they would fit into the overall mix of global programs, whether on development or reconstruction. British Prime Minister Gordon Brown recently called for concerted international efforts on global warming, energy, poverty, and postconflict reconstruction—inviting the United States to join an international coalition to address these shared concerns. If the Obama administration shares these priorities, it should begin by determining how to better leverage international cooperation.

Aid Reform

A New Department?

The most prominent proposals for aid reform focus on the first of these challenges (program coherence). They argue that the United States is suffering from major incoherence in its development activities that is creating dysfunctions in Washington and inefficiencies in the field. They also argue that no one designed this system by choice; rather, it evolved over time as the consequence of many uncoordinated decisions. To address these problems, many development advocates want the United States to follow the British approach of creating a new Cabinet-level department that has authority over all development activities. This would allow development to take its rightful place as a fully empowered third “D” and bring the unity of command and budget that are needed for effective operations overseas.³

This proposal has considerable appeal, especially in raising the priority of development and strengthening unity of command. The current fractionalization of aid programs can be compared (on a much smaller scale) to the problems that used to exist in the defense establishment when unbridled independence among the Services impeded effective joint operations. In the defense field, centralized control and program cohesion were strengthened in three steps: the creation of the Department of Defense and the appointment of a Secretary in the aftermath of World War II; the strengthening of the powers of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, powers that Secretary Robert McNamara put in place during the Kennedy administration, including by using systems analysis and the budget process to control procurement decisions and force planning; and the Goldwater-Nichols–legislated changes to strengthen jointness and create powerful operational unified commands. Today, DOD has elaborate planning and budget processes to try to achieve program coherence that work fairly well, considering the massive size of DOD programs, budgets, and forces.

While the parallels from defense reform may sometimes be inappropriate for the nonmilitary departments of the U.S. Government, the experience of DOD is still relevant. It suggests that an analogous process in development might take decades to reach full force, but could be jump-started by the first step of creating a Cabinet-level—or at least a more powerful and integrated—department with a high-powered staff. As in the case of DOD, the staff would have to be attuned to the national security thinking of the administration and work closely with National Security Council staff. They would also have to write a national strategy

for development similar to DOD's Quadrennial Defense Review—or fully contribute to a national security strategy that works across defense, foreign relations, and development issues. The benefits of such innovations would be substantial: greater priority given to the most important issues and programs; better balancing of short- and long-term objectives; more coherent budget choices; and better program integration and coordination in the field.

However, securing support in Congress and the executive branch for such a radical change (requiring new legislation, new budget accounts, and major reorganization of executive branch structures) would be politically difficult and costly. The Obama administration may not wish to bear those costs, especially given the weak economic and financial outlook.

On the other hand, major reforms and increases in American development aid will require a dramatic repackaging and sustained, high-level political leadership. Indeed, there is at least in policy communities a broad consensus that reform is needed and that continuing the status quo is undesirable. Bipartisan support should rally behind a well-articulated plan to strengthen foreign assistance for both contested state-building and reconstruction and long-term development assistance. The main aim should be to achieve greater unity of effort, if not command, across the government.

While various proposals exist, we focus on two major organizational options for restructuring foreign assistance in the United States. The first would emphasize the need to shore up weak capacities within existing structures, shifting greater authority and funding to USAID, but basically preserving development assistance as its core mission. The second would go further by creating a new agency in which both state-building and post-conflict reconstruction and development assistance would become the twin pillars of a powerful agency, still under State Department overall foreign policy direction, but capable of implementing the array of responses likely to be needed in the developing world in decades to come.

Option 1: A Stronger U.S. Agency for International Development

This option would maintain today's three-program structure comprising USAID, the MCC, and PEPFAR. However, it would especially seek to strengthen USAID, which has been left to atrophy, by providing greater funding, more personnel, and a wider role in coordinating overseas implementation. While some enhancement of USAID's limited capacity for state-building could be undertaken, this option would be predicated in part on an assumption that Afghanistan and Iraq were more anomalies than they were bellwethers of future requirements. Instead, this option

would seek to restore America's soft power by bolstering USAID as a lead agency, providing more development assistance, and restoring a higher caliber of development assistance expertise and central coordination in the field than currently exists. It would be most attractive if the Obama administration wanted to strengthen country assistance programs without major legislative or organizational changes. The administration would have to convince Congress and other U.S. agencies to agree to two changes: a substantially larger USAID personnel budget and permission to bring qualified experts into senior positions from outside the government; and stronger roles for USAID mission directors in controlling development activities overseas. If these changes were made, this option would allow the following improvements:

- The Director for Foreign Assistance would shift from State to USAID and be given authority to coordinate the MCA and PEPFAR programs and track all other U.S. programs impinging on development (including DOD, public diplomacy, and domestic agency programs). The State Department activities and managers of three bureaus—International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs; Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor; and Population, Refugees, and Migration—would shift from State to USAID.
- Senior USAID officials would be better able to play major roles in Washington policy processes.
- USAID mission directors would become development counselors with authority to coordinate programmatic activities at the country level across all three major development assistance programs. Domestic agencies with international programs would have to get clearance from development counselors to work in country.
- USAID would expand its number of technical experts in fields such as economic growth, private sector development, infrastructure, and rule of law. It would replace some functions that contractors now perform—for example, working as senior advisors in government ministries—with direct-hire personnel.
- USAID would be allowed flexibility to create a “float” of officers above the number required for permanent positions, to enable USAID to respond to emergency demands and to provide training (for example, the most promising Foreign Service Officers selected for executive leadership—FS-1s—would regularly attend National Defense University).

- The Director for Foreign Assistance would create a new, independent Office of Evaluation that reports to the Administrator. This office would evaluate all three major development programs.

Option 2: A U.S. Agency for Development and Reconstruction

In this option, a single development agency could be created at the Cabinet or sub-Cabinet level. However, state-building and reconstruction missions would be elevated to be on par with development assistance, and the agency might therefore assume a new name to reflect both its dual missions and its new authority. At the same time, to ensure that it was indeed the foreign assistance implementation agency of the United States, it would be given chief budget authority over all foreign assistance activities—obviously still under the overall administration guidance of the White House (especially the Office of Management and Budget) and the State Department (which would remain the lead in foreign affairs policy overall).

The MCC and PEPFAR would continue as separate operating agencies, but they would not have their own independent budgets; the administration would request their funds in a unified development budget overseen by one set of authorizing committees and appropriations subcommittees. Foreign assistance programs for U.S. domestic agencies would continue to appear within the budgets of those agencies, but would have to be approved by the development agency.⁴ Congress would retain the authority to promulgate program guidance, but earmarks would be kept to a bare minimum. The development agency would build its program budgets more from the bottom up, with field missions and development counselors (see option 1) playing stronger roles. The USAID Inspector General would have audit authority over all foreign assistance programs.

The rationale for this option is that “budget is policy.” If you do not have control of the budget, you do not have control of policy or programs. With independent budgets, agencies develop their own objectives, support structures on Capitol Hill, and interest groups. That tends to happen even with formal budget controls (as Secretary McNamara learned in the 1960s), but without the budget tool, there is no hope for coherent resource allocation. This option would require new legislation.

The challenges for the future are not just to improve program coherence, but also to strengthen conflict prevention, growth support, stabilization, and international cooperation. We believe these objectives can be advanced through a stronger USAID, but especially through a single development agency reconfigured to place missions on a more equal footing with development assistance. The stronger USAID or new USADR would

work hand in glove with the Departments of State and Defense, while retaining sufficient strength to preserve development assistance programs from becoming overwhelmed by short-term security goals.

Under either option, several additional steps can be taken:

- Developing a new component of staff and operations focused on stabilization and reconstruction, including coordination with DOD, combatant commands, and the State Department on contingency planning and expeditionary implementation. All aspects of program management (personnel, contracting, operational doctrines, and organizational culture) should be optimized for the special demands of stabilization support. This component should be large enough to meet the demands for leading and coordinating civilian capacity for the full range of planning contingencies. It would be far larger under a new USADR than a bolstered USAID.
- Formally designating conflict prevention as a goal of U.S. diplomatic, security, and development policies. The United States should strengthen its engagement with the UN and regional bodies to support conflict mediation and peace enforcement. U.S. Africa Command and other combatant commands should help national and UN forces improve their logistics, equipment, and training and should advise peace enforcement forces on contingency planning. The United States should work with Britain to build Group of 7 (G-7) support for the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative and other agreements to incentivize good management of mineral wealth. USADR and State should be given more resources for rule of law, local government, and institution-building.
- Integrating the resources presently in the MCA and USAID to offer better support for long-term economic growth initiatives in leading-edge countries. The Millennium Challenge Corporation could continue to select its compact-eligible countries based on quantitative indicators, but more attention could be paid to qualitative judgments of who among the best-scoring countries is demonstrating the strongest political commitment to self-led reforms and sound business development policies. USAID/USADR could help countries develop sound business development strategies that can be incorporated in country proposals to the MCC. These proposals may focus on specific investments to be funded by the MCC but should include broader national changes to improve the conditions for business development and exports. The best-performing coun-

tries should be eligible for multiple compacts that can overlap and be renewed. The MCC and its board of directors could be the judge of the most promising proposals (the “judging” function should be separated from the advising function provided by USAID), but proposals should not be forced into textbook norms (local leadership of change is more important than strict orthodoxy). In compact countries, the MCC and USAID/USADR could work together to oversee program implementation and help the government and private sector build their capacities. For compact countries with strong development potential, USAID should provide long-term help on institution-building, especially in financial planning and management. If host governments can improve their fiduciary capacity to levels required to meet U.S. standards of accountability, the MCC could allow them to include budget support in their compact proposals.

- Working with the Departments of State and Defense to strengthen USAID/USADR cooperation with multilateral and bilateral development agencies. The United States needs more coordination of its policies toward the developing world across U.S. agencies and between the United States and other actors and governments involved in reconstruction and development. One way to improve both types of coordination would be to establish a new statutory body of senior career officials from State, USAID/USADR, Treasury, and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (similar to the Joint Chiefs of Staff) to provide advice to Cabinet Secretaries and the White House on U.S. policy on poverty, trade, energy, global warming, and conflict management.⁵ That should be combined with more active engagement in G-7 diplomacy.

Building USAID

Critics may object that USAID does not have the capacity to play these ambitious roles. Some skepticism is warranted; after all, even if all goes well, these reforms will take years to implement. But the question is not whether one has faith in USAID as it exists today, but how the United States can best strengthen its capacity in development assistance to meet the likely demands of the future. We believe that institution is USAID (or a stronger development agency that subsumes USAID) for the following reasons:

- Running development programs overseas requires operational and management skills and strong familiarity with local conditions. USAID has those capabilities. It has been weakened by staff cuts but

can be rebuilt. State also has knowledge of local conditions, but lacks an operational and management culture. State is a policy, diplomatic, and reporting organization. Its officers are selected for analytic and representational skills. USAID officers are chosen and rewarded for management skills. They are specialists in the art of implementing development programs in the difficult and often chaotic conditions of poor countries. While in some cases they tend to focus on bureaucratic minutiae, the best members of the USAID Foreign Service have more in common culturally with the best military officers in DOD (who also have a management culture) than with their fellow Foreign Service Officers in State.

- USAID is not good at interagency coordination, but these weaknesses could be compensated for by changes in USAID or the creation of USADR. USAID has long been a junior partner in the interagency game, limited by its specialized role, uneven support at senior levels of the national security apparatus, and narrow political base on Capitol Hill. Over the years USAID has developed a culture of trying to “fly below the radar” to minimize intrusions into its programs. These problems are not easily solved, but could be eased if USAID or USADR were given more staff with the bureaucratic skills and political savvy to operate at senior levels in interagency processes. Such people could come from the ranks of political appointees, agency senior career staff, and State Department detailees. In addition, President Obama could appoint a new Deputy National Security Advisor for Development to oversee policy development and implementation.

USAID or USADR would be the organization best placed to ensure that U.S. international development activities complement each other and fit local conditions. The involvement of domestic agencies in foreign assistance has to be managed better. Most such programs focus on one sector or one discipline within a sector (for example, agriculture or police training). A coherent assistance program with 10–20 different activities cannot be directed from 8,000 miles away.

Conclusion and Findings

Creating an interagency ethos built around defense, diplomacy, and development requires, *inter alia*, strengthening our capacity for development and state-building, as well as improving our unity of effort (if not also unity of command) over foreign assistance programs. To meet the

demands of American national security, development and conflict management requires increased resources and organizational changes. The Bush administration made several important improvements—raising aid levels, actively addressing the HIV/AIDS crisis, and establishing an innovative program to promote economic growth (the Millennium Challenge Account). However, the jury is still out on the final success of other administration efforts, such as the creation of an integrated aid system through the establishment of the Director for U.S. Foreign Assistance, or the launching of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization to provide adequate civilian capacity for stabilization and state-building in contested zones and postconflict reconstruction.

Elevate priority of economic and development assistance.

There are sound arguments to be made for a Cabinet-level development department, not least to help elevate economic and development assistance as a priority and to create better unity of effort. The same principle that dictated that we create a strong Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and combatant commanders, and a new joint culture across the military Services—even while preserving individual Service culture and expertise—could well be applied to our foreign assistance and development programs.

Whether or not a Cabinet-level development department is appropriate or feasible, two basic attributes—greater effectiveness and greater integration and unity of effort—deserve bipartisan support in the new administration. One alternative would be to strengthen policy and budget control by an empowered USAID or new USADR. A weaker version of that approach would leave budgets separate but seek to increase policy coherence through a strong policy staff in USAID and Office of Management and Budget leverage on the budget. A stronger version would integrate the budgets for the main development programs (USAID, PEPFAR, and MCC) and require domestic U.S. agencies to have their foreign assistance activities approved by USAID. However, the second version would require legislative action.

Strengthen civilian capacity for stabilization and reconstruction and conflict prevention.

Expanding and properly resourcing the remit of USAID to create a new U.S. Agency for Development and Reconstruction, in which development still comes first but reconstruction skills are put on a level playing field, would go a long way toward centralizing civilian capacity in the logical organization. Regardless of how program coherence is addressed, the Obama administration needs to strengthen civilian capacity for stabiliza-

tion and reconstruction. A key missing ingredient is structured contingency planning, training, and doctrine development for expeditionary activities. That should be led by an expanded cadre of stabilization specialists in USAID that works closely with the combatant commanders. The United States also needs to strengthen its efforts to prevent conflict (including more support for peace enforcement), promote economic growth in good-performing low-income countries (building on the Millennium Challenge Account, but adding other elements), and work cooperatively with international development partners.

Notes

¹ Not to be confused with the Millennium Goals, which are internationally agreed benchmarks aimed at halving poverty by 2015.

² See <<http://users.ox.ac.uk/~econpco/research/conflict.htm>>.

³ This is the proposal advocated by three past USAID administrators (J. Brian Atwood, M. Peter McPherson, and Andrew Natsios) in "Arrested Development—Making Foreign Aid a More Effective Tool," *Foreign Affairs* 87, no. 6 (November-December 2008).

⁴ *Ibid.*, 131. This is similar to the system that used to exist in development assistance. From the early 1960s to 1992, the Office of Management and Budget insisted that all foreign aid activities by U.S. agencies go through USAID.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 132.

Domestic Agencies, Civilian Reserves, and the Intelligence Community

Bernard T. Carreau¹

Agencies that traditionally played only a domestic role increasingly have a role to play in our foreign and security policies. This requires us to better integrate interagency activity both at home and abroad.

—2006 National Security Strategy

At no time since the launch of the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program in Vietnam has there been as much internal debate, or as many novel initiatives, regarding the role of U.S. Government civilians in complex operations as there is today. The military is overburdened and needs help from government civilians, especially when ground operations involve irregular warfare, including counterinsurgency and stability operations, which are population-focused and depend as much or more on political, economic, social, and psychological progress as on military progress. Previous chapters examined initiatives to build civilian capacity at the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of State, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). This chapter looks at current and potential capabilities of the “domestic” agencies—an imprecise but useful term intended to connote those agencies whose core missions are primarily related to domestic policy and programs, especially the Departments of Justice, Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture, Homeland Security, Transportation, Labor, Energy, Interior, Health and Human Services, and Education. What do they bring to the table? Can the expertise, institutional knowledge, and agency culture developed largely for domestic purposes be translated into an overseas, operational context? How can the capabilities of the domestic

agencies be enhanced by collaboration with the Intelligence Community and a potential civilian reserve corps?

The civilian initiatives recently launched at State, DOD, and USAID will, if successful, provide important capabilities for complex operations, but they will not be on a scale necessary for current and future needs. Domestic agencies, civilian reserves, and the private sector will have to fill the gap. (The private sector is addressed in other chapters.) How can domestic agencies complement and augment the capabilities of the State Department and a USAID reformulated as the U.S. Agency for Development and Reconstruction (USADR), and how would USADR relate to and coordinate the activities of the domestic agencies? This chapter examines these issues and proposes integrating the domestic agencies into a national framework headed by the National Security Council (NSC), with the State Department coordinating strategic policy and USAID/USADR coordinating ground operations. Domestic agencies would be assigned statutory responsibilities in discrete areas of complex operations and would take operational guidance from USAID/USADR and be reimbursed using a model similar to that involving the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and domestic agencies in domestic disaster relief.

Untapped Potential of Domestic Agencies

Domestic agencies have enormous potential to contribute to complex operations.² Nearly all of them have capabilities that are or could be relevant in overseas complex operations, even though their capabilities were often developed for domestic purposes and even though, in some instances, there are statutory constraints on using those capabilities in foreign operations. Although domestic agencies will need to develop additional capabilities and will need more resources, new authorities, and an operational culture to perform effectively in complex operations, they enjoy certain distinct advantages over their foreign operations agency counterparts. Their principal assets are their agency cultures, core competencies, institutional knowledge, primary constituencies, and, above all, their reachback capability built on a large manpower base.

Reachback Ability: Strength in Numbers

A strong reachback capability gives domestic agencies their greatest strength and provides the strongest argument to tap into them for complex operations. Their large bureaucracies collect data, analyze issues, develop policies, enforce laws, negotiate agreements, and oversee programs intended to promote national goals, such as effective health care, education, agricul-

tural proficiency, a business-friendly commercial environment, and efficient transport systems. The number of full-time employees housed at the agencies, while not on the same scale as that of DOD, is impressive in relation to that of the State Department and USAID (see table 7–1).

Table 7–1. Total Employees in Foreign Operations and Domestic Departments/Agencies, 2007

Foreign Operations Departments/Agencies Total Employees	
Department/Agency	Total
USAID	2,100
State	19,000
Domestic Departments/Agencies Total Employees	
Department/Agency	Total
Commerce	40,000
Agriculture	100,000
Transportation	53,500
Treasury	108,000
Justice	105,000
Energy	15,000
Labor	15,000
Health and Human Services	67,000
Education	4,200
Homeland Security	100,000
Total	607,700

Table 7–1 shows the large reachback capacity of 10 major domestic agencies. Most of them dwarf the total personnel at the State Department and USAID, with Justice, Treasury, Agriculture, and Homeland Security each having 50 times as many direct hires as USAID. With such large staffs, only a very small percentage of the total yields substantial numbers of potentially deployable persons. Just one percent of the Commerce Department’s total staff is 400 people, and three percent would be 1,200. One percent of Justice’s staff would be 1,050 people, and three percent would be 3,150. Under the current plans of the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), Commerce should eventually have a total of 45 persons in the active and standby

readiness corps combined, and Justice would have 558. (Under funding levels as of July 2008, Justice had 45 total, and Commerce just 2, in the active and standby corps.) Just one percent of the staffs of the 10 agencies would amount to 6,077 persons. This number is well in excess of the 5,000 active/standby government civilian personnel estimated to be required for complex operations in chapter 2.

In-house Expertise: Real Accountability

The large number of full-time staff at the domestic agencies combined with statutory missions in a broad range of areas such as agriculture, commerce, rule of law, health care, education, and transportation give the agencies *in-house* subject matter expertise. This is in sharp contrast to the State Department, which relies heavily on contractors for certain critical tasks in complex operations, and USAID, which relies almost exclusively on contractors in complex operations. Chapter 8 addresses the many concerns associated with outsourcing in complex operations, particularly in a war zone. This in-house expertise gives domestic agencies direct control over policy implementation and operational management, which in turn results in stronger accountability. When agencies are managing their own direct hires, there is no middleman, no profit motive, no moral hazard, no competing interests, no overworked contracting officers, no army of lawyers, auditors, and cost accountants needed to police the contract (to say nothing of the actual work performed on the ground)—issues discussed in chapter 8 that can affect the management and oversight of contractors. Managing direct hires presents its own set of challenges, of course, but in general the direct chain of command gives supervisors more control over outputs and outcomes on the ground.

Alignment of Agency Core Mission and Culture to Operational Task

A subtle but important advantage of increasing the involvement of domestic agencies in complex operations is that it will lead to closer alignment between agency core mission and the operational task on the ground. It would not be a complete alignment because no domestic agency has stabilization of in-conflict or postconflict countries as a core mission, but it would be a closer alignment.³

Foreign operations agencies, including DOD, and the military also have not traditionally considered in-conflict or postconflict stabilization as a core mission. Recent internal policy documents and reorganization at DOD, State, and USAID aimed at highlighting the central role of stability operations reveal the novelty of stability operations as core missions at

those agencies and were instituted largely in response to inadequacies of the response of those agencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. That the Secretary of Defense had to issue a policy directive⁴ putting stability operations on par with combat operations as core missions of DOD and the Services is a testament to the previous absence of, if not aversion to, stability operations as a *de jure* obligation, to say nothing of a *de facto* responsibility in the culture and mindset of the department and the Services. S/CRS was created in August 2004 and sanctioned by Congress first in December 2004 in an appropriations bill, but the basic authorities of the State Department were not amended to include the new office until October 2008.⁵ USAID has traditionally been focused on long-term development. Although the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), which focuses on the immediate needs of countries in transition from conflict to democracy,⁶ was created by statute in 1992, it is small and has few resources. More important, there is a significant cultural rift within USAID between proponents of the traditional long-term development focus of the agency and those who recognize the need for the shorter term, quick-fix programs espoused by OTI and intended to serve as a bridge to longer term development. Internal reorganization and policy pronouncements intended to highlight the importance of stability operations and civil-military cooperation in the work of USAID are of very recent vintage. To date, Congress has not added stability operations as a statutory core mission of the agency.

While no agency would count overseas stability operations as a statutory core mission, at least not until very recently, domestic agencies do have core missions related to the operational tasks that need to be performed in theater as part of overseas contingencies. In contrast to the Department of State, USAID, and even DOD, the Department of Justice has a law enforcement mission, albeit largely for domestic purposes. It understands the language, culture, tasks, and concerns of law enforcement professionals; its own representatives can talk cop to cop, criminal investigator to criminal investigator, prosecutor to prosecutor, corrections officer to corrections officer, attorney to attorney. The Department of Commerce understands the needs and concerns of the business community, which is the primary constituency of one of its major bureaus. It does not run businesses or make commercial investments, but it understands the language of business, commercial risk, the connection between political instability and investment security, the nuts and bolts of selling, marketing, pricing, cost accounting, exporting and importing, and commercial legal environments that are conducive to investment and the conduct of business.

Even among domestic agencies, it is important to match the operational task to the agency's core mission. Several agencies, including the Departments of Treasury, Commerce, State, and Labor, have core missions related to economic activity. If the operational task is business development or a public works program, the Treasury Department would not be a good fit, because Treasury's core mission relates to macroeconomic fundamentals, public finance, banking, and capital and currency movements. Its constituency is more Wall Street than Main Street. Job creation programs and other microeconomic initiatives would be more closely aligned with the missions of the Commerce Department or the Labor Department.

The issue of agency culture is complex and can be considered from various perspectives. As currently configured, no domestic or foreign operations agency has a culture that coincides precisely with the demands of overseas complex operations, especially stability operations. The big advantage that foreign operations agencies have is their overseas experience. Yet many domestic agencies have a far-flung international presence and extensive international experience, too. Treasury has attaches stationed in Embassies around the world; it has an office dedicated to international capacity development in financial and budgetary matters; it represents the United States at the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank; and it negotiates tax, investment, and trade treaties all over the world. Commerce has an entire bureau devoted to international trade; its Foreign Commercial Service has 1,500 full-time employees; it negotiates trade agreements and international industrial standards and has a strong presence at the World Trade Organization; and various bureaus provide international capacity development training and technical assistance in commercial law, telecommunications policy, weather forecasting, and intellectual property protection. Agriculture provides international training and technical assistance in agricultural production and marketing, animal husbandry, and veterinary services; its Foreign Agricultural Service has nearly 1,000 employees; it negotiates agriculture-related trade agreements and international food standards. Justice has legal advisors and law enforcement officials stationed all over the world, and it has offices dedicated to international police training and judicial system capacity-building.

DOD and USAID have operational capability and planning expertise that the State Department and the domestic agencies do not have. The lack of an operational and planning capability is the biggest impediment to effective performance in complex operations for domestic agencies. This issue is explored more thoroughly later in the chapter.

Domestic Agency Capabilities

The appendix to this chapter examines the capabilities of 10 domestic agencies to contribute to complex operations. In most cases, the capabilities support a domestic mission but could be applied in an overseas complex operation, if the agency had the mission, resources, and/or political will to do so.⁷ In other cases, the capabilities identified were developed by reason of statutory missions that relate only indirectly, coincidentally, or serendipitously to complex operations. In still other cases, capabilities were developed by agencies for a statutory purpose that is completely unrelated to any aspect of domestic or overseas contingency operations, but could be applied in complex operations with minimal effort and creative thinking.

The focus here is not primarily on governmental functions, but on practical capabilities that can assist in stabilization efforts. It is self-evident that all agencies can provide training on the structure and organization of their agencies, their ministerial functions, and the programs and regulations that they administer. The Ministry Advisory Teams in Iraq can easily be replicated in any overseas contingency. It is also self-evident that all agencies that represent the United States in international organizations can provide training in conforming national practices with international standards. Transportation can help bring local aviation practices into conformity with the standards of the International Civil Aviation Organization; Labor can help align local labor laws with the guidelines of the International Labor Organization; Commerce can bring local trade practices into conformity with standards of the World Trade Organization; and Homeland Security can help bring local customs laws into conformity with the guidelines of the World Customs Organization. What is less obvious is what capabilities domestic agencies can bring to bear in the areas of security, law enforcement, governance, job creation, rule of law, and social order.

All domestic agencies are made up of bureaus, each with its own mission, and often with its own culture. While the missions of the bureaus under a single agency are generally related, this is not always the case. The major bureaus of the Department of Transportation all deal with some form of modal transport, whether sea, air, highway, or rail. At the other extreme, the Department of Commerce is made up of a hodgepodge of bureaus whose missions are barely related to each other. The mission, culture, core competencies, and constituencies of the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration bear almost no relation to those of the International Trade Administration. Yet they both reside in the Department

of Commerce, as do the Economics and Statistics Administration (which houses the Census Bureau), the Patent and Trademark Office, the National Telecommunications Information Agency, and other bureaus. In these instances, the culture of specific bureaus will be more important than the culture of the department as a whole.

Overcoming Barriers to Enhancing Domestic Agency Capabilities

As currently constituted for complex operations, domestic agencies are diamonds in the rough, if not still unmined in some instances. This section describes the major barriers and how to overcome them.

Political/Bureaucratic Barriers

Domestic agencies come under the jurisdiction of over 30 congressional committees. One of the biggest obstacles to gearing up the domestic agencies for complex operations will be to convince congressional oversight committees that a new mission regarding complex operations will not detract from the overwhelmingly domestic purpose of the laws, regulations, and programs that the agencies are responsible for. If Labor cannot process unemployment insurance claims, if Transportation cannot ensure civil aviation safety, if Commerce cannot enforce trade laws or accurately predict the path of hurricanes, if Homeland Security cannot ensure port safety or mitigate against domestic natural disasters, if Justice cannot prosecute domestic criminals or interdict narcotraffickers, because critical agency staff have been siphoned off to help stabilize or reconstruct Afghanistan, Kosovo, Bosnia, or Iraq, the complex operation mission for all domestic agencies will be dead in the water. The *sine qua non* of any attempt to mobilize the domestic agencies for complex operations will be that their existing domestic responsibilities not be jeopardized.

This political barrier is really the mirror image of a major bureaucratic impediment to the addition of complex operations to domestic agencies' missions, an impediment that is entirely internal to the agencies. It has to do with how the agencies perceive themselves and their core mission. Bureaucracies jealously guard their turf and prerogatives and as a general matter seek to expand their resources and responsibilities and power, *but only to the extent they perceive the new responsibilities and resources to be related to their core mission*. When agencies are given a new mission that they do not perceive as within their core competency, they will naturally want to reject it or slough it off to someone else, even if it comes with additional resources and power. This is currently the case with DOD

and stability operations in general. It has been encouraging the State Department and other civilian agencies to take more of a role in stability operations. So eager is it to pass off the task of stability operations that it has been willing to *pay* the State Department under the authority of section 1207 to help fund S/CRS. When one agency is willing to give up resources to another agency in order to take over a task that it does not want, there is a major mismatch, or at least a *perceived* mismatch, between what the donor agency sees as its core mission and the new, unwanted mission thrust upon it. While section 1207 is widely viewed as a creative solution to a complicated bureaucratic funding issue, it is as much a sign of the dangerously dysfunctional, orphaned status of stability operations in the Federal Government as a whole. There are already signs of domestic agencies resisting overtures by the State Department to contribute personnel to the active and standby readiness corps and raising bureaucratic roadblocks because the agencies do not view overseas complex operations as part of their core missions.

These political and bureaucratic barriers must be attacked in the same way. If domestic agencies are going to be given responsibilities for complex operations, the new responsibilities must be tied to the agencies' core missions. Because the demand for complex operations response capacity is elastic, the capabilities needed must also be elastic. Yet if the new capabilities needed for complex operations are so specialized that they are completely divorced from the agencies' core missions, the agencies will be saddled with excess capacity during nonsurge periods (which, after all, will be the normal state of affairs) that will be politically and economically unsustainable. Equally if not more important, they will meet with internal bureaucratic resistance. Agencies will convince themselves that the new mission does not match their core competencies and will seek to pawn it off on someone else. The new responsibilities will become unwanted orphans, and the agencies will resist training and preparing for them or will make half-hearted attempts to do so. A key consideration, therefore, in developing new capacities for complex operations among the domestic agencies is how the agencies will use those new capabilities in a steady-state context. Even if the domestic agencies are given a national security mission, that mission will of necessity be relatively small compared to the overwhelmingly domestic focus of most of their activities, and it must not detract from their domestic responsibilities. The question, then, is how the new capabilities in a steady-state context will contribute to the core mission and the largely, though not exclusively, domestic focus of the agencies' activities.

The answer is to take an expansive view of the agencies' core missions. This should not be difficult, given the realities of globalization and the increasing interconnectedness of the world in all areas—finance, labor, health, trade, commerce, agriculture, energy, and transportation. With minimal effort, the mission statements of nearly all the relevant bureaus in the key domestic agencies could be enhanced with reference to capabilities needed for complex operations. For example, the mission of the Foreign Agricultural Service is to promote the export of U.S. corn, soybeans, and other agricultural products. The mission of the Foreign Commercial Service is to promote the export of U.S. industrial products. No bureau in the Department of Agriculture or the Commerce Department has the mission of revitalizing agricultural production in foreign countries or spurring private sector development in foreign countries in complex operations.⁸ Yet if Commerce and Agriculture develop Middle East regional expertise on local business practices, agricultural production, and marketing practices as part of their new responsibilities in complex operations, this expertise will be of great value in the course of their traditional roles of advising U.S. businesses on foreign business climates and promoting the sale of U.S. agricultural products and equipment, and in conducting inspections of food imported into the United States. In the longer term, a stable and prosperous postconflict country will be a much better market for U.S. agricultural and industrial goods, services, and investment.

This same reasoning would apply with congressional oversight committees regarding the traditional roles of the domestic agencies. Even though most of the oversight committees do not have national security or foreign affairs as a primary focus, many of them, such as the Commerce, Finance (Ways and Means), Judiciary, Agriculture, Labor, and Transportation committees in both the House and the Senate, do have an international reach and are increasingly affected by international events.

Finally, no matter what the merits of the rationale for adding a complex operations mission to the domestic agencies, the initiative would require strong Presidential leadership, and it will need to be presented in terms of national security. Such a significant addition to the domestic agencies' core missions will require the President and the leadership of the Congress acting in concert, with a common purpose.

Structural Barriers

Structural barriers relate to the agencies' basic authorities and the resources needed to carry out the complex operations mission. Domestic agencies will begin to develop appropriate capabilities and operational

capacity for complex operations only when given an explicit national security mission by Congress requiring them to train, prepare, and deploy personnel in complex operations. Each agency should be given specific responsibilities and tasks so that there is no doubt as to what they are responsible for. Where two or more agencies have overlapping responsibilities, one of them should be named as the lead agency.

The key to success in any interagency collaboration project is that each agency involved in the project must have a stake in the outcome; be responsible for a specific piece of the mission; be able to take credit for the success of that piece of the mission that it is responsible for and, equally important, accept blame for the failure of that piece of the mission; and be adequately resourced to perform its specific mission effectively. There are numerous examples of effective interagency collaboration projects. The example of domestic disaster relief, where FEMA coordinates the activities of numerous agencies in responding to domestic emergencies, will be discussed more fully later in the chapter. Each agency has a *statutory* mission to contribute to domestic disaster relief and specific responsibilities regarding that mission.

Another example is the Joint Interagency Task Force South, headquartered in Key West, which coordinates interagency drug interdiction efforts. Each agency involved owns a discrete part of the drug interdiction mission and its responsibilities are clearly defined by *statute*. The agencies include DOD (Office of the Secretary of Defense/Policy, U.S. Southern Command), the Department of State (International Narcotics and Law Enforcement), the Department of Justice (Drug Enforcement Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI]), the Department of Homeland Security (Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement), and the Treasury Department (Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence). Each agency benefits enormously by participating in the task force, coordinating activities, and sharing information and intelligence because the execution of its own statutory mission is facilitated and enhanced by such participation. Even without the task force, the FBI would be responsible for investigating criminal activity related to drug trafficking, and Treasury would be responsible for investigating and documenting money laundering schemes related to drug trafficking. By participating in the task force, the FBI obtains information that enhances its ability to build a criminal case, and Treasury obtains information that enhances its ability to track financial flows and the persons and entities controlling those financial assets.

The current structure for interagency coordination on complex operations violates nearly every principle of organizational management and bureaucratic motivation. Agencies have every incentive to engage in stonewalling and foot-dragging tactics. They have no mission to engage in overseas complex operations, their congressional oversight committees do not expect them to do so, they are not resourced to do so, and they get no credit for performing effectively and no blame for a failed mission, so there is practically no accountability at all for them. The fact that agencies do not cooperate well under the current structure is painfully obvious to any observer of the ongoing attempts by S/CRS to negotiate memoranda of agreement with relevant domestic agencies regarding the details of agency participation in the active and standby readiness corps and reimbursement expenses. The process had been dragging on for months, with agencies raising all manner of real or imagined legal and budgetary impediments to participation and quibbling incessantly over the most mundane aspects of how to calculate the reimbursement cost per employee. This is not to imply that some of these details may not be significant; it is merely to suggest that domestic agencies have no real incentive to make the system work under the current structure. The Department of State has been cast in the role of supplicant, and the domestic agencies in the role of almsgiver. Under a different structure, where domestic agencies had a statutory responsibility to participate in overseas complex operations, and Congress expected them to and provided resources to do so, domestic agencies would have strong incentives to make the interagency coordination system work.

With respect to resources, chapter 10 discusses the potential cost of funding a corps of deployable government civilians for complex operations, and a reimbursement mechanism between USAID and the domestic agencies is described later in this chapter. That reimbursement mechanism will generally apply only for surge requirements. Domestic agencies will still need a plus-up in their budgets to account for their new steady-state requirement to be prepared for overseas deployments. In some instances, this will require realignment of existing interagency budgets, and in other instances, it will require new resources.

The new statutory mission for overseas complex operations must be tied to the agencies' core missions. The best way to do this is to build on and expand the capacity development programs that many agencies already have. The Department of Justice's International Criminal Investigative Training and Assistance Program and the Office of Prosecutorial Development Assistance Training provide police training and judicial system capacity development training. Both programs are funded fully by the State

Department, but Justice should be given its own budget for these programs. Likewise, Commerce should have its own funding for its Commercial Law Development Program, which is fully funded by USAID. Treasury is one of the few agencies that receive independent funding for its capacity development program. Congress has already determined that it is in the national interest to establish and fund the Office of Technical Assistance, which provides technical assistance in matters related to public finance, budget, tax, and banking.

Cultural Barriers

The final and possibly most difficult barrier to overcome is agency culture. Modifying how agencies think, what they care about, how they perceive themselves, what they aspire to, and what career paths are most important in terms of promotion, prestige, and benefits is difficult under any circumstances, but it is that much more complex when the shift in focus relates not just to subject matter expertise and geographical emphasis, but also to mindset and way of approaching problems. Most civilian agencies, the State Department included, do not have operational capability. They are not boots-on-the-ground, roll-up-your-sleeves doers; they do not build anything or govern anyone. Their expertise is in policy formulation, regulation, data collection and analysis, reporting, negotiation, and program management. Yet to obtain adequate complex operations capabilities, they will need to develop an operational culture and become proficient in planning.

There are many pieces of the puzzle that need to fit together to accomplish this goal. With a national security mission for complex operations explicitly spelled out in the basic authorities of each of the relevant domestic agencies and adequate resources provided, the agencies will over time develop the capabilities, institutional knowledge, and capacity to perform the appropriate tasks. Domestic agency cabinet secretaries and senior representatives need to be held accountable for their new missions, and congressional oversight committees must call them to task for work underperformed and commend them for work well done. Congress will need to determine how to organize the committee structure to accommodate the new agency missions, either by adding the mission to traditional oversight committees or by having the agency report to a new committee for the complex operations mission, such as the House and Senate Foreign Relations Committees. Many agencies already report to more than one committee, and some report to multiple committees.

Training and education will be critical to the success of the new missions, as discussed in chapter 9. Each agency will need to develop and train

a corps of National Security Professionals who will be available to deploy for surge requirements and, perhaps more important, integrate their training and expertise acquired for complex operations into the steady-state core missions of their agencies.

The National Security Professionals at the domestic agencies will need to develop a symbiotic relationship with DOD, the military, and USAID. The agencies will need to learn from them about operational planning and implementation, and Defense and USAID will need to absorb some of the subject matter expertise of the domestic agencies.

Integrating Domestic Agencies with CRS and USAID

S/CRS, relocated under the NSC (as discussed in chapter 5), should retain the overall policy coordination role for all civilian agencies involved in complex operations, but ground operations should be coordinated by USAID. The best model is the role that FEMA plays vis-à-vis civilian agencies in domestic disaster relief. Although Hurricane Katrina may have hurt the image of FEMA and its domestic agency counterparts, the magnitude of the disaster and the new interagency structure, with FEMA coming under the Department of Homeland Security, contributed to making Katrina an unusual example of interagency confusion and inadequate response. In general, FEMA and civilian agencies, in concert with state and local actors, have provided effective relief during domestic natural disasters.

Under the Stafford Act, FEMA has the authority to reimburse agencies for expenses incurred in responding to domestic emergencies. A similar reimbursement mechanism could be instituted for USAID, with agencies applying for reimbursement to cover expenses incurred in overseas complex operations. USAID will coordinate activities on the ground and be able to tap into the in-house expertise of the domestic agencies as both on-the-ground program implementers and contract managers. Some mechanism will need to be created to allow USAID to take advantage of the large staffs of the domestic agencies to act as project overseers. While contracts would still be let and managed by USAID, domestic agency representatives could act as technical advisors or project managers for specific tasks on the ground so as to increase and strengthen the oversight capacity of USAID.

Congress would give domestic agencies specific responsibilities to participate in overseas complex operations. In addition, under the auspices of S/CRS, the executive branch would draft an International Response Framework for overseas complex operations that would mirror the National Response Framework (NRF) for domestic emergencies.⁹ The NRF establishes 15 Emergency Support Functions, each with a designated lead agency

and supporting agencies, and the specific responsibilities of each agency delineated. The International Response Framework would establish a similar manageable number of overseas support functions, with lead and supporting agencies specified, and the specific tasks of each agency spelled out.

Sizing the Demand for Domestic Agency Personnel

Chapter 2 presents scenarios for estimating the overall size of the civilian force needed for complex operations. It concludes that an active civilian response capacity of 1,000 personnel and a standby capacity of 4,000 personnel will be needed. How that force might be divvied up among the agencies is the topic of this section.

Current Proposals

Section 1605 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2009 authorizes the Secretary of State, in consultation with the administrator of USAID and the heads of other appropriate agencies of the U.S. Government, to establish and maintain a Response Readiness Corps made up of active and standby components drawn from Federal Government personnel.¹⁰ The Active Readiness Corps is comprised of persons whose only job is to act as first responders within 48 hours of a given crisis. They will be drawn from the civil and foreign service, and they will have a variety of skill sets, ranging from policemen to judges to engineers to rule of law and governance specialists. These first responders may conduct initial assessments, engage in diplomatic talks with the host government, and work alongside the U.S. and/or foreign militaries. Supplemental funding in 2008 allowed for recruitment of a total of 100 Active Corps members (see table 7–2), and the fiscal year 2009 request is for a total of 250 members.

Table 7–2. Supplemental Funding		
2008 Supplemental Funding Active Readiness Corps		2009 Request Active Readiness Corps
U.S. Agency for International Development	37	93
State	30	72
Justice	24	62
Agriculture	3	8
Commerce	2	5
Health and Human Services	2	5
Homeland Security	1	3
Treasury	1	2
TOTAL	100	250

The Standby component of the Response Readiness Corps consists of civilian agency employees who retain their current job responsibilities until they deploy. The Standby Corps is currently manned at 250 personnel, with 500 planned for 2009, and a long-term goal of 2,000 (see table 7–3).

Table 7–3. **Standby Readiness Corps Status (as of July 2008)**

	Current	Fiscal Year 2008–2009 Goal	Long-Term Goal
U.S. Agency for International Development	86	186	744
State	140	144	576
Justice	21	124	496
Agriculture	0	16	64
Commerce	0	10	40
Health and Human Services	3	10	40
Homeland Security	0	6	24
Treasury	0	4	16
TOTAL	250	500	2,000

Current Civilian Deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan

The number of civilians from domestic agencies deployed as of August 2008 to Iraq and Afghanistan in Provincial Reconstruction Teams and otherwise is shown in table 7–4.

Table 7–4. **Civilians Deployed to Provincial Reconstruction Teams by Agency**

Agency	Current operations (as of August 2008)	
	Iraq	Afghanistan
State	687	220
U.S. Agency for International Development	59	95
Justice	56	40
Agriculture	23	13
Homeland Security	23	0
Treasury	8	3
Transportation	4	3
Commerce	2	0
Energy	2	0
Health and Human Services	1	0

As a point of comparison, at the height of the CORDS program in Vietnam in 1969, 1,343 of the 2,685 civilian personnel deployed were assigned to the program (see table 7–5).

Table 7–5. Civilians Deployed to Vietnam, September 1969

State	U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)	United States Information Agency	Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support	
			State	USAID
2,685	119	1,118	105	128
				1,215

Source: Department of State, Foreign Service List, September 1969.

Current S/CRS plans envision active and standby personnel spread out over six domestic agencies in addition to State and USAID. As of August 2008, there were eight domestic agencies deployed to PRTs in Iraq, and only four deployed to PRTs in Afghanistan. This chapter concludes that at least 10 domestic agencies should play significant roles in complex operations. It is difficult to extrapolate from current proposals and historical cases what portion of the 5,000 active/standby civilian response capacity should be allocated to the domestic agencies, and how many to each one, because of the statutory and budgetary constraints that the domestic agencies have traditionally operated under. With new authorities, budgets, and missions, agencies such as Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture would train active and standby personnel in much larger numbers than those currently proposed by S/CRS.

Integrating Civilian Reserves

Section 1605 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2009 also authorizes the Secretary of State, in consultation with the administrator of USAID, to establish a Civilian Reserve Corps “for which purpose the Secretary is authorized to employ and train individuals who have the skills necessary for carrying out reconstruction and stabilization activities, and who have volunteered for that purpose.” Under the act, the Civilian Reserve Corps can only be deployed pursuant to a determination by the President that “it is in the national security interests of the United States for United States civilian agencies or non-Federal employees to assist in reconstructing and stabilizing a country or region that is at risk of, in, or is in transition from, conflict or civil strife.”¹¹ The Civilian Reserve

Corps will consist of civilians from state and local governments, as well as private sector specialists with skills relevant for stability operations. Although the Civilian Reserve Corps has yet to be manned, current State Department plans project a goal of nearly 2,000 personnel.

Civilian reserves, although managed by the State Department, would share “joint proponentcy” with the relevant domestic agency whose core mission most closely aligns to the expertise and assignment of the reservist. Police trainers, prosecutors, and corrections officers would be jointly managed by State and Justice. A veterinarian would be jointly managed by State and Agriculture. This should be a mandatory feature of the civilian reserves. While called up and managed by the State Department, they should be operationally managed by the agency whose core mission matches the task on the ground. In fact, they should be fully integrated into the overseas workforce of that agency. This is the only way to exercise effective oversight of reservists.

In theory, civilian reserves would constitute the surge requirement for complex operations, whereas full-time government employees would constitute the steady-state corps of National Security Professionals at the agencies. This will depend on full funding for the Civilian Reserve Corps and the availability of qualified professionals for deployment. If the corps is not adequately funded or no qualified professionals are available, the domestic agencies will have to rely on their own trained staff and contractors.

Integrating the Intelligence Community

The Intelligence Community must be tapped for complex operations. Right now, it is overwhelmingly focused on military targets and counterterrorism operations. Yet many agencies, especially the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, collect and analyze enormous amounts of information that is relevant for complex operations. They often have regional expertise and linguistic abilities unmatched in the domestic agencies. They do ethnographic mapping (related to tribal structure and economic and power relationships), cadastration (related to land ownership), and other sociocultural intelligence collection that could greatly assist State, USAID, and the domestic agencies in political, economic, and social planning. Information-sharing barriers must be overcome by granting Intelligence Community and military-grade clearances to specialized domestic agency personnel. Congress should remove any legal constraints that impede information-sharing in the Intelligence

Community, and the NSC should ensure that relevant information is shared with appropriate agencies.

The Director of National Intelligence has introduced a 500-day plan to create a culture of collaboration among intelligence agencies across professional disciplines and to establish common operating environments and information policies to ensure effective intelligence dissemination throughout the intelligence agencies and among authorized consumers. This same culture of collaboration should apply to select National Security Professionals among the domestic agencies.

Conclusion and Findings

Congress should give each agency a national security mission with adequate funding (or a mechanism for reimbursement through USAID/USADR) to enable the agency to educate and train a cadre of professionals in the particular skills needed for complex operations.

A statutory requirement will create accountability, which will in turn bleed into agency culture over time. The statutory mission for complex operations must be closely aligned with each agency's core mission and core competency. Each agency should redraft its mission statements for all bureaus to accommodate the new statutory mission for complex operations and seek to ensure that the mission complements and enhances the traditional core missions of bureaus. Following the example of Commerce, each agency should inventory the internal capabilities of all bureaus that are relevant to complex operations. Domestic agencies' statutory responsibilities in complex operations will apply in both steady-state applications (the Active Response Corps and the Standby Response Corps) and in surge applications.

USAID/USADR should be given the role of operational coordinator for domestic agencies in complex operations, with reimbursement authority modeled on the Stafford Act, mirroring the FEMA-like structure for domestic contingencies.

Each domestic agency will have statutory responsibility for specific areas, such as rule of law, vocational training, private sector development, business rehabilitation, and transportation infrastructure, and will be reimbursed by USAID/USADR for incurred expenses.

Under the auspices of the National Security Council and S/CRS, USAID/USADR and all domestic agencies should immediately begin to draft an International Response Framework for overseas contingencies modeled on the National Response Framework (revised in January 2008) for domestic emergencies.

The agencies should delineate a limited number of Emergency Support Functions (the NRF contains 18), specify a lead agency and supporting agencies, and spell out specific activities required of each agency and subagency unit, such as a bureau or specific office.

While the Civilian Reserve Corps will be funded and run by a single agency (S/CRS), activated civilians must be managed, or at least co-managed, by the domestic agency with area expertise—the same agency that is contributing full-time staff to the effort in theater.

Management responsibility must be specifically provided for by statute or, at a bare minimum, by executive order. This is the only way to ensure effective oversight and control of the corps. There must be a direct match between the task of the activated civilian and the core mission of the oversight agency.

Appendix

The domestic departments and agencies listed below are in the traditional order of Presidential succession.

Treasury Department

Public finance, payments system, budget policy, and management. One of the most critical functions immediately following a military intervention is the reestablishment of a public finance and payments system. Without it, the military, police, and civil servants cannot be paid, and no essential services can be provided. Treasury's Office of Technical Assistance has experts in this area; they will need to acquire advance knowledge of the public finance system, including government salaries, so as to be able to act quickly.

Tax policy and administration, government revenues. It will be crucial to reinstate the flow of government revenues as quickly as possible, whether the government's primary source of income is tax revenue or proceeds from the sale of natural resources. Treasury has expertise in tax collection and administration.

Banking and financial services. The banking system will need to be reestablished as quickly as possible to facilitate commerce. Treasury has technical expertise in this area.

Government debt management. Treasury can examine the international debt holdings of the local government and begin to negotiate with lenders and international institutions before the intervention if debt restructuring or forgiveness is necessary to restore investor confidence in the local country. This will be a critical issue to jumpstart economic development.

Terrorist financing and money laundering. Treasury can assist the local government in tracking terrorist financing and money laundering schemes.

Department of Justice

Corrections, courts, police training. Justice operates the Federal Bureau of Prisons, which oversees all Federal prisons within the United States. While its mission is exclusively domestic, its expertise in managing and building prisons could be applied in overseas complex operations. The Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and Training assists foreign governments in criminal justice development and the training of judges and prosecutors. The International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program assists foreign governments in developing capacity to provide professional law enforcement services, including police training and the development of evidentiary standards.

Countering terrorism, criminal behavior, and drug trafficking. The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Criminal Division's Counterterrorism Section have enormous expertise in tracking down national and transnational criminals, uncovering terrorist activity, and monitoring foreign intelligence operations and espionage activities in the United States. The FBI also provides international training and assistance in investigative techniques, forensic sciences, and new investigative technologies. The Drug Enforcement Administration enforces the controlled substance laws and regulations of the United States, coordinates with drug law enforcement counterparts in foreign countries, and manages a national drug intelligence program in cooperation with Federal, state, local, and foreign officials to collect, analyze, and disseminate strategic and operational drug intelligence information. Finally, the Criminal Division and the U.S. National Central Bureau, which acts as the U.S. representative to the International Criminal Police Organization, facilitate international law enforcement cooperation among nations.

Rule of law training and capacity-building. Drawing on the breadth of legal expertise in a range of areas it has developed for domestic purposes, the Department of Justice could oversee rule of law initiatives in overseas complex contingencies. Justice could draw on its comparative law expertise to conduct an assessment of local laws, customs, and governance structures for complex operations as well as review existing assessments and determine what additional information is needed and who should be required to collect it. Justice could begin to lay the groundwork for the development of sustainable legal institutions in the political, economic, and social sectors as well. It could review customary and traditional law, including tribal

law (such as the Pashtunwali code) and religious law (such as sharia), and explore their role in the maintenance of rule of law, especially in the early stages, and the interplay between these customary concepts and Western legal traditions and international legal standards.

Department of Agriculture

Rehabilitation of agricultural infrastructure. In addition to rehabilitating the institutional infrastructure of the agricultural sector, such as plant and animal inspection services and the control of livestock disease, in foreign contingencies, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) can help assess the physical infrastructure of the agriculture sector, including arable land, crop distribution, irrigation and watershed systems, livestock, and rangeland. It can help develop rehabilitation plans for major agricultural industries.

Food aid and emergency food distribution. USDA administers a variety of food aid programs to deliver agricultural commodities and other food items to foreign countries for such purposes as relief from natural disasters and famine, the promotion of democracy and private enterprise, humanitarian assistance, and child nutrition. While the programs have strict statutory limitations on when and where they can be used, the expertise acquired in the administration, distribution, and marketing of the food items covered by these programs could be applied in foreign complex operations.

Marketing and export of agricultural products. USDA can assess the state of traditional export and horticultural crops and assist in improving their processing, distribution, and marketing. In addition, the agency can assess the export potential of these products on a regional and worldwide scale.

Rural development assistance. The Bureau of Rural Development administers programs designed to support rural communities that go beyond agricultural services, including the Rural Utilities Service, the Rural Housing Service, and the Rural Business Cooperative Service. For purposes of domestic disaster relief, this bureau administers several emergency programs (using grants, direct loans, and guaranteed loans) directed at rural housing, utilities, and the repair and reconstruction of buildings and facilities. This expertise could be applicable to overseas complex operations.

Department of Commerce

Local business knowledge and local company vetting. Foreign Commercial Service officers have language skills and knowledge of local markets, business practices, laws affecting the conduct of business, companies,

and businesspeople. They vet local companies, interviewing company executives and key officers and visiting the premises to determine if the business is legitimate and a potential trustworthy partner for a U.S. exporter or investor.

Industry expertise, economic assessment, and defense conversion. Several bureaus have sections that are organized according to industrial sector such as heavy industry, construction, computer technology and information services, steel and minerals, chemicals, and transportation equipment. The Bureau of Industry and Security issues export licenses to companies wishing to export products and technologies that have potential military and commercial applications. The Patent and Trademark Office reviews patent applications and issues patents, the National Institute of Standards and Technology oversees industrial standards and measures in specific industry sectors, and the International Trade Administration has industry specialists for purposes of helping U.S. companies find export markets. While the industry expertise in each of these bureaus was developed for a distinct purpose, and the experts in one bureau rarely work with those in another, the combined wisdom of the industry specialists could constitute a corps of in-house experts who could assist in performing assessments of local economies and industries in contingency operations and in identifying regional trade opportunities.

The Bureau of Industry and Security, because of its expertise in dual-use technologies, can greatly assist in the conversion of defense industries to commercial concerns. After the Cold War, the bureau did an exhaustive study of all defense and weapons-related factories in the former Soviet Union and compiled a report describing the plant and equipment at each site. The report was disseminated to potential investors abroad for purposes of determining whether the plants could be converted at reasonable cost to commercial uses.

Nonmarket economies and state-owned enterprises. One provision of the trade laws requires Commerce to determine whether a country has a market or nonmarket economy and the point at which the latter “graduates” to market economy status. These provisions require Commerce to do extensive analyses of the extent of control that governments exert over economic activity and specific economic sectors, and to study the treatment and behavior of state-owned enterprises. Commerce auditors and industry analysts who routinely visit the premises and examine the records of foreign state-owned enterprises could help with initial vetting of state-owned

enterprises in a foreign complex operation to determine their commercial viability and map out a strategy for rehabilitating them.

Local commercial legal environment. The International Commerce section of the General Counsel's office keeps track of the commercial legal environments of our major trading partners in order to advise U.S. exporters on such issues as contract enforcement, foreign investment restrictions, antitrust issues, corruption and bribery, and the judicial system. This office did an extensive analysis of the legal environment facing foreign investors under Saddam, examining everything from Iraq's constitution, property rights, foreign investment restrictions, and court system to contract law, contract enforcement, and the recognition of international arbitration awards. This analysis was completed before the March 2003 invasion.

Telecommunications assistance. The National Telecommunications Information Agency allocates radio spectrum for nondefense government agencies. Although developed for domestic purposes, the agency can provide technical assistance in complex operations for establishing a telecommunications regulatory regime, allocating spectrum to government and commercial users, licensing mobile phone providers, developing Internet governance principles, assisting with telecommunications infrastructure planning and procurement, and assessing telecommunications infrastructure and human resources capability.

Community development, economic stabilization. The Economic Development Administration assists communities in the United States that have suffered serious structural damage to their underlying economic base, such as through base closures, natural disasters, or the loss of manufacturing jobs. It uses loans, grants, and public works projects, and it works with state and local governments to explore other incentives to attract new investment to the devastated community. While restricted to domestic activity by statute, the agency nonetheless has acquired expertise in local economic regeneration that could be relevant in foreign complex operations.

Election planning and voting. The Census Bureau can provide technical assistance and advice on performing "election rolls"—a necessary pre-election population census in preparation for national and local elections, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology can provide technical advice on the design and application of voting systems.

Department of Labor

Vocational training, reintegration of combatants. Labor runs numerous education and training programs, including ones for disadvantaged

youths, ex-convicts, and ex-combatants. While all for domestic purposes, these skills could be applied in a foreign context.

Economic assessments, labor force studies. The Bureau of Labor Statistics collects and analyzes data on employment, unemployment, earnings by state and region, employee compensation, wages, salaries, and benefits by occupation. It does economic projections, including changes in the level and structure of the economy and employment projections by industry. It does international comparisons on labor productivity, labor force composition, unemployment, and hourly compensation costs. This kind of data would be extremely useful for a pre-intervention analysis of the local economy.

Department of Health and Human Services

The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) oversees the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the National Institutes of Health, the Food and Drug Administration, and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services.

Emergency medical preparedness. The Office of Preparedness and Response serves as the Secretary's principal advisory staff on matters related to bioterrorism and other public health emergencies and coordinates inter-agency activities between HHS, other Federal agencies, and state and local officials responsible for emergency preparedness and the protection of the civilian population from public health emergencies. Through its surge capacity efforts, it works to integrate mass casualty preparedness activities across local, state, and Federal levels consistent with the National Incident Management System, a Federally coordinated national emergency response system. The National Disaster Medical System is a Federally coordinated system that augments the Nation's medical response capability by helping state and local authorities deal with the medical impacts of major peacetime disasters and by supporting the military and the Department of Veterans Affairs medical systems in caring for casualties evacuated to the United States from overseas armed conventional conflicts. Assistance is available in the form of personnel, supplies, and equipment; patient movement from a disaster site to unaffected areas of the Nation; and definitive medical care at participating hospitals in unaffected areas. Although emergency medical planning and preparation are mandated only for domestic contingencies, they could be adapted for overseas contingencies.

Department of Transportation

Support to civil aviation infrastructure. The Federal Aviation Administration can assess the condition of civil airport infrastructure, provide

technical expertise regarding the restoration of war-damaged civil air infrastructure, and provide assistance regarding the development of policy and regulatory guidance related to the civil aviation infrastructure.

Reserve shipping capacity. The Maritime Administration maintains a fleet of vessels for the Ready Reserve Force to assist the U.S. Transportation Command in providing strategic sealift capabilities during national emergencies, including overseas military contingencies.

Port rehabilitation and support to commercial shipping. The Maritime Administration can assess the condition of civil port operations and related maritime infrastructure and provide technical expertise in the restoration of maritime infrastructure. For commercial shippers operating in war zones, the administration can provide war risk insurance in cases where commercial insurance is not available.¹²

Highway and railroad rehabilitation. The Federal Highway Administration and the Federal Railroad Administration can assess the condition of surface transportation networks, including roads and bridges, as well as the condition of rail transportation networks and equipment. They can provide technical expertise to assist with the repair and restoration of highway and rail infrastructure.

Department of Energy

Nuclear security and nuclear and radiological waste disposal. More than half the department's budget is devoted to national nuclear security, including research and development, maintenance, and production of nuclear weapons; nuclear waste disposal; and nuclear nonproliferation, including the provision of assistance to other countries to protect or dismantle nuclear material, and, in the case of Russia, nuclear warheads as well. It provides equipment and training to U.S. border guards to identify smuggled nuclear material and oversees all disaster planning to respond to nuclear emergencies in the United States and worldwide. In complex operations, it can identify and secure nuclear sites, clean up and ensure the safe disposal of nuclear waste, and divert nuclear scientists to peaceful research. In Iraq, the department helped the Defense Department identify and clean up sites with radiological sources,¹³ helped establish the Iraqi government organization charged with identifying and tracking all radiological sources in Iraq, and set up a program to identify and pay Iraqi weapons scientists.

Energy infrastructure assessments and power generation management. The Department of Energy manages the Strategic Petroleum Reserve and

leads a national effort to modernize and expand America's electric delivery system. It also manages, markets, and transmits Federal hydroelectric power through the Southwestern, Southeastern, Western, and Bonneville Power Administrations. It could play a significant role in assessing the energy infrastructure of conflict countries and in building, managing, and regulating power grids and electricity delivery systems.

Energy technology research. The department owns 23 laboratories and technology centers that employ 30,000 scientists and engineers. Although the department owns the facilities and equipment, the employees work for the private contractor that operates the facility. The laboratories also contract with other U.S. Government agencies. The facilities engage in a variety of technology, science, and research and development efforts, including developing advanced coal, oil, and natural gas technologies; conducting research in basic energy sciences, biological and environmental sciences, and computational science; and conducting research in energy efficiency and renewable energy technologies. In a steady-state context, the department could devote resources to the development of energy technologies that are particularly suited to stabilization environments in such areas as portable power generators, water purification, and solar-powered heating and cooling systems.

Department of Education

National education standards, local school systems, school infrastructure. The Department of Education establishes national education standards for students and teachers, runs programs to improve student achievement and literacy standards, and trains teachers. It provides grants for infrastructure improvement, for charter schools, and for low-income children, and it funds student loans and grant programs. These skills can be applied in overseas contingencies.

Department of Homeland Security

Ports and waterways development, security, and maritime law enforcement. The Coast Guard is a U.S. military branch involved in protecting the Nation's waterways and ports. It performs search and rescue, assists in maritime mobility efforts, enforces immigration and drug laws, and protects natural resources and U.S. economic interests. The Coast Guard has an International Affairs component that provides technical assistance to foreign governments in maritime law enforcement, marine safety and environmental protection, small boat operation and maintenance, search and rescue, port security, and infrastructure development for countries with waterway law enforcement programs.

Border security, immigration control, and customs control. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) can help establish initial border security and control and provide training and development of infrastructure for customs, immigration/emigration, trade, travel, and ports. CBP could also assist in training and initial security work related to tracking and preventing insurgent and terrorist materials from entering the country across borders. CBP knowledge, skills, and resources such as unmanned aerial vehicles and other high-tech border security devices have the potential to help control borders in the initial stages of stability operations. Over time, CBP could assist in the process of transferring border, port, and airport control to a new government and ensuring that trade and commerce can commence freely. The Border and Transportation Security enforces the Nation's immigration laws—both in deterring illegal immigration and pursuing investigations when laws are broken—and can provide training in immigration services.

Emergency preparedness and response. The Federal Emergency Management System responds to disasters that occur in the United States by managing Federal response and recovery efforts. FEMA's response capabilities include National Disaster Medical Systems teams, Urban Search and Rescue teams, and Mobile Emergency Response Systems teams. FEMA's International Affairs Division supports disaster relief activities worldwide and provides training and technical expertise exchanges.

Notes

¹ The author is grateful for the assistance of Adriana Brazleton in drafting this chapter.

² Recent studies have begun to review the capabilities and potential role of domestic agencies in complex operations. See, for example, Merriam Mashatt and Bob Polk, "Domestic Agencies in Reconstruction and Stabilization: The '4th D,'" briefing, United States Institute of Peace, June 2008, available at <<http://library.usip.org/articles/1011686.980/1.PDF>>.

³ This is in stark contrast to domestic contingencies. Many domestic agencies are assigned specific responsibilities *by statute* for domestic disaster relief and other homeland emergencies, and these responsibilities are further refined in the National Response Framework, which is led and coordinated by the Department of Homeland Security.

⁴ Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, "Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations," November 28, 2005, available at <www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300005p.pdf>.

⁵ National Defense Authorization Act of 2009.

⁶ The USAID Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) supports U.S. foreign policy objectives by helping local partners advance peace and democracy in priority countries in crisis. Seizing critical windows of opportunity, OTI works on the ground to provide fast, flexible, short-term assistance targeted at key political transition and stabilization needs; available at <www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/transition_initiatives/>.

⁷ This book addresses civilian capacity for both domestic and overseas contingencies. This section concentrates on capabilities for overseas contingencies because, as noted earlier, many domestic agencies already have statutory requirements to participate in domestic contingencies.

⁸ The Department of Agriculture's 2008 Strategic Plan includes the following goal: "Coordinate USDA's international activities in support of the National Security Strategy and U.S. foreign and trade policy, including in postconflict or post-disaster states." While this is an internal document and does not constitute a statutory mission, it is indicative of the broad inherent authority that most agencies have to include national security goals in their own mission statements if they choose to do so.

⁹ The National Response Framework model for overseas contingencies has been proposed by several other commentators. See, for example, A. Martin Lidy, "A Snapshot of Emerging U.S. Government Civilian Capabilities to Support Foreign Reconstruction and Stabilization Contingencies," Institute for Defense Analyses, August 2006. See also Roberta Cohen and James Kunder, *Humanitarian and Human Rights Emergencies* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, June 2001).

¹⁰ 22 USC 2651a, "Organization of Department of State."

¹¹ 22 USC 2351, "Encouragement of Free Enterprise and Private Participation."

¹² There is no similar government war risk insurance program available for land-based cargo.

¹³ Radiological sources are not nuclear weapons or weapons-usable nuclear material; radiological sources are widely used in medicine, industry, and research. They can be used to make a dirty bomb but not a nuclear weapon.

Outsourcing Civilian Capabilities and Capacity

Bernard T. Carreau¹

The U.S. Government must turn to contractors when it has more missions to accomplish than qualified government personnel can perform, but excessive reliance on contractors to solve the civilian capacity problem can cause agencies to lose the very core competencies needed to accomplish those missions. This chapter explores whether agencies have outsourced so much that they are losing core competencies and whether this potential loss is impeding effective oversight of contractors. It deals primarily with the outsourcing of services, not the procurement of goods, needed for complex operations that would otherwise be performed by government civilians or the military—services like security, policing, training, advising, capacity-building, local governance, economic rehabilitation, and restoration of essential services. The chapter considers outsourcing from a national security perspective rather than an economic one. Instead of asking the question, “Is outsourcing better, cheaper, and faster?” it asks, “Does outsourcing contribute to minimizing threats to U.S. military and civilians deployed and to maximizing the effectiveness of the military and political goals set for the operation?”

Congress and private observers have focused much attention on private security contractors such as Blackwater and Dyncorp, the rules for the use of force under which they operate, and the legal restraints they are subject to. On the reconstruction side, observers have tended to focus on issues of cost overruns and potential abuse. For example, Congress created the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction in 2004 to examine the use, and potential misuse, of all obligations, expenditures, and revenues associated with reconstruction and rehabilitation activities in Iraq.² While the accountability of private security firms and financial reckoning of reconstruction contractors are critical issues, there are more fundamental questions that outsourcing raises from a national security perspective.

The most critical issues that outsourcing raises are the following:

- Are agencies retaining their core competencies? Some agencies rely so heavily on contractors that their permanent staff is losing institutional knowledge and in-house expertise.
- Are agencies capable of exercising sufficient oversight of contractors? Contractor oversight has become increasingly difficult over the years as acquisition procedures have grown more complicated, outsourcing has skyrocketed, and the number of contracting officers has not kept pace.
- Is there an appropriate match between the core mission of the agency overseeing a contractor and the work the contractor is performing? Military and civilian agency contractors overlap in overseas complex operations. The Department of State hires private security contractors to protect government civilians in theater. The Departments of State and Justice hire police trainers and advisors who work alongside military trainers and advisors. The Department of Defense hires private contractors to assist in reconstruction activities.
- Is there a need for extraordinary oversight or command and control relationships with respect to contractors operating in a war zone? When contractors report to different agencies for similar missions in a war zone, oversight becomes more problematic, and interference in the battlespace is more likely.

What is a core competency? A simple definition would be any capability necessary to carry out an agency's core mission, as defined in the agency's basic authorities. Executing a core mission does not necessarily mean that the agency must perform the function in-house, but it does mean that the agency must maintain sufficient in-house capability and institutional knowledge to design a program, draft a contract, and, most importantly, manage the program and oversee private sector partners with enough authority and skill that it can ensure that mission goals are met. This may mean preserving a certain amount of in-house expertise and capability even for functions that an agency decides may be largely contracted out. It is in the government's interest to maintain core competencies that allow it to choose an appropriate workforce mix among military assets, government civilians, and the private sector.

Privatization in and of itself does not hurt the goals of the mission. On the contrary, private contractors generally contribute significantly to mission effectiveness and should be seen as an effective and necessary force

multiplier. There always has been and always will be a need for contractors. The private sector can provide skills that the government does not have, it can often respond more rapidly to surge requirements, and it can sometimes provide services more efficiently than the government can. Contractors must fill the gap between limits on the size of the force and the burgeoning demand for troop deployments in contingency operations, as well as between limits on the size of the full-time staff at civilian agencies and the surge demand for civilian deployments.

Yet the U.S. Government is ultimately responsible for achieving mission goals established by the President and the National Security Council. The military and civilian agencies must maintain sufficient core competencies in order to achieve those goals whether work is performed in-house or outsourced. Their core competencies must include the ability to maintain sufficient oversight capacity when work is outsourced because they are ultimately responsible for the work performed, or not performed, by contractors. This chapter explores whether post-Cold War Federal budgets and congressionally allocated resources for government personnel constrain the ability of the government to maintain an appropriate workforce mix and offers recommendations for rebalancing and realigning the government/private sector mix so as to increase overall mission effectiveness.

Historical Use of Contractors

As of the second quarter of 2008, the number of contractors in Iraq was approximately the same as the number of total U.S. military personnel.³ This is the highest ratio of contractors to military personnel in American history for any conflict in which the United States was a belligerent (as opposed to a participant in a peacekeeping operation). Table 8–1 shows the degree of reliance of the U.S. Government on contractors in every major war since the beginning of the Republic.⁴

In the 19th century, the ratio of contractors to military personnel held fairly constant at about 1:6. With the massive mobilization for World War I and the first large-scale engagement of U.S. forces overseas, the ratio dropped precipitously from 1:6 to 1:24, but throughout the 20th century, the general trend has been for the number of contractors to rise steadily until reaching today's 1:1 ratio. The two outliers in the 20th century are the Korean War and the Gulf War. The Korean War showed a sharp rise in the contractor-to-military ratio, because the United States relied heavily on Japanese and Korean civilians for equipment maintenance performed at depots in Japan.⁵ The apparent dramatic reversal in reliance on contractors during the Gulf War is misleading and can be explained by the massive

Table 8–1. Use of Contractor Personnel during U.S. Military Operations

Conflict	Estimated Personnel (Thousands)		Estimated Ratio of Contractor to Military Personnel
	Contractor	Military	
Revolutionary War	2	9	1:6
War of 1812	n.a.	38	n.a.
Mexican-American War	6	33	1:6
Civil War	200	1,000	1:5
Spanish-American War	n.a.	35	n.a.
World War I	85	2,000	1:24
World War II	734	5,400	1:7
Korea	156	393	1:2.5
Vietnam	70	359	1:5
Gulf War	9	500	1:55
Balkans	20	20	1:1
Iraq Theater as of early 2008	190	200	1:1

financial contributions to the war effort by regional allies, particularly Saudi Arabia. Large amounts of goods and services were provided by contractors during and after the Gulf War, but they were not hired or paid for by the U.S. Government.⁶ Finally, U.S. operations in the Balkans were marked by an unprecedented contractor-to-military ratio of 1:1, but the engagements in the Balkans were marked by brief military action, a light footprint, and a relatively permissive environment, in contrast to the other wars listed in the table. The novelty of Iraq is the heavy reliance on contractors in what essentially remained a combat zone for several years after the invasion.

In Iraq, more than half of the estimated 149,000 contractors funded by DOD perform base support functions, and 20 percent provide construction services.⁷ The high number of contractors in Iraq reflects several recent trends. After the Cold War, the military began to downsize and to outsource many logistical and support functions that previously had been performed by military personnel. Beyond the military, the U.S. Government as a whole has trended in recent decades toward outsourcing activities that can be performed by the private sector based on the theories that the private sector can respond more quickly to surge needs and that competition among private sector actors would lead to economies of scale and

increased price discipline.⁸ These presumptions are discussed more later in this chapter.

The Current Framework for Outsourcing Services

The current legal and policy framework for determining what governmental activities are suitable for contracting is based on whether the activity is an *inherently governmental function*.⁹ According to Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76:

An inherently governmental activity is an activity that is so intimately related to the public interest as to mandate performance by government personnel. These activities require the exercise of substantial discretion in applying government authority and/or in making decisions for the government. Inherently governmental activities normally fall into two categories: the exercise of sovereign government authority or the establishment of procedures and processes related to the oversight of monetary transactions or entitlements.¹⁰

The purpose of Circular A-76 is to establish Federal policy for competing “commercial activities.” It emphasizes the “longstanding policy” of the Federal Government to rely on the private sector for needed commercial services:

In the process of governing, the Government should not compete with its citizens. The competitive enterprise system, characterized by individual freedom and initiative, is the primary source of national economic strength. In recognition of this principle, it has been and continues to be the general policy of the Government to rely on commercial sources to supply the products and services the Government needs.

This statement dates back to 1955 when Circular A-76 first appeared, and it has remained in all iterations of the document in ensuing decades. It expresses a preference for contracting whenever possible as a governing philosophy and may help explain what many observers would claim has become an overreliance on contractors, particularly in cases of a national security emergency. The circular directs agencies to ensure that the American people receive maximum value for their tax dollars, to identify all activities performed by government personnel as either commercial or inherently governmental, to perform inherently governmental activities

with government personnel, and to determine if government personnel should perform a commercial activity based on a cost effectiveness analysis. A commercial activity is:

[A] recurring service that could be performed by the private sector and is resourced, performed, and controlled by the agency through performance by government personnel, a contract, or a fee-for-service agreement. A commercial activity is not so intimately related to the public interest as to mandate performance by government personnel. Commercial activities may be found within, or throughout, organizations that perform inherently governmental activities or classified work.

Although this definition is somewhat circular, the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) Policy Letter 92–1 provides additional guidance on the distinction between inherently governmental functions and commercial activities. The command of military forces and the direct conduct of criminal investigations are inherently governmental, but contracting for armed convoy security and the provision of special non-law enforcement security activities that do not directly involve criminal investigations, such as prisoner detention or transport and nonmilitary national security details, is not. The determination of agency policy, such as the content and application of regulations, is inherently governmental, but services that relate to the development of regulations and the provision of legal advice and interpretations of regulations and statutes are not. Awarding and administering contracts are inherently governmental, but services that involve the evaluation of another contractor's performance, assistance in contract management, the technical evaluation of contract proposals, and assistance in the development of statements of work, are not. The determination of budget policy, guidance, and strategy is inherently governmental, but services that relate to budget preparation are not.

Under Policy Letter 92–1 (paragraph 7(b)(4)), agencies shall conduct a "totality of circumstances" analysis to determine whether award of a contract "might effect a transfer of official responsibility." Among the considerations in this analysis are:

The contractor's ability to take action that will significantly and directly affect the life, liberty, or property of individual members of the public, including the likelihood of the contractor's need to resort to force in support of a police or judi-

cial function; whether force, especially deadly force, is more likely to be initiated by the contractor or by some other person; and the degree to which force may have to be exercised in public or relatively uncontrolled areas. (Note that contracting for guard, convoy security, and plant protection services, armed or unarmed, is not proscribed by these policies.)

Other considerations include the degree to which official discretion would be limited, the degree to which contractor activity involves interpretation of complex or ambiguous case law, and the finality of any contractor's action affecting individual claimants or applicants.

Individual government agencies must determine whether a particular activity is inherently governmental. Circular A-76 requires agencies to designate a Competitive Sourcing Official who will be responsible for implementing the provisions of the circular. At DOD, the Deputy Under Secretary for Installations and Environment is the designated official. The Department of Defense has more discretion than other agencies in time of war. According to Circular A-76, "The Department of Defense [Competitive Sourcing Official] (without delegation) shall determine if this circular applies to the Department of Defense during times of a declared war or military mobilization."¹¹

The Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act requires all agencies to submit to OMB and make public an annual inventory of all activities that are inherently governmental and the reasons for that determination. DOD is guided by Directive 1100.4 (February 12, 2005), which sets out guidance for manpower management, and Instruction 1100.22 (September 7, 2006), which implements policy in Directive 1100.4 for "determining the appropriate mix of manpower (military and civilian) and private sector support necessary to accomplish Defense missions consistent with applicable laws, policies, and regulations." Instruction 1100.22 provides a rationale for defining certain functions, such as operational command and control of military forces, combat operations, and military discipline, as inherently governmental; it identifies activities, such as combat operations and the direction and control of detention facilities for enemy prisoners of war and civilian internees, that must be performed by military personnel; and it distinguishes between combat support functions that must be performed by military personnel (for example, where there is an unsafe number of personnel in hostile areas who are not combatants) and combat support functions that do not require military performance but do require DOD civilian performance because the presence of the private

sector would constitute an unacceptable risk. The instruction contains an intricate matrix of criteria used to determine the appropriate manpower mix and describes numerous exemptions to what might otherwise be viewed as commercial activities. These exemptions provide allowances for such things as control of combat and crisis situations, operational risk, military-unique knowledge and skills, continuity of infrastructure operations, civilian and military rotation, civilian and military career progression, and even DOD management decision.

The Department of State applies the *inherently governmental* test as a first step in a decisionmaking process in line with the OMB's Commercial Services Management (previously Competitive Sourcing) Initiative. Whether a function is, in the end, outsourced or not depends on several subsequent steps focused on factors such as availability, price, quality, and possible other impediments. When considering the procurement of services at overseas posts, functions must first be categorized as either "inherently governmental" or "potentially commercial." State's key criterion is whether a service "requires significant discretion in decisionmaking that would bind the Government to a course of action." This includes, for example, consular officers who issue visas, financial specialists with certifying authority, contracting and grants officers, or human resources officers who make decisions on hiring and salary levels. By contrast, "potentially commercial" functions are those that are "routinely provided by the marketplace through private contractors" and "do not involve significant discretion in decision-making." If a function is judged to be "potentially commercial," State requires an assessment of possible "other impediments" (for example, possible security concerns or host-nation labor laws). Finally, the availability of services and anticipated savings (which must exceed 10 percent) are established through market research.

Contracting Spectrum


Policy Letter 92-1 recognizes the difficulties of determining what is inherently governmental:

Just as it is clear that certain functions, such as the command of combat troops, may not be contracted, it is also clear that other functions, such as building maintenance and food services, may be contracted. The difficulty is in determining which of these services that fall between these extremes may be acquired by contract. Agencies have occasionally relied on contractors to perform certain functions in such a way as to

raise questions about whether Government policy is being created by private persons. Also from time to time questions have arisen regarding the extent to which de facto control over contract performance has been transferred to contractors.¹²

Following this logic, it is useful to think of activities required for complex operations as falling somewhere on a continuum, with activities on the far left side being noncontroversial (such as food and laundry services) and activities on the far right being highly controversial (such as interrogation of prisoners and oversight of other contractors). Figure 8–1 offers a notional visualization of such a spectrum.

Figure 8–1. **Contracting Spectrum**



Reasonable people can disagree over the placement of particular activities on the spectrum, but it is useful to establish a framework for analyzing individual activities and determining not only whether they are appropriate to outsource, but also, if the activity is outsourced, whether extraordinary oversight, integration procedures, or command and control

relationships in theater need to be established, particularly in a war zone. The arrow in the lower right corner is intended to indicate that, in a war zone, activities that might otherwise be considered appropriate for outsourcing in peacetime might pose more concerns and require greater scrutiny in a war zone. For example, police training and restoring essential services in a war zone might be considered so imperative for the protection of military and civilian personnel on the ground and the achievement of national security goals that normal outsourcing practices might be detrimental to the success of the mission. Either the tasks should be performed by government personnel or, if contractors are used, special oversight, integration, and even command relationships may need to be put in place. These issues are explored later in this chapter.

DOD Instruction 1100.22 contains explicit guidelines for assessing operational risk with respect to outsourcing activities performed by military, DOD civilian, and contractor personnel, with special attention paid to maintaining command and operational control of contingencies and crisis situations and maintaining critical skills during a mobilization or war. The instruction also contains provisions to maintain DOD oversight and control of inherently governmental operations when contractors are used to provide contract advisory assistance and contract support services.

As discussed above, Policy Letter 92–1 addresses the complexity and ambiguity of the more problematic activities by requiring an analysis of the “totality of circumstances” when deciding whether award of a contract might effect a transfer of official responsibility. In addition, it includes a list of 19 specific activities in its appendix B that are not considered to be inherently governmental functions but which:

may approach being in that category because of the way in which the contractor performs the contract or the manner in which the government administers contractor performance. When contracting for such services and actions, agencies should be fully aware of the terms of the contract, contractor performance, and contract administration to ensure that appropriate agency control is preserved.

It points out that the list of activities in appendix B is only illustrative and that it “is not intended to promote or discourage the use” of such contractor services. The list includes services that relate to inspection, budget preparation; reorganization and planning activities, the development of regulations, the evaluation of another contractor’s performance, acquisi-

tion planning, contract management, technical evaluation of contract proposals, the development of statements of work, and legal advice and interpretation of regulations. When functions described in appendix B are involved, Policy Letter 92–1 requires additional management attention to the terms of the contract and the manner of performance, but “how close the scrutiny or how extensive or stringent the management controls need to be is for agencies to determine.”

The contracting spectrum table is useful for visualizing the relative risk of outsourcing various activities, but it should not be viewed as classifying discrete activities as in either the in-house category or the outsourcing category. An activity in and of itself does not belong in one category or the other. Rather, the activity must be viewed in the context of the situation in which it is performed. Almost all activities can be viewed as inherently governmental in a hot war zone. Similarly, even highly problematic activities can be outsourced in very stable and secure environments with proper oversight and program management. The contracting spectrum should be viewed as depicting the relative risk of maintaining or losing core competencies. All of the activities on the spectrum may be required at one time or another to fulfill a DOD mission. The question is how much expertise and capability are needed for each activity, depending on situational requirements. The agency may be able to contract out most food and laundry services in most situations, but it will need some capability to meet these requirements in certain other situations. Moving up the spectrum toward the highly problematic activities, such as VIP protection and convoy security, the agency will need to maintain much more in-house capability for more unstable situations even if it uses contractors in more secure environments.

The Fog of Cost Effectiveness

The current outsourcing framework places heavy emphasis on cost effectiveness as a rationale for contracting, and the Federal Acquisition Regulation is overwhelmingly focused on cost issues. The presumption persists in many circles that work performed by the private sector is better and cheaper than that performed by the government and that the government therefore should outsource wherever possible. This chapter is not primarily concerned with cost because national security considerations should trump cost and, when fulfilling emergency needs and surge requirements, cost will generally be of lesser importance than the imperative of meeting the surge requirement. DOD Instruction 1100.22 provides that “risk mitigation shall take precedence over cost savings when necessary to

meet [inherently governmental] responsibilities or provide critical mission capabilities.” Nonetheless, the issue of cost figures prominently in all Federal legal and policy documents related to contracting.

Often overlooked in calculating the costs of contracting are the heavy transaction costs associated with managing and overseeing contracts, which are the extra expenses that an organization takes on in order to manage the contracting process.¹³ Instruction 1100.22 provides that:

When assessing the merits of contracting functions, manpower authorities should also assess whether it would require more manpower to develop the statement of work; award and execute the contract; and assess the quality of the final product or service, than it would take to perform the service in-house.

Transaction costs are the most difficult aspects to predict prior to issuing the contract and the most difficult to measure afterward. They include the costs of administering the bidding system; managing and supervising the contract; auditing the contract; and the legal expenses involved in drafting and overseeing the contract, defending against legal challenges, and taking legal action against nonperforming contractors. Transaction costs could also include the opportunity cost of the loss of institutional knowledge at the contracting agency.¹⁴ All of these sometimes hidden costs raise the actual cost of the contract, but there is no agreed formula for measuring them.

Other issues that can affect long-term costs for a contracting agency are the imperfect information between the agency and the contractor and the shrinking competition in the marketplace as agencies become more dependent on contracting over time. As an agency comes to rely more and more on a contractor for a particular service, the degree of “asymmetrical information” between the two parties will increase.¹⁵ Agency personnel become less and less aware of the actual costs associated with a particular service, and the contractor is allowed a freer hand to determine rates and costs. Furthermore, government contracting often does not take place in a true open market. Without a truly competitive market, suppliers have more influence over the terms and prices offered to the buyer—in this case, the U.S. Government. Because barriers to entry to the U.S. contracting system—in the form of complex regulations, a potential need for security clearances, and prior relationships with agencies—are relatively high, often only a few firms are able to control the market, and the competitive pool of available contractors

can shrink to what is effectively an oligopoly, a duopoly, and sometimes even a monopoly.¹⁶

While many experts agree that contracting is cost-effective for purely surge requirements (instead of the agency being saddled with full-time personnel and the attendant benefits and overhead costs for an indefinite period, and military overhead costs are notoriously high), the question of what constitutes a surge requirement and when a surge requirement becomes a de facto steady state expense by virtue of recurring or rollover contracts has become blurred in recent years. Service contracting that is recurring and predictable is de facto steady state, and a case can be made that it would be cheaper to perform the services provided by such contractors in-house.

Agencies Losing Core Competencies

The real purpose of contracting is to allow government agencies to extend their capabilities to achieve mission goals. The inherently governmental framework will not necessarily shield agencies from losing their core competencies because the focus of the framework is on discrete activities. Nothing in the OMB or the statutory and regulatory framework asks the question: “Has an agency contracted out so much that it has lost all or part of its core competencies?”

Agencies must maintain effective institutional knowledge and skills in order to deliver their statutorily assigned government services and to oversee contractors performing the same or related tasks. Many tasks can be outsourced as long as enough institutional knowledge and in-house expertise exist to oversee contractors effectively. If an agency loses its core competencies and institutional knowledge, it is difficult if not impossible to exercise sufficient oversight over contractors.


The Department of Defense

With a budget of \$515.4 billion for fiscal year 2009, and over 3 million military and civilian personnel, DOD has by far the largest budget and full-time workforce of any Federal agency.¹⁷ It is also the largest contracting agency in the world. Because of its budget and workforce, it is easier for DOD to maintain its core competencies than for other agencies. As shown in figure 8–2, DOD has identified a number of non-inherently governmental functions that it considers critical to its warfighting mission, including medical capabilities, legal capabilities, intelligence analysis, and ammunition building.

DOD's ability to focus on core competencies reflects in part the massive resources and personnel available to Defense and the different missions and policy guidelines facing Defense in comparison with other agencies. OMB Circular A-76 provides a wholesale exemption for Defense from the inherently governmental guidelines "during times of declared war or military mobilization," and DOD Instruction 1100.22 provides extensive guidelines for exempting commercial activities from contracting to mitigate operational risk. What is absent from the OMB guidelines is any acknowledgment that civilian agencies can also be intimately involved in a war zone and that a similar exemption should apply to them as well.

Still, even Defense can lose core competencies in discrete areas. Some observers fear that DOD may be losing its ability to do effective cost estimates and project oversight. DOD has neglected the skill sets of contracting officer representatives (CORs) and contracting officer technical representatives (COTRs), the program and technical experts who oversee project implementation.

Figure 8-2. **Core Capability**



Examples of non-inherently governmental functions we retain as part of our core military capability: Medical, Legal, Transportation, Ammunition Builders, Food Services, Maintenance, Communication, Intelligence Analysis, Security.

The Secretary of the Army established an independent Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations to review contracting shortfalls and recommend internal changes and legislative solutions to ensure that the Army is properly equipped for future

expeditionary operations. The commission released its report in October 2007.¹⁸ Subsequently, in the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2008, Congress directed the Army to evaluate the recommendations. In response, DOD and the Army have taken steps to increase the stature, quantity, and career development of military and civilian contracting personnel (especially for expeditionary operations), to facilitate contracting and contract management in expeditionary operations, and to provide training and tools for overall contracting activities in expeditionary operations.¹⁹


U.S. Agency for International Development

In contrast to DOD, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has for decades been losing full-time staff, suffering budget cuts, fighting off proposals for its elimination, and vying with new (the Millennium Challenge Corporation) and old (the State Department) agencies for control of the development portfolio. The loss of direct-hire staff has made the agency more dependent on outside partners for the delivery of services that used to be performed in-house, with the result that USAID has been losing core competencies for years. USAID has always worked through private sector partners—for-profit contractors, universities, nonprofit grantees and cooperative agencies, and private voluntary organizations. The difference is that today these partners are responsible for the largest share of program implementation. More development knowledge in the form of technical expertise and institutional memory may now reside in these partner organizations than within the agency itself.

Since its inception in 1962, the number of Foreign Service Officers within USAID has shrunk by more than 1,200 percent. At the height of the Vietnam War, USAID had 12,000 employees; in 2006, it had 1,016. The agency's direct-hire personnel today have little time for actual development work. Although the number of direct-hire personnel is set to double over the next 4 years,²⁰ the agency will still be short-handed by historical standards (see figure 8–3).

Figure 8–3 also shows that, while the agency's program responsibilities have remained relatively constant in dollar terms since 1980, the number of direct-hire staff available to perform the work has sharply decreased. The heavy reliance on contractors and private sector partners at USAID is clearly not the result of surge requirements, but rather of a series of budget reductions, personnel cuts, and policy decisions made over the years to promote the use of the private sector. The heavy reliance on private partners began in earnest in the 1980s and coincided with annual budget and

Figure 8–3. Diminished USAID Foreign Service Cadre



Source: USAID.

personnel reductions as well as a switch in focus of development aid from a basic human needs orientation (education, agriculture) to the promotion of private sector activities (privatization, financial sector development, trade and investment promotion).²¹ According to one observer, USAID became part of a “new wave of privatization that was to attract the support of contractors and other private businesses,” which enabled the agency to “deflect criticism that it was pouring money needed at home into foreign countries by asserting that a high percentage of its funds actually stayed in the United States.”²² In the 1990s, the Clinton administration added a new focus on democracy and governance, transition assistance, and more funding for humanitarian assistance, but without a commensurate increase in direct-hire personnel.

USAID has been fighting for survival for many years and has had to reinvent itself, in terms of both program orientation and its method of delivery, to suit the philosophies of various administrations. But if the agency is to become a bona fide force in complex operations and an indispensable part of U.S. national security strategy, it will need to move away from an overreliance on contractors and private sector partners, reestablish in-house expertise, and develop more effective field oversight.

Losing Oversight of Contractors


Whenever an agency outsources a service, it loses some control over the desired outcome. How much control it loses depends on the workload of the agency's contracting officers and their competence. Each step further removed the contracting officer is from the actual on-the-ground project, the more control is lost. When contractors are hired to oversee or coordinate other contractors, the agency loses still more control.

Overburdened Contracting Officers

As the number of contractors and the total value of contracts have increased exponentially in the last 20 years, the number of contracting officers overseeing those contracts has not kept pace. Figure 8–3 above shows that the number of direct hires at USAID has decreased by 1,200 percent since 1962 while the dollar value of contracted programs has remained relatively constant. At DOD, from fiscal year 2000 to fiscal year 2005 alone, the total value of contracts increased by 100 percent, while the acquisition workforce remained static.²³

Figure 8–4 shows the skyrocketing number of contracting actions issued by the Army between 1995 and 2007—an increase of 700 percent—while the contracting workforce remained constant. The steep increase in contracting actions and the dollar value of the contracts coincided with the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, a time when contractor oversight was all the more critical to national security.


Figure 8–4. Army Contracting Actions, 1995–2007



Source: Army Contracting Office.

At the Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, which oversees foreign police training programs, the dollar value of contracts administered increased between 1996 and 2008 by over 2,000 percent, whereas the number of full-time staff at the bureau increased by only 125 percent (see figure 8–5). The result is that the average dollar value of contracts overseen by each individual staff member increased from approximately \$1.5 million in 1996 to over \$15 million in 2008.

Figure 8–5. Increase of Value of Contracts



The increasing workload of contracting officers across the government has limited the officers' ability to perform effective oversight of each individual contractor and the work the contractor is performing.

Policy Letter 92–1 takes full account of the issue of contractor oversight and offers the following guidance:

The extent of reliance on service contractors is not by itself a cause for concern. Agencies must, however, have a sufficient number of trained and experienced staff to manage Government programs properly. The greater the degree of reliance on

contractors the greater the need for oversight by agencies. What number of Government officials is needed to oversee a particular contract is a management decision to be made after analysis of a number of factors. These include, among others, the scope of the activity in question; the technical complexity of the project or its components; the technical capability, numbers, and workload of Federal oversight officials; the inspection techniques available; and the importance of the activity. Current contract administration resources shall not be determinative. The most efficient and cost effective approach shall be utilized.

At least on paper, the current policy framework contains sound, if imprecise, guidelines for agencies to manage the oversight function, but it provides no practical mechanism for agencies to rebalance their contract oversight personnel in the short and medium run. The current system is not nimble enough to make rapid adjustments in the number of contract officers (and CORs and COTRs) to be able to respond to unforeseen surge requirements. The Iraq and Afghanistan wars have been funded largely through supplemental appropriations rather than through the normal appropriation cycle, making advance planning more difficult.

Congress began to take note of these difficulties in the National Defense Authorization Act of 2008, which required the Army to evaluate the recommendations in the report of the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations (the Gansler Commission Report), which the Army released in October 2007. The Army submitted its response in May 2008.

Program Management or Contract Management?

The problem of contractor oversight is much deeper than just the dearth of qualified contracting officers and their oversized workload. Increasing the ratio of contracting officers to contract value would be helpful, but will not by itself solve the problem of ineffective oversight of contractors. The entire Federal acquisition apparatus has resulted in a system that is more adept at managing the contracting *process* rather than the actual work performed on the ground. This may not have been the intention of the drafters of the acquisition laws and regulations, but it has been the unmistakable effect. The Gansler Commission Report similarly observed, “[t]oo often, both in peacetime and during expeditionary operations, the focus of the contracting process is on contract award, with post-award management being neglected.”²⁴

There has been significant attrition among CORs and COTRs, the very officials whose primary job is contractor management and oversight. Turnover, shortages, and attrition of contracting officers and program managers are a continual concern.

The Federal acquisition system is governed by over 20 different statutes,²⁵ nearly 2,000 pages of Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), and thousands of additional pages of individual agency regulations. DOD has the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation, and USAID has the Agency for International Development Acquisition Regulation. On top of this is an enormous body of administrative law decisions handed down by administrative law judges and common law decisions handed down by the Federal courts. As new decisions are handed down, new protests are filed, new lawsuits are brought, and new issues arise, contracts get longer, and the bidding and award process becomes more complex. Federal acquisition law is as hopelessly complicated as tax law and antitrust law, and only specialists with many years of training and experience can be effective at it. At DOD, it takes 6 to 8 years to train a contracting officer.

Contracting officers of necessity spend much of their time dealing with the bidding and award process—issues related to fair and open competition, public notice, transparency, legal recourse of losing bidders, social goals and set-asides to benefit specific groups and disadvantaged regions, and employment opportunities for U.S. citizens. Nearly three-quarters of the FAR is devoted to solicitation, bidding, award of contracts, and contract requirements. Only 200 out of nearly 2,000 pages of the FAR are devoted to contract *management*. In addition, contracting officers can be especially conservative about following the bidding and award procedures to the letter because, under certain circumstances, they can be held personally liable for unauthorized or mishandled awards.

There are certain contracted tasks that do not fit precisely within the core competencies of any agency. This section highlights the issue of whether there is an appropriate match between contracted task and agency mission, and uses the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) and the task of criminal justice development and training as a case study.

INL is the primary U.S. agency for assistance to law enforcement entities in foreign countries. It accounted for 69 percent of foreign police assistance and 52 percent of justice assistance in 2004 worldwide (excluding current programs in Afghanistan and Iraq).²⁶ The bureau manages some 4,600 contractors globally, and its fiscal year 2008 budget is projected

to be \$2.6 billion.²⁷ Its core mission is described in its fiscal year 2008 Budget Program and Budget Guide as follows:

[T]o reduce the threat of international crime and illegal drugs to the United States and its global partners through cooperation, with emphasis on capacity-building where weak justice sectors are vulnerable to terrorist threats and in countries which are critical to protecting our way of life. INL achieves its mission by deploying *foreign assistance policy development and program management expertise* [emphasis added] aimed at combating international narcotics production and trafficking, combating international crime and terrorism, and strengthening law enforcement and other rule of law institutional capabilities.²⁸

This mission brief can be accommodated within State's overall mission to "advance freedom for the benefit of the American people and the international community."²⁹ At the same time, the Department of State's *core competencies* lie in the area of diplomacy and policy advice as opposed to law enforcement.

By way of comparison, the Department of Justice defines its mission in this way:

To enforce the law and defend the interests of the United States according to the law; to ensure public safety against threats foreign and domestic; to provide Federal leadership in preventing and controlling crime; to seek just punishment for those guilty of unlawful behavior; and to ensure fair and impartial administration of justice for all Americans.³⁰

U.S. Government law enforcement assistance has historically been provided by several agencies. Initially a purely military enterprise, it became a civilian responsibility during the Kennedy administration with the establishment of the Office of Public Safety (OPS) within USAID.³¹ As a result of an association between USAID programs and serious human rights abuses in Latin America, Congress shut down OPS in 1975.³² Three years later, INL was created, initially with a focus on narcotics. Since Presidential Policy Directive 71 made INL the lead agency for post-conflict reestablishment of criminal justice in 2000, the bureau has grown by leaps and bounds.

INL has traditionally been a contracting agency that delivers assistance to law enforcement entities abroad by directly managing private

sector contractors and by contracting out to other Federal departments, most prominently the Department of Justice's International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) and Office of Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training (OPDAT). These agencies may then, in turn, subcontract out to private sector companies.

In Iraq, INL oversees more than 1,000 contractors, while ICITAP oversees about 300 contractors.³³ This raises the question of how best to organize U.S. Government assistance to law enforcement and security sector reform in complex operations. Contractors clearly provide a vital surge capacity. However, there must also be effective oversight by the contracting agency.

INL's mission is not law enforcement *per se*. It does not take on the task of providing law and order in overseas contingencies; rather, it provides capacity development to help host nations build indigenous law enforcement capabilities. The mission does require law enforcement technical expertise, along with corrections, prosecutors, border protection, and governance, but it is primarily a capacity-building mission that requires a skill set to negotiate with host nation partners and monitor their efforts to become a global partner in the war against transnational crime. It is this broader mission related to transnational crime, international narcotics flows, and long-term capacity development that most closely aligns with the mission of the State Department. However, with respect to the more near-term needs of the particular elements of law enforcement, such as police training, corrections, and prosecutors, the mission may be more closely aligned with the core competencies of the Justice Department. State's back office support systems are designed to administer diplomacy missions abroad along with consular affairs, not to provide support for these basic law enforcement needs.

Some observers suggest that the Department of Justice be given exclusive responsibility for both planning and implementation of police training and support functions.³⁴ ICITAP and OPDAT would become the principal implementing bureaus, making Justice the expert agency within the Federal Government for foreign police and justice assistance, with State in a supervisory capacity.³⁵ However, as currently configured, ICITAP and OPDAT are small offices lacking independent funding and relying almost exclusively on contractors in much the same way INL now does. In the end, the U.S. Government currently lacks an appropriate organizational design to carry out the function of criminal justice development. The Department of Justice might struggle with this mission just as much as INL. Nonetheless, Justice has a reachback capability that is directly related to law enforce-

ment activities. With a proper mission and funding, it may be the more appropriate agency to oversee the initial law enforcement needs related to the development of police, corrections officers, prosecutors, and judges that are of such critical importance in the early postconflict stages. Once stability is established and longer term capacity development and security sector reform can begin in earnest, the State Department could resume its traditional role.

Contractors in a War Zone

In Iraq, the outsourcing issue has gained particular prominence because of a series of incidents involving private security contractors (PSCs). The incidents, which involved mostly State-hired PSCs, had detrimental impacts on the U.S. mission in Iraq and led to the realization that contractors have not been properly managed in theater and that operational oversight needs to be strengthened.³⁶ The case of PSCs is instructive primarily because it illustrates the special circumstances attendant to contractors in a war zone. Concerns over contractor oversight and command and control are heightened in a war zone, and interagency coordination becomes more problematic. Are special command relationships and oversight mechanisms needed for contractors operating in a war zone?

Despite the public attention that PSCs have received, they represent only a small portion of total contractors in Iraq.³⁷ PSCs have generated enormous controversy and have probably had a disproportionate effect on public opinion in both the United States and Iraq. From the perspective of mission effectiveness, particularly at the operational and tactical level, the issues related to PSCs that have made headlines are relatively minor.³⁸ DOD estimates that less than one percent of all operations conducted by PSCs in Iraq have resulted in hostile action.³⁹ Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to underestimate the significance of PSCs from the geopolitical perspective, such as with respect to their effect on the negotiation of the Status of Forces Agreement between Iraq and the United States,⁴⁰ and their effect on public opinion in both countries.

For the most part, PSCs have operated very effectively and have been a good force multiplier. Incidents of civilians being killed by PSCs are extremely rare, as are incidents of PSC abuse of local civilians. The case of PSCs is instructive, because heightened public attention has forced DOD and State to reconsider their oversight mechanisms and to coordinate better. The lessons and actions stemming from PSCs may need to be carried

over to other contracting areas, such as those involving local governance, job creation, and other areas critical to mission effectiveness.

The story of PSCs in Iraq suggests what may be done to ensure that contractors do not become “fire and forget” systems (that is, ignored once the contract is signed) in the highly complex and volatile environment of a war zone. Some 11,000 PSCs are active in Iraq under U.S. Government contracts (9,952 with DOD and 1,400 with State).⁴¹ DOD PSCs provide security for senior military officials, Army Corps of Engineers personnel, military facilities, and over 19,000 supply convoys. State PSCs provide security for the Ambassador, U.S. officials in Iraq, and visiting Members of Congress and executive branch officials.⁴² Incidents involving PSCs have focused congressional attention and given rise to recommendations to improve contractor oversight and command and control arrangements. So concerned was Congress that it issued a Sense of Congress resolution in the 2009 Defense Authorization legislation regarding the conduct of PSCs in a designated area of combat operations.⁴³ Three main problems have been identified: insufficient oversight and accountability; a lack of coordination between different agencies using contractors (including in the crucial area of rules on the use of force); and a bewildering array of contract management guidance combined with a lack of trained staff to manage PSCs at the operational level, which has been particularly challenging for State.

DOD and State efforts to rectify this situation have gathered pace since the Nisour Square incident in September 2007.⁴⁴ In December 2007, DOD consolidated some 40–50 fragmentary orders relating to PSCs in Iraq by issuing Fragmentary Order 07-428, which addresses arming procedures, rules for the use of force, incident reporting, and commanders’ oversight responsibilities.⁴⁵ State has issued four separate directives to accomplish the same task.⁴⁶ However, it is not clear to what extent these guidelines are complementary or whether PSCs could be operating under different rules for the use of force depending on which agency they contract with. Multi-National Force–Iraq established an Armed Contractor Oversight Division (ACOD) as a focused overall point of contact for policy issues relating to DOD-hired PSCs. Its express mission is to reduce the number of PSC weapons discharge incidents, hold PSCs accountable for their actions, and minimize the impact of such incidents on the credibility of U.S. efforts in Iraq.⁴⁷ This has brought significant improvements in the operational command and control arrangements for PSCs. At the tactical level, DOD has replaced the tracking of PSC movement through the contractor-operated Reconstruction Operations Center with a network of six Contractor Operations

Cells (CONOCs). These cells enable commanders to coordinate closely with PSCs while the tactical unit is put in charge and can deny a PSC's request for movement in the battle space.⁴⁸ However, while DOD has taken the lead in operating the new mechanisms, each agency retains operational command over its contractors, and coordination mechanisms are consensual. To further improve coordination, DOD and State concluded a memorandum of agreement in December 2007; and DOD and USAID signed a memorandum of understanding in July 2008. The Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) has been put in charge of PSC contract administration in Iraq and developed a quality assurance framework in coordination with ACOD; for this purpose, it roughly doubled its staff in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility by shifting staff from other areas.⁴⁹ State is increasing the number of diplomatic security agents in Iraq from 36 to 81 and is now requiring at least one agent to accompany PSCs on personal protection missions.⁵⁰ Lastly, U.S. Joint Forces Command has developed training on the role of PSCs in the battle space for senior staff; the Army now incorporates PSC scenarios into its Battle Command Training Program; and the Marine Corps includes scenarios on rules on the use of force and escalation of force involving PSCs into predeployment training.⁵¹

However, problems remain. In the first place, the efforts by U.S. agencies to enhance oversight only apply to U.S. contractors, which potentially leaves some 50 percent of PSCs in Iraq outside these new arrangements. For non-U.S. PSCs, coordination is voluntary. Most significant is the question of sustainability. The setting up of ACOD, enhanced responsibility for DCMA, the operation of six CONOCs, and the increase in diplomatic security agents in Iraq involve a redistribution of human resources. DCMA officials have questioned whether the surge in contract management and oversight personnel can be maintained in the long run.⁵² State has had to take the extra diplomatic security agents for Iraq from posts in other areas, which has negatively affected State's other missions (such as providing security for visiting dignitaries).⁵³ Finally, the fact that four out of seven ACOD personnel are themselves contractors⁵⁴ highlights just how difficult it is to retain sufficient core capacity for oversight of core functions in-house. Indeed, one should question to what extent the lack of oversight can be overcome if contractors are brought in to supervise other contractors. Clearly, PSC management in a war zone calls for a much more hands-on approach than was originally anticipated.

The case of PSCs illustrates what it takes to manage contractors effectively in a war zone while keeping control of core missions and functions. The reappraisal of PSC management and coordination undertaken

in Iraq can serve as an example for possible measures to ensure that outsourcing does not detract from mission effectiveness. However, other areas have not to date drawn the same level of public interest and pressure. This may be due to the spectacular nature of incidents like the March 2004 Blackwater ambush in Fallujah, or the Nisour Square incident. Both involved State contractors, which immediately affected broader U.S.-Iraqi relations. These types of incidents clearly undermine mission goals, and the damage is done in a compressed timeframe. It will be much harder to mobilize the same sort of support and interagency cooperation in other areas where detrimental consequences could also occur in a war zone but might only be felt over the medium or long term.

The case of PSCs also shows that the argument in favor of contracting is sometimes based on a false economy. If control over core functions is to be retained, a substantial number of skilled personnel are required to manage contractors adequately. Contractors are undoubtedly a valuable asset, especially as a surge capacity. But U.S. agencies may have gone too far and been too optimistic about the savings achieved in costs and personnel by outsourcing core functions. This imbalance needs to be adjusted across the board, and not just in the high-profile (but low-volume) area of PSCs.

Conclusion and Findings

Federal outsourcing guidelines (especially OMB Circular A-76, OFPP 92-1, and subpart 7 of the FAR) should drop the requirement that agencies separate their activities between inherently governmental functions and commercial activities and replace it with a requirement that agencies determine which activities are critical to their core missions.

The current requirement to designate activities as either inherently governmental or commercial forces agencies to choose between in-house performance and outsourcing, unless a specific exemption can be invoked or a satisfactory rationale presented. The result is that some agencies have virtually lost the ability to perform certain functions—even some that may be critical for mission success in certain situations. A core mission-critical standard, on the other hand, would allow agencies more flexibility to perform any function in-house if circumstances warrant and to determine how much of a particular activity should be outsourced to fit the requirements of the mission.

OMB should permit all agencies operating in a war zone, not just DOD, to determine whether the provisions of Circular A-76 should apply in complex operations.

Congress should create a new standard in the Federal contracting guidelines that would require all agencies to maintain sufficient in-house expertise and institutional knowledge to ensure that the agency does not lose its core competencies.

No agency should be allowed to contract out so much that it loses its core competencies. By this standard, USAID's resources and number of direct hires should be increased substantially.

Congress and OMB should require agencies to review those contractor positions that have become entrenched and are essentially steady-state. These positions should be converted to direct hires as a cost-savings measure.

Contracts that recur annually and have become a de facto steady-state expense should be converted to direct-hire positions.

The National Security Council and OMB should review whether there is an appropriate match between agency core missions and contracted tasks in complex operations.

To ensure proper oversight of contractors, the core mission of the oversight agency must be aligned with the contracted task. Without such alignment, the agency will not be able to exercise effective oversight, even if it is sufficiently staffed to fulfill its own core missions.

Notes

¹The author is indebted to Joshua Jones and Christoff Luehrs for their research and assistance in drafting this chapter.

²Congress created a similar Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction in 2007.

³Congressional Budget Office (CBO), *Contractors' Support of U.S. Operations in Iraq*, August 2008, available at <www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/96xx/doc9688/08-12-IraqContractors.pdf>, 13.

⁴William W. Epley, *Contracting in War: Civilian Combat Support of Field Armies* (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1989), 28–34. In fact, the United States relied so heavily on Japanese suppliers and contractors that many economists attribute Japan's postwar economic revival to the Korean War (Japan did not have access to Marshall Plan funds).

⁵Ibid.

⁶CBO, 13.

⁷CBO, 8.

⁸Ibid.

⁹The primary Federal documents that provide guidance on what is inherently governmental are the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) Policy Letter 92–1 (September 23, 1992), the Federal Acquisition Regulations, subpart 7.5 (March 2005), Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A–76 (May 29, 2003, revised), and the Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act of 1998. In addition, other laws prohibit the use of contractors for other discrete activities, including the hiring of mercenaries.

¹⁰OMB Circular A–76. The circular further provides that an inherently governmental function involves, among other things, the interpretation and execution of the laws of the United States so as to:

- (a) bind the United States to take or not to take some action by contract, policy, regulation, authorization, order, or otherwise;
- (b) determine, protect, and advance its economic, political, territorial, property, or other interests by military or diplomatic action, civil or criminal judicial proceedings, contract management, or otherwise;
- (c) significantly affect the life, liberty, or property of private persons;
- (d) commission, appoint, direct, or control officers of employees of the United States; or
- (e) exert ultimate control over the acquisition, use, or disposition of the property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, of the United States, including the collection, control, or disbursement of appropriated and other Federal funds.

¹¹ A-76, paragraph 5h.

¹² OFPP Policy Letter 92-1, Para. 4.

¹³ Much of this discussion is based on ideas presented in Elliot Sclar, *You Don't Always Get What You Pay For: The Economics of Privatization* (London: Cornell University Press, 2000).

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid. See also Stephen J. Rimmer, "Competitive Tendering and Contracting: Theory and Research," *Australian Economic Review* 107 (1994).

¹⁶ Sclar; also Rimmer. For an example of oligopolies in the intelligence contracting sector, see Tim Shorrock, *Spies for Hire: The Secret World of Intelligence Outsourcing* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2008).

¹⁷ "Fiscal 2009 Department of Defense Budget Released," Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense No. 90-08, February 4, 2008. This does not include the supplemental budget for the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts.

¹⁸ "Urgent Reform Required: Army Expeditionary Contracting," October 31, 2007 (Gansler Commission Report).

¹⁹ See "U.S. Army National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 Section 849 Report to Congress," May 28, 2008.

²⁰ See USAID's "Development Leadership Initiative," authorized in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009.

²¹ Ruben Berrios, *Contracting for Development* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000), 12-13.

²² Ibid., 13.

²³ GAO-06-838R, 7-8.

²⁴ Gansler Commission Report, 40.

²⁵ Among the statutes are the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947, the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, the Small Business Act of 1958, the Truth in Negotiations Act of 1963, the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act of 1974, the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984, the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, and the Federal Acquisition Reform Act of 1996.

²⁶ David Bayley, *Changing the Guard: Developing Democratic Police Abroad* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).

²⁷ Information provided by James A. Walsh, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, Department of State.

²⁸ U.S. Department of State, "Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs: Fiscal Year 2008 Budget Program and Budget Guide," 2007, available at <www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/rpt/pbg/c24130.htm>.

²⁹ U.S. Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, "Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2007-2012," available at <www.usaid.gov/policy/coordination/stratplan_fy07-12.pdf>.

³⁰ Department of Justice Mission Statement, available at <www.usdoj.gov/02organizations/>.

³¹ Bayley, 26; Charles Call, "Institutional Learning within ICITAP," in *Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security*, ed. Robert Oakley, Michael Dziedzic, and Eliot Goldberg (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1998), 315-363.

³² See Bayley, Call.

³³ These figures were compiled from testimonies before the House Armed Services Committee, as well as a recent report on the subject. See Anne W. Patterson, "Contracting for the Iraqi Security Forces," testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation, April 25, 2007, available at <http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/OI042507/Patterson_Testimony042507.pdf>; Bruce C. Swartz, "Department of Justice Personnel Deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq," testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, October 16, 2007, available at <www.usdoj.gov/criminal/icitap/press/room/2007/oct/10-16-07daag-armedforces-afghanistan-iraq.pdf>; "Major Areas in Which Contracts Have Been Utilized to Support the Training, Equipping, and Sustainment of the Iraqi Security Forces, and Challenges that Have Been Encountered in Interagency Coordination, Contract Management, and Oversight," testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation, April 25, 2006, available at <http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/OI042507/Swartz_Testimony042507.pdf>; and "Stand Up and Be Counted: The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces," available at <http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/OI_ISFreport062707/OI_Report_FINAL.pdf>.

³⁴ Bayley, 139.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 139–141.

³⁶ GAO–08–966, Human Rights First (2008).

³⁷ CBO estimates for Iraq are at most 30,000 personal security contractors (PSCs) out of 190,000 total contractors in early 2008; see *Contractors' Support of U.S. Operations in Iraq* (Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office, August 2008). The International Peace Operations Association, an industry advocacy group, estimates that PSCs make up only 10 percent of total contractors in Iraq.

³⁸ This is not to say that the issues are not important. Clearly, better rules on the use of force and better oversight of PSCs are needed. This chapter describes some of the important steps that have already been taken. In addition, greater legal accountability is needed. Progress already has been made in this area as well. Under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, DOD has referred 58 cases to the Department of Justice, 12 of which have been charged (CBO [2008], 24). More recently, one contractor has been tried by the Army under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (GAO–08–966, 28).

³⁹ DOD, interview with Gary Motsek, September 5, 2008.

⁴⁰ The Status of Forces Agreement between Iraq and the United States that was approved in December 2008 ends the immunity from prosecution under Iraqi law for PSCs operating in Iraq. The issue of contractor immunity was a major stumbling block in the prolonged negotiations over the agreement.

⁴¹ GAO–08–966, 1.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 1.

⁴³ Section 832 of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2009 says, "The House bill contained a provision (sec. 824) that would require the Secretary of Defense to modify existing regulations to ensure that private security contractors are not authorized to perform governmental functions in an area of combat operations. The Senate bill contained a similar provision (sec. 841) that would also specify certain functions that constitute inherently governmental functions when performed in highly hazardous public areas. The agreement includes a provision that expresses the sense of Congress with regard to the performance of certain functions by private security contractors in an area of combat operations."

⁴⁴ On September 16, 2007, Department of State PSCs killed several civilians after their convoy had been attacked. The incident sparked public outcry as well as several investigations, and is seen as a watershed event by U.S. Government officials.

⁴⁵ GAO–08–966, 12–13.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 19.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 10.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 21–22.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 13–14.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 18.

⁵¹ Ibid., 17–18.

⁵² Ibid., 16.

⁵³ Ibid., 19.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 11.

Educating National Security Professionals for Stabilization and Reconstruction

John W. Yaeger and L. Erik Kjonnerod

Stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) activities in support of national security objectives have been linked to U.S. military education for 150 years. The Civil War, Reconstruction, and westward expansion established a need for better educated officers capable of addressing a host of military and nation-building challenges. The Industrial Revolution had brought nearly instantaneous communication via telegraph, greatly enhanced logistics via rail, and vastly more lethal and plentiful weapons. In addition to the challenges of mastering new technology, officers were responsible for law and order in frontier territories, which meant that military commissions had to decide issues of civil and criminal law, yet Army officers had no formal education beyond their pre-commissioning experience—if they had any higher education at all.

Following the Civil War, Army Generals Ulysses S. Grant, William T. Sherman, and Philip H. Sheridan were tasked with examining the methods the Service used to conduct its training and education programs.¹ Part of the plan was fulfilled in 1881, when General Sherman, Commanding General of the Army of the United States, authorized the establishment of the School of Application for Cavalry and Infantry at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. That school is now the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, where the Army Command and General Staff College is changing its basic curriculum to include more tenets in the S&R arena, as well as leading the effort to impress these into the larger professional military education system of the Army.²

Conflicts or national crises inevitably reveal shortcomings in the operational performance of the U.S. Armed Forces. “Lessons learned” that are deemed worthy of being preserved and refined in academic environments lead to modifications to professional military education. In today’s

rapidly changing national security environment, it is imperative to link our overall Federal educational system, heavily dependent on the military institutional structure, to S&R challenges and the resulting need for comprehensive doctrine, training, and implementation.³

This chapter will describe the emerging education system for this critical component of our national security by providing background information on the National Security Professional Presidential executive order, describing the need for and required capabilities of National Security Professionals, offering the historical context of prior legislation, and addressing current National Security Professional education programs.

Executive Order 13434

The most pressing need for National Security Professional capabilities, as determined by recent experience, falls within the S&R arena. Although there was not a great need for an education system that addressed S&R during the Cold War, the national security environment has changed drastically since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Cold War had offered a level of predictability. Two superpowers dominated the world's security environment, and as a result of their rivalry, the two attempted to understand each other. There was no question about the role the U.S. military played in the standoff—to be prepared to operate offensively and defensively against Soviet military forces and prevail in the event of war. With the demise of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, national, religious, and ethnic conflicts were no longer held in check.

By the middle of the 1990s, it had become clear that security challenges were different from those that the United States had faced during the Cold War and immediate aftermath. Ethnic rivalries, international crime, economic imbalance, transnational and asymmetric threats, demographic shifts, refugees and internally displaced persons on a massive scale, and disasters, both manmade and natural, required security solutions that employed a wider range of instruments of national power than before. The United States responded to the new security environment by launching an evaluation of ways in which multiple departments and agencies could team to mass their capabilities in the face of these contingencies.

With the “intervention”⁴ of Haiti still fresh, the Rwandan genocide barely over, and a humanitarian catastrophe in Somalia looming, the Bill Clinton administration promulgated Presidential Decision Directive 56, “Managing Complex Contingencies,” which sought to counter stovepiping by dictating a new mindset of interagency horizontal coordination, collaboration, planning, and implementation. A major component of this

widely acclaimed directive was the expectation that departmental bureaucratic cultures could be changed as integration became the rule of operational execution. Education for Federal professionals was a critical element of this expected transformation, and the National Security Council (NSC) looked to National Defense University (NDU), the Foreign Service Institute, and the U.S. Army War College to build comprehensive programs to accomplish the desired ends. Regrettably, without any clear ways (inter-agency doctrine) or means (fiscal and human resources), the initiative stalled and soon became irrelevant to the emerging challenges of the day.

The George W. Bush administration brought a renewed energy to the directive to craft procedures to effectively and efficiently address the range of security situations challenging the United States, but consensus on interagency cooperation was elusive. A survey of senior leaders and their deputies across the interagency community concluded that the equation for success was a shared understanding of the environment in which the contingency was occurring; a solid understanding of the capabilities of the players and partners who were engaged in planning or participation; and a comprehensive understanding of the process by which these forces consolidated their individual strengths and resources to effect change on the ground.⁵

Inside the Federal Government, one department did provide its managerial and leadership cadre with education that built upon those broad categories as part of its overall professional education programs. The Department of Defense (DOD), in particular through the professional military education (PME) and joint professional military education (JPME) programs, laid out the learning objectives and tasks that permitted educational programs to adapt to the emerging changes in national security challenges.⁶ Reinforced by the Goldwater-Nichols Act (discussed below) and congressional oversight, military officers and many of their noncommissioned colleagues followed a career-long program of learning through participation in formal educational institutions within DOD and in civilian academia.

What was lacking was a similar program for civilian leaders across the spectrum of Federal agencies. This deficiency became painfully apparent when the United States mishandled disasters at home and abroad. The DOD reaction to these contingency situations was reflected in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) process, where, for the first time, interagency working groups strongly recommended that a more expansive academic program be made available to all Federal officials who worked in the national security arena. DOD codified its plan for interagency

education in the 2006 QDR, a congressionally mandated examination of DOD roles, missions, and capabilities. The 2006 QDR stated:

The Department will also transform the National Defense University, the Department's premier educational institution, into a true National Security University. Acknowledging the complexity of the 21st-century security environment, this new institution will be tailored to support the educational needs of the broader U.S. national security profession. Participation from interagency partners will be increased and the curriculum will be reshaped in ways that are consistent with a unified U.S. Government approach to national security missions, and greater interagency participation will be encouraged.⁷

The issue was elevated to the NSC and the Homeland Security Council, which supported the notion of a new Presidential directive for establishing a cadre of National Security Professionals equipped, like their military counterparts, with the tools to meet the emerging threats to national and international norms. Executive Order 13434, signed by President Bush on May 17, 2007, directed the establishment of a three-part program of education, training, and professional assignments for military and civilian National Security Professionals spanning all executive departments in the national security community.⁸ Executive Order 13434 states:

To enhance the national security of the United States, including preventing, protecting against, responding to, and recovering from natural and manmade disasters, such as acts of terrorism, it is the policy of the United States to promote the education, training, and experience of current and future professionals in national security positions in executive departments and agencies.⁹

A National Strategy Directive followed in July that laid out the principal component elements of this program based on a three-part approach: education, training, and professional experience. These three pillars will rest on a platform of human capital management that will be administered separately inside each participating agency. This is the approach that is currently being implemented.

The implementation plans for programmatic aspects are being developed by departments and agencies and will fit the specific needs of each

Federal agency as these perceive their needs for National Security Professionals in the right positions and with the right qualifications. Once requirements have been canvassed and assembled, educational standards will be determined that will drive the development of courses and programs at Federal teaching institutions and, eventually, within civilian academia at undergraduate and graduate levels. However, lack of well-articulated requirements hinders progress. Executive Order 13434 names 15 departments and agencies to a steering committee but does not specify the numbers and types of billets needed or provide additional resources.

While struggling to understand the demand for National Security Professionals, an evolutionary counterpart effort has emerged to determine what senior political leaders were requiring and directing for their department roles and responsibilities. Most stark in this regard were the changes brought about inside the Departments of State, Defense, and Homeland Security, each of which was confronting new and transformational challenges in the manner in which traditional functions and expectations were viewed from within, as well as outside, the parameters of mission responsibilities. As described in detail elsewhere in this volume, State created the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) to implement a new National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD-44) in this area;¹⁰ DOD Directive 3000.05 elevated nonkinetic contingency operations to a par with warfighting; and DHS struggled to reorganize its capabilities for implementing the findings of the Katrina After-Action Report.¹¹

Executive Order 13434 tasked Federal departments and agencies with integrating development of professionals who could collaborate in a whole-of-government approach to problem resolution as well as in these more scripted mission sets. The initial consensus on how this would be most expeditiously accomplished was to build on JPME tenets, adding a heavy dose of the capabilities of the entities of government, the roles and missions of agencies and departments, and those individual skills aimed at facilitating the creation of more capable leaders and managers of interagency teams in complex contingency situations that support national security goals.

While this approach was deemed adequate to begin planning for the development of courses, interagency members concluded that their needs were insufficiently represented, and a more robust developmental effort was directed by the Directorate of the Consortium for National Security Education that had been established by Executive Order 13434 and its ensuing National Strategy Directive. Under the leadership of the

U.S. Institute for Peace, a more comprehensive set of characteristics of National Security Professionals was developed and sent to the Federal educational community for use in establishing academic programs. This has resulted in the development of an approach to building the appropriate curriculum that could be adapted for use across the spectrum of Federal learning institutions.

More specifically, before the “what” for learning was developed, there was a need to identify the attributes a graduate of this program must have to meet the needs of the individual departments for S&R. The desired qualities had to be further distilled into what characteristics are expected of the students entering the program. With graduate competencies and entrance criteria known, specific learning outcomes of the education must be developed. Subsequent to developing learning outcomes, a delivery method (correspondence, resident, online) must be identified, as well as a set of options for program length that fit the varied professional capabilities and workplace realities of those interested in participating in the National Security Professional program. Accurately established competencies become a crucial first step, since if these are wrongly identified, the subsequent learning programs will be squandered.

In summary, many professionals dealing with national security agree with the need for a National Security Professional program. A cadre of interagency professionals educated and trained to deal with complex contingency operations, natural disasters, recovery operations, and so forth is an excellent idea. Unfortunately, since the numbers of personnel required to be educated and trained have not been clearly established, departments and agencies are reluctant to divert resources toward this effort.

Capabilities Addressed by the National Security Professional Education System

As a result of an unstable security environment since the end of the Cold War, new roles for the military have emerged, and all interagency organizations that deal with national security must possess the capacity to operate in a volatile, uncertain milieu that presents new challenges to the United States. Ethnic and religious conflicts, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, instability in Iraq and Afghanistan, religious fundamentalism, and terrorism are now more prominent threats to national security to which the United States needs to respond.

Historically, strategic, critical, and creative thinking have been important in leaders. In today’s world, they are required at levels below senior

leadership. Similarly, leaders may have possessed a certain level of cultural awareness, but not to the degree required today. An education system designed to develop National Security Professionals must place increased emphasis on some competencies and expand old capabilities to remain relevant and capable of operating in an unpredictable environment. As DOD elevated soft power readiness to a par with offensive and defensive operations, leaders were forced to view their personal and institutional skill base in a different light. As General George C. Marshall understood at the end of World War II, he “had to learn a new set of skills to deal with the challenges of working with the Department of State and other civilian agencies” in carrying out his responsibilities in mufti.¹²

A Skill Set for the New Environment¹³

Strategic thinking. Understand the country’s national security strategy and the various documents that convey it. National Security Professionals must be able to envision future states in collaboration with other agencies, think strategically, and engage in interagency planning.

Critical and creative thinking. Analyze problems in concert with other agencies; seek out, evaluate, and synthesize information from multiple sources; assess and challenge assumptions; and offer alternative and creative courses of action.

Lead interagency teams. Create a shared vision and unity of purpose among all players; win the confidence and trust of all players; effectively utilize the knowledge, skills, and resources of each team member; develop and mentor staff from other agencies; ensure collaborative problem-solving; and manage internal conflicts.

Maintaining global and cultural acuity. Maintain an integrated understanding of factors that influence national security (for example, global, regional, and country trends); possess knowledge of relevant foreign cultures and histories; and have foreign language(s) proficiency. National Security Professionals must also be familiar with the structures, processes, and cultures of the other agencies with which they work.

Collaborating. Work with other agencies to accomplish goals; build and maintain networks/relationships that span agencies; and promote an environment that encourages collaboration, integration, and information-/knowledge-sharing.

Planning and managing interagency operations. Develop interagency plans (strategic and operations); execute and monitor interagency operations

(that is, be adept at budget/financial management, project/program management, and performance management/evaluations in an interagency environment); maintain strong political and situation awareness; and navigate interagency decisionmaking processes.

Mediating and negotiating. Mediate disputes and/or negotiate with partners and stakeholders during operations.

Communicating. Be able to articulate information orally and in writing; listen actively; read nonverbal cues; manage the expectations of diverse groups; and tailor communications to different circumstances and audiences.

Enhancing JPME Competencies

There are some immediate observations from the above list of shared capabilities. First is an underlying assumption, similar to joint professional military education, that students must bring with them a certain level of knowledge and skills developed within their own agency. For example, specialized skills required for disaster response, state-building, or counter-insurgency would come from a parent organization.

Second, no single school will deliver full education of all competencies; a system or system of systems within the educational process is required. The reason for having a system of higher education for National Security Professionals is fundamentally the same reason civilian higher education institutions exist: the education system must fulfill a broad array of purposes.

Finally, the education system cannot exist in isolation. The development of effective National Security Professional leaders will require that they have the appropriate professional experience.

There are many parallels between the required National Security Professional education system and JPME, which emerged from professional military education. Each PME institution had a mission that responded to the need that created it. A side benefit to schools that had students from other Services emerged. When students from other Services attended, it became evident that the academic environment provided an opportunity to obtain a greater understanding of other Services. Dual purposes were served; the Armed Forces could work toward solving the Nation's military and defense problems and, in doing so, could gain a better understanding of each other. This was one of the fundamental principles for establishing joint professional military education. Combining students from each Service created a "joint" student population, compelling them to learn each

other's perspective as they studied. Today's challenge requires that joint student and faculty populations be expanded to include more department and agency representation. These qualities currently exist in JPME but must be expanded from joint to interagency and international dimensions to ensure effective development of National Security Professional leaders.

Toward a National Security Professional Educational System

The history of our PME system has shown that the future of National Security Professional education will depend predominantly on available resources. JPME required congressional involvement to succeed and evolve. To better understand the dynamics of building this new education program, it is valuable to briefly review the historical context of congressional intercession in the development of JPME.

Goldwater-Nichols

In the mid-1980s, support by the Services for unity of effort and JPME required congressional intervention. Congress was told by DOD that the Services were trying to work in concert. However, Congress concluded that DOD reform efforts were ineffective and further action was necessary. Poor inter-Service coordination during the Vietnam conflict had continued through Operation *Eagle Claw/Evening Light*, the failed attempt to rescue American hostages in Iran in April 1980, and Operation *Urgent Fury* in Grenada in October 1983 revealed deficiencies in joint operations to Congress.¹⁴ An internal Joint Chiefs of Staff review, a congressional staff review, and a Presidential Blue Ribbon Panel helped convince Congress that its concerns were valid; all reached the conclusion that change was necessary.¹⁵

The Senate and House passed the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 on September 16 and 17, 1986, and President Ronald Reagan signed it into law on October 1. The legislation increased the authority of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who was made the principal military advisor to the President. The Joint Staff was enlarged and its duties revised. Selection procedures for staff also were revised, as discussed below, and staff were made subordinate to the Chairman, not their respective Service chiefs.

Certain portions of Goldwater-Nichols influenced JPME and have many similarities to what is required to develop National Security Professionals: the joint officer management system and the professional military education curriculum.

Joint Officer Management System

Congress addressed the problem identified by the Chairman's Special Study to ensure the Joint Staff benefited from the assignment of quality officers. The study had highlighted that it was desirable to have officers arrive for service on the staff with the prerequisite education. Goldwater-Nichols established a joint officer management system with the goal of improving the performance of officers in joint duty positions by establishing management procedures for their selection, education, assignment, and promotion.¹⁶ The "system" required that an officer satisfy certain prerequisites before being designated a joint specialist. Included in the requirements was attendance at one of the resident JPME programs of National Defense University (the National War College, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, or the Armed Forces Staff College).¹⁷

To ensure that NDU graduates used their education, Congress injected requirements for assignments following graduation. Certain officers entered the colleges with a joint specialty designation; the new law mandated that all officers with the joint specialty who graduate from each JPME school must be assigned to a joint duty assignment as their next duty assignment, unless waived by the Secretary of Defense on a case-by-case basis. In addition, at least 50 percent of all other officers graduating from each JPME school must fill a joint duty assignment as their next duty assignment.¹⁸ The idea behind these legislative directives was to populate joint positions with officers who had received a joint education.

A concern in Congress was to ensure that officers assigned to joint duty, such as the Joint Staff, were officers with career potential. Prior to this legislation, joint duty had a reputation as a "kiss of death" for a career.¹⁹ The new law put pressure on the Services to ensure this did not happen:

Each selection board convened under section 611(a) of this title that will consider officers who are serving in, or have served in, joint duty assignments shall include at least one officer designated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who is currently serving in a joint duty assignment. The Secretary of Defense may waive the preceding sentence in the case of any selection board of the Marine Corps.²⁰

According to this requirement, if there was a promotion panel viewing records of 100 officers for promotion to the next rank and 1 individual out of the 100 was on the Joint Staff, for example, then the Chairman of

the Joint Chiefs must appoint an officer on the reviewing board to protect the interests of the Joint Staff.

The ultimate goal of military officers is to achieve flag or general officer rank. A perception existed that certain assignments enhanced one's opportunity for selection to this rank. Whether this was only a perception or a fact, Congress ensured that a joint assignment was a requirement: "An officer may not be selected for promotion to the grade of brigadier general or rear admiral (lower half) unless the officer has served in a joint duty assignment."²¹

To ensure the Services' feet were held to the fire, Congress required an annual report on promotion opportunities for those who went to joint duty assignments:

The Secretary of Defense shall include in the annual report of the Secretary to Congress under section 113(c) of this title, for the period covered by the report, the following information (which shall be shown for the Department of Defense as a whole and separately for the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps):

- (1) The number of officers selected for the joint specialty and their education and experience.
- (2) The promotion rate for officers considered for promotion from within the promotion zone who are serving on the Joint Staff compared with the promotion rate for other officers considered for promotion from within the promotion zone in the same pay grade and the same competitive category, shown for all officers of the armed force and for officers serving on the headquarters staff of the armed force concerned.²²

Congress established a joint officer system and included provisions to ensure joint duty assignments were career-enhancing.

The same approach should be taken toward National Security Professional education. Attending a school that is part of the National Security Professional program cannot be seen as the "kiss of death." Graduates of the program should use the education they receive. The personnel systems of departments and agencies need to support a National Security Professional educational system by sending "front-runners" to school and assigning them appropriately. Congressional action may be required for this to be accomplished.

Professional Military Education Curriculum

The Senate Committee's findings focused on the perceived inadequate quality of joint duty military personnel. Included in the definition of quality was the necessary education. Goldwater-Nichols addressed this as well, and required that NDU ensure its curriculum content was consistent with the needs of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Additionally, there was a new mandate to ensure academic rigor:

The Secretary of Defense, with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall periodically review and revise the curriculum of each school of the National Defense University (and of any other joint professional military education school) to enhance the education and training of officers in joint matters. The Secretary shall require such schools to maintain rigorous standards for the military education of officers with the joint specialty.²³

Prior to the passage of this act, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had little voice in the Service professional military education institutions. This new requirement for review eventually led to an accreditation process not only for the colleges at NDU, but also for other PME schools. The statute requires that:

The Secretary of Defense shall require that each Department of Defense school concerned with professional military education periodically review and revise its curriculum for senior and intermediate grade officers in order to strengthen the focus on—

- (1) joint matters; and
- (2) preparing officers for joint duty assignments.²⁴

With this legislation, the Chairman was given the authority to ensure all Service colleges, as well as NDU, were providing the education the Chairman required. If the education contained deficiencies, the institution had to answer to the Chairman. The end result was an accreditation system for JPME.

The National Security Professional educational program will also require that someone be in charge of the curriculum, and accreditation will become a more predominant issue. Schools participating in the education of National Security Professionals that have accredited programs need

to maintain those while the new National Security Professional educational program establishes standards. Accreditation is a means of self-regulation and peer review adopted by the civilian educational community. The accrediting process is intended to strengthen and sustain the quality and integrity of higher education. Ultimately, an accredited institution has the confidence of its peer institutions. The intent for accreditation is to obtain the same benefits that civilian higher education institutes gain through their accreditation process. Criteria must be developed to ensure credits are transferable and determine if courses will count toward certificate or degree programs. An accreditation process will validate the adequacy and currency of curricula. Congressional intervention may be required before resources are devoted to establishing an accreditation process for National Security Professionals.

In summary, Goldwater-Nichols has shown that for this new education system to be successful:


- it must have support from the agency/department human resources systems
- the personnel systems must work together to ensure efficiencies are realized
- education and assignments must be linked and career enhancing
- the curriculum needs to be relevant and dynamic
- an accreditation process will be necessary to ensure these goals are accomplished.

Progress toward a National Security Professional Educational System

Such endeavors as the Project for National Security Reform and Beyond Goldwater-Nichols II contemplate continuation of the principles of Executive Order 13434. The main components of the program will remain based on the three pillars of education, training, and professional experience anchored in human capital management and accountability, as depicted on the right side of figure 9–1.

This program will permit departments and agencies to assess individual needs and designate positions that meet those requirements. To ensure that the program gets under way, the current plan for implementation will focus on the domestic aspects of the National Response Framework. All executive branch agencies have identified Senior Executive Service (SES) employees with responsibilities in this arena, who will be

Figure 9–1. **Progression in National Security Professional Training and Education**



required to participate in a three-part learning program. This is initiated with a “Town Hall” meeting in which designated SES officers will meet with their departmental leadership to discuss the importance of their new responsibilities and begin to establish the network of associations that will facilitate efficient operations in time of crisis. The second aspect of this training program requires completion of an online training course on the details of the National Response Planning (NRP) process. Upon successful completion, each individual receives certification and is validated as qualified to participate in NRP activities. The final phase of the training involves participation in a 3-hour simulation built around a domestic crisis requiring interagency response and multidepartmental collaboration. The main goal of this experiential program is to allow the participants to exercise their knowledge of the process and the planning across departmental boundaries.

Once the SES community has been exposed to this training, each department will be required to identify subordinates who work directly under senior leaders. The larger number of managers and implementers will be trained in the same manner, and the cadre of National Security Professionals will be established for domestic response purposes. Federal personnel who work in international affairs will undergo similar training that uses the Interagency Management System as its basis. Each department and agency will be required to identify for these programs all per-

sonnel who perform national security functions. Departments and agencies are responsible for adjudicating which of their personnel have satisfactorily completed the required phases of the training programs and award them National Security Professional certification. There is currently no positive educational requirement associated with the National Security Professional development; this will be forthcoming once the new administration sets guidelines for the Office of Personnel Management to enforce.

In the area of stabilization and reconstruction, where the majority of new resourcing appears headed, the educational component will consist of a series of short courses that has, as its base, a set of learning objectives crafted by the S&R education and training sub-Policy Coordination Committee—an interagency working group at the Assistant and Deputy Assistant level. These include a focus on principles, authorities, and theories; responders' roles, responsibilities, and linkages to S&R operations and actors; communications in S&R environments; adaptive leadership principals; and actions in hostile environments, first aid, safety, and field expediency practices. These will be presented over the course of a 2-week pilot program that will build into a full-time series of academic programs, at National Defense University and the National Foreign Affairs Training Center, in support of the Active and Standby Components of the Civilian Response Corps.

Conclusion and Findings

Strengthening interagency relationships is vital to improving national security. The potential exists to enhance U.S. national security by creating a career-long program of learning for the development of National Security Professionals. A robust development program that includes education, training, and professional opportunities can increase collaboration among agencies, and educating agency personnel and placing them in jobs where they will use that interagency education will produce a new type of U.S. Government leadership.

National security leaders who can analyze at the strategic level; who know the capabilities, organizational cultures, procedures, and roles of U.S. departments and agencies; and who are able to plan and conduct complex operations in peace, crisis, war, and postconflict settings overseas and in homeland contingencies will be invaluable assets to our Federal Government. As established in chapter 2, roughly 15,000 personnel—5,000 active and 10,000 reserves—need to be equipped to deal with complex contin-

gency operations. At a minimum, the active components need to have benefited from an interagency educational program.

Development of an education and training program has stalled. There is no sense of demand or urgency to create a National Security Professional educational program. History has shown that it takes a crisis or war to spur investment for a JPME institution. We have an opportunity now to invest based on a recognized need. To fulfill this potential requires an investment similar to the one DOD made in the establishment of JPME. Infrastructure, tenets of operational procedure, and coordinating personnel policies must be created and resourced to provide for a capacity adequate to manage national needs.

Congressional intervention may be needed to create interest in moving forward. The individual military education institutions were not a military education “system” until Congress became involved. Education did not have the priority to compete for resources before congressional intervention. As agencies struggle with their own internal funding requirements, interagency education will compete with near-term financial and personnel readiness issues. Personnel who receive National Security Professional education and training must be assigned to positions that will make use of their education. The temptation to assign the “rising star” to work on internal department or agency problems must be overcome. The rising stars should not return to their old positions. Promotions need to reflect recognition of interagency experience.

These considerations, and examination of historical experience, yield the following findings.

Create a National Security Professional education system.

The National Security Professional program requires a robust system of education and training opportunities that cover entire careers. The concept is similar to a state university system with a single administration (chancellor and staff) that oversees several campuses, each with its own identity and mission. There must be some flexibility in the system so that different delivery methods are available. Short courses, such as those offered at NDU’s Information Resources Management College, must be considered as well as the 10-month resident programs, such as NDU’s new College of Interagency Security Affairs. A new academic entity is needed to ensure an appropriate education is offered in a broader national security environment. Existing schools are fulfilling unique missions; some fit well with interagency education but may not be a perfect match to National Security Professional education, and their missions should not be changed.

Make a commitment to resource National Security Professional education.

Actually, multiple commitments are required to educate the large number of National Security Professionals needed to execute new missions. Agencies and departments must commit their professional support; attending school must be career-enhancing; and congressional action may be required to ensure that commitments endure.

Enable civilian colleges and universities to feed the National Security Professional system.

The Reserve Officer Training Corps supplies officers to the U.S. military. Prior to commissioning, students take specialized courses at colleges and universities throughout the country to prepare them for a military career. A similar system must be established to leverage the U.S. higher education system for civilian aspirants who desire careers in Federal departments and agencies serving national security purposes.

Establish a Federal chief learning officer.

A Federal chief learning officer, similar to a chancellor in a state university system, should be established, under either the Office of Personnel Management or the National Security Council, to coordinate and oversee this comprehensive approach to national security leadership. This office, perhaps built on the foundation of the current Integration Office under the Office of Management and Budget, would be responsible for the allocation of resources to the departments and agencies that participate in national security affairs.

Notes

¹ Elvid Hunt, *History of Fort Leavenworth: 1827–1927* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: The General Service Schools Press, 1979); Orville Z. Tyler, Jr., *The History of Fort Leavenworth 1937–1951* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: The Command and General Staff College, 1951).

² In October 2008, the Army issued the *Field Manual for Stability Operations* (FM 3–07), which aligns Army doctrine and training with the spirit of National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD–44) and Department of Defense Directive 3000.05.

³ The network of Transformation Chairs from U.S. military education institutions and international partners addresses issues of leadership development in a rapidly changing national security environment in “Challenges for National Security Organizations and Leadership Development: Trends and Shocks in Complex Adaptive Systems,” in *Fighting Chance: Global Trends and Shocks in the National Security Environment*, ed. Neyla Arnas (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press and Potomac Books, Inc., forthcoming).

⁴ A military action consisting of armed forces of one geopolitical entity entering territory controlled by another such entity, generally with the objective of intervention for the purpose of preventing or ameliorating an ill. The term was introduced in Walter E. Kretchik, Robert F. Baumann, and John T. Fishel, *Invasion, Intervention, “Intervasion”: A Concise History of the U.S. Army in Operation Uphold*

Democracy (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1998), available at <www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/Kretchik/kretchik.asp>.

⁵ The survey was compiled under contract with the Interagency Transformation, Education and Analysis (ITEA) program by ThoughtLink, Inc., a group of especially gifted analysts who interviewed over 90 representatives from nine government department and agencies, compiled the results, and delivered these findings to the ITEA Steering Group in March 2000.

⁶ National security, as used in this chapter, applies to those threats and challenges to the Nation that are international as well as domestic in nature. This definition is addressed in Executive Order 13434.

⁷ Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2006* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2006), 79.

⁸ Executive Order 13434 was a direct outcome of the work of the interagency steering group chaired by the National Defense University ITEA program for top-down guidance to implement educational aspects of the QDR Building Partnership Capacity directives to reform the manner in which education and training were provided to a greater percentage of the Federal civilian workforce.

⁹ Executive Order 13434, "National Security Professional Development," May 17, 2007, section 1.

¹⁰ NSPD-44, "Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization," available at <www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-44.html>.

¹¹ A summary of four Katrina after-action reports prepared by the White House, Senate, House of Representatives, and Government Accountability Office prepared by the Association of State and Territorial Health Officials is available at <www.astho.org/pubs/KatrinaReportsSummary.pdf>.

¹² George C. Marshall, address to graduating class, United States Military Academy, 1953.

¹³ The following list of competencies was presented by the Executive Committee of the National Security Education Consortium in August 2008. It draws extensively on Patricia Thomson, *State-Building Competencies: USIP Peacebuilding Toolkit* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, June 2008), available at <www.usip.org/files/resources/State%20Building%20Competencies.pdf>.

¹⁴ U.S. Senate, *Defense Organization: The Need for Change*, staff report to the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), 645.

¹⁵ Ibid.; *Report for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, by the Chairman's Special Study Group: The Organization and Functions of the JCS* (Arlington, VA: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1982); *President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management* (Washington, DC: The White House, 1986).

¹⁶ Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, chap. 38, sec. 661.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ *Report for the Chairman*, 1982.

²⁰ Goldwater-Nichols, chap. 38, sec. 402.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Goldwater-Nichols, chap. 38, sec. 667.

²³ Goldwater-Nichols, chap. 38, sec. 663.

²⁴ Ibid.

Providing Authorities and Resources

Gordon Adams, William I. Bacchus, and David Glaudemans

The experiences of American forces in Iraq and Afghanistan have prompted many to call for a large civilian force able to “surge” in place of or alongside the military in future postconflict stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) operations. A number of directives, bills, and initiatives have emerged since the interagency coordination failures that affected the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The current plan, developed under the State Department’s Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), calls for a 4,250-member civilian response corps able to deploy to S&R operations around the world. This study is based on the assumption that 4,250 personnel are not enough to have an impact on fragile and failing states. Rather, the larger force of 15,000 civilians discussed in chapter 2 would be required for the United States to mitigate current and potential crises in fragile and failing states.

The costs of a rapid civilian deployment capability of 15,000 are large, though not insupportable. Based on the assumption that one-third of this civilian force will be continuously deployed, this capability could cost at least \$2.1 billion annually by fiscal year (FY) 2013. This figure, which would vary with the type, duration, and location of the civilian deployments and the nature and requirements of contingencies, includes the cost to build, sustain, and deploy a civilian force of 5,000 for 1 year, drawing from a total civilian force of 15,000 by FY13.

Today, the Federal Government does not have the capability to support and deploy such a civilian force. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have taught difficult lessons to policymakers. The first of these is that the Department of Defense (DOD) has funding and flexibility to support stabilization and reconstruction operations, but lacks the training, experience, and personnel to execute these tasks over the long term. While the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) and Provincial

Reconstruction Teams have borne some fruit, they have also been fraught with problems, including lack of long-term strategy, inadequate oversight, and inability to provide funding that sustains some of the more development-like projects over the long run.¹ A new civilian structure would need clear mechanisms for raising foreign assistance funding for its recruitment, management, and operational deployments.

The second lesson of Iraq and Afghanistan is that the civilian capacity to plan, develop, deploy, and sustain such efforts is thin, at best. The S/CRS effort is the first attempt at building such a capacity. This initiative, however, has been inadequately supported by the White House, is too buried in the State Department bureaucracy to have sufficient authority, and has encountered internal and external resistance. Further, its proponents have found it difficult to raise the funds needed to implement their agenda. In general, it has been far harder to raise budgets for foreign policy than for defense. This has resulted in an interim funding solution, agreed to by DOD and State, that allows DOD to provide State with \$100 million a year for such efforts. This solution is unlikely to be sustainable in the long run; a more permanent mechanism must be found.²

While DOD has been amply funded, including supplemental funding as needed for deployments and nonmilitary operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have been relatively starved in budgetary terms.³ In particular, neither institution has the trust from Congress that would allow it to build such a capacity, let alone the contingency funding that would allow it to be flexibly deployed.

Creating a Civilian Response Capacity

White House Process and Structural Changes

Rebalancing the toolkit to enable a strong civilian capability for stabilization and reconstruction operations requires both a different approach at the White House level and further reform in the policy planning and budgetary operations of the foreign policy community. These reforms need to be undertaken broadly to develop the coherent policy framework, strategic and budgetary planning skills, and processes that lead to adequate funding for such a capability. The reforms need to begin with more focus on strategic and budgetary planning at the White House level. The Bush administration and previous administrations did not empower the White House institutions to think strategically or do long-term policy guidance or budgetary planning. As a consequence, the short term has taken prece-

dence, tactics have overwhelmed strategy, planning capabilities have been thin, and the response to each crisis has been ad hoc.

The key strategy document—the National Security Strategy—prepared by the National Security Council (NSC) is usually a lightly edited statement of generalities. In some administrations, this document has been nothing more than a compendium of the wish lists of every department and agency. Others have set clear priorities, but the White House spends little time or effort providing guidance that would put budgetary teeth in the strategy or overseeing its implementation in the budget process or departmental programs. With respect to complex operations, there has been no NSC or Office of Management and Budget (OMB) capacity to coordinate strategy or guidance for the long term. Instead, there has been a series of ad hoc approaches to each crisis, which never seem to lead to a systematic, institutionalized planning and budgeting process. This has been seen in the nature of the NSC function, which is not “operational” but rather “coordinative.”

It is time for the White House processes to catch up with the problems of the 21st century, including the rapid tempo of complex operations that are likely to take place. Without running the risks of becoming operational, the NSC should be empowered to engage in meaningful strategic planning. And the OMB needs to be empowered to marry its considerable talent at budgetary analysis to a long-term focus on programmatic guidance to agencies.

An effective National Security Strategy requires a more integrated process, with guidance and budgetary followup. The White House should coordinate a National Security Strategy Review every 4 years, focusing on the long term, producing a clear set of national security policy priorities. The NSC should lead this effort, with support from OMB. The first of these reviews should begin before the inauguration, after which a new NSC could become involved, leading to the release of a document that sets major priorities for national security policy within the first 4 months of the new administration taking office, including the priority to be given to developing complex operations capabilities. This overall policy review should be revised annually and repeated in full every 4 years.

By itself, the public strategy document that outlines broad policy priorities is inadequate to focus and guide Federal departments and agencies. Through its strategy review, the new administration should establish three or four key security policy priorities that will be implemented through a new set of documents. The most important of these would be National Security Planning Guidance, which provides tasking and budget

details with respect to these key priorities to all of the relevant national security departments and agencies. This guidance should include details for military and civilian organizations involved in complex operations. It should be given to departments and agencies on a classified basis every 2 years, starting in the new administration's first 6 months in office. The NSC and OMB should steer this effort—a new and much stronger role for these two key offices than they have had to date. The leadership of both is needed to ensure that the guidance is consistent with overall national security policy and that the policy priorities are adequately resourced in agency budgets. Developing that guidance should be supported by interagency working groups on each of the priority areas, such as nonproliferation, counterterrorism, support for fragile states, complex operations and post-conflict reconstruction, and development assistance.

The strategy and the national security planning guidance should be incorporated in a new budget submission from the administration to Congress. A national security budget document, covering all requests for diplomacy, foreign assistance, defense, intelligence, and homeland security, should be transmitted along with the overall Presidential budget request. This integrated document should focus specific attention on the policy areas identified as priorities for the guidance process, which could include complex operations. Greater detail should be provided on these priority areas, with a discussion of the cross-agency synergies that would lead to more effective action.

Neither NSC nor OMB has enough staff or the right skills to lead this process. At the very beginning, President Barack Obama should create strategic planning staffs within both the NSC and OMB, expanding staffs, and recruiting detailees from the key departments to enhance their long-term planning capabilities. This is particularly important for complex operations, given the likelihood of such operations being under way not only in Afghanistan and Iraq, but also potentially in other areas. Creating this capacity means overcoming the reservations every new administration has about enlarging the White House staff. The national security problems of this century make such a change critically necessary, especially if programmatic and budgetary guidance are to be effective.

The particular urgency of the fragile state/complex operations issue also means that it is important to create a new NSC directorate for this policy area. The weakness of the current process, which was put in place by National Security Presidential Directive 44, makes clear the need for a more forceful NSC/OMB role. Truly successful interagency coordination

and resource planning will only emerge in response to sustained, meaningful, detailed, and authoritative guidance from the White House.

Agency Process and Structural Changes

Adequate funding for a civilian response capacity will also depend on changes in the institutional arrangement and processes on the civilian side of the executive branch. The unbalanced toolkit is especially evident in this area. If the civilian tools are going to be provided with adequate funding, they need to have the responsibility for such operations. As well intended as the S/CRS effort is, the office's reach exceeds its grasp, leaving a credibility gap with Congress when it comes to funding such operations on the civilian side of the government. In reality, three different functions need to be established in the foreign policy institutions of the U.S. Government. These functions need to link State and USAID closely in the planning, maintenance, and deployment of a civilian capability.

The policy for civilian operations needs to be the responsibility of the State Department, working under NSC/OMB guidance. The capacity for such policy planning needs to be strengthened at State, with adequate personnel to carry out such an effort. That responsibility is probably best assumed by the current S/CRS office, either reporting to the Director of Foreign Assistance or as part of the Policy Planning Staff, working closely with the regional bureaus, a working relationship with which the department is already familiar.

The second responsibility is to organize, train, and support a civilian response capacity. This responsibility is not now an integral part of the skill set of the Foreign Service or the State Department. While it has not been a central aspect of USAID's mission, the agency has a well-developed capacity to work with private corporations, contractors, personal service contractors, and nongovernmental organizations, all of which are likely providers of the reserve capacity needed from the private sector. USAID also has extensive experience working with other Federal agencies involved in overseas operations, many of which use the agency's foreign assistance funds to support their programs.

USAID should be given the authority, capacity, and responsibility for organizing, establishing, training (working with the Foreign Service Institute), and administering the active, standby, and civilian reserve capacity needed to support complex operations. This will involve the following: streamlining USAID's contracting capability; establishing an office responsible for recruiting, training, and managing the reserve corps; negotiating agreements with other Federal agencies to have the

capacity to call up the standby force; providing the necessary budget funds; and developing a curriculum at the Foreign Service Institute for the necessary training. This task goes hand in hand with the urgent requirement to increase USAID staffing, responsibilities, and visibility overall in the executive branch process.⁴

Finally, there is the responsibility for deploying and operating the force. This is a responsibility shared with the White House and State, since policy decisions on deployment will have an important diplomatic input. But the actual capacity to respond quickly to contingencies is much closer to the current capabilities of USAID than it is to those of State. Today, the operations of the Offices of Military Affairs, Transition Initiatives, Conflict Management and Mitigation, and Foreign Disaster Assistance all provide prototypes of the kind of capability that can be built at USAID to execute such operations. The new administration should move quickly to develop this capability at USAID, building on its current capabilities.

Restructuring Authorities from DOD

A third critical change is needed to build the capacity at State/USAID. The ad hoc authorities that have been created at DOD need to be transferred to the civilian policy institutions. This means, specifically, changes in the Commander's Emergency Response Program currently funded and operated at DOD. This program was funded initially out of seized Iraqi assets, but has grown in size to an FY09 request for \$1.7 billion and has expanded to Afghanistan and, most recently, the Philippines. Moreover, DOD is seeking to make the CERP global in application and authorize the program in its permanent statute, Title 10 of the U.S. Code.

While CERP has made many valuable contributions to the U.S. military effort in Iraq and Afghanistan, it represents a clear expansion into the arena of foreign assistance provision by the military. This expansion has three negative consequences. First, support for reconstruction and development is manifestly not a military skill. The military does not do it especially well, and fulfilling that mission adds to the stress on the Nation's military forces. Second, the continual expansion of military capacity and funding for this mission reinforces the view that the civilian institutions are incapable of executing or funding it—a self-fulfilling prophecy that foreshadows even further expansion of DOD's responsibilities. Finally, asking DOD and the Services to execute this responsibility has put an increasingly uniformed face on U.S. global engagement, with negative consequences for the U.S. image in the world.

There is ample evidence that many in the military would like to see civilian institutions strengthened to take a stronger role in the complex operations and fragile state policy arena. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review made an explicit call for stronger civilian capabilities; Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has urged an expansion on the civilian side;⁵ and the 2008 National Defense Strategy devotes an entire page to the importance of engaging civilians more effectively.⁶

The Obama administration needs to move quickly to correct this imbalance. Military commanders will clearly need authority and funding to carry out stabilization and some limited reconstruction activities in areas where U.S. forces are in combat and conditions are too insecure to allow civilian agency personnel to operate. That authority should be clear, funded, and carefully defined in a way that does not leave the military saddled with responsibilities for long-term development and the requirement to provide sustaining funds for development-type projects. In turn, State and USAID need to be empowered to carry out such projects in all areas outside combat zones, closely connecting them to the longer term goals of economic development and strengthening governance. The CERP language needs to be rewritten to fit with this transfer of responsibility, with the civilian response capacity responsible for execution.

Raising Funds for the Civilian Response Capacity

The fiscal environment for funding defense and international affairs is likely to be difficult for the next several years, given the financial crisis and recession that began in 2008. This reality will make it difficult to find the resources to create and sustain a civilian reserve corps and response capability. The costs on the civilian side are, however, relatively modest in the context of overall Federal spending. While it may be necessary to develop this capacity at a modest pace, given the overall fiscal constraints, it is important to set the process in motion quickly. Failed and fragile states will continue to be a reality of the international environment, perhaps even more so as a result of the global economic slowdown. And the United States will continue to be called upon to support efforts to strengthen such states, making the need for some capacity urgent.

The new administration needs to act quickly to develop the White House capability, reform both State and USAID with new processes and structures, and issue a new national security policy directive that moves in the proposed direction. It needs to begin right away to build the capacity at State and USAID necessary to make policy, administer, and deploy the capability. As part of these early steps, the White House needs to draft language,

in consultation with Congress, that will provide adequate staffing, authority, and funding for such a capability.

The underlying question, then, is how to raise foreign policy funding for such complex operations that will permit building, maintaining, equipping, and, ultimately, deploying such a capability. Several ingredients are needed: a permanent funding account in the foreign policy world to develop, administer, and maintain the capacity for a civilian corps, and a contingency type of funding capability that will allow it to be deployed, as needed. The costs to create and manage a standing capability and an on-call reserve should be built into the base State Department/USAID budgets and requested of Congress.

As for the costs of deployment, there are several possible budgetary options. One would be to estimate the likely expenditures for a deployment, based on the cost estimates in this chapter, seek an appropriation of that amount into a State Department or USAID contingency account, and require congressional notification, should an administration decide to draw on that account. The advantage of this approach would be that relatively full funding for a deployment would be immediately available, without the need for further appropriations. The disadvantage is that Congress resists appropriating contingency funding, especially when the sum is relatively large, as it would be in this case.

The second option would be to establish a contingency account, but seek no appropriations until a contingency arose that required a deployment. At that time, the administration could, as it has in the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan, seek an emergency supplemental appropriation to cover the projected costs. This solution might appeal to Congress, as it would require no appropriations until a contingency arose. However, in the absence of easily reprogrammable foreign assistance funding, it could seriously delay deployment of the civilian capability, pending approval of a supplemental.

The third option would be a combination of the two. A contingency account could be created at State or USAID to which an initial appropriation could be made, sufficient to support the opening months of a deployment of the civilian force. The administration could then request emergency supplemental funding to cover the projected full costs of the deployment. The precedent for a smaller contingency account would be the Emergency Migration and Refugee Assistance account at the State Department or the International Disaster and Famine Assistance account at USAID, both of which are contingency funds with relatively small appropriations that are

frequently “topped off” with additional funds for major crises, such as the Indian Ocean tsunami.

Funding in the International Affairs (Function 150) appropriation account to support recruitment and management of a force, as well as contingency funding, will depend on involving Congress early in the discussions, especially the key Foreign Relations, Armed Services, and Appropriations committees. A proposed force and funding mechanisms drafted without the involvement of Congress will almost certainly be greeted with skepticism on Capitol Hill. The executive needs to ask for the funding it truly requires for the mission, but it can only expect a positive response if it engages Congress from the beginning in defining the capacity, the terms of that flexibility, and the accountability it expects to provide to Congress in return for the funding.

Budgeting for a Civilian Response Capacity

This budget builds the size of the civilian deployable cadre to 15,000 members over 4 years. This is based on the recommendations and assumptions developed throughout this book that the United States needs to be able to deploy 5,000 civilians continuously to three types of operations—large, medium, and small. This 1:2 deployment-to-reserve ratio (one-third of the force deployed, while one-third is preparing to deploy and one third is reconstituting post-deployment) is common throughout the military and is necessary to accommodate personnel in training and transition.

This civilian capacity is divided into three tiers of readiness: active, standby, and reserve. The active component consists of 1,000 civilian experts ready to deploy immediately, the standby corps consists of 4,000 civilians drawn from Federal Government agencies and available to deploy within several weeks, and the reserve corps consists of 10,000 civilians drawn from state and local government and the private sector. The reserve corps is available to deploy within 6 to 8 weeks.

For the purposes of this book, current and pending legislation regarding a civilian reserve is ignored, and the budget developed here is independent of any existing or potential future capability.

The budget to create, sustain, and manage a 15,000-member civilian force includes five categories: salaries, training, recruitment, deployment, and S/CRS nonsalary management. The cost and staffing summaries are displayed in tables 10–1 and 10–2, and the methodology in calculating these costs is detailed in the succeeding paragraphs.

Table 10–1. **Total Cost Summary to Build Civilian Response Capacity**
(\$ in millions)

	2010	2011	2012	2013
Salaries	25.6	80.2	123.9	159.3
Training	82.6	141.1	223.4	286.7
Recruitment	18.1	24.4	35.4	37.9
Deployment	362.2	648	1,167	1,664
Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization Non-salary Management	16.2	16.7	17.2	17.7
Total	504.7	910.4	1,567	2,166

Table 10–2. **Staffing Summary to Build Civilian Response Capacity**

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Active		50	300	600	800	1,000
Standby			500	1,250	2,500	4,000
Reserve			2,000	4,000	7,000	10,000
Reserve Office			25	50	50	50
Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)	19	19	56	76	76	76
Total (Less Civilian Response Capacity Office and S/CRS)	19	69	2,800	5,850	10,300	15,000

Salaries

The active corps of civilians are full-time U.S. direct hires ready to deploy immediately; therefore, their salaries are captured in the salary component of the budget. The salary costs of the standby corps and reserve corps are budgeted in the deployment budget. In addition to the active corps, the salary component of the budget captures the salaries of the S/CRS staff and the reserve office staff (see table 10–3).

Active corps. Compensation for the active corps includes three elements: salary, benefits, and a one-time support cost of \$12,000 per person. This budget assumes an average annual FY10 salary of \$105,382 and inflates this salary at 3.5 percent annually. The official Federal Government full fringe benefits cost factor is 32.85 percent (24 percent for retirement benefits, 5.7 percent for insurance and health benefits, 1.45 percent for Medicare, and 1.7 percent for miscellaneous benefits), which brings the FY10 benefits

Table 10–3. Salary Summary (\$ in millions)

Component	2010	2011	2012	2013
Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization	2.8	9.6	11.4	11.8
Active	22.8	65.2	105	139.7
Reserve Office	1.9	5.4	7.5	7.8
Total	25.6	80.2	123.7	159.3

cost to \$34,618. Including \$12,000 for support, the full costs for the active corps in FY10 total \$152,000 per person with 375 new active corps hires.

S/CRS and reserve office. Staffs for S/CRS and the reserve office are direct hires and for the purposes of this study receive the same average salary and benefits as the active corps. Again, support costs total \$12,000 per person. Total costs for S/CRS and reserve office personnel are \$152,000 per person with 62 new hires in FY10.

Salaries for the reserve corps are only paid during deployments and, therefore, are discussed below.

Training

The training component of the budget consists of seven functions: reserve salaries and travel during training; active and standby development; training facilities; support staff; support for training support staff; reserve training for surge; and predeployment specialized training. These functions capture initial training, retraining, and refresher courses, and specific predeployment training intended to quickly prepare the civilian contingents for specific operations or crises (see table 10–4).

Table 10–4. Training Summary (\$ in millions)

Component	2010	2011	2012	2013
Reserve salaries/travel during training	27.8	28.8	44.7	46.2
Active and standby (A&S) development	31.3	45.4	64.9	78.7
A&S training facilities	6.7	9.6	13.7	16.6
A&S training support staff	6.9	10	14.3	17.4
Support for training support staff	2	-	-	-
Reserve training for external surge	5.3	29.6	53.5	79.1
Predeployment and specialized training	2.5	18	32.2	48.6
Total	82.6	141.1	223.4	286.7

Salaries and travel during training. Training and salary costs are \$13,899 per person in FY10 and are inflated at 3.5 percent annually. Members of the reserve corps require initial training after recruitment and acceptance, as well as periodic refresher training. Members of the active and standby components are already on salary as Federal employees but may require travel and per diem, depending on the location of their assigned training.

Active and standby development. Development costs for the active and standby corps are \$41,780 per person in FY10 and are inflated at 3.5 percent annually. This category includes comprehensive costs for development of course curricula and materials in entry and refresher training for the active and standby corps, and for delivery of that training. Because most of this preparation can be used for reserve entry and refresher training as well, no costs for that purpose are included.

Training facilities. Training facilities cost \$8,910 per person in FY10 and are inflated 3 percent annually. This category recognizes the inability of the Foreign Service Institute and other Federal Government training facilities to accommodate the large space requirements for the training required, and covers leases of needed space for this purpose.

Support staff. The cost for support staff in FY10 is \$9,210 per civilian trained. This cost is inflated 3.5 percent annually. This category is essentially the cost for training instructors to perform training that is provided for in other categories.

Support for training support staff. This is a one-time cost of \$2 million to support 86 trainers. This category provides equipment and supplies and other support items for use by the trainers described above.

Reserve training for surge. Reserve training for surge is \$8,770 per civilian in FY10. This cost is inflated 3.5 percent annually. This category covers general training prior to deployment for the reserve, and is in addition to the entry and refresher training described earlier.

Predeployment specialized training. Predeployment training costs \$2,700 per person in FY10 and is inflated 3.5 percent annually. This training is for all three groups (active, standby, and reserve), and provides specialized instruction keyed to a specific deployment.

Recruitment

The cost to recruit, screen, enroll, and provide clearances to this civilian force is captured in the recruitment budget. Using industry recruiting metrics and previous work done by consultants,⁷ this budget calculated the

costs of the three main components of the recruitment budget: recruiters, assessment and enrolling, and clearances (see table 10–5).

Recruiters. This budget assumed that the recruiter-to-recruit ratio required to successfully capture enough civilians would begin at 1:45 and improve to 1:65 by FY13. The cost for each recruiter is assumed to be \$100,000.⁸

Assessment and enrolling. Assuming that recruits will pay for the cost of the test, this budget covers the travel costs associated with bringing in three recruits for every position available. This budget assumes \$830 per person in travel and lodging costs inflated at 3 percent annually.⁹

Clearances. The clearance costs associated with the civilian force apply to the entire deployable force and are assumed to be \$3,200 per person in FY10 based on data supplied by S/CRS Resource Management staff. This cost is inflated 3 percent annually.

Table 10–5. Recruitment Summary (\$ in millions)

Component	2010	2011	2012	2013
Recruiters	5	6	7.9	7.9
Assessment center	5.9	8.3	12.5	13.6
Clearances	7.2	10.1	15.1	16.4
Total	18.1	24.4	35	37.9

Deployment

The deployment costs for a large civilian capacity are substantial. Using the component staffing levels posited earlier (1,000 active, 4,000 standby, 10,000 civilian reserve), in order to reach the desired deployment level of 5,000, this chapter assumes that by FY13, 80 percent of the active force (800), 30 percent of the standby force (1,200) and 30 percent of the civilian reserve (3,000) would need to be deployed. This may be unrealistic, especially for the latter two groups. For example, S/CRS assumes that it would be possible to deploy 80 percent of the active force, because they will be hired with a primary responsibility to deploy. But they assume that only 10 percent of both the standby and civilian reserve members could be deployed under existing conditions. If this is correct, then the overall size of the three cadres would need to be increased above 15,000 and the deployment ratios would have to be changed so that 80 percent of the higher active base would allow lesser deployment percentages of the other two. Because

full staffing is posited to take 4 years (FY10 through FY13), it will be necessary to monitor carefully whether the higher deployment percentages are viable and adjust the levels of the three categories if necessary (see tables 10–6 and 10–7).

Table 10–6. Deployment Staffing Model

Model I	2010	2011	2012	2013
Active reserve capacity (80 percent)	240	480	640	800
Standby reserve capacity (20–30 percent)	100	275	700	1,200
Civilian reserve corps (30 percent)	600	1,200	2,100	3,000
Total	940	1,955	3,440	5,000

Table 10–7. Deployable Civilian Force Staffing

	2010	2011	2012	2013
Active	300	600	800	1,000
Standby	500	1,250	2,500	4,000
Reserve	2,000	4,000	7,000	10,000
Total	2,800	5,850	10,300	15,000

There are six components of the deployment costs: reimbursement to standby agencies supplying personnel; reserve salaries when deployed; equipment; security; logistics and benefits; and experts (see table 10–8).

Table 10–8. Deployment Summary (\$ in millions)

Component	2010	2011	2012	2013
Standby reimbursement	14	39.8	105	186.3
Reserve salaries	61.7	124.6	247.4	365.8
Equipment	164	227	366.1	464.4
Security	64.6	138.5	251	375.8
Logistics/benefits	22.2	47.6	86.3	129.1
Experts	35.6	70.3	110.9	142.7
Total	362.2	648	1,167	1,664

Reimbursement to agencies. This cost assumes the same average FY10 base salary (\$105,382) and benefits (32.85 percent) for the standby personnel as the active, S/CRS, and reserve office captured in the salaries component of the budget. No support costs are associated with this reimbursement. It is assumed that S/CRS will pay 100 percent of the deployed standby corps members' salary and benefits to the supplying agencies, who will continue to pay their own personnel during deployment.

Reserve salaries. This covers the reserve corps compensation when deployed. In calculating these costs, the budget follows the consultants' analysis that determined the ratio of reservists hired at different grades on the OPM General Schedule. This budget employed those ratios and applied expected FY10 salary information to the deployment figures assumed in this book. Reservists will not receive full benefits when deployed as they would retain insurance and health benefits from their permanent employer, and so a smaller figure (27.15 percent) was used to calculate the benefits cost. Salary costs were inflated at 3.5 percent annually.

Equipment. This cost is substantial and covers the equipment required for the active, standby, and reserve corps when deployed. The budget used data developed by S/CRS to calculate the equipment cost per deployed civilian (\$178,318) and inflated this cost by 3 percent annually. This cost includes vehicles, survival kits, and communications. It also captures the storage and maintenance costs for equipment for both the basic components and the deployed force. Finally, this analysis assumes 30 percent of all equipment will need to be replaced every year.

Security. The deployed force will require a separate security detail to ensure the safety of the civilian force. Based on information from the S/CRS budget analysis, the cost per deployed civilian for security is \$68,788 in FY10. This cost is inflated at 3 percent annually and applied to the total deployed force across all three tiers of readiness.

Logistics and benefits. This category includes benefits such as danger pay, post differential, cost-of-living adjustments, additional personal equipment (bulletproof vests, sleeping bags, and so forth), and special communications, like satellite links and any communications not part of the standard package needed for a specific deployment. Using S/CRS data, the cost per deployed civilian is \$23,636, inflated 3 percent annually.

Experts. The civilian capacity will initially, and perhaps permanently, require a supplement of experts who can be contracted to suit specific needs. Drawing from the S/CRS budget analysis, the cost per deployed

civilian is \$37,879, inflated 3 percent annually. This budget, however, assumes a 25 percent decline in the civilian force’s reliance on expert contractors over the FY10–FY13 period.

S/CRS Nonsalary Management

The S/CRS nonsalary management component of the budget includes the development and maintenance of databases, development and conduct of workshops and conferences, headquarters communications, and travel to events not covered in the deployment category. These functions are broken down into two elements: operational activities and infrastructure costs (see table 10–9). These costs are fixed and are irrespective of the size of the civilian force.

Table 10–9. **Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization Non-salary Management Summary**
(\$ in millions)

Component	2010	2011	2012	2013
Operational activities	15.7	16.2	16.7	17.2
Infrastructure	0.52	0.53	0.55	0.56
Total	16.2	16.7	17.2	17.7

Conclusion and Findings

For the civilian response capacity to be adequately funded and effective, the new administration needs to have the courage of its convictions. Strategic planning and guidance at the White House level are needed to send a clear message about priorities and interagency tasking. Civilian institutional reforms will be needed to ensure that the right responsibilities are in the right agencies and that they are properly funded and empowered to take on the task. A clear signal needs to be sent that the administration will no longer ask DOD and the military to perform civilian functions. And Congress needs to be brought into the discussion early for agreement to be possible. Only with these steps can this considerable fiscal requirement and the flexibility to operate the force be acquired.

Because this is uncharted territory, it will be necessary to monitor initial deployments carefully, to ensure that deployments of up to 5,000 can be sustained with the suggested staffing level of 15,000. The cost to create, support, administer, and deploy a 15,000-member civilian force is

large but manageable, and some relevant funding is already included in State Department requests for 2009 and 2010. Total cost by FY13 is estimated to be \$2 billion. This includes salaries (\$160 million), training (\$287 million), recruitment (\$38 million), deployment (\$1.7 billion), and non-salary management costs (\$17.7 million).

Define department and agency roles and responsibilities.

There needs to be a coordinated NSC/OMB capability for strategic planning, operational oversight, and interagency policy and budgetary coordination.¹⁰ State should be responsible for planning, setting policy, and determining the overall approach for countries and regions where the civilian response capacity is to be used, but it should not have operational responsibility for recruiting, training, or deploying the response capacity. This responsibility should be with USAID, building on existing capabilities for quick response.

Create a CERP-like program for State/USAID.

Such a program would enable quick response funding for stabilization and reconstruction programs.

Build a civilian force capability into the base budget.

Funding for the recruitment, training, and management of the civilian active, standby, and reserve capability needs to be built into the base budgets at State and USAID.

Fund deployment costs through contingency fund and supplementals.

A contingency fund could be either fully funded for projected operations, or partially funded to permit rapid and early deployment. Emergency supplemental requests could then be used to acquire funding for longer term operations.

Bring Congress in early.

For Congress to have confidence in State and USAID capabilities to develop and deploy the civilian response capacity force and to provide the needed funding, it must be brought into the development of this force early on, as a full partner.

Develop and present an integrated national security budget presentation document.

The new administration should prepare and present to Congress an integrated national security budget presentation document that incorporates diplomacy, foreign assistance, public diplomacy, defense, and intelligence.

Notes

¹ See Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “July 30, 2008 Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to Congress,” and U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, “Agency Stovepipes vs. Strategic Agility: Lessons We Need to Learn from Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan,” April 2008.

² See Gordon Adams and Cindy Williams, *Strengthening Statecraft and Security: Reforming U.S. Planning and Resource Allocation*, MIT Security Studies Program Occasional Paper, June 2008, 81–106.

³ See the American Academy of Diplomacy and the Henry L. Stimson Center, “A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future: Fixing the Crisis in Diplomatic Readiness,” October 2008, available at <www.academyofdiplomacy.org/publications/FAB_report_2008.pdf>.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Department of Defense, *2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2006). “Our diplomatic leaders—be they in ambassadors’ suites or on the State Department’s seventh floor—must have the resources and political support needed to fully exercise their statutory responsibilities in leading American foreign policy.” Robert Gates, remarks before the U.S. Global Leadership Campaign, July 15, 2008, available at <www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1262>.

⁶ Department of Defense, *National Defense Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, June 2008), 17. The document includes the statement: “The United States must improve its ability to deploy civilian expertise rapidly, and continue to increase effectiveness by joining with organizations and people outside of government—untapped resources with enormous potential.”

⁷ Bearing Point, “Management Study for Establishing and Managing Civilian Reserve: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization,” May 30, 2006, 7–5.

⁸ Ibid., 7–4.

⁹ Ibid., 7–5.

¹⁰ Operational oversight is not the same as the execution of operations from the National Security Council that have caused problems in the past. Complex operations would be controlled by the Interagency Coordinator addressed in chapter 2.

Connecting Government Capabilities for Overseas Missions

Neyla Arnas

While interagency cooperation is important at the strategic and operational levels, it is at the tactical level that it becomes essential to the success of an operation. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee recognized these findings in a December 2006 report: “It is in the embassies rather than in Washington where interagency differences on strategies, tactics and division of labor are increasingly adjudicated.”¹ As this chapter will illuminate, most efforts at interagency collaboration on the ground have taken place within the confines of a military structure.

This chapter examines civil-military integration in the field under a range of circumstances. The first section looks at daily, ongoing, interagency cooperation at Embassies and geographic commands. Within geographic commands, closer examination is given to Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs), advisory groups with varying degrees of interagency representation on combatant command (COCOM) staffs. U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) and U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) have taken the JIACG concept further by organizing their commands in a new way that integrates the interagency into regional command activities.

The second section discusses interagency cooperation in complex operations using three vastly different examples: Vietnam’s Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program; Afghanistan and Iraq’s Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs); and the 2004 tsunami humanitarian relief operations. The third section assesses the nature of civil-military leadership during various complex contingencies. The fourth section presents options for improving civil-military integration. The conclusion offers suggestions for strengthening civil-military

integration in the field and presents findings that, if implemented, would create a far greater on-the-ground civilian presence than currently exists—a civilian presence that is independent of COCOM structures.

Interagency Cooperation on a Daily Basis

Embassies and Country Teams

The Embassy and country team is the oldest example of integration. “All embassies are interagency platforms,”² with the country team being “the critical intersection where plans, policies, programs, and personalities all come together.”³ As the scope and scale of representation from other Federal components grow steadily at Embassies all over the world, so too does the importance of integrated efforts. Since 9/11, Embassies have hosted an influx of personnel involved in counterterrorism activities. Concomitantly, the number of Department of Defense (DOD) personnel and noncombat activities has increased significantly.⁴ In some large Embassies, Department of State representation relative to other Federal agencies can be less than one-third of full-time U.S. personnel. While most of the increases have come from the Departments of Defense, Justice, and Homeland Security, 27 U.S. departments and agencies are represented at overseas Embassies.⁵

Country teams, in which Federal representatives at the country level meet under the leadership of the Ambassador, have limited capabilities and generally do not address issues at the regional level. Also, no amount of asserting the Ambassador’s authority, whether by Presidential decree or memorandum of understanding, has been able to overcome conflicting agency agendas, resources, and authorities. The Ambassador has little influence over the non-foreign affairs agencies represented at an Embassy, which take their direction from their headquarters in Washington—and sometimes that direction conflicts with the Ambassador’s vision. In a recent study advocating the creation of “frontline country teams,” the authors stress that the success of the country team depends on enhancing the Ambassador’s authority.⁶

Nonetheless, the country team can serve as a clearinghouse for information-sharing and program deconfliction, as can the geographic commands, where interagency presence is expanding.

Joint Interagency Coordination Groups and Regional Commands

All regional commands have a JIACG or JIACG-like capability embedded in their staff structures.⁷ What initially started as an urgent post-9/11 need for interagency coordination on counterterrorism issues has since

evolved into varying capabilities, depending on the needs of the command, including full-spectrum interagency coordination.

JIACGs are advisory staff elements with varying degrees of interagency representation on COCOM staff designed to meet the specific needs and organizational structures of the command. It should be noted that these JIACGs do not have operational authority. Ambassadors and country teams have no direct relationships with JIACGs.⁸ Briefly:

- U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) has renamed its JIACG, calling it the Commander's Interagency Engagement Group, a special staff element under the chief of staff.
- U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) has reorganized its JIACG into an Interagency Task Force for Irregular Warfare, a combined operations, intelligence, and interagency organization.⁹
- U.S. Pacific Command's (USPACOM's) JIACG is a division under J5 and J3.
- U.S. Northern Command has an interagency directorate, the largest interagency component of the COCOMs with the participation of over 60 U.S. departments and agencies.¹⁰
- U.S. Transportation Command's JIACG is a special staff element under the chief of staff.
- USAFRICOM has created a Deputy for Civil-Military Affairs and has been stood up with the intention to be a fully integrated civil-military staff.
- USSOUTHCOM has transformed its JIACG into a J9 interagency "partnering directorate" with a civilian deputy.

The creation of USAFRICOM and expansion of USSOUTHCOM's interagency composition (both of which are discussed in more detail below) represent a growing recognition that many U.S. national security priorities are transnational in nature and are best addressed within a regional, multiagency approach. A 3D security framework recognizes diplomacy, development, and defense as equal pillars in the implementation of national security policy.¹¹ Phase zero operations, which focus on preventing conflict and addressing the root causes of insecurity, require a concerted, whole-of-government, 3D approach. Existing national security structures do not accommodate a broad regional approach. The 2008 National Defense Strategy states, "A whole-of-government approach is only possible when every government department and agency understands the

core competencies, roles, mission, and capabilities of its partners and works together to achieve common goals,” and points to USAFRICOM and USSOUTHCOM as moves in the right direction.¹²

The reach of country teams in Embassies is limited to individual nations. While COCOM areas of responsibility encompass entire regions, those organizations are military and, until recently, did not have inter-agency components. Attempts to increasingly involve interagency components at COCOMs represent a regionalization of the country team concept. However, no amount of interagency cooperation at the COCOM level can overcome the following facts:

- JIACGs and JIACG-like elements lack operational capability.
- There is no civilian-led regional structure (as a COCOM counterpart) to focus on conflict prevention.
- During crises, the organization with the money has the de facto lead.
- Stovepiping and competing interests of various agencies translate into the pursuit of narrow objectives with their own monies.
- There do not exist in the U.S. Government people who are concerned with the government as a whole and can make choices that are not turf-related.
- The commander (or, for that matter, the Ambassador) lacks real authority over other agencies represented at the command (or Embassy).
- The civilian agency has limited capacity to support the broad array of COCOM activities. The civilian agencies do not have the people to spare except at the expense of their organizations’ missions.
- Incompatible networks and collaboration software (including security protocols, policy, and culture) pose challenges to sharing information and knowledge.
- There are impediments to coherent regional policy development and implementation caused by inconsistent geographic boundaries among U.S. Government agencies.

There seems to be general agreement that an integrated whole-of-government approach is needed to effectively implement U.S. policies and plans during complex operations. Agreement is lacking over the best way to organize government assets in both peace and conflict.

USAFRICOM

The command, formally established October 1, 2008, came about in response to the evolving geostrategic environment in Africa and a defense strategy that focuses on conflict prevention, or phase zero operations.¹³ Combining a geographic area that formerly was divided among three geographic commands (USEUCOM, USCENTCOM, and USPACOM), USAFRICOM has the advantage of starting with a clean slate and has established a command structure that fully integrates civilian and military staffs. Sometimes referred to as a “combatant command plus,”¹⁴ USAFRICOM has dispensed with the J-codes common to other unified commands, organizing itself instead across six categories that are focused more broadly and that integrate interagency leadership and representation:¹⁵

- Outreach: responsible for interagency partners and the international community; directed by a Department of State civilian
- Intelligence and Knowledge Development: capacity-building to avert crises that may lead to conflict; headed by a senior intelligence civilian
- Strategy, Plans, and Programs: more expansive than a typical J5; the director of programs will be a U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) civilian, and the Department of Treasury will provide a Senior Executive Service–level civilian
- Operations and Logistics: functions combined to ensure a coherent effort; the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (in USAID) and Department of Homeland Security are both represented in this branch
- Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems
- Resources: not only the typical financial aspects, but also the manpower pieces; deputy director is from the Department of Commerce.

Senior positions from USAID and the Departments of State, Treasury, Homeland Security, and Commerce have been approved. Representation from the Department of Agriculture and Department of Energy is pending. Less senior positions will be determined by the civilian agencies.¹⁶

The primary focus of the command remains military-to-military relations with African partners. The command treats the region as a whole rather than applying the single country framework of Embassies. USAFRICOM will also support U.S. Government agencies and international organizations that have activities in the region, working on a “sustained basis to build capacity, support the humanitarian assistance efforts of USAID and

others, working with our African partners to get ahead of the problem set to head off impending crises if necessary, or to respond as necessary.”¹⁷

DOD has not escaped the controversy. Some, including Africans, other U.S. agencies, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), assert that the creation of USAFRICOM is an example of the militarization of U.S. foreign aid.¹⁸ Vice Admiral Robert T. Moeller, Deputy for Military Operations at USAFRICOM, has addressed this criticism, reiterating that DOD would be playing a supporting role to the activities of other U.S. agencies and international organizations and focusing on security sector reform that builds local capacity.¹⁹ In spite of the criticism, it is also widely acknowledged that USAFRICOM represents a positive development for U.S. Africa policy, drawing additional resources and attention to the region.²⁰

To underscore the importance of working with interagency partners, from the outset, USAFRICOM created a new organizational structure, establishing two deputies to the commander: a military deputy (Deputy to the Commander for Military Operations) and a new civilian deputy (Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Activities). A foreign policy advisor still reports separately to the commander. Another new command element calls for a senior development advisor, a position specifically envisioned for a senior officer from USAID who will report directly to the new civilian deputy. When fully staffed, the command will have approximately equal numbers of uniformed personnel and civilians, with a large component of the civilians being from DOD.

Another feature that will set USAFRICOM apart from other commands is that it will not have assigned or allocated forces, relying instead on the global force management process. The decision was made to stand up USAFRICOM under the new National Security Personnel System, which forced the command to think in concrete terms about the kinds of skills its personnel needed. Having to familiarize themselves with the civilian personnel system, including training, professional development, and recruitment, has been challenging for the military component of the command but has served to unify military and civilians. Most notably, all employees from other U.S. Government agencies will be dual-hatted as DOD employees, allowing them the same benefits enjoyed by DOD personnel.²¹ The ongoing issue of the limited capacity of other U.S. Government agencies to divert their personnel to these missions remains a significant problem.²²

Although USAFRICOM will be headquartered at Kelley Barracks in Stuttgart, Germany, consideration is being given to options for representation on the African continent, including the expansion of military repre-

sensation in Embassies. The initial reaction to locating the command on the continent has been negative. Both domestic and international criticism has centered on the perception that moving the command to Africa is part of a larger goal to establish a U.S. military foothold on the continent, despite DOD assurances that the intent is to establish a staff headquarters and not a military one. African countries' concerns range from having a foreign military presence within their borders to an American presence emboldening domestic terrorist groups.²³

Finally, USAFRICOM is set to build upon the experiences of the only forward U.S. military presence in the region, Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF–HOA), located in Djibouti. CJTF–HOA was established in October 2002 to detect, deter, and defeat transnational terrorist groups in the region. Its approximately 1,500 civilian and military personnel, however, work on a range of activities from counterterrorism to humanitarian assistance. CJTF–HOA has supported 11 humanitarian missions, such as airlifting supplies to Ethiopia and Kenya, and many civil-military operations that involve digging wells and building and repairing schools, hospitals, and roads. CJTF–HOA is an example of an ongoing regional phase zero operation.²⁴

USSOUTHCOM

USSOUTHCOM is responsible for U.S. military efforts in Central and South America. Like USAFRICOM, its focus is on operations that are not combat-related, including counternarcotics and Plan Colombia. Unlike USAFRICOM, USSOUTHCOM is a mature command that is undergoing a transformation toward a joint and interagency operation,²⁵ although it has a long history of working within the interagency community.²⁶ Like USAFRICOM, it has abandoned J-coding in favor of staff structures that integrate individuals from other U.S. departments and agencies into the command, and it is in the process of reorganizing to accommodate dual deputies to the commander, adding a civilian deputy from the Department of State. Civilians will head the Stability Directorate, the Partnering Directorate (formerly the JIACG), and the Resources and Assessment and Enterprise Support sections; the Security and Intelligence Directorate and the Policy and Strategy Directorate will be led by military officers. Where civilians lead a directorate, the deputy will be a military officer and vice versa.²⁷ Once the reconfiguration is fully implemented, no military staff growth is foreseen; civilian staff growth will depend on agency decisions.

Approximately 35 interagency personnel are currently embedded in USSOUTHCOM staff, including those from USAID, the Departments of

State, Justice, Treasury, and Homeland Security, and the Intelligence Community.²⁸ Interagency interaction takes the form of coordination group meetings, which are convened to address regional topics of shared interest to the interagency community (such as hostage situations, support and operation of migrant camps, and hurricane relief operations, to name a few).²⁹

Within USSOUTHCOM, Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-South) is an example of an interagency, joint, international task force working to address a specific, regional issue, drug interdiction.³⁰ Coordinating the operations of eight U.S. agencies, the four U.S. military services and representatives from 11 foreign countries, JIATF-South, based in Key West, Florida, may be a model of integration. The fight against illegal cocaine in Latin America requires coordinated interagency efforts to interdict the flow of drugs across many boundaries and terrains (land, sea, air) in the region. Coca plants are grown and cocaine is produced in Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru, known as the “source zone.” The “transit zone” includes every country between the source zone and the United States.

Interagency Cooperation in Complex Operations

Three models of interagency cooperation are discussed in this section. The CORDS program in Vietnam is the most complex and intense example of civil-military cooperation in the field to date. The PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq attempted to emulate the CORDS program in some respects, but comparisons show that the two actually have little in common. Finally, a discussion of the 2004 tsunami relief operation highlights civil-military coordination during a humanitarian response to a regional problem.

Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support Program

The challenges to civil-military coordination are not new. The CORDS program in Vietnam was an innovative effort to integrate interagency programs and conduct nation-building in a theater of war. There has been no structured solution for civil-military integration during conflict at the country level since that time.³¹ CORDS was preceded by the unsuccessful Strategic Hamlets Program, designed to deploy USAID, the United States Information Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, and military advisors into the provinces of South Vietnam. These agencies worked at cross-purposes, despite President John F. Kennedy’s intervention.³² CORDS, on the other hand, brought together over 2,500 military and civilian U.S. advisors, unified under a civilian deputy to the commander of the military assistance command, and is cited as a model for today’s interagency challenges.

However, using CORDS as a model misses several fundamental points. The implementation of CORDS, after other failed attempts at asserting civilian control over the Vietnamese pacification mission, represented a massive change to the U.S. organizational and operational approach to the Vietnam War. A change of this magnitude was possible because of President Lyndon Johnson's full support. The comprehensive nature and massive scale of the effort were products of the circumstances and constraints of the time: it came late in the day, after costly U.S. military intervention, with time constraints uppermost in U.S. policymakers' minds.³³ CORDS was a last-ditch effort to turn the tide by building a counterinsurgency organization that worked alongside local security forces. Particularly important to CORDS success was the fact that the South Vietnamese provided a significant security component, an element that has not been matched in either Afghanistan or Iraq.³⁴ The Vietnamese-to-U.S. advisor ratio, even at the peak of American involvement, was over 100:1.³⁵

The architect of the organization, Ambassador Robert Komer, described CORDS as:

a unique experiment in a unified civil/military field advisory and support organization . . . [where] soldiers served directly under civilians, and vice versa, at all levels. They even wrote each other's efficiency reports . . . and CORDS was fully integrated into the theater military structure. The Deputy for CORDS . . . [was] perhaps the first American of ambassadorial rank to serve directly in the military chain of command as an operational deputy, not just a political advisor. The cutting edge was unified civil-military advisory teams in all 250 districts and 44 provinces.³⁶

Even so, during a lessons learned conference after the war, Ambassador Komer observed that "the military operated, and, I might add, also the civilians, on the basis of their own internal goals, rather than in terms of any concept of overall national, as opposed to parochial service requirements."³⁷ That problem still exists today.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams

PRTs are America's newest model of civil-military integration, designed from the onset as 3D interagency organizations, operating by consensus rather than clear military or civilian leadership. The first PRT was stood up in 2002 in Afghanistan, where 15 different nations now run 26 PRTs. The

first PRT went to Iraq in 2005.³⁸ As of March 2008, 24 PRTs operated in Iraq's 18 provinces.³⁹

Afghanistan. Of the 26 PRTs in Afghanistan, the United States leads 12; International Security Assistance Force coalition partners lead the other 14.⁴⁰ The size and composition of PRTs vary. In Afghanistan, U.S.-led PRTs typically consist of 50–100 personnel, of which only a handful are U.S. Government civilians or contractors. An Air Force lieutenant colonel or Navy commander heads the U.S.-led PRT but does not command the non-DOD civilians. In addition, U.S.-led PRTs have two Army civil affairs teams and typically include a military police unit, a psychological operations unit, an explosive ordnance/demining unit, an intelligence team, medics, a force protection unit, and administrative and support personnel. An Afghan representing the Ministry of the Interior may also be part of the team.⁴¹

Iraq. In Iraq, there are two types of U.S.-led PRTs: 11 “original” PRTs and 13 “embedded” PRTs, which, unlike the original PRTs, are embedded in brigade or regimental combat teams. In addition to PRTs, other kinds of units do similar work, including Provincial Security Teams and Regional Reconstruction Teams. Coalition members Britain, Italy, and the Republic of Korea each lead a PRT. Unlike those in Afghanistan, Department of State personnel lead the Iraq teams. Civilians (including many contractors) staff the original PRTs. Security for the original PRTs is provided by either a contracted personnel security detail or a military movement team from a nearby unit. The original PRTs may have as many as 100 team members, including personnel from the Departments of State, Agriculture, and Justice; Multi-National Force–Iraq; the Gulf Region Division of the Army Corps of Engineers; USAID contractors; and locally employed Iraqi staff. These PRTs are located on forward operating bases.⁴²

The subject of PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq has been thoroughly covered by others;⁴³ the intent here is to focus on some lessons learned. These can be summed up as “no doctrine, no training, no people, and no money.”⁴⁴ The organization and operations of the PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq are different, but they share many problems—and those problems reside within the U.S. Government, not in Iraq or Afghanistan. A House Armed Services Committee report and the PRT Lessons Learned Workshop identified the following examples as challenges facing PRTs across the board:⁴⁵

- lack of unity of command/effort in the field, resulting in multiple U.S. Government voices that confuse host-government officials and hamper the effectiveness of efforts

- absence of doctrine/policy/mission, creating a personality-driven/-dependent environment
- limited or no understanding of PRT role by host country
- lack of integrated civil-military training
- no ownership, resulting in no single organization being responsible
- lack of “unity of funding”
- problematic staff selection, creating uneven skill sets
- no metrics for measuring success
- shortfalls in coordination mechanisms with host country.

The lack of ownership of PRTs, identified at the PRT Lessons Learned Workshop as the core problem,⁴⁶ means that no agency or institution is responsible for providing the capability for stability and reconstruction support in situations where there has been a failure of governance. By extension, no one agency is responsible for providing trained personnel and equipment, and there is no doctrine or commonly accepted conceptual model for how this capability should be integrated across the interagency and within the host country. Remarkably, Ambassador Komer identified the lack of a single department charged with counterinsurgency as the most important factor in the failure to carry out a pacification program on a scale commensurate with the need: “[Counterinsurgency] was everybody’s business and nobody’s, because there was no vested interest, no great department charged precisely with this function.”⁴⁷

Current PRT organizations are ad hoc, personality-driven operations succeeding in spite of themselves because talented, dedicated individuals are working creatively to solve myriad problems. These are fortuitous tactical successes rather than planned strategic ones.

The House Armed Services Committee report notes that, after 5 years’ experience with PRTs, there is no way to discern when they will have fulfilled their mission and will no longer be needed.⁴⁸ How will PRTs transition as security conditions and our military posture change?

Comparing CORDS and PRTs

Beyond the fact that both CORDS and PRTs are combined inter-agency elements with an embedded security component, the two types of organization have very little in common. CORDS was embedded in a large military headquarters responsible for an entire country. The unity of planning and effort extended to the province, village, and even hamlet level of

CORDS and its South Vietnamese counterpart structure. Perhaps the most notable difference between CORDS in Vietnam and our current efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan is the scope and size of the CORDS mission as compared to the missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, particularly in terms of the civilian commitment. Table 11–1 illustrates the point with comparative numbers for U.S. civilian engagement in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

Table 11–1. Total U.S. Civilian Personnel in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq

Vietnam (1969)	Afghanistan (2008)	Iraq (2008)
2,685*	384	907

* Includes personnel from Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Information Agency, and Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS). Of the total, 1,343 were CORDS.

Source: Department of State and USAID.

Humanitarian Crises—Tsunami Relief

The ability to respond successfully to humanitarian disasters requires coordinated interagency surge and organizational capacity. The 2004 tsunami that affected six countries in Southeast Asia (India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Maldives, Sri Lanka, and Thailand) is a case in point. With no regional interagency infrastructure in place, the U.S. Government had to create a series of ad hoc organizations to confront and coordinate the problems suffered by several nations.⁴⁹ Still, the response to tsunami relief was successful due to several factors. First, it was a disaster of rapid onset, the extent of the destruction was readily apparent, and the decision to intervene was made quickly, resulting in an overwhelming international response. When the onset of a disaster is slower, assessment of the problem and the decision to intervene can take time. In addition, while the 2004 tsunami had a big impact over a wide region, the effects were contained to areas along the coastline. Finally, with the enormous outpouring of money, funding was not an issue for relief agencies. As a result, NGOs that might have requested funding from United Nations (UN) agencies or USAID raised funds elsewhere, and their coordination with these agencies was thus voluntary.⁵⁰

The important role of the U.S. Navy in the tsunami relief effort, particularly in flight support and medical assistance, is widely recognized, although it was downplayed by USPACOM. Within hours of the crisis, USPACOM dispatched assets ranging from carrier strike groups to water puri-

fication ships to aircraft to provide emergency support. The USPACOM commander issued a directive spelling out that its role was as a supporting element to the general relief effort. USAID characterized the interagency cooperation as a “comfortable set up where everyone was doing what they do best—the military was not making the humanitarian decisions.”⁵¹

The most significant aspect of the U.S. military support was the availability of almost 60 helicopters, which shuttled relief supplies, including fresh water, from U.S. ships and other staging areas to towns and villages.⁵² In addition to the delivery of relief supplies, the military participated in search and rescue missions, evacuated the injured, and provided military forensic teams and preventive medicine units.

Although DOD played down its role in the tsunami relief, its most valuable contribution was its unique capabilities in command, control, and communications and in coordination. These capabilities, critical in war-time, proved equally vital in ensuring an effective, coordinated response. Within 2 days of the disaster, USPACOM had established a joint task force—Combined Support Force 536 (CSF 536)—to coordinate and conduct humanitarian assistance. CSF 536 collaborated closely with U.S. Embassies and USAID field teams, including deployed USAID Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DARTs). The Combined Coordination Center (CCC) at Utapao, Thailand, became the hub of international relief coordination; liaison officers from Britain, Japan, Thailand, Singapore, and Australia, USAID DART officials, a civil-military coordination cell, and a local representative from the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs met several times per day to coordinate efforts among their respective organizations. This provided an essential element of on-scene coordination that helped to avoid duplication of effort and facilitated accurate assessments of the extent of the damage and identification of the areas most in need of assistance. The CCC also helped facilitate the efforts of the international “Core Group” (Australia, Canada, India, Japan, United States, and others) that was established to coordinate the first stages of the international relief effort, identify and fill gaps, and avoid or break logistical bottlenecks, until the United Nations was able to mobilize and play a more central role in the relief response.⁵³

At the country level, to support the multination, multiorganization relief effort more effectively, CSF 536 established Combined Support Groups (CSGs) in each of the affected countries, headed by one-star officers, to coordinate with local agencies and NGOs as well as with U.S. DART teams. The CSGs played an important role in coordinating local public health relief efforts.⁵⁴ The CSGs essentially filled an organizational gap,

providing the framework and managerial skills that were the foundation for both the local government and the broader relief efforts. Under Secretary of State Alan Larson underscored USPACOM's on-scene efforts, noting "the remarkable things they accomplished to establish the logistical backbone for the entire relief operation and to facilitate the work of the United Nations, NGOs, and other donors."⁵⁵

The U.S. military filled the organizational need for a coordinating structure at the tactical level. The response to the tsunami disaster highlights the inadequacy of Embassies to take on a coordinating role of the magnitude and breadth required for a regional disaster. While the U.S. Embassies in the affected countries held daily country team meetings to assess logistics requirements for their specific country,⁵⁶ the tactical organization, coordination, and implementation of assistance was led by the only organization that had the capability to do so at a regional level—USPACOM.

Civil-Military Leadership

DOD has been working on the incorporation of nonkinetic operations and all that they entail for many years. Those efforts and the terminology used to describe them have evolved to include military operations other than war; stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR); and humanitarian and peacekeeping operations.

A phasing model forms the core of joint warfighting doctrine and is used to help commanders and staffs to visualize and think through an operation and to define requirements in terms of forces, resources, time, space, and purpose. The actual number of phases used will vary (they may be compressed, expanded, or omitted entirely) from operation to operation and will be determined by the commander.

Only in 2006 did the core document establishing the joint warfighting doctrine expand the phasing model to six phases—zero (shape), one (deter), two (seize the initiative), three (dominate), four (stabilize), and five (enable civil authority)—and establish a "stability operations" construct and military support to SSTR.⁵⁷

So-called command leads for each of the six phases seem clear in theory: phases zero (shape), one (deter), and five (enable civil authority) would appear to be the purview of civilian authorities, where diplomacy and aid theoretically are the main focus of an operation. Phases two (seize the initiative) and three (dominate) would imply a military lead. Phase four (stability) would involve a transition from military to civilian leadership and focus. In practice, the civilian/military focus and leadership during the various operational phases have worked differently.

These differences are not confined to phase four operations, where some ambiguity might be expected during a transition from military to civilian lead. As discussed earlier, the establishment of USAFRICOM suggests a regional military lead during phases zero, one, and five, especially given its mission, which is solely focused on soft power. USSOUTHCOM, which is modeling itself after USAFRICOM, is also undertaking more soft power missions. By contrast, the country teams in the regions covered by the work of USAFRICOM and USSOUTHCOM are at best equals with their military counterparts, not unequivocal leads. The civilians lack a regional equivalent to COCOMs in the field.

Similarly, phase four stability operations are meant to be civilian-led. The PRT experiences in both Afghanistan and Iraq indicate otherwise. While the nominal heads of U.S.-led PRTs in Afghanistan are military officers and the nominal heads of U.S.-led PRTs in Iraq are Foreign Service Officers, in reality, the lead belongs to the person representing the agency with the resources. Leadership is de facto determined by the goals of a particular PRT and the agency from which the resources are available to meet those goals. Therefore, no designation of command lead, whether civilian or military, will be meaningful unless the designated lead has the resources to back its leadership.⁵⁸ Table 11–2 summarizes how civilian versus military leadership has worked in practice during various phases of operations.

Table 11–2: Civilian versus Military Leadership during Phases of Operations			
	Phases Zero, One, Five: Shape, deter, enable civil authority	Phases Two, Three: Seize, dominate	Phase Four: Stabilize
Theory	Civilian lead	Military lead	Both; hand off
Practice	Growing influence of combatant commanders in regions. No civilian regional structure to counter this growth.	Suggested role for civilians especially when involved during ongoing conflict	Resource dependent

Is the phasing model still relevant to today’s national security challenges? The writers of doctrine point out that the phasing model is only a tool for the commander to use in planning an operation. Rarely are the phases clear-cut with precise boundaries—they do not necessarily fall into tidy categories, but instead tend to overlap. Furthermore, a whole-of-government approach to complex operations means that resources other than

those of DOD should be brought to bear on an operation. However, resource restrictions and the lack of an operational capacity prevent other organizations from taking a clear lead. DOD remains the only organization with the capability to organize, manage, and move people and resources to and within an operation.

Options for Improved Civil-Military Integration

Choosing which model of civil-military cooperation is most appropriate to the task will depend on the broader strategic environment. Different models may be appropriate, depending on the scenario, but a system that can accommodate the model must be in place to enable a decision when it is made.

The following suggestions for improved civil-military integration (which are not mutually exclusive) merit reflection in the context of:

- the evolving nature of threats to U.S. national security interests
- the extent of change we are prepared to consider in response to the changing security environment
- the increasing tension between country-centric versus regional approaches
- the current focus on agency equities at the expense of broader U.S. interests.

Create a Surge-absorption Capability at Embassies

The Embassy of the Future report suggests organizing the Embassy along functional rather than agency lines.⁵⁹ Currently, members of various U.S. agencies are segregated from each another. One suggestion involves “doubling the size of substantive State”—Civil Service and Foreign Service Officers, excluding support staff—and creating at each Embassy a function dealing with stability and reconstruction missions.⁶⁰ These positions would be staffed at all times, just as political, economic, consular, and public diplomacy functions are staffed today. In addition to staffing the new functional area with Department of State personnel, it would also accommodate other U.S. agency personnel. During a time of crisis, this unit within an Embassy would absorb any additional influx of government personnel. This would also mean fully integrating USAID into State to underscore its integral role in foreign policy rather than keeping it as a separate humanitarian assistance/development organization.

Clarify/Strengthen the Role of the Ambassador

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee observed that the leadership qualities of an Ambassador are a determining factor in the success of the campaign against terror. However, under current constructs, the Ambassador has no effective authority over non-foreign policy personnel at the Embassy. Recommendations for empowering the Ambassador include the authority to override directives from other government agencies to their staffs in the Embassy; the ability to approve all military-related programs implemented in country; and creation of a memorandum of understanding governing the activities of Special Operations Forces in country.⁶¹ Among the recommendations in *The Embassy of the Future* report that merit consideration is to grant Ambassadors authority over performance evaluations not only for all foreign affairs agencies, but also for all agencies on the country team.⁶² (Similarly, military commanders should have authority over performance evaluations for the interagency members at their command.) Along similar lines, Griffin and Donnelly advocate the creation of frontline country teams in which the U.S. Ambassador, supported by a military assistance and advisory group within the Embassy, would direct U.S. security partnerships. They stress that the success of the country team depends on enhancing the Ambassador's leadership authority and effectively integrating interagency operations on the ground.⁶³

Place Military Assets at the Command of Civilian Authorities

For some foreign affairs civilians, placing more civilians at COCOMs and relying on the transfer of DOD funds to implement programs under State authority only exacerbate the problem of the unbalanced resource equation. True civil-military integration would include the option of putting military assets at the command of civilian authorities up to the point where we go to war. After the military fights and wins the war, assets would be turned back over to civilian leadership. This would require creating and paying for a robust civilian infrastructure to take on the responsibility of civilian leadership.

Restructure Country Teams

Robert Oakley and Michael Casey propose restructuring Embassies along functional lines relevant to issues facing a particular country. At larger Embassies, positions for two deputy chiefs of mission would be created—one for substantive issues and one for program management. The deputy for management would be responsible for the country team's policy agenda; the other deputy would oversee the functional components of the Embassy,

such as law enforcement, trade promotion, and crisis planning and response. For an integrated approach, employees from various U.S. agencies would occupy appropriate components. The activities of military elements assigned to the mission would fall unambiguously under the authority of the Ambassador, except in the context of forces engaged in hostilities when the independent authority of combatant commanders would be activated.⁶⁴ Ambassadors would have input into the performance reviews of all employees, including those from non-foreign affairs agencies.

Reinforce Informal Coordination Mechanisms

The personalities of civilian and military leaders and their staffs, and their proximity to one another, can contribute to successful coordination of efforts. During Somalia's Operation *Restore Hope*, the civilian Presidential special representative and the military Combined Joint Task Force commander and their staffs collaborated successfully because of their personal commitment. In Afghanistan and Iraq, the Ambassadors and military commanders collocated their offices within the Embassies to ensure a coordinated approach. The examples set by these leaders trickled down to their staffs. By contrast, during the time of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, the Ambassador's and military commander's offices were separate and their staffs rarely coordinated with one another. Currently in Iraq, the Ambassador has authority over U.S. personnel, with the exception of those involved in military and security matters, who come under the authority of the military commander.

Restructure Regional Commands Using CORDS-like Structure

Using USAFRICOM and USSOUTHCOM as the prototype, a civilian deputy is integrated into a military command, and members of the interagency are represented throughout the command organized along functional lines to better accommodate an interagency approach. Where a civilian heads a directorate, its deputy is a military official, and vice versa. To be effective, this structure would be replicated at all levels to create a clear hierarchy⁶⁵ and would be reinforced when performance reviews are written without regard to civilian or military status.

Reconsider COCOM versus Ambassador Authority over In-country Preinsurgency Military Operations

Currently, military assistance and training programs remain under the execution authority of the COCOM commander. Certainly, collaboration and coordination take place, but this arrangement tends to place the COCOM commander in a preferred position in the eyes of host country

officials. Bob Killebrew proposes achieving unity of command in a preinsurgency theater by subordinating to the Ambassador all military forces charged with advising a host country's military forces, with the regional combatant commander in a supporting role. The size of the military presence should be expandable as needed, depending on the host country's requirements. Should a crisis occur, a Presidential envoy and a three-star deputy commander to the geographic combatant command would supersede the Ambassador. The country team, including the military element, would continue to function under the authority of the Ambassador up to the point of warfare, at which point the Ambassador would support the military operation.⁶⁶ The key to this scenario is the foundational presence of a military component in country that can swell to accommodate combat operations when needed.

Create Regional Civilian-led Interagency Organizations

Richard Downie proposes a complete restructuring of the U.S. foreign policy apparatus to make Federal departments and agencies "service providers" to a global system of regional civilian-led interagency organizations (RCLIOs), analogous to the way the military services are service providers to the combatant commands. An RCLIO would supervise both the COCOM and the Embassies in the region. The civilian RCLIO leaders would report to the President through a revised NSC system, which would reflect an interagency version of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As the Embassies would be under the RCLIOs, the National Command Authority would also be changed to include the Secretary of State, along with the President and the Secretary of Defense.⁶⁷

Conclusion and Findings

In recent years, DOD has increasingly advocated for and operationalized concepts for interagency integration.⁶⁸ This comes down to the issue of resources. The disparity in resources and comparative size of the Department of State and USAID makes it impossible for them to act as equal partners with DOD.⁶⁹ It is also a reflection on the nature of DOD as an organization with an operational capability. With the exception of a small rapid reaction capability at USAID and nascent efforts at the Department of State, DOD is the only show in town with an expeditionary capability.⁷⁰ As a result, most of the important efforts at civil-military integration and cooperation have taken place within the confines of the military, which does nothing to address the fundamental problem of the absence of a civilian infrastructure to lead U.S. Government efforts during complex operations.

The executive branch and Congress jointly bear responsibility for reinforcing this skewed state of affairs. The Bush administration consistently failed to request appropriate funding levels for S/CRS at the Department of State. Congress, in turn, widened the resource gap among these agencies by providing DOD more funds for stability and reconstruction operations.⁷¹ Systemic solutions to the problems that beset civil-military integration would necessarily involve Congress, including rewriting of authorizing legislation, realignment of committee jurisdictions, and an injection of resources for civilian foreign affairs agencies. Ultimately, the issue is bigger than S/CRS. *The Embassy of the Future* project suggests that diplomats, as America's first line of defense, must adapt to new centers of influence in a global environment where the power of nonstate actors is growing.⁷² However, the incremental increases in staff that only cover a "training float"⁷³ and operational requirements at current levels—estimated by the Department of State to be a little over 2,000 positions⁷⁴—are merely an attempt to keep up with present requirements. What is needed, if the Department of State is to become an equal partner in phase zero operations, is a bold revamping on a scale not discussed heretofore. It would include the full integration of USAID into State, reflecting USAID's integral role in foreign affairs. It would also include development of a meaningful civilian expeditionary capability that could rely on DOD resources to become activated without playing second fiddle to a DOD mobilization. Most importantly, it would not mean the continued trajectory of increasing the placement of civilian personnel under military leadership.

These considerations, and examination of historical experience, yield the following findings.

Create a civilian organizational structure or capacity that can absorb an interagency surge.

Create a permanent capacity within Embassies that would fill the organizational gap for an interagency "surge" at the country level. The Embassy would thus be able to take the lead and provide the organizational framework, managerial skills, and coordinating structure to absorb large influxes of people during complex operations.

Maximize the ability of Ambassadors to play leadership roles.

Strengthening Embassies would maximize Ambassadors' ability to play a leadership role during crises. Create regional Ambassadors' Councils whose principals and staffs would meet at least monthly to perform the functions of regional civilian commands before a crisis. When a crisis occurs,

the Ambassador most directly affected would take the helm, and others in the region, including the applicable regional military command, would provide support. The Ambassador is unique as the President's personal representative and is best placed to lead a concerted interagency effort during a crisis as well as during peacetime. The default leadership lies with the Ambassador, unless there is a war. Under those circumstances, the goal would be for the Ambassador to resume control as soon as full-scale combat operations have ended, as determined by the National Security Advisor.

Maximize civil-military capacity for ongoing coordination.

In addition to reinforcing Embassies and maximizing the Ambassador's leadership capacity, there is a need for ongoing civil-military coordination. The best way to achieve this might include permanent regional physical proximity, permanent Department of State-led regional presence (regional Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, plus staff), and incorporation of the Ambassadors' Councils. The regionalization of civil-military cooperation is currently dominated by the military as exemplified by the new USAFRICOM and various task forces within other regional commands. The trend of assigning civilians as deputies within COCOMs still leaves the civilians subordinate to the military. There is a need for a separate civilian organization in the regions that will provide equal voice to the civilians that is not dominated by the military. While collocating such organizations might make sense in the cases of those COCOMs located in the regions they serve (USEUCOM, USPACOM), it might pose challenges for those COCOMs located stateside (USCENTCOM, USSOUTHCOM).

Institutionalize DOD logistical and materiel support to civilians.

The ability to implement an interagency surge is dependent on the capacity to move people and resources rapidly. DOD is the only organization with a logistics capability and is likely to remain so. Consideration should be given to an arrangement that allows civilians dedicated and equal access to immediate transportation and materiel from DOD during a crisis. It would include putting military assets at the command of civilian authorities. Civilian agencies do not have rapid access to funds of a scope that would allow rapid mobilization and deployment of resources. This limitation also must be addressed.

Notes

¹ "Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-terror Campaign," Report to Members of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Richard G. Lugar, Chairman, December 15, 2006.

² George L. Argyros, Marc Grossman, and Felix G. Rohatyn, *The Embassy of the Future* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007), 47.

³ Robert B. Oakley and Michael Casey, Jr., "The Country Team: Restructuring America's First Line of Engagement," *Joint Force Quarterly* 47 (4th Quarter 2007), 146.

⁴ "Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-terror Campaign."

⁵ Argyros, Grossman, and Rohatyn, 47.

⁶ Christopher Griffin and Thomas Donnelly, "The Frontline Country Team: A Model for Engagement," American Enterprise Institute, June 2008.

⁷ Information on JIACGs provided to author informally by U.S. Joint Forces Command J9 Interagency Division, April 2008.

⁸ "Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-terror Campaign."

⁹ USCENTCOM characterizes the reason for the May 2008 reorganization as including the desire to move from soft coordination to action, to increase intelligence leverage, and to support the Pentagon's move for an irregular warfare requirement. Extracted from USCENTCOM brief "JIACG to IATF-IW," presented June 11, 2008, and provided to author informally by USJFCOM J9 Interagency Division.

¹⁰ Richard D. Downie, "Reforming U.S. Foreign Policy Implementation: Creating a Global System of Regional Civilian-Led Interagency Operations," April 30, 2008.

¹¹ Lisa Schirch and Aaron Kishbaugh, "Leveraging '3D' Security: From Rhetoric to Reality" (Silver City, NM, and Washington, DC: Foreign Policy in Focus, November 16, 2006).

¹² *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: The White House, June 2008), 17–18.

¹³ Phase zero is a deliberate strategy of engagement, encompassing all activities prior to phase one to prevent conflict from developing in the first place. It consists of shaping operations, building capacity in partner nations, and placing heavy emphasis on interagency support and cooperation. Phase zero involves the execution of a broad national strategy where DOD is not the lead agency and its programs are only a part of the larger U.S. Government effort. See Charles F. Wald, "The Phase Zero Campaign," *Joint Force Quarterly* 43 (4th Quarter 2006), 72–73.

¹⁴ Lauren Ploch, "Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa," Report RL34003 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, March 10, 2008), 4.

¹⁵ Robert T. Moeller, "AFRICOM: The Road Ahead for United States Africa Command," speech at the Brookings Institution, May 27, 2008.

¹⁶ "Best Practices for Geographic Combatant Command Transformations: SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM," Institute for Defense Analyses, April 9, 2008.

¹⁷ Moeller.

¹⁸ "Transforming National Security: AFRICOM—An Emerging Command: Synopsis and Key Insights," notes from conference on USAFRICOM sponsored by the Center for Technology and National Security Policy, available at <www.ndu.edu/CTNSP/NCW_course/AFRICOM%20Summary%20Notes.pdf>.

¹⁹ Moeller.

²⁰ "Transforming National Security: AFRICOM—An Emerging Command Synopsis and Key Insights."

²¹ Moeller.

²² In general, other agencies are not authorized manpower for overseas missions, and their contributions to these missions are "diversions" from their legislative charter and authorized funding.

²³ Ploch, 10.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 18–19.

²⁵ USSOUTHCOM's interagency partnering and reorganization brief, CAPT Kevin C. Hutcheson, Deputy Director for Interagency Integration, Interagency Partnering Directorate (J9), source: USJFCOM.

²⁶ Plan Colombia was a bilateral, whole-of-government approach between the United States and Colombia that involved successful security sector reform and an interagency team. The 500-person Joint Interagency Task Force–South conducts counter-illicit trafficking operations with personnel

from all the military Services, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, the Intelligence Community, and 11 allied civilian (law enforcement) and military organizations. See “Best Practices for Geographic Combatant Command Transformations.”

²⁷ Downie.

²⁸ “Best Practices for Geographic Combatant Command Transformations.”

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Downie, 5.

³¹ Oakley and Casey.

³² Ibid.

³³ Richard W. Stewart, “CORDS and the Vietnam Experience: An Interagency Organization for Counterinsurgency and Pacification,” National War College, May 1, 2006.

³⁴ It is worth noting that earlier pacification efforts in Vietnam had floundered because of the lack of sustained territorial security as an indispensable first stage of pacification. The military—regarding pacification as civilian-agency business—had never provided adequate security resources. Large-scale pacification required full-time, sustained protection at the key village/hamlet level on a large scale. Primary responsibility for local protection of the rural population devolved upon local forces recruited from this population itself. W. Scott Thompson and Donaldson D. Frizzell, eds., *The Lessons of Vietnam* (New York: Crane, Russak and Company, 1977), 216.

³⁵ Ibid., 215.

³⁶ Robert W. Komer, *Bureaucracy at War: U.S. Performance in the Vietnam Conflict* (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1986), 120.

³⁷ Thompson and Frizzell, 271.

³⁸ U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, “Agency Stovepipes vs. Strategic Agility: Lessons We Need to Learn from Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan,” April 2008, 15, available at <http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/Reports/PRT_Report.pdf>.

³⁹ Michelle Parker, *Programming Development Funds to Support a Counterinsurgency: Nangarhar, Afghanistan, 2006*, Defense and Technology Paper 53 (Washington, DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, September 2008).

⁴⁰ International Security Assistance Force is the NATO-led force operating in Afghanistan under a United Nations mandate. Armed Services Committee Report, 13.

⁴¹ “Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-terror Campaign,” 14.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ For a comprehensive treatment of the subject, see “Agency Stovepipes vs. Strategic Agility.”

⁴⁴ Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, PRT Lessons Learned Workshop, Gettysburg, PA, March 2008.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Thompson and Frizzell, 271.

⁴⁸ “Agency Stovepipes vs. Strategic Agility,” 31.

⁴⁹ Downie.

⁵⁰ Interview at U.S. Agency for International Development, Washington, DC, June 27, 2008.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ralph A. Cossa, “U.S. Military Provides ‘Logistical Backbone’ for Tsunami Relief,” March 2005, available at <www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2005/March/20050304111202dmslahrellek0.5149347.html>.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Dave Tarantino, “Asian Tsunami Relief: Department of Defense Public Health Response: Policy and Strategic Coordination Considerations,” *Military Medicine* (October 2006), available at <http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3912/is_200610/ai_n16810493/pg_3?tag=artBody;col1>.

⁵⁵ Cossa.

⁵⁶ Interview at U.S. Agency for International Development.

⁵⁷ Joint Publication 3–0, *Joint Operations*, September 17, 2006, iv, forms the core of joint war-fighting doctrine.

⁵⁸ PRT Lessons Learned Workshop.

⁵⁹ Argyros, Grossman, and Rohatyn, 48.

⁶⁰ Interview with member of the Senior Foreign Service, June 17, 2008.

⁶¹ “Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-terror Campaign.”

⁶² Argyros, Grossman, and Rohatyn, 49.

⁶³ Griffin and Donnelly.

⁶⁴ Oakley and Casey.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Bob Killebrew, “The Left-Hand Side of the Spectrum: Ambassadors and Advisors in the Future U.S. Strategy” (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, June 2007).

⁶⁷ Downie.

⁶⁸ Including Secretary of Defense Gates making a pitch for increased resources for the Department of State.

⁶⁹ Schirch and Kishbaugh.

⁷⁰ S/CRS at the Department of State lacks an operational capability.

⁷¹ Schirch and Kishbaugh.

⁷² Argyros, Grossman, and Rohatyn, 4.

⁷³ “Training float” refers to the additional staff required to allow professional development while fully manning an Embassy, as opposed to the current practice of “hiring to attrition.”

⁷⁴ Ibid., 10.

Complex Operations in the Homeland

Bernd McConnell and Kristine Shelstad

Things are different overseas. Generally, the U.S. Government has the luxury of looking at a problem, a mission, from a national or Federal, top-down point of view. The Ambassador and country team, the combatant commander and his staff—each has relative control over the U.S. assets in that country or region. For the most part, longstanding diplomatic protocols with the countries within their sphere of influence ease our operations, whether in response to a disaster or otherwise. Save for some difficult-to-pin-down nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), the construct a U.S. team overseas encounters is relatively hierarchical—at least from a U.S. perspective.

Not so in the homeland. The internal U.S. organization is decidedly nonhierarchical, with mayors who do not work for Governors and Governors who do not work for the President. Thousands of local, state, Federal, and private sector organizations have a role to play in securing, stabilizing, and reconstructing our nation. Here, all emergencies are local and the civilians are always in charge. The homeland galaxy is rich in capabilities but poor in cohesion—no one organization has the requisite authority or manpower to harness and employ all the potential.

Enormous capacity exists at the local and state level, often not coherently accounted for and more often not well funded. Even more capacity resides in the private sector, as corporations such as Wal-Mart and Federal Express set the standard for supply and logistics, and the Southern Baptist Convention is premier in mass feeding operations. Local, national, and international NGOs operate independently throughout the country. Despite attempts to put a framework (the National Response Framework [NRF]) around all this capability, there is no common picture that encompasses all national assets.

The shock of the 9/11 attacks led the U.S. Government to turn inward and look at domestic operations through the lens of terrorism. We established the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to bring together the disparate interagency elements that had apparently failed to prevent this horrific attack. We established U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM)—the first “homeland” command since George Washington’s Continental Army—to bring together Department of Defense (DOD) elements with homeland defense and security equities.

The devastation of Hurricane Katrina led the U.S. Government to again examine its ability to provide coordinated, interagency, and intergovernmental support to its citizens. The storm and its aftermath caused a shift in priority from solely terrorist (manmade) events to a more all-hazards approach. The uncoordinated Federal, state, and local responses exposed dangerous seams, which led to recommendations for more Presidential authority to deploy Federal assets to “assist” Governors. This seemed for a time to signal a more robust—and perhaps leading—role for the military in domestic operations during a catastrophic event.

DHS’s initial focus on terrorism and its decidedly law enforcement-centric leadership left the department ill prepared to shift toward natural disasters and response-based action. The debate as to whether DHS should be a law enforcement or an all-hazards organization was reflected in the 2007 version of the National Security Strategy, which promoted a more all-hazards view of homeland security. The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA’s) place within DHS was questioned, and a major reorganization ensued that placed FEMA more firmly in preparedness and planning roles versus purely a response role.

In the years following the 9/11 attacks, USNORTHCOM held that homeland defense—DOD in the lead—was its paramount mission and that defense support to civil authorities—DOD in support—was secondary. In fact, the USNORTHCOM mission statement relegated civil support to a parenthetical, “after the semicolon” status. Katrina and the lessons observed caused USNORTHCOM’s pendulum to swing toward civil support. The mission statement evolved, giving civil support equal relevance. The need to anticipate was added, codifying the Katrina-inspired imperative to “lean forward” during hurricanes, floods, wildfires, and other emerging disasters.

Our national capacity sounds and is enviable. We can bring enormous resources to bear on the Nation’s planning and response needs. However, we continue to struggle to build the right structures and establish efficient processes that will facilitate unity of effort. In 2008, the

6-year-old Department of Homeland Security stated it would “lead the unified national effort to secure America . . . prevent and deter terrorist attacks and protect against and respond to threats and hazards to the nation . . . ensure safe and secure borders, welcome lawful immigrants and visitors, and promote the free-flow of commerce.” USNORTHCOM “anticipates and conducts Homeland Defense and Civil Support operations within the assigned area of responsibility to defend, protect, and secure the United States and its interests.”

Setting the Department of Justice and other Federal agencies aside for the moment, DOD and DHS will be the key Federal actors in planning for and conducting complex operations in the homeland, but the processes to do so are still stovepiped. While separate organizations (one for “security” and one for “defense”) may have had merit early on, the separation creates confusion today with respect to roles and missions. DOD is better funded, better manned, and better equipped, and has an inherent planning culture—which all leads to the tendency for the military side to get ahead of the civilian side. It is not difficult to imagine scenarios in which DOD or USNORTHCOM reacts because it *can*, not necessarily because it *should*. There is a history of this overseas, as hastily trained military teams take on roles previously reserved for seasoned State Department, Justice, Commerce, or Agriculture specialists, or the ubiquitous NGOs.

Reorganizing for Homeland Security

Department of Homeland Security and USNORTHCOM

In June 2002, President George W. Bush announced he would build a new department that would have primary responsibility for homeland security. The President felt that America needed a unified structure to fuse the homeland security–related information, operations, and authorities that had previously been dispersed throughout 100 government organizations. This effort was the most sweeping change to the U.S. Government structure since the Department of Defense was created in 1947.

Merging 22 disparate organizations, missions, cultures, and payroll systems was a daunting task that posed a huge challenge to our change-hating Washington establishment. The DHS goal was to provide one department whose primary mission is to protect the homeland, borders, ports, and critical infrastructure; synthesize homeland security intelligence; coordinate communications with state and local governments as well with the enormity of the private sector; protect against bioterrorism/weapons of mass destruction; and manage Federal emergency response.

The first DHS organizational attempt tried to forge nearly impossible alliances while suffering from turf battles, unclear powers, and contradictory laws and Presidential directives. From the start, overlap between DOD and Department of Justice equities muddled the goals and missions for the new organization. Critics lamented that the organization was given the responsibility for securing our homeland without having the requisite powers to do so—the initial structure did not include an intelligence capability and did not effectively address how the new DHS would interface with the military and with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Many of these issues were cleared up in the 2003 second-stage review, to include building policy function and intelligence capabilities and revamping FEMA to reassume its previous preparedness role.

USNORTHCOM faces a challenge unique among combatant commands; it must plan and conduct missions within the constraining legal framework placed upon the military domestically and must do so within the historical tension between state and Federal entities. Fifty states and territories fall within USNORTHCOM's area of responsibility (AOR), but there are numerous state, local, and private sector organizations that have primary responsibility for the people and places USNORTHCOM may be called on to protect.

USNORTHCOM's AOR includes the air, land, and sea of the continental United States and Alaska, while U.S. Pacific Command maintains defense responsibility for Hawaii and Pacific territories. U.S. Southern Command takes responsibility for Puerto Rico's and the U.S. Virgin Islands' defense, although USNORTHCOM will be involved in a defense support to civil authorities scenario. USNORTHCOM's AOR includes Canada, Mexico, and the Turks and Caicos Island, and the command manages theater security cooperation programs with these important international partners.

Originating documents and study pieces related to USNORTHCOM standup called for the organization to be composed of approximately 500 personnel with significant National Guard staffing to facilitate collaboration with states and their National Guards. The original working group recommended that fully 50 percent of the USNORTHCOM staff be National Guard officers as they would bring familiarity with state-led domestic issues and solutions. The original concept also recognized that the command must work in concert with existing agencies, the FBI and FEMA most notably, and with the newly emerging Department of Homeland Security. The initial planning team recognized the new combatant command needed to be innovative and flexible enough to

address the unique interagency and intergovernmental challenges facing a homeland command.

The Nation's Governors, while understanding the need to respond strongly to attacks on the Nation, viewed USNORTHCOM establishment with some trepidation. Congressional testimony from both Governors and National Guard leaders recommended USNORTHCOM be sensitive to sovereignty issues associated with deploying Active-duty troops within state boundaries and recommended using the National Guard under state authority as the best solution to bridge this gap.

USNORTHCOM is headquartered at Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado Springs. The commander of USNORTHCOM is dual-hatted as the commander of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). NORAD is the U.S.–Canadian binational command with responsibilities including aerospace warning, aerospace defense, and the newly established maritime warning mission. NORAD and USNORTHCOM staff functions, save the respective operations directorates, are merged. NORAD and USNORTHCOM share an integrated operations center at Peterson Air Force Base that provides land, air, space, missile warning, maritime, and cyber domain awareness.

Government directives recognize that USNORTHCOM will rarely, if ever, be the lead Federal agency. The National Response Plan and its recently released successor, the National Response Framework, enumerate lead agency responsibility per each of the emergency support functions. DOD has the lead in none of them but has a supporting role in all.

USNORTHCOM has evolved, but not to the extent envisioned in the literature. Nonetheless, our natural uniformed partners in homeland defense and security, the U.S. Coast Guard and the National Guard, have 22 and 43 billets at USNORTHCOM respectively, including a Coast Guard flag officer as deputy operations officer. The USNORTHCOM deputy commander previously was chief of the National Guard Bureau, and the command's operations officer is a Guardsman. The commander of a USNORTHCOM subordinate element, Joint Task Force–Civil Support, is a National Guard general officer, and three general officers have been reassigned to USNORTHCOM elements as drilling Reservists—two as advisors to the commander and one to the Army component, U.S. Army North (ARNORTH).

NORAD and USNORTHCOM (N–NC) enjoy the largest interagency presence of any combatant command, with about 60 individuals representing over 40 outside organizations resident in the commands. Another 20 organizations—not all Federal—have predesignated representatives on call

in the immediate area. These are powerful representations, demonstrating a national commitment to our homeland.

What's in a Name? Homeland Defense versus Homeland Security

The July 1997 version of the *National Strategy for Homeland Security* defines *homeland security* as a “concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur.” This definition was retained in the post-Katrina 2007 version of the National Strategy, but the new strategy clearly recognizes the need for our national security priorities to reflect that catastrophic natural and manmade disasters—not just terrorist events—have serious implications for homeland security.

The Department of Homeland Security is charged with coordinating this concerted national effort across Federal agencies, throughout intergovernmental layers, and with nongovernmental and private sector entities. The DOD role in homeland security is detailed in Joint Publication 3–26, *Homeland Security*, which states that the “Armed Forces of the United States support the *National Strategy for Homeland Security* through two distinct but interrelated mission areas—homeland defense and civil support,” which is subsequently reflected in USNORTHCOM’s mission statement. The publication further delineates homeland defense and civil support as subelements of the overall “homeland security” umbrella.

Homeland defense, as a supporting pillar of homeland security, is “the protection of U.S. sovereignty, territory, domestic population and critical infrastructure against external threats and aggression or other threats as directed by the President.” The Department of Defense is the lead agency for homeland defense activities under the larger homeland security umbrella. The definition recognizes that “external” threats may manifest themselves from internal sources, so the definition allows the President the flexibility to use DOD internally if he feels the homeland defense definition has been met.

Our strategies recognize, in theory, that homeland security, homeland defense, and civil support are not separate functions, but rather a continuum. When DHS was being developed, DOD was extremely wary that domestic military operations would be subjugated to the new department. While initial standup studies for USNORTHCOM did not shy away from the term *homeland security*, subsequent documentation tended to discount the term, preferring instead to emphasize that homeland defense was something separate from homeland security. Much was made of the distinction between the two terms, perhaps to preserve separate funding

streams, and the very stovepipes that DHS and USNORTHCOM had been created to deconstruct were actually semantically cemented.

The caveat in the definition of *homeland defense*—that it (with DOD in the lead) can include not only protection against external threats and aggression, but also “other threats as directed by the President”—opens a seam of ambiguity that causes redundancy and/or conflict among DHS, Justice, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and DOD as the lines between defense and security blur in the homeland. Some feel inter-departmental redundancy and overlap are actually beneficial to prevent gaps in the government’s ability to detect, deter, and respond to terrorist attacks. Unfortunately, they also blur the command and control lines and complicate the civil-military interface as multiple agencies, including DOD, work the same issues seemingly in parallel rather than in an integrated fashion.

With no clear boundary between homeland defense and homeland security, DOD and other agencies will continue to juggle lead agency responsibilities and to struggle with the very different command and control cultures among DOD and its interagency partners. Some studies, such as the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report “Managing the Next Catastrophe: Ready or Not?” have called for a clear statement that DOD will never take the lead in the homeland unless the threat is such that only the military can effectively deal with it.

The National Guard: Bridging the Gap Between State and Federal Entities

Hurricane Katrina brought issues of state sovereignty to the forefront. The Federal response system did not allow for proactive coordination so that Governors could efficiently request Federal support without also appearing to have failed in the eyes of their constituents. There were no coordinated state-Federal plans that truly delineated what each level of government was capable of providing during a catastrophic event. This Federal-state and civil-military national discourse has played out in commissions, reports, and think-tank pieces addressing these issues. Recent Commission on the National Guard and Reserve (CNGR) and CSIS reports have emphasized the need for Governors and their National Guards to be vital players in domestic planning and response.

The Constitution, and its clear statement that Governors have all powers not specifically reserved for the President, is perhaps the singular issue making operations in the homeland a unique endeavor. The CNGR has suggested a Council of Governors be appointed to advise the Department

of Defense, while the Chief of the National Guard Bureau was recently elevated to the rank of 4-star general and appointed as advisor to the Secretary of Defense.

Operations in the homeland are inherently nonhierarchical. Governors are bound by Federal laws and by strings attached to Federal funding, but for the most part states are fairly independent actors. States that border Canada and Mexico have particularly interesting state-Federal issues, to include longstanding civil associations with their cross-border neighbors.

The *National Strategy for Homeland Defense* highlights the key role the National Guard and its 450,000 members in over 3,300 communities play in domestic operations as a bridge between state and Federal military forces. The Guard has moved from being a strategic reserve to an operational one, building new, domestically oriented organizations to deal with the threat. Notably, each state has fielded a weapons of mass destruction civil support team (WMD-CST) with the ability to rapidly assess a suspected chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear event.

As of mid-2008, the National Guard was providing over 50 percent of the combat forces in Iraq; on any given day, the Air and Army National Guard have over 50,000 Airmen and Soldiers deployed around the world. Each day in America, an average of 7,000 Guardsmen are performing homeland defense and security missions under a Governor's control. Guarding critical infrastructure, supporting Customs and Border Protection along the southern border, and supporting law enforcement in counterdrug efforts make up the majority of this support. During natural disasters and emergencies, the number swells dramatically as Guardsmen are called up to support relief efforts.

In addition to being authorized to employ his or her state's National Guard troops, a Governor can also call upon surrounding states to surge support. This is accomplished through the congressionally recognized Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), which allows states to provide mutual aid—Guard and/or other state assets. This is how 50,000 National Guardsmen were able to quickly deploy to Louisiana and Mississippi in Katrina's wake. Participation in EMAC is voluntary, and it may not be as effective in a national event such as a pandemic.

The Department of Defense: Adjusting to Operations in the Homeland

The DOD role in domestic operations has always been problematic. No one Assistant Secretary of Defense has responsibility for the domestic area, and DOD had largely abdicated domestic operations missions to the Army. In fall 2002, Congress established the Assistant Secretary of

Defense for Homeland Defense (ASD [HD])), under the Under Secretary of Policy, with the principal policy responsibility for DOD homeland defense activities. The ASD (HD) was to coordinate with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop the policies and recommendations that would enable homeland defense and defense support of civil authorities and to coordinate DOD domestic preparedness and crisis management functions. The ASD (HD) was recognized as having a special relationship with the homeland combatant command—USNORTHCOM—in guiding command planning and execution within the politically sensitive domestic arena.

ASD (HD) has the unique responsibility of dealing with the complex interagency and intergovernmental partners with which domestic DOD operations must be coordinated. During its first year, this new Assistant Secretary was given oversight of defense critical infrastructure and defense industrial base activities in the homeland. In 2005, the office gained the responsibility for coordinating DOD's assistance in countering threats from nuclear, radiological, biological, chemical, and high-yield explosives.

The office was reorganized and expanded again in 2006 with its transformation to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and America's Security Affairs (ASD HD/ASA). This change gave the relatively new office responsibility for military policy in the entire Western Hemisphere.

National-level Civil-Military Cooperation in the Homeland

The Homeland Security Council and the National Security Council guide civil-military coordination policies and national agendas. Given the similar focus for each of these entities, many officials and reports have called for their merger—as bifurcated homeland and international security policies do not serve the country well. At present, there is no single strong interagency coordination body within the Federal Government; the President cannot easily compel collaboration, and each department level organization functions relatively independently.

The promise of USNORTHCOM was to provide a single point of contact for homeland defense and civil support operations—essentially one operational level organization for Federal and other civil organizations to coordinate with the Active or Title 10 military forces. In the USNORTHCOM headquarters, the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) provides the command and staff with the “rest of the story” in planning and response.

The JIACG provides a framework to integrate interagency partners into planning and exercises. Resident agency representatives from 40 organizations live and work at Peterson Air Force Base and provide the subject matter expertise needed to inform USNORTHCOM's operational planning. Twenty more local organizations contribute as needed. These representatives provide context for military planning to ensure military capabilities are applied in the most effective manner. USNORTHCOM's Interagency Coordination Directorate facilitates this process and ensures two-way information flow between USNORTHCOM and its vital security and defense partners.

During steady-state operations, the representatives on the JIACG team contribute to planning efforts by writing interagency annexes to each USNORTHCOM plan. These annexes provide basic contingency operations guidance regarding the interagency cooperation required to successfully accomplish the plan. It is essential that USNORTHCOM military planners fully understand interagency partner capabilities and limitations at the local, state, and national levels so as to accurately plan for the military support that might be required in the various planning scenarios. USNORTHCOM planners and partners typically form interagency working groups to address specific sectors or requirements or to update particular USNORTHCOM or interagency plans.

JIACG members ensure that USNORTHCOM plans are consistent and coordinated with those of their parent organizations to ensure unity of effort during steady-state and response operations. Conversely, USNORTHCOM planners often augment Federal and state partners in their planning efforts. For example, USNORTHCOM planners have participated in FEMA-led hurricane planning efforts, particularly in the area of evacuation and search and rescue operations.

Deliberate planning efforts are augmented by strong interagency situational awareness in the NORAD and USNORTHCOM Command Center, which maintains contact with interagency operations centers such as the National Operations Center, the DHS center that monitors the Nation's security around the clock. The command center personnel provide information to the commander and staff as emergency situations develop. If an emergency situation warrants, the JIACG will transition to the Interagency Coordination Group (ICG) and fall in on a preconfigured interagency watch center to provide intensive interagency perspective and information-sharing during an exercise or contingency.

ICG members reach back to their agency headquarters and forward to their agency representatives in the field to ensure subject matter exper-

tise is resident in the command. The ICG works as a civil-military team to accomplish a running estimate, an interagency assessment that both informs the commanders' decisionmaking process and provides our interagency partners with insight into the military process.

In addition to Federal interagency partnerships, it is imperative that USNORTHCOM understand the vast private sector and the capabilities that business, academic, faith-based, volunteer, and nongovernmental organizations bring to the homeland mix. USNORTHCOM's Interagency Coordination Directorate, working with DHS, has developed a private sector coordination program designed to ensure the command's planning and response operations are fully supportive of those being conducted by the private sector.

Essential Partnership: Private Sector and International Partners

The private sector does plan and will respond. Perhaps most important from a homeland defense and security standpoint, fully 85 percent of all critical infrastructure in the United States is owned and operated by private sector entities. Defense industrial base, critical telecommunications nodes, and oil and gas pipelines all represent terrorist targets and are essential to the continued operation of the Nation's business. DHS reaches out to private sector entities through its Private Sector Office, its Office of Community and Faith-based Initiatives, and FEMA's volunteer organizations liaison team.

Hurricane Katrina highlighted the need to include the private sector in the National Response Framework. Private sector organizations are essential in critical infrastructure systems and in rapidly restoring commercial activities in order to mitigate the effects of natural or manmade disasters. Planning collaboratively with business and not-for-profit health care and power generation owners and operators is critical. Nongovernmental, volunteer, and faith-based organizations perform essential feeding, sheltering, and other support services that alleviate suffering.

The next great disaster could very well manifest itself along one of our borders, equally affecting the United States and our neighbors in Canada or Mexico. Civil-military relations take on an added dimension when applied across a border. While Canada and the United States enjoy a strong cooperative relationship, the relationship with Mexico is more problematic. Yet the U.S.-Mexico border has a higher threat for both man-made and natural incidents and disasters. It is imperative that civil security and emergency response organizations on both sides of the border proactively collaborate to protect the citizens of both nations.

USNORTHCOM exercises theater security cooperation programs with both Canada and Mexico. Recently, the command has developed cooperative Mexico emergency management engagement opportunities with FEMA, the Environmental Protection Agency, the U.S. Geological Survey, and other civil organizations. The goal is to knit together military and civil planners and responders to ensure unity of effort among civil, military, and international partners.

Legal Constraints on Operations in the Homeland

The U.S. military has historically shied away from operating domestically—as a matter of both law and culture. While all DOD elements would agree that defending the homeland is job one, DOD is much more comfortable accomplishing that defense from a distance, taking on enemies overseas.

The Constitution provides that states are primarily responsible for the welfare of their residents. Specific legislative prohibitions such as the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878,¹ the Insurrection Act of 1807,² the Economy Act of 1933,³ and the Stafford Act⁴ place strict limits on the military's domestic operations.

The Posse Comitatus Act states in its entirety:

Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force⁵ as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.

Today, the act is understood to prohibit Title 10 U.S. military personnel from conducting domestic law enforcement and to preclude domestic elected officials from using the military to achieve their own personal aims. The term *posse comitatus* reflects historical American mistrust of the Federal military born of the experience of British troops forcing colonists to provide food and lodging and, eventually, of those troops (which, at the time, were “federal” troops) being used to try to quell the American Revolution. The law is now interpreted as applying only to Title 10 troops and does not prohibit a Governor from employing the state's militia, or National Guard, in essential law enforcement activities. Posse comitatus discussions are often accompanied by Insurrection Act discussions, as the act details the conditions under which the Federal Government *is* allowed to use Federal forces domestically—in limited circumstances and “only for the pur-

pose of putting down rebellions or enforcing constitutional rights if state authorities fail to do so.”

An interesting conundrum arises from the interaction of the Posse Comitatus Act and the Insurrection Act—their application virtually precludes the use of Title 10 Active-duty and Reserve forces during natural or manmade disasters, unless such disasters rise to a level that somehow fits the definition of putting down rebellions or enforcing constitutional rights. Post-Katrina, the National Defense Authorization Act of 2007 amended the Insurrection Act to give the President the authority to commit both Federal and National Guard troops not only to quell rebellions and ensure constitutional rights, but also to handle more broadly defined emergencies, such as natural disasters and terrorist attacks. While the impetus behind this change was altruistic—ensuring Title 10 Active-duty and Reserve Forces are available to the Nation more quickly during disasters—the change was vehemently opposed by Governors. State chief executive officers held that the change afforded too much authority to the President. A subsequent “all Governors” appeal forced the reversal of the 2007 provision.

Governors realize there is much capacity resident in Title 10 forces, both Active and Reserve, and actively seek ways to tap into that capacity to support state disaster response efforts. The CNGR, after much discussion with state officials, recommended that Governors be afforded the ability to have operational control of Title 10 forces when those forces are activated for state-led disaster response. The classic unity of command argument was applied, as the commission asserted that unique or specific Title 10 capabilities should just be “chopped” to Governors when needed, rather than employed independently with a parallel command structure. This debate continues.

The Economy Act was originally enacted in 1933 as a means to balance budgets and reduce costs, but in the domestic operations arena it generally provides a way for Federal agencies to contract with each other to accomplish specific tasks—on a reimbursable basis. It is this act that makes the military very expensive to use domestically. If, for example, FEMA requires support from DOD, such as aircraft or imagery, FEMA must reimburse DOD for all costs incurred. In most cases, civilian, local, state, or other non-DOD Federal or private sector resources are much less expensive. The result is that the military is often the “first responder of last resort” due to its cost.

The Stafford Act created a system for providing Federal disaster assistance to state and local governments. It dictates that a Presidential Disaster Declaration prompts FEMA to coordinate material and financial assistance

and gives FEMA the responsibility to coordinate government disaster relief efforts. Presidential declarations can be prompted by major disasters, emergencies, fire suppression, defense emergency, and activities in anticipation of an impending disaster. Each type triggers specific funding ceilings, duration of support, and types of support (both military and civilian) that can be employed. The Stafford Act forms the basis of the National Response Framework, which fundamentally dictates DOD civil-military homeland response operations.

The National Response Framework (descendent of the National Response Plan) guides the National response by delineating response principles and defining participating organizations and their roles and missions. The principal of tiered response is a basic NRF tenet. It is generally accepted that emergencies are best handled by the lowest level jurisdiction, such as city or county emergency responders, to speed appropriate response to those in need. In the civil-military arena, this first tier would include the concept of “immediate response” authority in which local military organizations—Active, National Guard, or Reserve—can be part of a short-term “life and limb” effort. As the scope or specificity of the disaster grows, the state provides support to local governments, and Federal authorities provide support to states. To ensure unity of effort, the NRF delineates 15 broad lanes of responsibility, or emergency support functions (ESFs); FEMA coordinates interagency support to local and state authorities by activating specific ESFs as needed. Each ESF is led by a single agency that can call upon other agencies, including DOD, to support that particular ESF mission. For example, ESF 8 (the provision of public health and medical services) is led by the Department of Health and Human Services, but DOD could be called upon to support it in the area of mass fatality management. Interestingly, DOD is in the lead for only one ESF, public works, which is led by the civil side of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. DOD does, however, have a supporting role in all ESFs.

During normal, steady-state operations, FEMA monitors conditions and prepares for response operations through 10 regional offices. In recent months, and in response to lessons learned from Katrina, FEMA has been making its regional response staffs more robust and empowering them to be more proactive in planning and more autonomous in response. DOD promotes the civil-military relationship at this regional level by stationing a defense coordinating officer and a small defense coordinating element (DCO/E) in each of the FEMA regions. These DCO/E teams build relationships with their FEMA counterparts that help DOD in general— and USNORTHCOM in particular— anticipate potential DOD requirements

under the NRE. ARNORTH, as the Joint Land Force Command under US-NORTHCOM, oversees the DCO/E teams during steady-state operations.

In an emergent event, the National Guard under a Governor's control may well be the first DOD uniformed responder, but they can also be quickly joined by Active-duty forces under local commanders who are authorized to provide immediate response in the event an emergency occurs in the vicinity of their bases. Generally, this support is in the immediate area, for a short duration, and for imminent emergency situations.

Some believe that DOD only becomes involved when local and state capabilities are "overwhelmed"—a term that most elected officials do not appreciate. In reality, unique military capabilities can and should be employed immediately and can complement a well-organized state response. In all likelihood, Army and Air National Guard will be employed under the Governor's command before the joint field office is established, and long before the DCO and other Title 10 forces arrive. Specific Title 10 capabilities can be employed at the Governor's request; for example, when Minnesota's I-35 bridge collapsed into the Mississippi River, specialized Navy divers with unique skills not immediately available in the civilian community complemented local efforts. In this event, the Department of Transportation was the lead Federal agency.

It is obvious that there could be at least three different chains of command—all military, all in uniform—showing up at one disaster site: the state's National Guard under the Governor (and other states' National Guard forces under EMAC), the local troops under a base commander, and Active-duty forces under USNORTHCOM. This can be very confusing to the civilian community as the differences in command and status are not readily apparent. During Hurricane Katrina, for example, Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi all called out their state National Guard under the command of their respective Governors. When 40,000 EMAC-facilitated National Guard forces began flowing into the region, National Guard task forces in Louisiana and in Mississippi managed their reception and employment to fulfill the Governors' needs.

The Federal response to Hurricane Katrina was perceived as being late to the fight. State-Federal mistrust, lack of knowledge regarding process, and political agendas appeared to dictate the response. Still, over 70,000 DOD personnel (50,000 Guardsmen and 20,000 Active-duty and civilian employees) deployed to the scene quickly and in most cases were immediately useful. But in some cases, the DOD response was not deconflicted either internally or among interagency partners, resulting in confusion and squandered resources.

What about trying to preclude crisis, prevent attacks, and plan for response? Under the overall goal of keeping the homeland secure, we have national strategies for homeland security, homeland defense, information-sharing, combating terrorism, pandemic influenza, and other potentialities. Through the National Response Framework we have a strategy for response, but until recently the Nation has not had an integrated system to accomplish the planning necessary to implement these strategies and mitigate the effects of crises. In June 2008, DHS released a Draft Integrated Planning System for Homeland Security with a stated purpose to “further enhance the preparedness of the United States by formally establishing a standard and comprehensive approach to national planning.”

As this integrated system begins to develop at the National level, states and regions are also organizing to accomplish integrated planning. One such effort drawn from local roots is the FEMA/Office of the Secretary of Defense–developed concept of a Task Force for Emergency Readiness (TFER). This concept would enable a core planner group at state level that would bring together state, National Guard, DHS, and private sector expertise to specifically address a state’s planning priorities. The interagency team would contribute to building integrated plans that address public, private, military, and civilian capabilities and concerns. Still in the concept phase, this team would be tailored to meet each state’s needs and would report to the state emergency manager or other official as designated by the respective Governors. It is envisioned that state TFERs would eventually provide a conduit to Federal response planning and response capabilities (both DHS and DOD), aid the development of regional planning coordination and response procedures, and implement lessons learned across all levels of government.

Conclusion and Findings

In the homeland, complex operations are impossible without collaboration.

Collaboration is probably more important in the homeland than anywhere else, and it must include the elements of the interagency—Federal and state—as well as international and private sector actors—for-profit, not-for-profit, nongovernmental, and academic organizations.

In the homeland, DOD will never be in the lead.

The distinction between homeland security and homeland defense is not helpful, is divisive, and should be eliminated.

In the homeland, the constitutional roles of the President and the Governors are clear—and lead to considerable executive tension.

This is very evident in the relationship between Federal troops and the National Guard of the individual states. Short of Federalization, a single chain of command is essentially impossible. What might be possible and beneficial is a merger—perhaps a partial one, but better a full one—of USNORTHCOM and the National Guard Bureau.

In the homeland, the actors need the same coordination and collaboration skills and mindsets we seek in complex operations overseas.

This is true particularly with respect to interaction between government and nongovernment players. We believe this is the age of the Joint Interagency Task Forces—led by a Federal agency but comprising needed elements of other agencies, not just Federal and perhaps not just governmental. What the organization is called is not of consequence.

A Final Word

Stability operations is a term and concept with some currency, at least within DOD. Most discount its applicability to the homeland. That is a profound mistake, as students of Katrina can attest. The 54 independent nations—also known as states and territories—that make up our homeland provide all the challenges, and perhaps more, inherent in complex operations elsewhere.

Notes

¹ A useful summary of the Posse Comitatus Act is provided in Eric V. Larson and John E. Peters, *Preparing the U.S. Army for Homeland Security: Concepts, Issues, and Options* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), available at <www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1251/MR1251.AppD.pdf>.

² The Insurrection Act of 1807 is the set of laws that govern the President's ability to deploy troops within the United States to put down lawlessness, insurrection, and rebellion. The laws are chiefly contained in U.S. Code 10, sections 331–335.

³ The Economy Act Agreement for Purchasing Goods or Services permits Federal Government agencies to purchase goods or services from other Federal Government agencies or other major organizational units within the same agency.

⁴ The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (PL 100–707), signed into law November 23, 1988, and amended as the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 (PL 93–288), constitutes the statutory authority for most Federal disaster response activities especially as they pertain to FEMA and its programs. See <www.fema.gov/about/stafact.shtml>.

⁵ The Air Force was added in 1956; the Navy and the Marine Corps are included by a DOD regulation.

Designing a Comprehensive International Approach

Charles L. Barry

International organizations have learned to act together under pressure rather than by design when attempting to resolve conflicts and their aftermath. The rough starts and high cost in lost lives and treasure reflect the lack of prior planning and coordination of arrangements cobbled together on the ground. Even today, after numerous crises and nearly two decades of post–Cold War responses, collaboration continues to begin late and be characterized by arms-length coordination rather than close, continuous cooperation. An international response to crises and conflicts is usually limited to a few actors; it is almost always ad hoc and piecemeal. A more comprehensive application of resources and power emerges only over time, after much earnest but often wasted effort. That is the impact of having few agreements or processes worked out before a crisis is already a full-blown tragedy demanding international attention.

There is a far better way within reach. The international community could address conflicts by employing all elements of power and every resource at its disposal. It could undertake concerted civilian actions early on, perhaps even preventing conflicts. Such a goal is possible only if organizations agree to cooperate before a crisis unfolds, and they put in place the mechanism they will need to employ should preventative steps fail. What is required is a comprehensive approach to conflicts, one that brings to bear all relevant resources, both military and civilian, cooperating for a return to bona fide security and legitimate governance.

Considerable conflict resolution resources are available from a host of international and multinational organizations. A number of these organizations are always poised to respond and have been doing so—albeit independently of each other, and often of their own members—for many years. These organizations and their members constitute a vast reservoir of capabilities that can be brought to bear wherever their interests coincide.

The United States has membership in many of these organizations, and could take the lead in bringing them together in a better organized and more effective comprehensive approach to conflict resolution.

The premise behind the comprehensive approach is simple: applying all elements of power with sufficient resources early in a crisis (or postconflict situation) greatly reduces the social, economic, and physical damage to the society under stress, and hastens the return to peace at lower cost to all concerned, the protagonists as well as the international community.

This chapter describes the potential for contributing to a comprehensive approach from international partner organizations. It uses the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a principal example, but the basic concepts presented here also apply to Asia, Latin America, and other nations. Some have strong, demonstrated capabilities, while others may be able to contribute only after many more years of nurturing. Still, every potential contributor is important. Demand will always outstrip the capacities of a few actors. Even relatively new organizations can afford a diplomatic opening to their members to get involved, some of whom may not be able to get involved directly in a future crisis.

An International Grand Strategy for Conflict Resolution

The United States is undertaking to design a coordinated, comprehensive international approach as the “new norm” in response to crises or conflicts. Such a response will be solicited from as broad a cohort of international responders as possible, both nations and collective organizations, public and private. In doing so, the greatest reservoir of talent is introduced early and in the most organized way. Getting buy-in to this approach will require discourse, investment, and negotiations.

In headline form, the elements that must be brought to bear are diplomatic, informational, military, economic, and societal (DIMES) resources, specifically a comprehensive approach to:

- *Diplomacy.* Resolution of crisis or conflicts usually requires intense and complex negotiations among protagonists. Resolution is never easy and can be made more difficult if all possible channels are not pursued in concert. Ideally, all international organizations unite their diplomatic offices to end the conflict.
- *Information communications.* Restoring communications channels and promulgating accurate, current, and relevant information are critical to reestablishment of governance and public order. These systems are essential to collaboration, cooperation, and informa-

tion-sharing among international actors and local stakeholders. Indigenous systems must interface with international resources to reopen communications and information channels, thwart disruptions (including cyber attacks), and extend the reach of legitimate government channels throughout the affected country. Comprehensive information flows facilitate reconstruction and development across all elements of DIMES.

- *Military engagement.* Security is essential to reestablishing conditions of public safety and security. It is also indispensable to the initiation of reconstruction and postcrisis development. Military presence tends to last much longer than expected. It must be sustained and adequate to prevent a return of hostilities, lawlessness, or the emergence of an insurgent movement that could disrupt legitimate authority.
- *Economic and financial solutions.* Economic commitment to recovery is essential. Donor conferences have become the norm. However, commitments often are slow to materialize in the face of great need. Funds also must be wisely managed and provided consistent with the capacity to apply them. Corruption, both internal to the area and from external opportunists, is a threat to be addressed in the earliest planning stages. The ultimate goal should be to reestablish a solid economy and finance system, supportive of stability and independent development. This requires substantial resources from abroad, plus solid local and global expertise.
- *Societal-cultural solutions.* The root causes of conflict are often the apparent or actual disenfranchisement and oppression of identifiable religious, ethnic, or racial groups. Overcoming deep-seated animosities can take generations of healing under conditions of fairness and transparency. This has been (or is well on the way to being) achieved in some parts of the developed world. The knowledge of how to construct or rebuild social ties must be brought to bear in a concerted way. It requires engagement by an effective contingent of sociologists advising local leaders and international diplomats.

Designing a comprehensive international approach is a huge undertaking. It will take time and skill to move the model from design to reality. A roadmap is required to transition from the present piecemeal efforts to a more deliberate response. The early tasks will be to set up an effective way to explain the initiative and its worthy goal. Gaining commitments from

allies and international organizations to collaborate in advance will not be easy; most are reluctant to signal any commitment until facts on the ground and the relevant international situation are clear. Ideally, existing allies can be the first to accept the new approach, followed by a steadily expanding circle of partner countries and organizations. Over time, a strong and vast network of potential partners will be realized, though the few main international actors will be critical to success.

NATO's Comprehensive Approach: Lessons from the Balkans and Afghanistan

Applying an international comprehensive approach to conflict resolution is a fresh proposal, yet a fundamentally simple concept. It means bringing all elements of power to bear, in the most effective way possible, to get prompt results. That requires prior agreement, collaboration, and planning among international actors. It is similar on an international scale to the U.S. initiative to build interagency capacity alongside the Department of Defense.

In two cases, the Balkans and Afghanistan, NATO has gained almost 13 years of continuous experience working with other international partners toward conflict resolution. Today, NATO remains engaged in Bosnia as an advisory headquarters and potential reserve organization to the European Union (EU), in Kosovo as the active military partner to the EU, and in Afghanistan as the major security and stabilization force under the United Nations (UN). In each of these conflicts, NATO arrived early and began to establish roles and mission relationships with other actors on the ground. All organizations were in reaction mode, with minimal awareness of each other's processes, priorities, and organizational cultures. No agreements existed between them, and often the first task was to make initial introductions and negotiate relationships, even as the situation was in dire need of immediate action.

In Bosnia, NATO arrived with 60,000 troops in December 1995, after the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina was initialed at the Dayton Proximity Talks.¹ Its role, as the Implementation Force (IFOR), was to enforce the military aspects of the Framework Agreement and head a Joint Military Commission. A UN High Representative, with no authority over IFOR, oversaw implementation of civilian aspects of the agreement as chair of a Joint Civilian Commission. Major tasks were given to particular agencies of the UN, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), including oversight of

human rights violations, accounting for the release of combatants, arms limitations, establishment of confidence- and security-building measures, and oversight of elections. Many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) were already in country providing humanitarian assistance, and the Western European Union/EU had ongoing missions, respectively, policing in Mostar and border patrolling along the Danube River. All parties' natural focus was on mounting their particular operation, with only limited liaison to other agencies. Learning curves everywhere were steep, and performance was degraded by stovepipe-style execution, resistance to information-sharing, and competition for limited resources, such as the use of airports, vehicles, ground transport routes, and communications links. Only slowly, through painful experience and considerable difficulty, did ties among agencies grow stronger and more open. The lesson for NATO, from IFOR until its subsequent Stabilization Force mission was turned over to the EU in December 2004, was to underscore the need—much earlier in crisis response—for better understanding and teamwork among international agencies.

NATO's postconflict role in Kosovo began in June 1999, at the conclusion of its air campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. NATO deployed as many as 50,000 troops from members, partners, and allied countries as the Kosovo Force (KFOR), a peace enforcement force under UN mandate. According to NATO, KFOR's initial mission set was five-fold: "to deter renewed hostility and threats against Kosovo by Yugoslav and Serb forces; to establish a secure environment and ensure public safety and order; to demilitarize the Kosovo Liberation Army; to support the international humanitarian effort; and coordinate with and support the international civil presence."² In effect, NATO had to cooperate with many international partners, including the UN Interim Mission in Kosovo³ for issues related to police and justice as well as civil administration, with the OSCE for matters involving democratization and institution-building, and with the EU regarding reconstruction and economic development. Each of these portfolios had critical implications for NATO's missions. Many NGOs were also involved in these efforts. While experience in Bosnia meant cooperation began on a higher plane, it still suffered from much the same lack of coordination and planning, and parallel versus integrated operations, that impeded progress in Bosnia. Even 8 years later, many issues concerning refugees, property returns, sectarian violence, dual-ethnicity institutions (in the Mitrovica area), and the handover of security to trained local police and military units remain to be completed.

In Afghanistan, the 50,000-plus NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) faces a far more difficult challenge in civil-military teamwork than its Balkan predecessors. The realities of a full-scale counterinsurgency war, a bona fide sovereign government, a burgeoning opium trade, and a vastly larger and less hospitable area of operations are just some of the unique challenges of Afghanistan. NATO's mission is "to assist the Government of Afghanistan and the International Community in maintaining security within [the ISAF] area of operation. ISAF supports the Government of Afghanistan in expanding its authority to the rest of the country, and in providing a safe and secure environment conducive to free and fair elections, the spread of the rule of law, and the reconstruction of the country."⁴ NATO did not assume control of the ISAF mission until August 2003, almost 2 years after the end of initial hostilities. Many civilian agencies were already on the ground as NATO began its mission, first in Kabul and then expanding gradually to assume responsibility for the whole country. NATO's role calls for coordination at many levels with multiple NGOs, several UN agencies, and the European Union. However, none of these efforts enjoy integrated planning or well-established channels for routine coordination of programs. Much is left to the initiative of individuals on the ground and their capacity to develop effective relationships among stakeholders—which leaves a lot to chance in a highly volatile environment for NATO's 26 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and 5 regional commands. However, the EU is separately responsible for police training throughout the country,⁵ and is engaged in multiple assistance programs under the European Commission Humanitarian Organization, including food security in rural areas, demining, funding schools, and refugee return. These types of operations are the essential civilian components of conflict resolution and would benefit from close coordination with NATO and other agencies.

In recognition of the enduring disconnects evident in the Balkan and Afghanistan operations, Denmark elaborated a concept called the Comprehensive Approach (CA) and succeeded in putting it on NATO's agenda in 2004. The Danes saw that, even though NATO had no operational civilian capabilities, the need for coordinating such resources had been demonstrated in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. Each response had been initiated without early and effective civil-military coordination, and mostly uninformed by lessons learned in previous operations. The result was waste of resources (and lives) while organizations sorted out tasks and relationships in the midst of a crisis rather than beforehand, in the so-called zero or shaping phase of crisis response. The Danes wanted

NATO to change that and, in June 2005, convened a seminar to open the CA discussion within the Alliance. The aim was not to develop new NATO capabilities, but to strengthen the capabilities the Alliance already had in civil planning and engage in cooperation with other international organizations, initially at the strategic policy level, and ultimately at the operational field level.

In spring 2006, Denmark and six other countries—the Czech Republic, Canada, Hungary, the Netherlands, Norway, and Slovakia—circulated a paper within the Alliance describing the basic ideas underpinning the CA initiative. The United Kingdom and United States later joined the initiative. In November 2006 at the Riga summit, NATO endorsed the Comprehensive Approach as its concept for conflict management and response. NATO leaders directed that an Action Plan be developed for how the Alliance would incorporate the CA internally and in its relations with other organizations, most notably the UN and EU. The Action Plan was endorsed in April 2008 at Bucharest. Since that time, NATO staffs have been implementing the plan's main features, which are to:

- improve NATO's crisis management and relevant planning procedures, both political and military
- improve practical cooperation with the UN and other organizations, including NGOs and local actors
- enhance NATO's military support to stabilization and reconstruction operations throughout all phases of conflicts.

Yet NATO's CA initiative has not been entirely a success. The most difficult obstacle has been an unrelated political impasse that frustrates the deepening of NATO–EU relations, including planning and coordinating actions in advance of operations. The sticking point centers on Turkey's objections to sharing NATO information with non-partner Cyprus, an EU member. The impasse demonstrates both the value and penalty of consensus decisionmaking. NATO and the EU must work in earnest to find a solution so that operations already under way can be afforded the best possible planning and coordination at the highest levels. The path ahead will require continuous emphasis from NATO and national leaders.

Global Partners

Primary Global Partners

Four major institutions—the United Nations, NATO, the European Union, and OSCE—have taken on crisis-response missions repeatedly and,

at least on occasion, beyond a regional scope. These organizations have demonstrated they are the mainstays of partner capacity at the international level. The strengths and weaknesses of each are described below, applying the DIMES model of institutional capacities.

*United Nations.*⁶ The primary global organization for conflict resolution is the United Nations. Many countries and institutions regard UN sanctioning to be essential to their participation in any operation. A UN resolution alone is rarely enough to restore peace, but for many countries it is an essential prerequisite for military action. UN peacekeepers provided by member states are sent to regions where armed conflict has recently ceased (or paused) to enforce the terms of peace agreements and discourage combatants from resuming hostilities. The founders of the UN had envisaged that the organization would act to prevent conflicts between nations and make future wars impossible. Since the Cold War, UN peacekeeping missions have mushroomed in number, size, and duration, straining UN capacities and the resources of its 192 member states. The United Nations has not only acted to keep the peace but also occasionally intervened in armed conflicts, the first of which was the Korean War (1950–1953). More recently, the UN authorized the liberation of Kuwait after the 1990 invasion by Iraq.

Reciprocally, the United States can help strengthen UN peacekeeping by increasing planning and training participation with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) staff. It can share relevant U.S. doctrine and embrace the value of UN peacekeeping in ways that garner stronger participation from all members. The United States can also help build UN capacities by working more closely with the UN to coordinate operations and U.S. support for UNDPKO.⁷

Several relevant UN subagencies are:

- UNDPKO. The UN leads 18 different peacekeeping missions in Africa, the Caribbean, the Middle East, Europe, and Asia. Serving in these missions are over 88,500 military and civilian personnel.⁸ Total approved annual expenses were over US\$5 billion for the period July 2006 to June 2007. The UN is also the largest source of deployable police officers in the world. The DPKO Police Division manages 15 police missions worldwide comprising almost 17,000 UN police.
- UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).⁹ Since 1950, UNHCR and its predecessor organization have been mandated to lead and coordinate international action to protect refugees and resolve refugee problems worldwide. Its primary purpose is to safeguard the

rights and well-being of refugees. It strives to ensure that everyone can exercise the right to seek asylum and find safe refuge in another state, with the option to return home voluntarily, integrate locally, or resettle in a third country. UNHCR's mandate has gradually been expanded to include protecting and providing humanitarian assistance to what it describes as other persons "of concern," including internally displaced persons (IDPs). UNHCR presently has major missions in Lebanon, South Sudan, Chad/Darfur, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kenya to assist and provide services to IDPs and refugees.

- UN Development Program (UNDP).¹⁰ The program, which operates in 166 of the world's 192 countries, is the largest source of expert advice, training, and technical assistance grants in the world, though all its funds come from contributions from member countries. Primary UNDP goals include strengthening democratic governance, reducing poverty, preventing and recovering from crises, and addressing energy and environmental issues—in particular, access to clean drinking water. The UNDP strategy of creating local capacity as the key to human development makes it a strong partner in postconflict reconstruction and development.
- The World Food Program (WFP).¹¹ The program is the food aid branch of the UN, providing food to about 90 million people a year, 58 million of whom are children. In 2006, WFP distributed 4 million metric tons of food to 87.8 million people in 78 countries; 63.4 million beneficiaries were aided in emergency operations, including victims of conflict, natural disasters, and economic failure in Kenya, Lebanon, and Sudan. In 2007, WFP's Sudan operation required US\$685 million to provide food assistance to 5.5 million people (2.8 million in Darfur alone). More recently, WFP aircraft have begun deliveries to Georgia to head off a hunger crisis among large numbers of internal refugees.
- The World Health Organization (WHO).¹² The organization is a primary partner agency of the UN in the areas of fostering health security, strengthening local health care systems, monitoring and responding to the threat of epidemics, and promoting development that reduces poverty, which is a leading factor in health and life expectancy. WHO maintains representatives in most countries that are able to provide local expertise on health issues. WHO is a prominent partner in relief efforts for natural disasters, such as the December 2004 South Asia tsunami and Cyclone Nargis, which struck Burma in 2008.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO is the security cornerstone for building partner capacity for crisis response. It initiated the concept of a comprehensive approach to conflict resolution under Danish leadership as early as 2005 and continues to elaborate it under its CA Action Plan, endorsed at the 2008 summit in Bucharest. NATO is primarily a military organization and is the most militarily capable multinational organization, with current major operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo. These military missions provide the perspective from which NATO elaborated the need for complementary civilian capacities that can rapidly deploy to conflict areas. Kosovo has been a NATO mission since 1999, Afghanistan since 2004. These long-running missions underscored for NATO the critical need for greater cooperation and partnership among the agencies providing security and those trying to achieve development.

NATO also has the capacity to organize civilian resources through its decades-old Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee and Civil Emergency Planning Directorate.¹³ These agencies can staff and coordinate all manner of nonmilitary contributions from member states, capabilities that—like most NATO military forces—are national rather than Alliance-owned. In Afghanistan, where NATO faces its most serious challenge, member states have assembled 26 nationally staffed and operated PRTs to work under NATO protection in remote areas. PRTs are one component of a comprehensive approach, but they are haphazard, cobbled together independently of each other, dissimilar in organization, and subject more to national direction than to coordinated mandates from an in-country civilian entity.

NATO has limitations when it comes to civilian capacity. It has concentrated on support to military operations, such as commercial transportation and logistics infrastructure. NATO's civil agencies know how, for example, to organize and manage road, rail, and riverine transit systems. NATO can couple these capacities with its military to assist in initial humanitarian aid and reconstruction following a crisis (as it did in response to the 2007 Pakistan earthquake) or conflict (as it is doing to aid PRTs in Afghanistan). For disaster response coordination, NATO has established the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center to work with UN agencies and its own members and partners to bring about a rapid, effective response. NATO has no capacity or plans to acquire robust civilian capacity of its own. For these resources, it calls on members to contribute nationally, as seen in the example of PRTs and the initial effort by Germany (now under the EU) to train police in Afghanistan. Over the longer term, NATO intends to call on the already strong

civilian crisis response capabilities of its long-term partners, the United Nations, European Union, and OSCE.

As mainly a military organization, NATO has facilitated the conduct of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) operations through its training and exercising for interaction with civilians in a conflict environment, including local authorities as well as international organizations, and representatives of other governmental and nongovernmental civilian agencies. The growing demand for CIMIC expertise led in 2001 to an attempt to establish an operational civil-military headquarters. Over time the headquarters role evolved into the training of both operational units and planning staffs engaged in CIMIC. In 2003, NATO approved a doctrine for CIMIC operations.¹⁴ The headquarters was determined to be better suited to the role of a center of excellence to develop doctrine and to train a cadre of CIMIC personnel across NATO. The CIMIC Center of Excellence was accredited by Allied Command Transformation in 2007 and is now open to students from the EU, NGOs, and other international agencies, as well as for NATO personnel.

European Union. The EU can bring a great deal of civilian capacity and a broad range of capabilities to the table under a comprehensive approach concept. Its main areas of expertise lie in the areas of governance, infrastructure reconstruction, and civil-sector development: customs and border matters, policing and judicial systems, institution and facilities development, and resourcing commercial enterprise. Recently, the EU has expanded to conduct small military peace enforcement and police monitoring and training operations. While these are promising for the future, the EU's primary contributions are in the economic and social sectors.

The EU Commission has nearly as many country delegations (about 120 European Commission Delegations [ECDs]) operating worldwide as the UN, each focused mainly on commercial development through aid and advice programs. It has mature, longstanding assistance programs across Eurasia, South Asia, Africa, and Latin America, delivering millions of euros each year to governments and private-sector enterprises. In addition to its ECDs, the EU has deployed civilian Special Representatives to specific crisis areas, such as Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Sudan. These representatives coordinate all manner of EU assistance and report directly to the EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Council. EU military, police, and civilian aid programs are harmonized in this way. However, the EU's competencies for civilian crisis response are a much wider portfolio and include

programs for humanitarian aid, assistance to displaced persons, civil protection, democracy building, rule of law, human rights protection, food aid and security, reconstruction, and mine action.¹⁵

The European Union works closely with the United Nations and maintains a staff there of approximately 30 civilian and military personnel to coordinate peace operations. (NATO, in contrast, has only one military officer at UN headquarters.) However, the EU and NATO have yet to construct sufficient modalities to coordinate their crisis response actions in advance, in spite of their well-established, side-by-side operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan. The notable exception is Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the EU assumed NATO's military mission, with continuing NATO support and potential reinforcement. The void in NATO-EU cooperation is the most gaping hole in achieving strong partnerships among the major organizations available for crisis response.

Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe. OSCE is the largest regional organization in the world, serving as both a forum for political dialogue and a vehicle for nonmilitary security action. Its 56 participating states from Europe, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and North America cover most of the Northern Hemisphere. OSCE deploys civilian resources and adjunct military staff to assist in preventing crises and resolving conflicts across Europe, and it has twice deployed outside Europe to Afghanistan.

OSCE's pedigree, beginning in the mid-1970s and continuing today, has been in arms control, military confidence- and security-building measures, human rights monitoring, and democratic institution-building, including election monitoring. Its stated aim is to secure stability in the European region, based on democratic practices and improved governance. It furthers these goals through its Forum for Security Cooperation, Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, and Conflict Prevention Center. The center has produced a number of practical tools for control and disposal of excess small arms and ammunition and exchange of military information between and among its members' militaries and other parties as a means of increasing transparency and preventing miscalculations. The center provides support to field operations for early warning, conflict resolution, and rehabilitation, including border management and the return of refugees.

The OSCE has fewer than 500 staff among its various agencies; approximately 3,000 additional staff operate in the field, supported by five times that number of non-OSCE-funded local hires. Approximately 70 percent of its budget of just over \$164 million (in 2008) goes to field

operations. In terms of civilian partner capacity, the OSCE offers high-value capabilities that are accustomed to partnering with other organizations across Europe, notably the UN, EU, and NATO, to which its members also belong.

The OSCE is a relatively untapped and unheralded participant in a comprehensive approach, ripe for providing increased support to complex operations, should its members reach that agreement. However, it has not held a summit in almost 10 years, and its Ministerial Council (member Foreign Ministers) meets only annually. Ongoing operations are overseen by weekly Permanent Council meetings at the Ambassador level. OSCE's modest budget, mentioned above, shrank slightly from 2007 to 2008. OSCE's current missions are in Afghanistan, Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia, Croatia, Georgia/South Ossetia, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine.

The discussion of the above agencies and their relevant subagencies indicating the areas of partner capacity they bring to the table is summarized in table 13–1.

Table 13–1. Primary Response Partners and Key Subagencies

United Nations

- High Commissioner for Refugees: Refugee matters
- Department of Peacekeeping Operations: Peacekeepers, police
- Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs: Humanitarian affairs
- Mine Action Service: Land mines
- Office on Drugs and Crime: Combating drugs and crime
- World Food Programme: Food aid
- World Health Organization: Health security

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

- Allied Command Operations: Full spectrum military response
- Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee/Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre: Civil emergency planning and assistance
- North Atlantic Council: Diplomatic
- Allied Command Transformation: Comprehensive approach experimentation and doctrine

European Union

- Common Foreign and Security Policy Rapid Reaction Mechanism and European Community Humanitarian Aid Office: Humanitarian aid

- European Security and Defense Policy: Military, police, and civilian security sector
- European Council and High Representative: Diplomatic
- Commission: Development aid

Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe

- Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights: Democracy, election monitoring, and human rights
- Office of the Representative on Freedom of the Media: Freedom of media and expression
- Security Cooperation Forum: Confidence- and security-building measures
- Conflict Prevention Center: Early warning, operations.

Essential Specialized Partners

Several other institutions or groups are also steadfast partners in conflict resolution: the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the ever-present NGOs. The contributions of these partners are reviewed below.

World Bank. The World Bank Group—in particular the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA)—is focused on developing countries in fields such as human development (education, health), agriculture and rural development (irrigation, rural services), environmental protection (pollution reduction, establishing and enforcing regulations), infrastructure (roads, urban regeneration, electricity), and governance (anticorruption, development of legal institutions).

The IBRD and IDA provide loans at preferential rates to member countries, as well as grants to the poorest countries. Loans or grants for specific projects are often linked to wider policy changes in a sector of the economy. For example, a loan to improve coastal environmental management may be linked to development of new environmental institutions at national and local levels and the implementation of new regulations to limit pollution.

International Monetary Fund (IMF). The primary mission of the IMF is to provide financial assistance to countries that experience serious financial and economic difficulties using funds deposited with the institution from its 185 member countries. Member states with balance of payments problems, which often arise from those difficulties, may request loans to help fill gaps between what countries earn and/or are able to borrow from other official lenders and what countries must spend to operate, including covering the cost of importing basic goods and services. In return, countries are usually required to launch certain reforms that have often been

dubbed the Washington Consensus. These reforms are generally required because countries with fixed exchange rate policies can engage in fiscal, monetary, and political practices that may lead to the crisis itself.

Nongovernmental organizations. In addition to global and regional multinational organizations, a comprehensive approach must also include early and regular strategic coordination with at least the most prominent of an estimated 44,000 nongovernmental international organizations.¹⁶ Chief among these are Doctors without Borders, Oxfam, Catholic Relief Organization, and World Vision. NGOs are a strong and growing cohort among crisis responders.

In 2000, 5 years after the Balkan conflicts claimed nearly a quarter million lives, and 2 years after the Rwandan conflict resulted in almost 800,000 civilian dead, the United Nations argued that the international community had a “right to protect” against ethnic cleansing, genocide, and crimes against humanity. Canada followed with a Responsibility to Protect project. Transnational civil action by operational NGOs and alliances¹⁷ of NGOs in areas of crisis has increased. Often these agencies are on the ground well before international intervention and remain after military action, if any, is concluded. In short, they are a valuable, if independent, resource, and it is essential to develop as close a relationship as possible with them.¹⁸ In addition, members of NGOs can come under attack and need both diplomatic and military protection.

The ICRC and the Red Crescent are other special international organizations that play powerful roles in many postconflict situations, particularly in accounting for refugees, prisoners, and internally displaced persons. The ICRC also provides food, shelter, and humanitarian relief to victims of conflict. Afghanistan is one of the ICRC’s largest operations, with 88 international representatives and almost 1,200 national workers.

In broad terms, the organizational partners described thus far can meet the DIMES competencies as shown in table 13–2.

Potential Regional International Partners

The organizations listed below are the most prominent in their respective geographic regions. None are strong sources of DIMES capabilities today; however, they represent the state of play in terms of regional cooperation that has a long path ahead before anything like the global players described above emerges. In terms of contributions to a comprehensive approach, they should be looked to first for diplomacy and second for assistance in gathering economic and societal assistance from their members. It is important to review these organizations to be aware of their current

Table 13–2. **Conflict Response Capabilities of Major International Organizations**

	Diplomatic	Informational	Military	Economic	Societal
United Nations	X	X	X	X	X
North Atlantic Treaty Organization	X	X	X	X	X
European Union	X	X	X	X	X
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe	X	X			X
International Monetary Fund/World Bank		X		X	
Nongovernmental Organizations		X		X	X

and potential strengths and weaknesses for contributing to a comprehensive approach. Understanding them will also aid in knowing what kinds of partners they may require in the event of crisis in their regions.

Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Established in 1967, ASEAN is the primary forum among Asian countries for building consensus toward a future comprehensive approach capability. ASEAN was established on the cardinal principle of nonintervention in national affairs. Members are mutually committed to not use force and confrontation, as well as a reluctance to institutionalize and legalize regional cooperation. They favor informal and underinstitutionalized forms of regional cooperation. Collectively, these features are known as the ASEAN Way. International connections to ASEAN for the United States are via bilateral relations with members, but also via the annual ASEAN Regional Forum. The forum decided in 2007 to establish a group for quick response to emergencies, and over the long term may be an emerging forum for security dialogue in Asia. Although ASEAN has not engaged in crisis response,¹⁹ it is a nascent forum for dialogue and potential cooperation on crisis response in its region.

African Union (AU). The AU is an intergovernmental organization of 53 African nations, established in 2002 by the amalgamation of two earlier African collectives, the African Economic Community and the Organization of African Unity. The AU has lofty goals to become the equivalent of the EU, with a single currency, and integrated defense forces and political structures. The purpose of the union is to help secure democracy, human

rights, and a sustainable economy, bring an end to intra-African conflict, and create an effective common market. The AU first undertook military intervention in May 2003 with the deployment of a peacekeeping force from South Africa, Ethiopia, and Mozambique to Burundi to oversee the implementation of the various agreements. Today, AU troops are also deployed in the Darfur region of Sudan and in Somalia.

Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The six-nation GCC,²⁰ formed in 1981 in reaction to the Iran-Iraq War, is primarily a trade organization and, like other regional organizations, is more a potential than an actual contributor to conflict resolution. However, recent joint statements with the EU indicate a willingness to take collective political positions, including on conflicts in Iraq and the Israel-Palestine situation. GCC members could make crucial contributions in diplomacy and economic recovery of conflict-destabilized states in the Middle East.

Organization of American States (OAS). The OAS is not often visible with regard to conflict resolution, but it has played an important role facilitating attempts to resolve conflicts in the Americas, both through formal participation in UN missions, as in Haiti, and through supporting negotiations.²¹ It is a longstanding regional organization and a potential partner in any international comprehensive approach in the Western Hemisphere. The OAS membership includes 35 independent states of the Americas. Nearly as important are more than 60 permanent observers from countries around the globe, including Russia, China, and several countries of the Middle East. The European Union is also a permanent observer. The OAS and OSCE recently called for closer, albeit unspecified forms of, cooperation and information-sharing.²²

Council of Europe (COE). COE membership creates an important benchmark for European countries, because membership essentially means the council approves of a country's democratic governance processes, including due regard for legal standards, human rights, cultural cooperation, democracy, and fair elections. Belarus is the one country in Europe denied membership since 1993 due to questions over election practices and freedom of the media. Others not accepted as sufficiently democratic are Kazakhstan, Kosovo, and the Holy See. Russia was granted membership in 1996. Established in 1947, the COE had 47 members in 2008.

The COE commits its members by way of conventions to particular matters intended to further ground core values across Europe. In this way, the COE is a useful tool in conflict prevention. Key conventions are the

European Convention on Human Rights, the Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, the Convention Against Corruption and Organized Crime, and the Convention on Cybercrime.

The United States has observer status at all COE deliberations. The COE's primary capacity as a partner to the United States in terms of a comprehensive approach to conflicts is its influence in conflict within Europe, broadly defined. For example, in the August 2008 conflict between Russia and Georgia—both COE members—the COE's European Court of Rights, at Georgia's request, invoked procedures asking both parties to submit information for a determination of violations of human rights. The convention carries the weight of international law. While likely not decisive by themselves, such tools of law and diplomacy are components of a comprehensive approach to conflict resolution.²³

Contact Groups

Contact groups have become an important informal tool in managing conflict resolution. An early, well-known use of this tool was with the Balkans Contact Group, composed of France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. These were the biggest troop-contributing countries and largest donors. They also included four of five members of the UN Security Council, under whose resolutions operations were authorized. A similar arrangement has been used since 2006 with regard to the conflict in Somalia (members: the European Union, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Tanzania, the United Kingdom, and the United States). Contact groups facilitate decisionmaking by keeping the groups small and limited to high stakeholders in terms of commitment to the crisis of concern. By being temporary arrangements, devoid of stand-alone bureaucracies and focused on a single issue, contact groups have a higher probability of being effective than large standing agencies with myriad competencies to oversee.


Based on the above discussions and categorization of U.S. partners among international organizations, a concentric model of major organizations with the potential to contribute partnership capacities across the DIMES paradigm is portrayed in figure 13–1.

Options for Institutional Connections

Strategic communications. The international community of organizations and their members, the community of nations, are a critical audience interested in understanding the U.S. approach to conflict resolution. Establishing robust, reliable means for two-way communications is as important

as ensuring that the right messages are sent. Sustained political engagement with partners should be initiated at multiple institutional levels, as well as among expert, nongovernmental entities that help shape organizational policy options. Systemic conduits are also important, beginning

Figure 13–1. **Global, Specialized, and Regional Partners for Crisis Response**



perhaps with liaison and visit policies, and proceeding to information exchanges and participation in selected events.

Options for strategic communications span the array of mediums. All means should be open and used with regularity such that the expectation is created that, in crises, various means will provide accurate U.S. positions and policies. In turn, the United States should develop ways to receive communications from organizational and key international partners to have a ready, accurate understanding of the positions of potential partners, and to gauge how well our own messages are getting through.

Building greater capacity and more effective cooperation. The United States will have to take a long view for building lasting, international partners for a comprehensive approach to conflict resolution, including

postconflict stability operations and reconstruction, both initial and long-term. Several opportunities present themselves:

- First, for Washington's relations with its most important partners—the UN (and its primary sub-agencies), NATO, OSCE, and the EU—much recent experience on the ground continues to yield a wealth of lessons learned that should be treasured collectively and applied to future coordination as early as possible in the runup to crises.
- Second, the United States must not ignore lower profile yet essential reconstruction partners, such as the World Bank, the IMF, and the relevant NGOs in each applicable competency. Specialized programs should be designed to enhance the capacities of the World Bank and IMF. Relations with NGOs are necessarily based on political and environmental factors. However, a strong, sustained program of outreach and transparency, as well as inclusion in exercises and regular dialogue, would provide a foothold and a basis for fine-tuning as relationships emerge.
- Third, the United States cannot afford to focus too narrowly on its traditional partners. Benefits may be reaped from investing in the future of the AU, GCC, ASEAN, and OAS as regional partners that may someday be stronger partners able to contribute critical capabilities.

Building partnerships prior to the need to respond. The United States needs a concerted program of interaction that will lead to agreements to react rapidly and collectively in time of crisis to bring to bear the required elements of DIMES. Conferences and workshops, as well as multidiscipline experimentation, should be designed with an eye to variable geometry to determine the most acceptable venue for international support and participation by policymakers and analysts across the spectrum of powers and resources desired.

Establishing sustaining partnerships during operations. Once partners have agreed to bring their resources to bear, either in-theater or in other relevant ways, the United States will need the requisite organizational, leadership, and negotiating skills to sustain partner participation over the long time frame of conflict resolution and reconstruction. As demonstrated in NATO's quest for added support in Afghanistan, a strategy to gain and maintain public support over the long haul is essential. In turn, it is necessary when setting goals to develop the public case for their achievement, and for the resources required over the anticipated length of mission.

Conclusion and Findings

The international situation demands far better crisis response and conflict management than we have today.

However, the cultural barriers to cooperation between and among international organizations are high; they pose a significant obstacle to achieving an international comprehensive approach. To proceed, a strategy must be found to lower and ultimately eliminate barriers to cooperation. Two or three institutions should take the initiative, demonstrating success that others can emulate.

The United States should develop and pursue a comprehensive approach agenda in each of the primary organizations of which it is a member (the UN, NATO, OSCE, World Bank, and IMF).

The United States should seek deeper contact with and perhaps limited participation as an observer in organizations where it is not a member.

The goal must be to cultivate support for, and contributions to, a comprehensive international approach to crisis and conflict resolution. The most important of these organizations is the EU.

In seeking conduits to organizations where the United States is neither a member nor a direct observer, close allies may be the best opportunity to establish ties and make the case for appropriate support.

The most promising organizations in addition to the EU are the AU, ASEAN, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

The NATO Comprehensive Approach initiative is a useful model for other organizations to follow.

At the same time, NATO needs to add momentum to the program through efforts to marshal the nonmilitary capabilities of its members.

Any initiative to harness international organizations to partnering arrangements must take into account their natural autonomy and their need for cooperation.

Sharing information and establishing closer consultations, collaboration, and planning earlier in the process are achievable early goals. If realized, such confidence-building activities will provide the foundation for greater cooperation in the mid- to long term.

Notes

¹ These talks among representatives of the Republics of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were held at Dayton, Ohio, in October-November 1995. The agreement was

initiated on November 30, witnessed by the members of the Balkans Contact Group—France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—plus the European Union Special Negotiator.

² See “Kosovo Force (KFOR)” on NATO Web site at <www.nato.int/issues/kfor/index.html>.

³ Although Kosovo declared its independence on February 17, 2008, disagreement among UN Security Council members has caused the UN Mission in Kosovo’s handover of its responsibilities to drag on. Thus, it officially maintains responsibility for administration of Kosovo as UN Resolution 1244 remains in effect.

⁴ See NATO in “Afghanistan Factsheet,” July 5, 2007, at <www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/040628-factsheet.htm>.

⁵ The EU Police Mission in Afghanistan was agreed May 30, 2007, and extends until May 30, 2010. It consists of 230 police and rule of law experts responsible for training the Afghan National Police and facilitating establishment of a judicial system. It reports to the EU through the EU Special Representative, on site in Kabul. The EU has authorized release of relevant local EU classified information to NATO/ISAF.

⁶ General reference for this section is the UN Web site, available at <www.un.org/aboutun/>.

⁷ See Nancy Soderberg, “U.S. Support for UN Peacekeeping: Areas for Additional DOD Assistance,” Defense and Technology Paper 42 (Washington, DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, September 2007).

⁸ Number as of June 2008. Up-to-date totals are available at <www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/>.

⁹ Information summarized from Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights Web site at <www.ohchr.org/EN/Pages/WelcmePage.aspx>.

¹⁰ United Nations Development Program (UNDP), *UNDP Annual Report 2008* (Washington, DC: UNDP, 2008), available at <www.undp.org/publications/annualreport2008/>.

¹¹ See <www.wfp.org/english/> for more information.

¹² See <www.who.int/en/> for more information.

¹³ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO Handbook 2006* (Brussels: NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2006), 301–302.

¹⁴ See NATO, *NATO Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) Doctrine*, Allied Joint Publication 9 (Brussels: NATO, June 2003), available at <www.nato.int/ims/docu/ajp-9.pdf>.

¹⁵ See EU Commission Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit, *Civilian Instruments for EU Crisis Management*, April 2003.

¹⁶ Halmut Anheier et al., *Global Civil Society 2001* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

¹⁷ Two prominent NGO alliances are InterAction and the International Council for Volunteer Agencies.

¹⁸ See Peter Willetts, “What is a Non Governmental Organization?” City University, London, available at <www.staff.city.ac.uk/p.willetts/CS-NTWKS/NGO-ART.HTM>.

¹⁹ In May 2006, following a request from the government of East Timor, approximately 2,100 military and police, plus ships and aircraft from Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Portugal deployed to quell unrest there. Malaysia is an ASEAN member while Australia and New Zealand are included in the wider “ASEAN plus six” group called the East Asia Summit.

²⁰ GCC members are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Yemen is presently negotiating membership. Iran and Iraq are excluded.

²¹ “OAS Peace-Building Experiences: Progress Achieved, Lessons Learned, and Future Possibilities,” available at <www.un.org/rights/micivih/rapports/peace-bu.htm>.

²² The call for cooperation came at a meeting at OAS headquarters between the organization’s respective Secretaries General: José Miquel Insulza (OAS) and Marc Perrin de Brichambaut (OSCE). “Secretario General de la OEA recibe a Marc Perrin de Brichambaut de la OSCE,” *Espacinsular*, November 13, 2007, available in Spanish at <www.espacinsular.org/spip.php?article4505>.

²³ See COE Web site at <www.coe.int/>. COE Chairman of Ministers Carl Bildt was also sent to Georgia to confer with the parties.

Linking U.S. Capacity to Local Actors

Linton Wells II, Larry Wentz, and Walker Hardy

In complex operations, the United States *cannot* achieve the social, political, and economic goals for which its military forces have been committed unless it can engage effectively with the populations it is trying to influence,¹ including local governments, businesses, and members of civil society,² in complex relationships that usually include concurrent mixes of collaboration, competition, and conflict.³ Earlier chapters have focused on engaging with interagency, allied, and coalition partners, and international players, and have stressed the importance of tactical execution. This chapter addresses local actors and effective interactions with them.

Coalition-building and Information-sharing

U.S. military doctrine recognizes the importance of building broad coalitions of stakeholders in complex contingencies.⁴ Implementing the doctrine, however, poses a two-fold challenge: how to empower civilian participants to operate more effectively in complex contingencies that include the military,⁵ and how to enable the military to interact more effectively with civilians.

In practice, the focus of military commanders and support personnel will be more on the needs of the joint or coalition force than on the civilian players in the operation. However, if there is to be an effective coalition, there must be external links to mission participants beyond the boundary of the military, and these links require that unclassified information be shared in both directions. Unclassified information-sharing is harder than it might seem, and all branches of the U.S. Government need to pay more attention to doing it well in stressed environments.

As always, the devil is in the details. Even with the best of intentions among senior decisionmakers, information still must be shared (and

protected as necessary) *on the ground* with a wide range of participants if complex operations are to succeed. Years of experience in stabilization operations, domestic and foreign disaster relief, and capacity-building of partner nations suggest that such sharing will not *really* happen without sustained, high-level attention. Senior decisionmakers need to pay attention to information-sharing and information and communications technology (ICT), including the role of ICT as an engine of stability and economic growth. These questions will be addressed in more detail later, as they cannot be left to technology and security specialists alone.

Engagement with Local Actors

Background

Earlier chapters described how U.S. policy and national security organizations have changed considerably since 2004 in ways that promote engagement with local actors.⁶ Collectively, these changes reflect significant modifications of policy and doctrine for the U.S. military, increasing emphasis on preconflict peacekeeping, capacity-building, and postwar stabilization and reconstruction, as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. The implications still are evolving. The new guidance recognizes that solutions to the problems that generate complex operations cannot be produced by military means alone. An important corollary is that high-level policy and doctrine changes must be converted into the detailed instructions that govern the way people act on the ground. In the U.S. military, this means that tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) need to prepare troops for interactions with unfamiliar participants. Until this guidance is in place, there will be time delays and disconnects in the field while military personnel refer issues to higher authorities. Ideally, the guidance also will be reflected in changes to operating instructions used by local actors when they operate with U.S. and other external players.

To promote more effective engagement, the Center for Technology and National Security Policy (CTNSP) at National Defense University has been coordinating a broad, international research effort called Sustainable Technologies, Accelerated Research—Transportable Infrastructures for Development and Emergency Support (STAR-TIDES),⁷ which focuses on affordable, sustainable support to stressed populations—postwar, postdisaster, or impoverished. STAR-TIDES emphasizes unity of effort⁸ when there is no unity of control. In particular, it looks to:

- enhance the ability of civilian coalitions (business, government, civil society) to operate in stressed environments


- extend the military's ability to work with civilians in these environments
- economize to save everyone money through low-cost logistic solutions and supply chain rationalization.

STAR-TIDES research applies to the issues not only of this chapter, but also of much of the book.

Local Actors

Figure 14–1 summarizes most of the players engaged in complex contingencies. The local actors, who are the focus of this chapter, include representatives of the affected nation—the center of the figure, as of the effort—typically including multiple stakeholders from business, government, and civil society. Examples are host government officials, local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), indigenous security services, local businesses, national subsets of international businesses, academia, and private citizens.⁹

Figure 14–1. Civil-Military Players in Complex Operations



Source: Martin Lidy, Institute for Defense Analyses.

As with the international players, most of the local participants will have distinct organizational cultures—often unwritten sets of rules, regulations, viewpoints, perspectives, and operating procedures—that are based on the unique history, mission, structure, and leadership of the organization. The actors bring with them different agendas, operating principles, experience, capabilities, sensitivities, expectations, accountability mechanisms, and lines of authority.¹⁰ Although the civilian organizations may not have as structured a sequence as policy-to-doctrine-to-TTP, they usually have their own procedures for field operations.¹¹

It is important to remember that all these entities—local government, local business, NGOs (domestic or international), and private citizens—are subject to the laws of the nation in which they are operating. Private entities may support government entities through contracts or grants, but typically have no formal authority and tend to act independently. NGOs are, however, responsible to their boards of directors and accountable to their private contributors. Although they may take money from one or more government sources, NGOs are not instruments of their governments, and do not usually take policy direction from institutional donors.

Both civil and military participants in these environments need to try to understand these differences in guidance, emphasis, and accountability and work through them. This is best done in advance of a crisis through established, structured consultation and social networking.

It is an old adage that “local knowledge is key.” To get that knowledge, governments usually need to reach beyond typical intelligence and military-to-military sources of information. The business community has extensive information about employment, investment, and economic growth in much of the world and maintains both significant resources that could be useful in foreign humanitarian relief and development operations and the skill sets to manage them. Local companies can provide local knowledge and technical expertise and, especially if they are elements of larger international firms, may be able to donate products or contribute financially to humanitarian response organizations.

Governments and public security elements of affected nations must be engaged actively as well. Those who are intervening need to work with local actors to build capacity in ways that improve quality of life, including:

- mentoring to enable national, provincial, district, and local governance
- enhancing security (police and security forces)

- reconstructing and developing infrastructure (roads, power, water, and telecommunications systems)
- promoting economic recovery and job creation
- acting for social well-being (health care, education).


How Can Engagement Be Done Most Effectively?

Experiences from the Balkans to Iraq to the 2004 Asian tsunami to Hurricane Katrina suggest that integrated approaches along six coordinated paths can increase the likelihood that engagement will be successful. Specifically, protagonists (government or nongovernment) need to:

- Build capabilities and find ways to deliver them that are useful in specific scenarios. These deliveries need to be to those who will have to operate, sustain, and live with the capabilities, not just to warehouses and depots.
- Weave social networks to build the trust that can facilitate effective responses in these contingencies and engage the appropriate range of stakeholders needed to get the job done.
- Promulgate policy, doctrine, and operating procedures to let people on the ground execute nontraditional missions without having to ask higher authorities for permission.
- Address legal and regulatory restrictions (for example, export control regimes, customs clearance procedures, and constraints on transferring Department of Defense [DOD] equipment to others when the military withdraws).
- Provide resources for rapid responses, phasing to long-term capability sustainment.
- Develop a robust program of exercises and training involving the whole range of the coalition so people will know what to do when the time for engagement comes. Proposed solutions should be tested as often as opportunities allow, lessons learned should be incorporated, and innovative approaches should be examined through experiments. Also, educational curricula must be adjusted over time.

These activities are shown in figure 14–2. This chart is not intended to describe a “turn the crank” model to produce effective results, but rather to indicate how much up-front effort needs to go into planning and capability development for complex operations.

Figure 14–2. Steps to Promote Engagement with Local Actors



Source: STAR-TIDES, available at <www.star-tides.net>.

Each of the paths above has its own unique challenges and opportunities; collectively, they can help achieve unity of effort among diverse organizations when unity of control is unachievable.

Build and Deliver Capabilities

Capabilities can be grouped into information-sharing and sensemaking; information and communications technologies; and other kinds of low-cost logistics, such as shelter, water, power, and ICT. The effectiveness of the solutions will vary by scenario, and it is important to match solutions to field conditions. Equally important is how to deliver the capabilities so that they are useful to end-users (not just suppliers) and how to reduce costs by making best use of supply chain options.

Information-sharing and Sensemaking

For more than a decade, the U.S. military has been developing network-enabled capabilities (NEC) that support network-centric operations and warfare. The basic premise of NEC is to empower people at all echelons by sharing information, which allows participants to develop shared situational awareness. This awareness, together with participants’ understanding of command intent, allows them to self-synchronize their actions to accomplish missions faster and at lower cost.¹² The North Atlantic Treaty Organization also is emphasizing NEC, while innovative militaries such as those of Singapore and Sweden are focusing on knowledge-based activities¹³ and network-based defense.¹⁴

Network-enabled capabilities can extend beyond the military sphere to facilitate interactions with civilian agencies. For example, in the area of

maritime domain awareness, the Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Coast Guard, and U.S. Navy routinely share information about situations off the Nation's coasts. Moreover, maritime security issues are becoming globalized in ways that could set examples for civil-military engagements with local actors.¹⁵

U.S. adoption of NEC should facilitate information-sharing and collaboration at all echelons, from international headquarters to people on the ground.¹⁶ There is no reason why these capabilities could not be used to share unclassified information if the right policies are in place.

As noted earlier, the ability to share unclassified information¹⁷ and to plan and execute complex operations effectively must be improved across the U.S. Government. This is not just an issue for the military or the Intelligence Community. To increase civilian capabilities in such roles, all U.S. Government entities need to develop a "bias to share" toward managing their own information, and be able to implement such sharing in ways that are useful to other participants.

Progress is being made. America's new Information Sharing Environment reduces restrictions on the sharing of sensitive but unclassified information in the areas of homeland security, counterterrorism, and law enforcement. It cuts over 100 caveats such as *For Official Use Only* and *Limited Distribution* to three categories of *Controlled Unclassified Information*.¹⁸ Although implementing details still are being worked out, this new categorization should facilitate information-sharing in a network-enabled environment.

Social, structural, cultural, and policy issues are even more important than technical questions in achieving interoperability. Will civilian partners be able, or willing, to inter-operate with U.S. concepts and technologies? Which NGOs are restricted from engaging with the military, either by their charters, or by fear of putting their people at risk? Will the U.S. military and government agencies be more willing to inter-operate and share with non-U.S. participants? Formal information-sharing agreements may be able to help in many cases. Some of these issues are addressed below under trust-building.

Unity of command is a basic tenet of military organizations, but it is a source of friction in complex environments. Military command and control does not extend to other U.S. Government agencies, much less to the myriad nongovernmental, international, and intergovernmental organizations and local participants¹⁹ that will be present in a complex operation. Yet some kind of unity of effort is essential.²⁰

Three operational elements will be needed in any contingency: someone must *focus* on the problem, the organization must be *agile* enough to meet the demands placed on it, and there must be mechanisms to *converge* the resources to get the job done. This sometimes is referred to as FACT (focus, agility, convergence transformation).²¹ Research in these areas is just beginning and needs to be encouraged, and must incorporate non-DOD partners.

“Sensemaking” is a key component of success in a network-enabled environment. It essentially involves awareness of the key elements (who, what, when, and where), an understanding of their meaning within the applicable context, and decisionmaking to reach a desired outcome.²² Personal and cultural differences are very important here, in that different individuals can derive different interpretations from the same data. Sensemaking also is an important area of research in nonmilitary decisionmaking and the cognitive sciences.

Collaborative mechanisms can help people work together better in networked situations, especially if they are dispersed. Part of the collaborative capability is technical (for example, which software tool set to use). But part also is social and cultural. Studies exist that describe the complex and subtle ways of building collaborative solutions among stakeholders in business, government, and civil society.²³ Implementing these solutions in a crisis situation involves important skill sets that need to be incorporated into leadership education.

Information and Communications Technologies

Telecommunications networks and collaboration tools provide the underpinnings for the information-sharing and sensemaking described above. Yet these powerful tools often are underappreciated. Whether by Internet, radio, phone, flashing light, or messenger, all actors in stressed environments need some form of communication to coordinate responses. The military will bring the communications and command and control capabilities it needs for its own purposes. These capabilities used to be much better than those of civilian participants. But there have been important changes in recent years. The explosion of commercial ICT now gives even small NGOs or commercial firms a way to have an effective communications presence, which opens the opportunity for government entities to benefit enormously from information held by other players—if government is wise enough to encourage two-way information flows and offer useful information.

Nearly all international participants use the Internet and commercial ICT where and when possible to support crisis response communications and information-sharing. Capabilities run the gamut from commercial satellite communications for access from remote areas to point-to-point microwave links, fiber optics cables, wireless clouds, and Internet cafes, when available. As a result, the Internet has become the default network for civil-military collaboration and information-sharing, at least from a deploying participant point of view. However, these expectations may collide with actual communications conditions for local actors on the ground. Some parties (many first responders, for example) prefer voice radios rather than computers. Some players, often local actors, may have no effective modern technology at all.

As a result, initial coordination is likely to be disjointed. The following comment by an observer of ICT support to Burma relief is instructive:²⁴

As we began our research, an integrated picture of players, information-sharing arrangements, and ICT deployments did not exist. Research from afar suggested the ICT deployments and information-sharing initiatives were independent and to some extent ad hoc and there did not appear to be an ICT advocate per se, nor did there seem to be a shared and agreed civil-military information and ICT strategy and plan for supporting relief activities in Myanmar. Furthermore, there did not appear to be any pre-agreed effort among the civil-military responders to collectively employ information and ICT as the core means to achieve “unity of effort” across the civil-military boundaries. There were also perceptions of sensitivities of NGOs dealing with the U.S. military that could be harmful to their working—perceptions of lack of independence and transparency by the Myanmar government.

Sustained, structured interactions can help. For example, a multinational exercise in Central America and the Caribbean called FAHUM (*Fuerzas Aliadas Humanitarias*, or Allied Humanitarian Forces) was in progress when Cyclone Nargis struck the Irrawaddy Delta.²⁵ During the exercise, significant coordination and advanced planning were evidenced in the Western Hemisphere regions, in stark contrast with the obstructionism of the government of Burma. Customs clearance procedures, transnational resource sharing, and even theater-wide incident management software had been worked out through prior consultation. This reconfirms that

regional coordination centers and the ICT backbones for stressed environments can be put in place and kept ready with advanced planning and follow-through.

Even if political agreements are in place, many technical issues need to be solved before communications will be reliable. Is power available? Are there civilian systems to rely on? Does the terrain allow for connectivity? Are people trained to use the equipment in place? Is there bridging equipment to link incoming communications equipment with indigenous gear?

To achieve an effective combination of sensemaking and information transport, several precursor steps are essential:

- Policymakers need to acknowledge that unclassified information-sharing is important. Traditionally, they have not.
- Rapidly deployable, integrated, easy-to-use equipment kits and situational awareness software need to be identified and made available quickly to those in the field. These can come from any source.
- Whatever solutions are picked need to be able to bridge the borders between whichever disparate organizations are involved in a particular operation. The origin is less important than the interoperability. In some cases, military units may have NGO modules within their deployable systems. In other cases, it may be better for all parties to fall in on recognized civilian systems, such as the UN's ReliefWeb, Humanitarian Information Centers, and the Emergency Telecommunications Cluster.²⁶
- Pre-established social network and trust-building can greatly facilitate responses. These are addressed below.

Low-cost Logistic Capabilities Matched to Scenarios

Logisticians note that when DOD units support operations such as building partnership capacity; stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR); or humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, they typically have to use deployable systems of record that are expensive, committed to operational plans, and on custody cards. As part of whole-of-government, civilian-empowering approaches, ways should be examined to provide alternative solution sets—that is, not necessarily through military or even government channels.

The STAR-TIDES research effort mentioned earlier considers contingencies that are domestic and international; short-term (disaster relief) and long-term (SSTR, refugees, economic development); and with or with-

out military involvement. One of its purposes is to empower civilian planners and service providers to improve the quality of service and reduce the burden on the military, where appropriate.

In addition to developing social networks, building trust, sharing information, and promoting sensemaking, STAR-TIDES has been focusing on seven kinds of transportable infrastructures (as opposed to deployable military equipment or the fixed infrastructures of the developed world). These are shelter, water, power, integrated combustion and solar cooking, cooling/lighting/heating, sanitation, and ICT. As an example, it has identified some 75 different types of shelters that generally are less expensive than military tents.²⁷

A key element in effective engagement with local actors is to tailor solutions to problems of interest to stakeholders, whether abroad or at home. By analyzing the range of candidate infrastructures, stakeholders can be offered potential solution sets (mixes of options for shelter, water, power, and so forth) suited to their needs. One of the key lessons so far is that very few solutions are suitable for all contingencies. For example, many of the infrastructures that could help build partner capability in sub-Saharan Africa are different from those needed by Andean ridge nations or Pacific archipelagos. Similarly, solutions to support the survivors of a U.S. earthquake in winter would be different from those needed after a Central American hurricane or for reconstruction in Afghanistan.

Delivery Mechanisms

Once solution sets are matched to scenarios, the next step is to build a broad stakeholder coalition to refine the proposed solutions and decide how best to deliver the capabilities. Building the coalition is outlined in the next section, but there are four broad options for providing the capabilities:

- Some might be stockpiled by the U.S. Government (USAID, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, DOD, and others).
- Some might be provided through non-U.S. Government channels (such as foreign governments, NGOs, and the United Nations).
- Others could best be provided by commercial supply chains, both indigenous and international.
- In some cases, the best approach might be to empower citizens to become more resilient themselves and reduce their need for outside assistance.

Turning these different delivery options into effective plans offers high payoff. It can improve the quality of support across a wide range of contingencies through integrated capabilities, reduced costs, and empowered local individuals.

Trust-building and Social Network Development

The key to trust- and relationship-building among the participating individuals and organizations lies in developing a more informed understanding of the roles, relationships, organizational and population cultures, capabilities, and motivations, as well as the information culture and information-sharing needs of the participants and affected nation. It is also vital to manage expectations and to ensure that actions support expectations.

Understanding the human interoperability dimension is essential. As one observer has noted: "Interoperability is a human behavior issue as much as a technology innovation and integration issue."²⁸ Thus, refinement of the infrastructure solution sets above must be paralleled by the development of social networks and related approaches to facilitate trust-building. Ideally, this will at least have been started before the actual contingencies arise.

In spite of the emergence of commercial ICT capabilities that enable collaboration and information-sharing and civil-military operations, experiences from the large number of complex operations conducted over the past decade suggest serious problems remain with civil-military collaboration and information-sharing.²⁹ Lessons include:

- the need for a common culture of trust in information networks and communications between civilian governments, military organizations, and other participants
- the need for communications to flow in all directions, almost all the time
- the need for flexible (but not completely ad hoc) information structures.

Many times there is a lack of shared understanding of participants' roles, responsibilities, and capabilities, and a lack of shared situation awareness.³⁰

There is ample evidence from real-world experiences (for example, the 2004 Asian tsunami and 2005 Hurricane Katrina relief operations; Iraq and Afghanistan SSTR; and development efforts around the world) that social networks can jump-start effective responses. Lessons observed need

to be studied and turned into lessons learned, for they are not always obvious, and mistakes are all too often repeated.³¹

Conventional wisdom holds that social networks cannot be developed quickly. The Maritime Strategy, referenced earlier, asserts that “trust and co-operation cannot be surged,”³² and U.S. Army Field Manual 3–0, *Operations*, makes similar points.³³ A famous dictum says that it takes three cups of tea to build trust: First cup a stranger, second cup a friend, third cup family.³⁴

But innovative sociocognitive research may be able to help. Clearly, the moment of crisis is not the ideal time to begin building social contacts. But some of the recent work in human interoperability suggests that trust-building can be accelerated.³⁵ Al Santoli, of the Asia-America Initiative, notes the importance of having a model for developing “rapid trust,” based on years of experience in the Muslim areas of the southern Philippines. Multi-stakeholder engagement models offer insights into ways to increase the likelihood of success in complex contingencies.

It is also important to keep in mind that different people may be suited to different social networks in different situations. The scuba-diving, Bahasa-speaking Indonesian neuroscientist who would be indispensable in Banda Aceh may not be nearly so useful in an Andean earthquake. This only reinforces the need for training and education across the range of civil and military providers and the importance of developing as broad an array of social networks as possible. Selected engagement also can help. For example, many of the larger NGOs have a security coordination unit, and the security professionals in these positions often have military experience. If the military can provide them useful information that can help keep their people safe, some of the barriers between the overall organizations could be reduced over time.

Finally, engagement plans need to be clear, uncomplicated, and consistent with the objectives and priorities of the affected nation. Properly written, they can enable sector reconstruction and development and ensure self-sustaining capacity to help reduce corruption and enhance transparency in governance, and thus offer opportunities to positively influence attitudes of the leadership at all levels and the population in general.

In sum, information-sharing, trust-building, and collaboration activities can have decisive impacts in complex operations, but they need to be treated as a core part of the overall strategy and not just as desirable but not imperative adjuncts to more traditional phases of operations.

Policy, Doctrine, and Operating Procedures

The most effective ideas will not make any difference unless they are conveyed in ways that people at all levels can use. For the military in the

field, this means getting down to the TTP that provides unambiguous guidance to troops on the ground about information-sharing, leave-behind capabilities, and so forth. There now is excellent policy and doctrine related to complex operations. However, despite the best of intentions in high-level policy documents, evidence shows that whatever is promulgated will be interpreted differently at different levels, usually resulting in perpetuation of the status quo.

This is not just a military issue. Wal-Mart used a very simple policy to great effect during Hurricane Katrina. The stores told employees they did not need to check with their chain of command before releasing inventory but rather just do what had to be done to help people through the disaster. The guidance was clear, and Wal-Mart employees acted on it and found ways to get water, medicine, and other key items to the victims.³⁶

Local actors will have similar issues. It remains essential to spend the time to understand each other's way of doing things and then document procedures that actually work under real-world conditions. This reinforces the importance of engaging before a crisis develops.

Address Legal Restrictions

Transferring equipment across civil-military boundaries raises complicated legal issues. For example, it took 2 years of negotiations in 2005–2007 between the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Capitol Hill before Congress would allow combatant commanders to provide host nations with a basic ICT capacity (such as wiring hospitals for Internet access) during humanitarian intervention and leave it behind.³⁷

Additional progress is being made on allowing increased sharing of DOD radio frequency bandwidth with civil-military mission partners³⁸ and sharing unclassified imagery with participants in disaster relief operations.³⁹ But the ICT experience above is indicative of the problems that must be overcome when transferring military equipment to civilian control. This only reinforces the importance of empowering civilian components to improve their own resilience and the value of using commercial supply chains. These options should be pursued aggressively.

The Tampere Convention provides the legal framework for the deployment and use of telecommunications in international humanitarian assistance. For nations that have ratified the Tampere Convention, regulatory barriers are waived for telecommunications to be used in disasters.⁴⁰ Not all nations have ratified this convention.

Relief operations can be hampered by legal restrictions on the use of U.S.-manufactured ICT equipment. This occurred during the Cyclone

Nargis relief effort in Burma, where, due to an executive order, U.S. ICT equipment could not be loaned to relief workers. An attempt was made to obtain export control numbers and approval from State, Treasury, and Commerce for release of equipment, but there were no procedures in place to expedite the release of such equipment in support of a humanitarian crisis.

Resource Requirements

Both the solution sets and the resource requirements vary extensively. The average stay in a refugee camp is over 7 years, and the approaches for the longer term need to be very different from those of the first 60 days after a disaster.

This chapter has outlined ways to work with stakeholders to parse the delivery sources for providing the capabilities needed in complex contingencies. Such decisions are not likely to be taken quickly or without contention. But the multi-stakeholder approach offers ways to increase civilian capabilities and reduce military costs. Done properly, it should be a win-win situation.

Whatever decisions are made about long-term solutions, some funding needs to be available on short notice (hours to days) to provide rapid-response capabilities (typically related to communications, lift, and power) in emergency situations.

Exercise, Train, and Educate

Even the best plans and analyses will not be effective when needed if they are not exercised. The July 2008 Golden Phoenix first responder exercise in San Diego, which involved over 140 entities, made clear that business and civil society members (NGOs, citizens' groups, etc.) also need to be brought into the planning process early and be part of the exercise regime for any complex contingency, both to build trust and to refine procedures. Such training also should include nontraditional infrastructures and information-sharing approaches as identified through projects such as STAR-TIDES, recognizing that there are intersections between technology, culture, and leadership that often are not exercised well. Whenever possible, field events should experiment with new concepts and equipment, and testing should be done and documented at every opportunity. Lessons learned also need to be incorporated and acted on, lest they be relegated to a recurring set of lessons observed, but never learned.

Experimentation should be an integral part of these activities. A growing body of experience points to the value of *shadow operations*—activities not on the critical path of the training that can be used to try new ideas. For

example, during emergency response training involving San Diego first responders and the U.S. military, Project K.I.D. tested procedures to safeguard and identify children after disasters. This shadow operation took advantage of the proximity of the military and the first responders but did not affect the outcome of their training events.

Government research and development should be combined with active monitoring of available commercial research to highlight potential upgrades. At the same time, independent testing and experimentation should be pursued to provide unbiased evaluations of the real capabilities of proposed solutions. This would be an ideal role for a civilian Underwriters Laboratory–type of institution.

The demands of complex contingencies also need to be addressed in the education process at both civilian and military institutions. Changing curricula in such environments is harder than often realized and needs dedicated attention.

Local actors are important, and their cooperation cannot be assumed. Prospects for success are improved by sustained and systematic consultation and planning, ideally before a crisis erupts. Additionally, information-sharing and ICT can significantly increase the likelihood of success in U.S. Government activities such as building partnership capacity and conducting complex operations—if they are engaged as part of an overall strategy that coordinates the actions of the whole of U.S. Government (interagency) and, as appropriate, NGOs, international organizations, international governmental organizations, international business, and other civil-military stakeholders. The focus also needs to be on generating effective results for the host or affected nation—to enable the host or affected nations to be successful. Properly utilized, ICT can help create effective initiatives and knowledgeable interventions, organize complex activities, and integrate complex operations with the host or affected nation, making the latter more effective.

Conclusion and Findings

Engage local actors seriously.

Include local actors in the broad coalitions of business, government, and civil society needed to build civilian capabilities for complex operations. Recognize their special needs, and do not focus mainly on the international members of the operation. Engage local actors in planning early, ideally before the crisis. Develop social networks and build trust ahead of time through persistent, patient engagement.

Emphasize unclassified information-sharing.

Acknowledge that unclassified information-sharing is important and make it a priority. Recognize that situational awareness and the communications networks to share it are not the technical adjuncts to major deliverables such as food, shelter, water, and security; they are the critical enablers of everything else that happens. Moreover, they need to work effectively across organizational boundaries.

Tailor capabilities and delivery mechanisms to local needs.

Plan ahead to provide capabilities that are focused on local needs, insofar as possible. Rapidly deployable, integrated, easy-to-use equipment kits and situational awareness software need to be made available quickly to those in the field. Their origin is less important than the fact that they are useful to and sustainable by those who will have to live with them. Significant amounts of money can be saved in the planning process by focusing on delivery sources. In some cases, U.S. Government sources may be most effective. At other times, non-U.S. Government sources may be best. The commercial supply chain should be mobilized, indigenously wherever possible, internationally when needed. Finally, processes should be developed to empower individuals, both to deal with emergencies and to participate in improving their own situations. Whatever component solutions are picked need to be integrated to provide effective responses.

Provide effective operating procedures.

Policy, doctrine, and legal issues must be translated into realistic operating procedures (TTP for the military) that facilitate field operations. Recognize that high-level plans almost never will be interpreted the way senior leaders expect in the absence of clear tactical guidance.

Allocate adequate resources, of the right sort.

On the one hand is a mix of short-term response packages, such as sensors, power grid-independent communications, and the lift to deploy them quickly. On the other hand, long-term, sustaining capabilities also may be needed. Long-term problems require both different solutions and different resource approaches, and transition plans must be available should short-term needs extend into long-term commitments.

Exercise and train with partners from broad coalitions.

Develop a structured program for as many potential scenarios as possible to facilitate trust-building, social network development, and planning. Include broad representation from business, government, and civil

society in the exercises. Golden Phoenix and FAHUM are good examples. Incorporate lessons into education programs as soon as possible.

Notes

¹ These entities form a subset of what the U.S. military often refers to as civil-military mission partners or *stakeholders*. The April 2008 Guidance for Development of the Force defines *mission partners* as “those entities not under the commanders’ direct authority that are participating in the mission.” Examples include, but are not limited to, other U.S. Government agencies; international organizations; nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); state, local, territorial, and tribal governments; indigenous security services; and others (including commercial firms and individuals as appropriate) who are directly contributing to the ongoing mission. Despite this definition in U.S. doctrine, many NGOs object to being considered “partners” with the military.

² See, for example, Mark Gerencser, Reginald van Lee, Fernando Napolitano, and Christopher Kelly, *Megacommunities* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008).

³ See “Converging, Combining, Emerging,” Executive Summary of Highlands Forum XXXII, May 29–31, 2007, available at <<https://www.hforum.com/conferences>>.

⁴ Joint Publication 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2007), chapter 7.

⁵ Department of Defense, *National Defense Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, June 2008), 17.

⁶ The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization in the State Department (S/CRS) was created in August 2004. National Security Presidential Directive 44, “Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization,” was issued on December 7, 2005. DOD Directive 3000.05, “Support to Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations,” was published on November 28, 2005. These concepts were reflected in the Army’s field manual on operations in February 2008, and on stability operations in October 2008, moving the ideas down from the broad policy arena into military doctrine. The new maritime strategy, issued in October 2007 by leaders of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, announced another important change in focus: “We believe that preventing wars is as important as winning wars.” In June 2008, the National Defense Strategy continued the shift by stating: “Greater civilian participation is necessary both to make military operations successful and to relieve stress on the men and women of the armed forces.”

⁷ Information is available at <www.star-tides.net>.

⁸ Joint Publication 1–02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, defines *unity of effort* as coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization—the product of successful unified action. Joint Publication 1–02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, April 12, 2001, as amended through October 17, 2008).

⁹ For more extensive treatments, see Larry Wentz, “An ICT Primer: Information and Communication Technologies for Civil-Military Coordination in Disaster Relief and Stabilization and Reconstruction,” Defense and Technology Paper 31 (Washington, DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, July 2006); Larry Wentz, Franklin Kramer, and Stuart Starr, “Information and Communication Technologies for Reconstruction and Development: Afghanistan Challenges and Opportunities,” Defense and Technology Paper 45 (Washington, DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, January 2008); and Robert M. Perito, ed., *Guide for Participants in Peace, Stability, and Relief Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, June 2007).

¹⁰ These points also are made in U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3–0, op. cit., chapter 1–54. With regard to civil agencies, FM 3–0 recognizes the different cultures and then notes that “personal contact and trust building are essential. . . . Civilian organizations bring resources and capabilities that can help

establish host-nation civil authority and capabilities. U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, June 2001).

¹¹ For example, USAID's Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy, July 2008, available at <www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/civilianmilitarycooperation.pdf>, and the UN Principles and Guidelines for Peacekeeping Operations, January 2008, available at <http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf>.

¹² For example, David S. Alberts, John J. Garstka, and Frederick P. Stein, *Network Centric Warfare* (Washington, DC: Command and Control Research Program, 1999).

¹³ See, for example, Singapore's Integrated Knowledge-Based Command and Control experiment, available at <www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/mindef_websites/atozlistings/scme/infocenter/papers/integrated_knowledge-based.html>.

¹⁴ See <www.ercim.org/publication/Ercim_News/enw66/rissanen.html>.

¹⁵ See, among others, the Sixth Globalization and Maritime Security Conference, Washington, DC, July 2008; the ASEAN Regional Forum meeting (July 2008), available at <www.41amm.sg/amm/index.php/web/info_for_delegates/statements/chairman_s_statement_15th_asean_regional_forum_24_july_2008_singapore>; and the Global Maritime Situational/Domain Awareness Conference, Vina del Mar, Chile, December 3-5, 2008.

¹⁶ Many foreign forces, including close allies, have expressed concern that the U.S. military is developing network-enabled capabilities so fast that they will not be able to keep up or to interoperate effectively. The possibility of mismatched capabilities is always a concern, but data sharing, metadata tagging strategies, and Web 2.0 approaches can mitigate many concerns by emphasizing collaboration and helping to bypass the thorny issues of who "owns" the data.

¹⁷ The military and intelligence communities are excellent at sharing classified and unclassified information within the .mil and .gov domains, and to some extent with coalition government partners, but there has been much less emphasis on sharing across the boundaries of the joint force with civil sector entities. To be useful, such information almost always must be not only unclassified, but also without caveats (that is, without restrictions like the former *For Official Use Only* markings).

¹⁸ The *Controlled Unclassified Information* framework was promulgated by the White House on May 9, 2008; available at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/05/20080509-6.html>. The Executive Agent for the program is the National Archives and Records Administration.

¹⁹ Nongovernmental organizations such as Save the Children, international organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, and international governmental organizations such as the United Nations and World Bank.

²⁰ LTG Claude V. Christianson, USA, "Synchronizing Global Defense Logistics: Unity of Effort," briefing at National Defense Industrial Association Logistics Conference, Miami, FL, March 2008.

²¹ An important paper is David S. Alberts, "Agility, Focus, and Convergence: The Future of Command and Control," *C2 Journal* 1, no. 1, available at <www.dodccrp.org/html4/journal_v1n1.html>.

²² See, for example, John J. Garstka and David S. Alberts, *Network Centric Operations Conceptual Framework Version 2.0* (Washington, DC: U.S. Office of Force Transformation and Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration, 2004).

²³ Gerencser et al.

²⁴ Larry Wentz, NDU Center for Technology and National Security Policy, trip report for visits to JTF Caring Response, International Telecommunication Union, United Nations World Food Programme, United Nations Children's Fund, United Nations Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance, U.S. Pacific Command J-6, and Asia-Pacific Center for Strategic Studies, June 24, 2008.

²⁵ FAHUM is a multinational exercise sponsored by U.S. Southern Command that concentrates on improving how civilian, government, and military agencies from the United States, the Caribbean, and Central America respond to natural disasters in the region.

²⁶ The Emergency Telecom Cluster is responsible for providing stopgap information and communications technology in disaster areas until other United Nations elements can set up operations and nongovernmental organizations and others can engage, including the affected nation. The cluster is

composed of the Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance (coordinator), the World Food Programme (WFP; provider of voice services), and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF; provider of data services). Either WFP or UNICEF can be the lead for a disaster. It is situation-dependent.

²⁷ STAR-TIDES does not claim to address all problems in these contingencies. For example, due to funding and staff expertise, it is not looking at security or medical support.

²⁸ Dr. Stefania VanHoozer-Brown, director of the Human Interoperability project.

²⁹ This has been repeatedly emphasized by lessons from the Strong Angel series of demonstrations since 2000. See <www.strongangel3.org>.

³⁰ For some thoughts on bridging these gaps, see Linton Wells II and Charles Hauss, "Odd Couples: The DoD and the NGOs," in *Inside Defense, Understanding the U.S. Military in the 21st Century*, ed. Derek S. Reveron and Judith Hicks Stiehm (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).

³¹ See the 10–20–30 document and other references from Strong Angel III at <www.strongangel3.org>.

³² *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*, October 2007, available at <www.navy.mil/maritime/MaritimeStrategy.pdf>.

³³ FM 3–0.

³⁴ Greg Mortenson, *Three Cups of Tea: One Man's Mission to Promote Peace . . . One School at a Time* (New York: Penguin, 2007).

³⁵ For example, a symposium was held in late September 2008 on "Human Interoperability and Building Partnerships: Rapid Rapport in Hastily Formed Human Networks."

³⁶ The decentralized procedures used by Wal-Mart and the Coast Guard during Hurricane Katrina can provide valuable insights into effective disaster responses.

³⁷ Prior to November 2006, Defense Department Directive 2205.2, "Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Provided in Conjunction with Military Operations," was interpreted to preclude the provision of information and communications technology capacity during stability, security, transition, and reconstruction or humanitarian assistance and disaster recovery operations. The intent was to keep DOD from using its funds for what should have been foreign aid purposes. After 2 years of negotiations between the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Hill, Congress provided language in the conference report of the 2007 Defense Authorization Bill that clarified the issue as follows: "Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities, under section 401(e)(4) of title 10, United States Code, includes information and communications technology as necessary to provide basic information and communications services."

³⁸ This is being incorporated into a forthcoming DOD Instruction.

³⁹ Commercial satellite imagery firms provide geospatial information data and products to the U.S. Government, but the contracts often require that the imagery be handled as *For Official Use Only* or some comparably restrictive caveat. This effectively makes the imagery unusable by most civil-military mission partners, such as nongovernmental organizations. Recently, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency has worked with the commercial firms to encourage the release of geospatial products without caveats to those working on disaster relief.

⁴⁰ See International Telecommunication Union Web site, available at <www.itu.int/itu-d/emergencytelecommunications/tempre>.

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CIVILIAN SURGE

KEY TO COMPLEX OPERATIONS

The United States today lacks adequate civilian capacity to conduct complex operations—those that require close civil-military planning and cooperation in the field, such as stabilization and reconstruction, humanitarian and disaster relief, and irregular warfare and counterinsurgency. Partial solutions to building such capacity have been offered in studies, directives, and statutes, but there has been no comprehensive review of all elements of this national need. This book is intended to fill that gap. Its main conclusion is that current efforts to build a civilian response capacity for complex operations are unfinished and that the administration of President Barack Obama needs to dedicate additional attention and resources to complete the task.

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